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THE JANA SANGH

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To My Parents

Preface

Although I am a Foreign Service Officer, the views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Department of State or the Foreign Service. Any errors or misdirected opinions are solely the responsibility of the author. The Foreign Service is responsible only for its assignment of me to the subcontinent in January, 1958. I have remained in or concerned with the subcontinent continuously since that date. My overseas posts have been Bombay, where I first became interested in the political history of the subcontinent, New Delhi, where most of the research for this work was carried out, and Lahore, where the writing was done. During this period I spent two academic years away from the area, the first to study Hindi at the Foreign Service Institute and the second on special assignment to the University of Pennsylvania for South Asian studies.

This study covers the period up to the end of 1967. On December 31, 1967, Pandit Dindayal Upadhyaya was president of the Jana Sangh. Unknown to me, as I wrote the final draft of this preface, Mr. Upadhyaya was murdered, his body found outside Mogulserai station near Banaras. Only later in the evening of February 11, 1968, did I learn of the tragedy. Thus the work of this book ends with Mr. Upadhyaya as president. Following his death, the party selected Atal Behari Vajpayee as its leader.

One of the questions to be faced in writing about Indian subjects is spelling. Throughout the book, the spelling chosen has been that used by the organization or individual concerned. Thus, *Jana Sangh* rather than *Jan Sangh, Vajpayee* rather than *Bajpai, Mookerjee* rather than any of the variants of that Bengali name. In quotations, however, the spelling has not been changed.

In writing this biography of the Jana Sangh I have been aided by many in India and in the United States. I have received assistance and cooperation from a large number of Jana Sanghis and members of other political groups including the Congress,

Praja Socialist, Samyukta Soçialist, and Swatantra parties and the Hindu Mahasabha. It is impossible to mention everyone, but three of the Jana Sangh have spent much time to aid me. Lalchand K. Advani, now chairman of the Delhi Metropolitan Council, arranged for the use of the back files of *Organiser* at my home, a necessity when my duties at the Embassy permitted me only weekends and occasional evenings for research. Balraj Madhok, one of the principal members of the party and now a Member of Parliament, gave many hours, loaned books and related some of the lore of the party. Jagdish Mathur, office secretary, made available documents and files of the central office and tirelessly answered questions. After the dissertation version was completed Messrs. Advani and Mathur and Dindayal Upadhyaya, then general secretary and president until his death on February 11, 1968, looked over the text and made several valuable suggestions. Keval R. Malkani, editor of *Organiser,* allowed the use of the files for some updating.

I am deeply indebted to Professor Holden Furber of the University of Pennsylvania, who supervised the writing of the dissertation version. To Professor Richard L. Lambert, who also read the dissertation, and Professor Donald E. Smith, who included an article on the party in his symposium *South Asian Politics and Religion,* I am also indebted. Professor Myron Weiner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Professor Richard L. Park of the University of Michigan also read the text and made several useful suggestions.

My Foreign Service colleagues Howard B. Schaffer and Herbert G. Hagerty have helped much by keeping a flow of Jana Sangh materials coming to me after I left my New Delhi assignment. Mr. Hagerty also read the manuscript and made several suggestions. The manuscript was typed by Mrs. P. J. Sullivan to whom I also owe many thanks.

My wife, Carol, has encouraged the work while Craig and Louise have accepted the disappearance of their father for long periods over a typewriter. My deep gratitude to my parents is shown in the dedication. Without their constant encouragement this work would not have been completed.

CRAIG BAXTER

February 11, 1968

Contents

APPENDICES

Tables

Maps

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The Bharatiya Jana Sangh enjoys a unique position among the national political parties of India: It is the only party that has increased its percentage of the popular vote and its share of parliamentary and assembly seats in each successive election from 1952 through 1967. Despite the party's strong position, in the Western world it has been undoubtedly the least studied and least well known of the major Indian political parties. This "biography" is an effort to present an historical picture of the Jana Sangh, a party which following the 1967 elections matured into a potent force on the Indian political scene, both in the national parliament and in the legislatures of several of the Indian states.

A study of the Jana Sangh is of value not only in the Indian context but also in the broader setting of religio-political movements in several Asian and African states. At a recent symposium on religion and politics in the three larger South Asian countries—India, Pakistan and Ceylon [1]—a study of a religio-political group in Pakistan—the Jama'at-i-Islam [2] was presented. The Jama'at, while having some similarity to the Jana Sangh, is different in one important respect. The Jama'at operates both as a religiously oriented body and as a political party. The Jana Sangh is solely a political

[1] *See* Craig Baxter, "The Jana Sangh, a Brief History," *South Asian Politics and Religion*, ed. Donald E. Smith (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 74–101.

[2] Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi," *South Asian Politics and Religion*, ed. Donald E. Smith (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 371–97.

party, but is closely connected with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu cultural organization. In Japan there is a pair of organizations that have many apparent parallels with the RSS-Jana Sangh relationship. These are the religious *Soka Gakkai* organization and its political offshoot, the *Komeito*. The RSS-Jana Sangh weekly Journal, *Organiser*, recently published an article implying a certain degree of identity between the Japanese pair and the Indian pair.[3]

Thus a study of the Jana Sangh is needed for two purposes: first, to determine its place within the Indian political system and, second, to examine its part in religio-political movements that seem to be gaining strength in several Afro-Asian countries. To the first purpose this work is directed; for the second, the political biography can only supply material on which a fuller study can be based.

Conflicts in India

Indian society and politics are influenced by several concurrent conflicts in the socio-political system. In three of these conflicts the Jana Sangh takes a stand. The first and oldest conflict on the subcontinent divides the older Dravidian culture from the newer Aryan culture, which entered the subcontinent about 1500 B.C. Until relatively recently this conflict existed without serious disruption. The Aryan civilization moved glacially from the northwest toward the extreme south, overwhelming the indigenous cultures while leaving enclaves here and there to endure as tribal remnants of the earlier culture. Violence broke out recently in Madras and political change occurred in the same state in 1967. The position of the Jana Sangh on the "north-south" question will be a central thread in this narrative.

A second and more violent conflict was the rivalry between Hinduism and Islam. For almost one thousand years the two major religions faced each other as Islam spread unevenly throughout the subcontinent from the northwest.[4] The two ancestors of the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS, were born in the atmos-

[3] *Organiser*, XX:7 (February 12, 1967).

[4] There was, of course, an earlier Arab movement into the Sind, but this was much less a forerunner of the expansion of Islam in the sub-continent than was the later movement into the northwest.

phere of Hindu-Muslim conflict. Sporadic violence between the two communities culminated in extensive rioting at the time of the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan. Communal disturbances recurred in each of the newly independent countries. Relations between India and Pakistan, never cordial, deteriorated so greatly in 1965 that open warfare broke out in September of that year. The Jana Sangh position on the status of the Muslim and other minorities in India and its views on Pakistan and Kashmir will be another thread in the narrative.

The third conflict was the struggle between modernism and traditionalism—between Westernization and Sanskritization. The Jana Sangh is internally divided over this issue. The acceptance of some degree of Westernization in order to modernize the economic machine of India is believed necessary by the party. The party also wishes to see in the new India a nation that is well rooted and unified in the national tradition of *Bharatiya Sanskriti*. This is the third thread of the narrative.

Biography

Political parties, after all, are made up of people. Thus the Jana Sangh is treated here as a living organism, as implied in the subtitle "Biography of an Indian Political Party." The focus throughout the narrative will be not only on the issues cited but also on the people who have determined their party's positions, who have worked to build an organization to propagate those positions, and who have sat in legislative bodies to carry out those positions.

In a biography it is necessary first to look at the subject's antecedents. The next two chapters will describe briefly the history and development of the Hindu Mahasabha, the political ancestor of the Jana Sangh, and the RSS, the organizational and ideological forerunner. A full-scale biography of the Mahasabha is still needed to fill one of the serious gaps in pre-independence Indian history. An excellent, though brief, account of the RSS exists but it is now outdated and out of print.[5]

From the ancestors of the Jana Sangh, the next chapter turns to the merging of Mahasabha political thought with RSS organiza-

[5] J. A. Curran, Jr., *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics, A Study of the R.S.S.* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1951.

tional strength to form the Jana Sangh in 1951. A political party, like a growing schoolboy, is subjected to rigid tests of its policies and its organization. For the Jana Sangh these trials came in 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967 in the Indian general elections. Chapters V, VII, IX, and XI will record these tests and the results. The intervening Chapters VI, VIII, and X will consider the activities of the party on the parliamentary, organizational and policy-making fronts in the periods between elections. Chapter XII will give a summary of events after 1967 and some conclusions will be drawn with regard to the three basic conflicts mentioned above and to the future alternatives which appear to be open to the Jana Sangh.

This work is not intended to be a study of the general Indian political scene from 1951 to 1967. Many events have taken place which are not mentioned in these pages. The general political setting is treated only insofar as the Jana Sangh played a significant role. Nor does the book study the state and lower working levels of the party, a subject too vast for one writer or any single work.[6] Frequent mention will be made of party operations at the state level, but only when state activities have a bearing on the growth and development of the party as a national organization.

The Jana Sangh is not a clandestine political body. Its sessions above the working committee level are, like those of the Congress, open meetings which anyone may attend.[7] The proceedings, however, are almost exclusively conducted in Hindi, which tends to limit attendance by foreign observers. The party has also suffered from its image as an "extremist religious organization" [8] or a group of "Hindu bigots," [9] so described by some Westerners who perhaps hoped that the Jana Sangh would simply disappear if everyone pretended not to notice it. Even the Indian press tended to ignore the Jana Sangh in its earlier days especially after the death of Mookerjee. Now the situation is quite the opposite. The party has

[6] Some work is being done on the state and lower levels of the Jana Sangh. *See,* for example, Harold A. Gould, "Religion and Politics in a U. P. Constituency," in Smith, *South Asian Politics and Religion,* ed. Donald E. Smith (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 51–73.

[7] At the invitation of the central office of the Jana Sangh the writer observed the Banaras, Bhopal and Ahmedabad sessions.

[8] W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (2nd ed.; Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 239.

[9] Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan* (London, Pall Mall, 1962) p. 98.

received extensive coverage in the press, beginning with the 1967 election campaign. Coverage of the party in the Western press has also increased greatly.

Indian daily newspapers are not an adequate source of information on the Jana Sangh. This work is based largely on material from the weekly *Organiser*, which is closely associated with both the RSS and the Jana Sangh. The *Organiser* serves to a considerable extent as a diary of the two organizations. Material drawn from printed sources has been supplemented by personal interviews. Documentation, however, is based on printed materials, not on private interviews and communications.

CHAPTER II

The Political Ancestor: The Hindu Mahasabha

What is a Hindu? "A Hindu means a person who regards this land of Bharatvarsha from the Indus to the Seas, as his Fatherland as well as his Holyland." [1] So runs the definition of a Hindu as accepted by the Hindu Mahasabha and stated by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who served seven times as President of Mahasabha. It follows therefore that only Hindus, including in Mahasabha terminology Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs as offshoots of Hinduism, can be regarded as full citizens in a Hindu *Raj,* as proposed by the Mahasabha. Neither Muslims nor Christians could be expected to accept the "holyland" designation of Bharatvarsha.

The Hindu Mahasabha of today is a small, politically unimportant party which keeps alive the flicker of the communal policies of the period of Savarkar's leadership. But the Mahasabha in its earlier days was not so narrowly communal and, like the Muslim League, often held its meetings concurrently with the Congress, and its members held dual membership in the larger organization.

The Beginnings

On December 30, 1906, in Dacca, a group of Muslim leaders joined together to found the Muslim League. The "Aims and Objects" of the League as adopted on that date were set forth:

> Resolved that this meeting composed of Musalmans from all parts of India assembled at Dacca decide that a Political Association be formed,

[1] V. D. Savarkar, *Hindutva* (Poona, V. G. Kelkar, 1942), p.

and styled All-India Muslim League, for the furtherance of the following objects:

(a) To promote, among the Musalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of Government with regard to any of the measures,

(b) To protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India and to respectfully present their need and aspirations to the Government,

(c) To prevent the rise among the Musalmans of India of any feelings of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the League.[2]

The first major "communal" political group which made its appeal on an all-India basis was thus founded. It is communal in that its membership was confined to one community [3] and its program was the furtherance of the political and general well-being of that community. Nonetheless, the group also called for a non-hostile attitude toward other communities so long as this lack of hostility was in keeping with the basic objectives of the organization. As will be seen, the original programs of the Hindu Mahasabha followed very much along the same lines.

The official historian [4] of the Mahasabha traces the organization from two early movements in Bengal and Punjab. These two provinces and Maharashtra have provided much of the leadership of the Mahasabha.

In 1907, soon after the founding of the Muslim League, the United Bengal Hindu Movement was formed. Prakash describes this Movement as a direct response to the founding of the Muslim League as well as a result of the turmoil in Bengal resulting from the partition of the province during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon.[5] Materials available on the Movement indicate, however, that

[2] A. B. Rajput, *The Muslim League, Yesterday and Today* (Lahore, Ashraf, 1948), pp. 19–20.

[3] It is still so. *See* the Constitution of the Pakistan Muslim League adopted at Lahore, April 7, 1966. Article 6.

[4] Indra Prakash, *A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sanghatan Movement* (2nd ed.; Delhi, Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha, 1952). This work is the only major study of the Mahasabha and is of course slanted to its viewpoint and to the role of Punjabis in the Mahasabha. This chapter draws heavily on Prakash's work.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

it comprised a group of more moderate Hindus who were not in sympathy with the revolutionary activities of ardent nationalists led by Aurobindo Ghosh and others. Also founded in 1907, the Punjab Hindu Sabha became the spearhead of the movement that eventually led to the establishment of the *Akhil Bharat* Hindu Mahasabha. At its first meeting the Sabha adopted this program:

> The Sabha is not a sectarian or denominated one, but an all-embracing movement and while meaning no offense to any other movement, whether Hindu or non-Hindu, it aims to be ardent and watchful in safeguarding the interests of the entire Hindu community in all respects.[6]

From 1909 to 1914 the Punjab Hindu Sabha held five conferences at Lahore, Amritsar, Delhi, Ferozepur and Ambala. Membership of the Sabha appears to have been largely urban Arya Samajists. The general secretary, Lala Lal Chand, was a leader in the Lahore Arya Samaj, as was Sir Shadi Lal, who became the leader upon Lal Chand's death in 1912.[7] Another spokesman of the movement was Lala Mul Raj Bhalla, whose brother Mahatma Hans Raj, led one of the two major divisions of the Arya Samaj.[8] Lajpat Rai ascribes to Mul Raj Bhalla and to Lal Chand the opinion that "the first duty of the Hindus was to get strong enough to stand on their own legs" before undertaking joint political action with Muslims through the Congress.[9] In another work Lajpat Rai quotes with approval the following description of the Arya Samaj and politics:

> . . . the type of man to whom the Arya Samaj doctrine appeals is also the type of man to whom politics appeals, *viz.*, the educated man who desires his country's progress . . . It is not therefore surprising that there are politicians among the Arya Samaj. But is is impossible to

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[7] Lajpat Rai, *Autobiographical Writings* (Delhi, University Publishers, 1965), p. 50, p. 113.

[8] For an excellent recent treatment of the religious and social beliefs of the Arya Samaj, a subject too vast to be gone into here, *see* Charles H. Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 294 ff. Mul Raj Bhalla's nephews (and Hans Raj's sons), Balraj Bhalla and Yodhraj, were both active in the founding days of the Jana Sangh. The use of the patronymic, in this case Bhalla, is often shunned by the formally casteless Arya Samajists, thus often hiding relationships from the researcher.

[9] Lajpat Rai, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

deduce from this that the Arya Samaj, as a whole, is a political body.[10]

The Arya Samaj in the Punjab is an important element not only of the Jana Sangh but also of the Mahasabha and the RSS. Indeed in contemporary politics the Arya Samaj is a major factor in the Punjab and Haryana Congress parties.

By 1914, the Congress had met three times in Lahore—in 1893, 1900 and 1909. In each case many of the active members of the Reception Committee were either Arya Samajists or, in 1909, members of the Punjab Hindu Sabha, or both. Arya Samajists like Lajpat Rai, Shadi Lal and Lal Chand had also been members of the Punjab delegations to Congress sessions in other parts of the country. It was in the 1906 session in Calcutta that the close relationship among Lajpat Rai, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and Bipin Chandra Pal—"Lal-Bal-Pal"—began. Presiding over the 1909 session in Lahore was Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a staunch Hindu who, like Lajpat Rai, was to serve both the Congress and the Mahasabha as president.

These contacts among Hindu leaders led to a feeling that an all-India body should be formed to counteract the growing influence of the Muslim League in which the brothers Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali and the young Mohammad Ali Jinnah were gaining importance. In December 1913, the Punjab Hindu Sabha sponsored a meeting at Allahabad at which an "All-India Hindu Mahasabha" was set up. The first session of the new group was held in 1914 at the holy city of Hardwar, where the Ganges issues forth from the mountains.

Association with Congress

The annual sessions of the Mahasabha generally were held at the same time and in the same place as the Congress sessions, the second session being at Bombay in 1915. It was possible,—was even encouraged by the Mahasabha—for its members also to be

[10] *Census Report for the United Provinces,* 1911, p. 135 ff., quoted in Lajpat Rai, *The Arya Samaj* (Lahore, Uttar Chand Kapur and Sons, 1932), p. 182–83. The editor, N. L. Gupta, of *Nehru on Communalism* (New Delhi, Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee, 1965) quotes, without source, Savarkar: "The Hindu Mahasabha itself is in fact but an enlarged and more comprehensive edition of the Arya Samaj," p. 22.

members of the Congress. In theory the Mahasabha was a forum within the Congress, in which Mahasabha members could express Hindu views and work for the protection of Hindu interests, but in such a manner as not necessarily to be anti-Muslim. Nonetheless, the Mahasabha members strongly opposed the separate electorates granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact of 1916, thus indicating the future Mahasabha demand for a "one-man, one-vote" constitution for India.

Some leaders of the Mahasabha were prominent also in the Congress and of these Lajpat Rai and Malaviya were the most important. Of Malaviya, an historian of the Congress said: "As a Hindu he is progressive in his ideas and leads the van; as a Congressman he is conservative and oftentimes leads the rear." [11] While finding Malaviya conservative, the same writer judged Lajpat Rai's activities in the Congress too impetuous: "He never saw eye-to-eye with the progenitors of the Non-Cooperation Movement and even in his concluding speech [at the Calcutta Special Session, September, 1920] predicted only failure for it. He was a fighter, but not a *satyagrahi*." [12] Lajpat Rai, however, could transcend his Hinduism, more specifically his Arya Samajism, and look beyond to a multi-communal India: "The Arya Samaj has to remember that the India of today is not exclusively Hindu. Its prosperity and future depends upon the reconciliation of Hinduism with that greater *ism*—Indian Nationalism—which alone can secure for India its rightful place in the comity of nations. Anything that may prevent, or even hinder, that consummation is a sin for which there can be no expiation." [13] Lajpat Rai continued his association with the Mahasabha up to November 17, 1928, when he died presumably as the result of injuries suffered in a police baton charge in Lahore. Malaviya, who died November 12, 1946, last presided over the Mahasabha at Patna in 1935.

In 1923, under the leadership of Malaviya the Mahasabha met at Banaras. The meeting, which did not coincide with the Congress, was organized by the Maharaja of Banaras, and the Working Committee was to include Dr. Bhagwan Das, a noted Banaras philoso-

[11] B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress* (Bombay, Padma Publications, 1946), Vol I, p. 102.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[13] Lajpat Rai, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

pher and father of Congress leader Sri Prakasa; Dr. Rajendra Prasad, later president of the Congress and of India; and Dr. B. S. Moonjee, later a Mahasabha president. The session also marked the first appearance of the Punjab revolutionary and Arya Samajist, Bhai Parmanand.[14]

At Banaras the Mahasabha supported a program which inevitably angered Muslims: endorsement of *shuddhi,* the process of reconverting to Hinduism persons who had left the fold. According to the 1911 Punjab Census Report,

> *Shuddhi* is a Sanskrit word which means purification. In religious terminology it is now applied to (1) conversion to Hinduism of persons belonging to foreign religions, (2) reconversion of those who have recently, or *at some remote period,* adopted one of the foreign religions, and (3) reclamation, i.e., raising the status of the depressed classes.[15]

The movement, propagated mainly in the Punjab and North West Frontier Province, was largely Arya Samajist. Lajpat Rai wrote: "The Arya Samaj started it as purely religious propaganda, with political motives in the minds of only some of its members." [16] The revival of *shuddhi* had predictable results. The Muslims immediately reacted with riot and counterpropaganda, and there was opposition from within the Congress, of which Gandhi was now the principal guide.

In 1924, a series of communal riots occurred, two of particular violence breaking out in Calcutta on May 23 and in Delhi on July 15. The most serious of all occurred in Kohat in the North West Frontier Province on September 9. Another major clash broke out at Lucknow on September 13 and 14. It is interesting to compare the Congress, Muslim League, and Mahasabha reactions to the riots: Speaking for the Congress, Pandit Motilal Nehru said:

> In Kohat a tragedy has taken place the like of which has not been known in India for many years . . . This is not the time for us to apportion blame upon the parties concerned.[17]

[14] Parmanand's son, Bhai Mahavir, was one of the general secretaries of the Jana Sangh at its founding and has frequently been a member of the Working Committee.

[15] Punjab Census Report, 1911, p. 148, quoted in Lajpat Rai, *op. cit.,* p. 248. Emphasis supplied.

[16] Lajpat Rai, *op. cit.,* p. 250.

[17] Quoted in R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India* (Calcutta, Firma Mukhopadhyaya, 1962–3), III, p. 179.

A Muslim League resolution read:

The All-India Muslim League feels it to be its duty to place on record that the sufferings of Kohat Hindus are not unprovoked, but that on the contrary the facts brought to light make it clear that gross provocation was offered to the religious sentiments of the Mussalmans and the Hindus were the first to resort to violence . . .[18]

Lajpat Rai spoke for the Mahasabha saying, "Even admitting the Hindus were at fault, [did they] deserve the punishment inflicted upon them?" [19] He later wrote:

Shuddhi was not the direct cause of these riots. But the wound inflicted upon Muslim sentiment by the *shuddhi* was undoubtedly one of the basic causes which produced the atmosphere which led to these riots. The motives were partly political, partly economic, and partly religious.[20]

A Unity Conference was called on September 26 in New Delhi by Hakim Ajmal Khan, a prominent Delhi Muslim who had been Congress president in 1921; Maulana Muhammad Ali, the Khilafat leader; and Swami Shraddhanand. But the conference could not halt the tide of communal feelings. While the conference was in session, clashes occurred in Shahjahanpur, Allahabad, Jabalpur and other places. Sporadic rioting continued during 1925 and 1926, with more serious disturbances in Delhi, Aligarh, Sholapur, and Calcutta.

In a counterpropaganda program the Muslims began the *tanzim* and *tabligh* movements. *Tanzim* (organization) and *tabligh* (propaganda) were both a missionary movement and a kind of reinforcement-of-faith campaign. To what extent the Muslims were successful in winning new converts is difficult to ascertain, but the *shuddhi* movement has progressed with some success over the years.[21]

The most prominent of the Arya Samajist and Hindu Mahasabha leaders in the *shuddhi* movement was Swami Shraddhanand. Shraddhanand was born as Munshi Ram in 1856. He early joined the Arya Samaj and was a leader of one group in the educational

[18] Quoted *ibid.*, p. 280.
[19] Quoted *ibid.*, p. 280.
[20] Lajpat Rai, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
[21] Donald Eugene Smith, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 171, records the conversion of 1,500 Christians in Travancore in a *shuddhi* ceremony in 1949.

controversies which rent the Samaj at the close of the nineteenth century. In the controversies he opposed both Mahatma Hans Raj and Lala Lajpat Rai. In keeping with the four stages of Hindu life, Munshi Ram became a *sanyasin* under the style Swami Shraddhanand. He associated with the Mahasabha and found himself opposed to the Congress. He has written of his most noted *shuddhi* mission:

On 13th February 1923, I was called to lead the movement for the reclamation of Malkana Rajputs by their several brotherhoods . . . I found to my astonishment, that while Muhammadan leaders, doing *tabligh* work openly, were allowed to guide the policy of the Congress and work as its accredited representatives, those engaged in the work of rescuing the Hindu Samaj from disintegration were tabooed and kept out of the Congress executive.[22]

These developments indicated not only the desire of the Muslims to retain their hold on the Rajput tribe—a desire in which they were unsuccessful—but also confirmation of the charge by the Mahasabha that the Congress was pro-Muslim, and it remains so. This charge, which recurs through the history of the Mahasabha, is matched by the charge of the Muslim League that the Congress was pro-Hindu.

On December 23, 1926, a Muslim murdered Swami Shraddhanand while he was ill and resting in his room above the bazaar which now bears his name in Delhi. The Swami was a victim of the communal tensions in India. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that the assassination "sent a thrill of horror all over India" and added:

What a death for a man who had bared his chest to the bayonets of the Gurkhas and marched to meet their fire! Nearly eight years earlier, he, an Arya Samajist leader, had stood in the pulpit of the great Jame Masjid of Delhi and preached to a mighty gathering of Muslims and Hindus of unity and India's freedom. And that great multitude had greeted him with loud cries of Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai . . . And now he lay dead, killed by a fellow countryman, who thought, no doubt, that he was doing a meritorious deed, which would lead him to paradise.[23]

Shraddhanand's associate in the editing of a weekly paper, *The Liberator*, wrote twenty years later in defense of the Swami: "A

[22] Shraddhanand, *Inside Congress* (Bombay, Phoenix, 1946), pp. 195–6.
[23] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (Bombay, Allied Publishers, Ltd., 1962), p. 370, quoted in *Nehru on Communalism, op. cit.*, p. 157.

libel was and has been sedulously propagated . . . that he was hostile to Muslims . . . He admired and loved Muslims. He only asked Hindus to improve their social system so that Hindus should not fall before the proselytising tactics of Musalmans . . ."[24] Unfortunately the writer did not present both sides of the question, and it was the other side which angered Muslims—*shuddhi*.

In the midst of these disorders—rioting, conversion attempts, and the murder of Shraddhanand—the Mahasabha continued to hold its annual meetings. In these sessions they often took steps which in no way could be encouraging to Muslims. Equally disturbing to the Muslims was the great number of prominent Congressmen who took part in the Mahasabha sessions. In the 1926 elections many of the moderate Congressmen broke with the parent body to contest under the label of the Swarajist Party; these dissidents included Pandit Motilal Nehru and Chittaranjan Das. However, two other groups of Congressmen also broke away and were seen by the Muslims to be closer to the Mahasabha than to the Congress. One was the Responsivist Cooperation Party, later named the India Nationalist Party, of Malaviya, N. C. Kelkar, B. S. Moonje and M. R. Jayakar, all of whom had been or were to be Mahasabha presidents. Another group was the Independent Congress Party, of which Lajpat Rai was a key member. To the latter two parties the Mahasabha gave its support against "the Swarajist Party and its pro-Muslim attitude."[25]

Malaviya presided over the 1924 session held in the Congress *pandal* at Belgaum. According to Prakash those attending included Mahatma Gandhi, Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, and Motilal Nehru. If this listing is correct, however, one can be quite sure they did not approve of all that happened in the Mahasabha session. One resolution called for the elimination of untouchability; Lajpat Rai has noted that the "work of the Mahasabha has been rather half-hearted and ineffective . . . in this respect."[26] A second resolution must have upset the Ali brothers and Nehru since it opposed the Lucknow Pact on separate electorates. The Mahasabha supported direct elections without separate electorates or reservation of seats,

[24] P. R. Lele in the introduction to Shraddhanand, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[25] Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
[26] Lajpat Rai, *op. cit.*, pp. 269–70.

a system which on its surface appears to be pure democracy, but which horrified the Muslims as they faced a Hindu *Raj* which they were certain would be anti-Muslim.

At the same session the party set up a committee ". . . to ascertain and to formulate Hindu opinion on the subject of Hindú-Muslim problems in relation to the question of further constitutional reforms."[27] On the committee were Rajendra Prasad; M. S. Aney, later a Congress governor of Bihar and still later an opposition member of the Lok Sabha; Moonje; T. Prakasam, later a Congress chief minister of Andhra; Jairamdas Daulatram, a Sind Congress leader and later governor of Assam; and the Liberal, S. Satyamoorthi, who wrote:

> It was for the first time giving a distinct political orientation to the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha which would not only be confined to the social and religious uplift of the Hindus, but would also focus and express Hindu opinion on political problems.[28]

At the 1925 Calcutta session, Lala Lajpat Rai presiding gave his program for the Mahasabha, which as it has influenced the Mahasabha, the RSS and the Jana Sangh, should be quoted in some detail:

> 1. To organise Hindu Sabhas throughout the length and breadth of the country. 2. To provide relief to such Hindus, men and women, who need help on account of communal riots and disturbances. 3. Reconversion of Hindus who have been forcibly converted to Islam. 4. To organise gymnasiums for the use of Hindu young men and women. 5. To organise Sevasamities. 6. To popularise Hindi . . . in cooperation with the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. 7. Open Hindu temples as halls where people may gather. 8. To celebrate Hindu festivals . . . 9. To promote good feelings with Mohammedans and Christians. 10. To represent communal interests of the Hindus in all political controversies . . . 13. To better the condition of Hindu women.[29]

In reading this list one wonders how item nine is in any way compatible with the other items, especially item three. Lajpat Rai, when he proposed *sevasamities* and gymnasiums, was almost certainly unaware that as he was speaking the RSS was being organized in Nagpur by Dr. K. B. Hedgewar. He also could not have

[27] Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 37–8.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

imagined that this RSS would have come closer to the accomplishment of item one than any other group as it has spread its *shakhas* to most of India and into Nepal and to the overseas Indians.

At this point in his narrative Prakash quotes with approbation, implying that the views expressed were accepted by the Mahasabha, the message of an old Punjab revolutionary. Lala Hardayal had been absent from India for fifteen years, most of that time spent in the United States, where he was a founder of the Ghadr Party. In an unidentified Lahore newspaper he is quoted as writing:

> I declare that the future of the Hindu race, of Hindusthan and of the Punjab rests on these four pillars: (i) Hindu Sanghatan; (ii) Hindu Raj; (iii) Shuddhi of Moslems; and (iv) Conquest and shuddhi of Afghanistan and the Frontiers. So long as the Hindu Nation does not accomplish these four things, the safety of our children and great grandchildren will be ever in danger, and the safety of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history and its institutions are homogeneous.[30]

Neither Hardayal nor anyone else has seen his four pillars carried out. After a conversion to pacifism, the old revolutionary died in exile in Philadelphia in 1938.

In the late 1920's, time was running out on the period of cooperation with the Congress. In 1928 Lajpat Rai died. Shraddhanand was already gone. Malaviya, now a member of the Central Assembly, was increasingly involved in Nationalist Party politics and was still active in the Congress. He and others who eventually became Congress stalwarts, like Rajendra Prasad, were becoming increasingly alienated from the younger firebrands who were allied with some of the older, and narrowly Hindu, Mahasabhites. Although there can be no definite dating of the break, it became clear that the two parties were irretrievably separated.

On a Separate Path

The historian of the Hindu Mahasabha has deplored the failure of the party to capitalize on the tensions between Hindus and Muslims, and places the blame on the more moderate leaders.

> As for the Hindu Mahasabha movement, the masses were roused to their utmost, the climax had been reached and the final victory was in sight. For the leaders at the helm of affairs of the Mahasabha no better

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

opportunity could have presented itself in the annals of the movement when a prompt, vigorous and more effective propaganda on their part would have turned the tables and placed the country on the right track for all times to come. But they missed the golden chance and missed it never to get it back again for a long time to come. They too could not have remained uncontaminated either by the terrorism of Muslim "goondas" or their mistaken faith in the omniscience of the Congress. And even leaders of such calibre as Lala Lajpat Rai and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya gradually faltered—unfortunately for India, a political dilemma of the first magnitude followed. But dark clouds have their silver linings and out of despondency sprang forth hope and light. The Hindu Mahasabha, seemingly weakened, emerged stronger in as much as it had to shift heavy responsibility on to the strong shoulders of two of its most tried and trusted generals, Dr. B. S. Moonje and Bhai Parmanand.[31]

The writer went on to describe this as the end of the period of the Mahasabha being "an adjunct of the Indian National Congress" and the beginning of "an all-India Hindu Organisation, with a strong, independent, bold and clear-cut policy, taking up matters which concerned the whole Indian community and judging them primarily from the Hindu point of view." [32]

Moonje was a Maharashtrian Brahmin; Parmanand, a Punjabi Arya Samajist. Both men had already been active in the Mahasabha and both were to continue their association throughout the remainder of their lives. Moonje went to the First Round Table Conference in London in 1930 "at the height of the Civil Disobedience Movement, though in justice to him it must be stated that he had declared that he went in his individual capacity." [33] Moonje was but one of a number of Maharashtrian leaders of the Mahasabha, of whom more will be mentioned later.

Parmanand (1874–1948) inherited the title "Bhai," which dated from an ancestor who gave his life defending a Sikh leader against the Moghuls. In the Arya Samaj Parmanand associated with the section headed by Lajpat Rai and Hans Raj. Later he taught in the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College in Lahore and served in Africa as an Arya Samajist missionary. On his return from Africa, he was associated with the Punjab revolutionaries and, with Lala Hardayal, worked with the Ghadr Party in the United States. In the

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–5.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[33] Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in *Nehru on Communalism, op. cit.*, p. 11.

1915 Lahore Conspiracy Case he was sentenced to death, the sentence being commuted to exile for life. After his sentence was remitted, he returned to Lahore and plunged into Hindu Mahasabha political work.

The new leadership of the Mahasabha was drawn largely from a group which claimed to have directed relationships with the "Lal-Bal-Pal" group of the Congress in the pre-Gandhi days. There was no question about the relationship of Parmanand with Lajpat Rai. Pal's revolutionary group in Bengal was represented principally by Ashutosh Lahiry, one of several Mahasabha alumni of the Andaman Islands. The Maharashtra group claimed political descent from Tilak. This group included Moonje, Jayakar, N. C. Kelkar, and most importantly Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. Like Tilak, most of the Maharashtra contingent were Chitpawan Brahmins, and indeed, as will be seen, many of the leaders of the RSS also belong to this community.

Savarkar was clearly the central personality in the Mahasabha from the time of his first presidency at Allahabad in 1937 until his retirement from politics after the assassination of Gandhi in 1948. Savarkar was born May 28, 1883, in Nasik District, the son of a landowner of moderate wealth. His father was also known locally both as a scholar of Sanskrit and as a patron on Western education. In his school days, including his college days at Fergusson College in Poona, Savarkar demonstrated intense Hindu nationalist feelings. As a teenager he participated in the stoning of a mosque in retaliation for Muslim acts in communal riots elsewhere in India. He organized a patriotic society at Fergusson and on one occasion arranged to have Tilak address a rally. He was expelled from Fergusson College, but through the intervention of Tilak was able to secure a scholarship to study in England. There he associated with the noted revolutionary Shyamji Krishna Verma, whose "India House" had financed Savarkar's scholarship. Savarkar was arrested in 1910 and ordered returned to India. He created an international incident when he escaped from the ship in Marseilles and claimed French asylum. British police went ashore, captured Savarkar and returned him to the ship.[34] In 1911 the Government of

[34] The case was eventually carried to the World Court at the Hague which decided the British had no right to recapture Savarkar on French soil. The decision was academic; the British ignored it.

India exiled Savarkar to the Andaman Islands, where he was to find Lahiry and his own brother also exiled.

Before his exile he had published *The First Indian War of Independence,* a highly Hindu nationalistic study of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. While in exile Savarkar wrote *Hindutva,* first published in 1924, and from which the quotation at the beginning of this chapter is taken. Savarkar was released from the Andamans in 1924, but was barred from political activity by the British until 1937, when he became president of the Hindu Mahasabha for the first of seven terms.[35]

Two Bengali Mahasabhites who entered the party in the middle thirties should be introduced—Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee. Chatterjee is a noted lawyer who before entering politics in the Mahasabha had been a justice on the Calcutta High Court. Both Mookerjee and Chatterjee belonged to the educated, relatively affluent Bengali society of Calcutta. One a lawyer, the other a second-generation educationist, neither appeared to fit into the strongly communal mold of the Punjab and Maharashtra Mahasabha groups. Nor did they trace their lineage to the revolutionary Bengalis as did Lahiry. Also in this category of Mahasabhite was Sir Jwala Prasad Srivastava, a Kanpur industrialist who was president of the United Provinces Hindu Sabha in 1942 and who also served on the Viceroy's Council.[36]

With the new cast of leaders in the Mahasabha introduced, it is necessary to turn back to the important Ajmer session of the Mahasabha in 1933 presided over by Parmanand. There he is reported to have said: "Hindustan is the land of the Hindus alone, and Musalmans and Christians and other nations living in India are only our guests. They can live here as long as they wish to remain as guests." [37] The Mahasabha also expressed its views on Urdu:

> Urdu is a foreign language which is a living monument to our slavery. It must be eradicated from the page of existence. Urdu is the language of

[35] The previous two paragraphs are drawn from the brief biographic sketch contained in *Sources of Indian Tradition* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 878–80, and from the obituary in the *Hindustan Times,* February 27, 1966. For a fuller and generally sympathetic biography *see* Dhananjay Keer, *Savarkar and His Times* (Bombay, A. V. Keer, 1950).

[36] Srivastava left the Mahasabha after independence.

[37] Rajput, *op. cit.,* p. 54; *Nehru on Communalism, op. cit.,* p. 2.

the *Malechhas* which has done great harm to our national ends by attaining popularity in India.[38]

These statements could cause the Muslims nothing but consternation.

In the 1937 elections which followed the passage of the Government of India Act of 1935, the Mahasabha supported the Congress Nationalist Party, among whose leaders were Malaviya and M. S. Aney. Malaviya presided over the Mahasabha for the last time in 1935. The Nationalists won thirteen seats in the Central Assembly as compared to 44 seats for the Congress. Among the Nationalist victors was Parmanand, who defeated Congress stalwart Diwan Chaman Lal in Punjab. Mookerjee won a seat in the Bengal Provincial Legislative Assembly.

The Congress won absolute majorities in a number of the provinces and proceeded to form ministries, but in several provinces no party was able to obtain a majority of the seats and coalition governments had to be put together. In Punjab the Unionist Party, a noncommunal group of Muslims and Hindus, formed a stable government under Sir Sikander Hayat Khan; the Mahasabhites like the Congress found themselves in opposition. In the North West Frontier Province in 1937, and later in Bengal, the Mahasabha had an opportunity to join in the cabinets.

In the Frontier, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan formed a ministry which combined Muslim Leaguers, Sikh Akalis and Mahasabhites, and placed the Congress led by Dr. Khan Sahib temporarily in the opposition. The Mahasabha member of the Cabinet was Finance Minister Mehr Chand Khanna. Khanna is now a leading member of the Congress from Delhi and was, until defeated by a Jana Sanghi in 1967, a Minister of State in the Central Cabinet.

In Bengal, Mookerjee was Finance Minister in the second Progressive Coalition ministry headed by Fazl-ul Haq. Mookerjee served from December 11, 1941, until November 20, 1942, when he resigned following a disagreement with Fazl-ul Haq on the question of the Midnapur police firing, of which more later.

Beginning in 1937, at Ahmedabad, Savarkar was elected president of the Mahasabha for seven consecutive years; 1938, Nagpur;

[38] Rajput, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–5.

1939, Calcutta; 1940, Madurai; 1941, Bhagalpur; 1942, Kanpur; and 1943, Amritsar. At the Amritsar session, however, Savarkar stepped aside because of ill health and was replaced by Mookerjee. The Bhagalpur session was banned by the British because of communal rioting in the town. The Mahasabha leaders attempted to go ahead with the session and several were arrested including Savarkar and Mookerjee. Although the Mahasabha was willing, for its own purposes, to cooperate with the Muslim League in forming ministries, it continued to press the claims of the Hindus as the only community which had a valid claim to the land of Hindustan and to emphasize the second-class citizenship of the non-Hindu communities.

The war brought the resignation of the Congress ministries in the provinces where they had been formed. While the Congress leaders protested the failure of the British to consult with the Indian Assembly before declaring war on behalf of India, the Mahasabha Working Committee, September 10, 1939,

> . . . extended general support to the British in the war while condemning the spirit of bargaining and of taking advantage of the prevailing crisis for the promotion of purely communal interests at the expense of national well-being . . . the Mahasabha urged the introduction of responsible government at the centre.[39]

On November 15, 1939, the Mahasabha again resolved:

> The British Government must bear in mind that India can never extend a willing cooperation unless she felt that the cause of her freedom was likely to be served in a substantial measure by offering responsive cooperation.[40]

When the Congress organized the "Quit India Movement" in 1942, the Mahasabha opposed it in a Working Committee resolution passed on August 31, 1942, and asked all Mahasabhites to remain at their jobs and not to interfere with the war effort.[41]

Reactions to the "responsive cooperation" given by the Mahasabha to the British varied. The official historian of the Mahasabha described his party's position:

[39] Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 143–4.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 146.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

Since the Congress leaders were imprisoned by the Government, the Hindu Mahasabha was left to take up the task of conducting whatever Indian national activities lay within its scope and hence assumed the leadership of all political parties in the country.[42]

The official historian of the Congress differed with this opinion:

In the formation of ministries in Muslim-majority provinces while the Congress was in prison, he [Savarkar] encouraged Hindu participation in them in different provinces on different grounds but in all these matters he was only echoing the policies of the Muslim League in looking up to the immediate rather than the remote, the policy of communal gain rather than the principle of Indian independence, the tactics of working with the British Government rather than the strategy of fighting them.[43]

The gains of the Mahasabha in this period—and there were sizable increases in membership[44]—were short lived. Once the Congress leaders were freed they again attracted the allegiance of the vast majority of Hindus. Cooperation with the League was clearly for tactical advantage only. While the League was moving closer toward partition and had adopted the Pakistan Resolution in Lahore in 1940, the Mahasabha was emphasizing the indivisibility of India and the "democratic" solution of "one man-one vote." "Exaggeration of the differences in India was met by exaggeration of its unity."[45]

When Gandhi went on a fast in February, 1942, three members of the Viceroy's Council resigned. Two of these were Hindu Congressmen, N. R. Sarkar and M. S. Aney; the third was the Parsi leader, Sir Homi Mody. A member of the Council with Mahasabha connections, Sir J. P. Srivastava, remained as Member for Food. Added to the Council was Dr. Narayan Bhaskar Khare, who had been Congress Premier of the Central Provinces in 1937 and was removed largely at the instance of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.[46] At this time Khare was nominally independent but he later became president of the Mahasabha and served as a Mahasabha member of

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[43] Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, II: 466–7.
[44] R. Coupland, *The Future of India* (London, Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 16.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[46] K. L. Panjabi, *The Indomitable Sardar* (Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), pp. 95–7.

the First Lok Sabha. Aney, who had worked with the Mahasabha in the Congress Nationalist Party in 1937, did not entirely sever his connections with the Government; he was appointed Indian High Commissioner in Ceylon.

Although the Mahasabha had been consulted by Sir Stafford Cripps when he visited India in 1942, the party was ignored by the Cabinet Mission in 1946. The Mission came to India following the 1945 elections which were an utter disaster for the Mahasabha. The only notable exception was Mookerjee whose seat was one of three won in the provinces. None was won at the center. The Mahasabha tried unsuccessfully to gain admission to the Simla Conference.[47] Savarkar did manage to present a memorandum to the Mission which was considered after the fact by the Working Committee on April 14, 1946:

> The Committee approved the memorandum . . . The memorandum contained the following points: Immediate declaration of India's independence, forming of an Interim Government to which complete power and authority must be transferred, complete autonomy for the provinces with the residuary powers lying at the Centre and the election of a Constituent Assembly consisting of all political parties in proportion to their voting strength and that this body should be vested with all powers inherent in a sovereign body.[48]

Two points in this memorandum are noteworthy. First, the Mahasabha accepted the Cabinet Mission proposal for greater autonomy in the provinces in order to retain the unity of India, although the Mahasabha did not concede, and never did concede, the right of the provinces to secede from the Indian Union. Secondly, undoubtedly recognizing its own political weakness as a result of the elections, the party proposed proportional representation in order to gain some measure of participation in the provincial and central legislatures.

With the arrival in India of Lord Mountbatten events moved rapidly toward independence and also toward an end which the Mahasabha viewed with horror: partition. The practical and less communal Mookerjee met with Jinnah in an effort to find some

[47] Abdul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 180. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, III, 698.

[48] Prakash, *op. cit.*, pp. 216–17.

common ground for avoiding partition.[49] Once he saw partition was inevitable Mookerjee worked for the partition of Punjab and Bengal to save those two Muslim majority provinces from going to Pakistan in their entirety. The Mahasabha remained aloof from this latter project of Mookerjee's. On June 3, 1947, Mountbatten announced his plan for independence and partition. The then president of the Mahasabha, L. B. Bhopatkar, issued a press statement the next day:

The British Government's plan for the transference of power reveals on the one hand an anxiety on the part of the British Government to pass power into Indian hands as speedily as possible, and on the other hand the triumph of the virile leadership of the Muslim League over the puerile one of the Congress High Command . . . It seems the Congress High Command is in a mood to surrender whatever the League chooses to demand.[50]

On June 8, the All-India Committee of the Mahasabha passed a resolution which to this day remains paramount in Mahasabha doctrine and which encouraged a still persistent feeling of insecurity in Pakistan. It said, in part:

. . . the cardinal principle of the Hindu Mahasabha has always been the unity and integrity of India and under no circumstances could it be a party to the vivisection of India in any shape or form . . . It reiterates that India is one and indivisible and that *there will never be peace unless the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and made its integral parts.*[51]

After Independence

On August 15, 1947, India was divided and the two successor states, India and Pakistan, became independent, self-governing dominions within the Commonwealth of Nations. The "calamity" which the Mahasabha feared had come to pass. The Working Committee met in New Delhi, November 30 through December 1, to consider the future of the party. A committee which included Bhopatkar, Moonje, Indra Prakash, Lahiry and V. G. Deshpande was appointed ". . . in order to reorient the policy of the Mahas-

[49] V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 113–4.
[50] Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 243–4. Emphasis added.

abha so as to make it more effective as an organ of progressive opinion in the field of social, economic, and political uplift of the Indian masses, and parties and organisations with similar objectives." [52]

Before the committee could report an event occurred which shook the Hindu Mahasabha to its foundations and eventually resulted in its all but total eclipse as a political party.[53] On January 30, 1948 a Chitpawan Brahmin, Nathuram Godse, assassinated Gandhi as he was entering the garden of Birla House in New Delhi to begin his evening prayer meeting. The story of Godse and his trial has frequently been told and need not be repeated here.[54] However, there are still questions which are under investigation and at this writing a commission is studying evidence to determine whether or not the Government of Bombay had some advance warning.[55]

Godse had had a connection with the Mahasabha in the past and had been an office-bearer. He also had had some connection with the RSS. He knew Savarkar and other Mahasabha leaders from Maharashtra. However, the Government of India was not able to prove that either the Mahasabha or the RSS directed his action. In view of the failure of extensive efforts of the Government to prove the complicity of Savarkar and others, it seems fair to conclude that neither the Mahasabha nor the RSS conspired with Godse. On the other hand, all, or almost all, of those convicted in the trial had a connection, past or present, with either the Mahasabha or the RSS or both.

The RSS was banned and the Mahasabha placed under severe restrictions.[56] Many Mahasabha leaders were arrested under the Preventive Detention Act. Strangely, however, the vice-president of the party, Mookerjee, remained a member of the Nehru Cabinet.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

[53] Richard L. Lambert, "Hindu Communal Groups in Indian Politics," in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 220.

[54] In addition to the standard histories of the period and the relevant portions of the works cited above by Azad, Keer, Prakash and Panjabi, *see also* a highly colored, anti-Mahasabha work: Jagdish Chandra Jain, *The Murder of Mahatma Gandhi* (Bombay, Chetana, 1961).

[55] *New York Times*, January 5, 1965; *Hindustan Times*, February 28, 1966.

[56] *See* Chapter III.

He had joined the Cabinet upon Nehru's invitation as Minister of Industries and Supplies on August 15, 1947. No one, then or since, to the writer's knowledge, has accused Mookerjee of complicity in the murder.[57] The wrath of the people was directed instead toward the Chitpawan Brahmin community in Maharashtra whose lot was an unhappy one for some time.

Even before the assassination, Mookerjee had advised the Mahasabha to leave politics and devote itself to social work.[58] After the assassination, on February 14, 1948, those members of the Working Committee who were not in jail passed a resolution which temporarily took the Mahasabha out of politics:

> . . . The Working Committee has given serious consideration to the various suggestions made regarding the reorientation of the Hindu Mahasabha policy. *Pending final determination* by the All-India Committee, which is to meet as soon as circumstances permit, the Working Committee feels that it must give a bold lead at this crisis specially in view of the tragic development toward internal strife. The Hindu Mahasabha, therefore, resolves to *suspend* its political activities and to concentrate on real Sanghatan work, the relief and rehabilitation of refugees and the solution of our diverse social, cultural and religious problems for the creation of a powerful and well-organised Hindu society in independent India.[59]

The "suspension" lasted just under six months. The immediate pressure from the assassination let up and the Working Committee reversed itself.[60] Mookerjee did not oppose the return of the party to active politics, but he wished to see the party drop its communal membership requirement and open its rolls to members of all communities.[61] The Working Committee which met on August 8, 1948, "recommended" that the party "consider among other things whether the membership" should be "thrown open to all citizens irrespective of caste or religion." [62] Mookerjee even suggested a change in name or that a new political party be formed while the

[57] Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 224, states that Mookerjee "dared not come out of his house." This should not be taken literally.

[58] Umaprasad Mookerjee, ed., *Shyama Prasad Mookerjee* . . . (2nd ed. Calcutta A Mukherjee and Co., 1953). Appendix III, p. 98.

[59] Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 253. Emphasis added.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 258. *See also* Balraj Madhok, *Syama Prasad Mookerjee* (New Delhi, Deepak Prakashan, 1954), p. 50.

[61] Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

it as "essentially leftist in character." Some of the "leftist" features included state ownership of land, nationalization of credit, transport and communications sectors and of "all key industries." Universal adult suffrage, territorial and functional representation in assemblies and a return to the *panchayat* system were advocated.[66] The program is still officially the policy of the Mahasabha though few if any members today support the nationalization provisions. The program was formally adopted in December, 1949, at the Calcutta session presided over by N. B. Khare, who had joined the Mahasabha in August of that year.[67] The session also repeated the demand for the end of partition: ". . . the Pakistan Agreement . . . be repudiated, and steps be taken immediately to restore the seceding areas as integral parts of Bharat Varsha." [68] Just before the 1951–52 general elections the Mahasabha again reversed itself and permitted the enrollment of non-Hindus "in the Parliamentary sphere of its activities." [69] The official historian is silent about the number of non-Hindus who took up the offer.

With the advent of the 1951–52 elections and the emergence of the Jana Sangh under Mookerjee's leadership, the story of the Mahasabha yields place in this biography to that of the Jana Sangh. The party has continued to exist, however, and it will be mentioned frequently in various connections with the Jana Sangh. There will be merger talks, sought and unfound electoral alliances, and crossing of Mahasabha members to the Jana Sangh.

In the 1951–52 elections the Mahasabha, though polling a much smaller vote than the Jana Sangh, actually elected four members of the Lok Sabha to the Jana Sangh's three. N.C. Chatterjee was elected from West Bengal largely through the efforts of his close friend, Mookerjee. Mrs. Shakuntala Nayar was elected from Uttar Pradesh; in 1962, she was elected to the Uttar Pradesh Assembly and in 1967, to the Lok Sabha, both times on a Jana Sangh ticket. Deshpande won two seats to the Lok Sabha in the former princely state of Gwalior. Upon his resignation from one of these seats, the local strength of the Mahasabha was sufficient to

[66] *Ibid., passim.*
[67] Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[69] *Ibid.*, pp. 288–9.

carry Dr. Khare into the Lok Sabha in the by-election. In Lok Sabha contests the Mahasabha polled .95 per cent of the total votes; in assembly contests, .82 per cent. It gained more than 10 per cent of the vote only in Madhya Bharat, of which Gwalior was a part. The party won 20 assembly seats of which 11 were in Madhya Bharat, four from West Bengal and two in Rajasthan. Single seats were won in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Bhopal.

The 1957 elections saw a sizable decrease in Mahasabha representation. Like the Jana Sangh it was eliminated from West Bengal after the death of Mookerjee, and also like the Jana Sangh it gained some benefit from its association with the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti in Bombay. The party won eight assembly seats, adding seven in Madhya Pradesh to one in Bombay. It also won two Lok Sabha seats: Brij Narain Brajesh from the Gwalior area and Bishen Chandra Seth from Uttar Pradesh. Deshpande and Chatterjee were defeated for re-election. Khare did not contest.

The 1962 elections saw a further decline. Seth was re-elected to the Lok Sabha, the only Mahasabhite. In the assemblies the party won eight seats, six in Madhya Pradesh and two in Uttar Pradesh. These two in Uttar Pradesh joined the Jana Sangh although one eventually left. Only 0.65 per cent of the voters supported Mahasabha candidates for the Lok Sabha; 0.51 per cent for the assemblies. The 1967 elections again saw one Mahasabhite returned to Parliament. He is Mahant Digvijaynath of Uttar Pradesh. The defection of the Rajmata of Gwalior from the Congress and her alliance with the Jana Sangh left the Mahasabha stranded in its former Gwalior pockets of strength. Thus the saffron-robed Mahant sits as the lone survivor of the Mahasabha in the Indian legislatures.

Almost none of the older members of the party from pre-independence days remain on the scene. Many have died; some have left the party for other political work, like Chatterjee; others have drifted out of politics and have retired. On February 26, 1966, in Bombay, "Veer" Savarkar died. Old animosities were largely forgotten and his services to the country during the freedom struggle were remembered. Statements of condolence were issued by many including the President, Vice President and Prime Minister.[70]

CHAPTER III

The Ideological and Organizational Ancestor: The RSS

The non-Hindu peoples in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., they must not only give up their attitude of intolerance and ungratefulness towards this land and its age-long traditions but must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion instead—in a word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in this country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment—not even citizen's rights.[1]

These are the words of Madhavrao Sadashiv Golwalkar, who since June 21, 1940, has been the *sarsanghachalak*, supreme leader, of the Rashtriya Swayamasevak Sangh.[2] The words were first written in 1939, when Golwalkar was a lieutenant of Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, founder and first *sarsanghachalak* of the RSS. The words are rather awkward reading as the second correlative *or* appears only in the fourth line from the end of the quotation. In short, the non-Hindus must become "near-Hindus" or be non-citizens of a Hindu Rashtra. As will be seen, the words of "Guruji" Golwalkar are law in the RSS, and there is no indication that Golwalkar's views of the place of non-Hindus in Bharat have been changed. Speaking of Muslims, Christians, Jews and Parsis, in a speech in Bangalore in 1960, Golwalkar referred to the minorities

[1] M. S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur, Bharat Prakashan, 4th ed., 1947), pp. 55–56.

[2] Usually translated *"National Volunteer Organization."* Here the initials RSS will be used, except where otherwise in quotations.

communities as "guests, but they are not the children of this soil."[3]

The RSS has provided much of the ideology of the Jana Sangh, much of it parallel to the ideology characteristic of the Mahasabha in the Savarkar and Parmanand period and after. It has also provided the Jana Sangh with a remarkably strong organization. To write the biography of the Jana Sangh it is necessary to look at the RSS as well as at the Mahasabha.

The Hedgewar Period

Dr. Hedgewar was born in 1889, in Nagpur, the city which is still the headquarters of the RSS.[4] He was a Brahmin of Telugu ancestry. He attended a British school in Nagpur but was expelled for leading an anti-British demonstration in 1905. As a young man he came under the influence of the great nationalist leaders of Maharashtra, particularly of Tilak. He finished his pre-college education in Poona at the National School and remained in that seat of Maharashtrian nationalism for several years before going on to the University of Calcutta where he earned a medical degree in 1915. In Calcutta he reportedly had some association with the revolutionary groups there and with Bipin Chandra Pal.

Returning to Nagpur, Hedgewar established a medical practice, but gradually turned toward nationalist politics. He joined the local unit of the Hindu Mahasabha and worked with the local Congress in the Non-Cooperation League in 1921. He worked with Muslims in the Khilafat movement, but like many Hindus he became disillusioned when the movement collapsed and the country was plunged into the series of communal disturbances which were described in the previous chapter. Hedgewar started a series of study groups in Nagpur and began a newspaper in Marathi, *Swatantrya,* which ceased publication in less than a year.[5]

Hedgewar and several associates believed that the freedom of

[3] M. S. Golwalkar, *Why Hindu Rashtra?* (Bangalore, Kesari Press, 1962), p. 8.

[4] The material for this section is largely drawn from two works; Jean A. Curran, Jr., *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics. A Study of the R.S.S.* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), and *Shri Guruji, the Man and His Mission* (Delhi, Bharat Prakashan, 1957).

[5] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 11, states the newspaper was closed by the Government; *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 24, states it ceased publication for financial reasons.

India could only be won by the Hindus and that to do so the Hindus needed cultural and physical strengthening:

> It became clear that Hindus were the nation in Bharat, and that Hindutva was Rashtriyatva . . . Only Hindus could free Hindusthan and save Hindu culture . . . Hindu youth had to be organised on the basis of personal character and absolute love of the motherland.[6]

The parallels between the views, and indeed some of the early life, of Hedgewar and Savarkar are evident, and in the emphasis on devotion to the motherland one sees also the Bengali *Bande Mataram* cult.

At the end of the Hindu festival of Dassera, the return of the victorious Rama to his capital city of Ayodhya is celebrated on Vijayadashmi Day. Rama has just defeated the evil Ravana in a conquest of good over evil. Hedgewar with five associates chose Vijayadashmi Day, 1925, to found the RSS in Nagpur.[7] An RSS publication describes the early days of the organization in rather flowery language:

> . . . The Swayamsevaks of the Sangh met daily for one hour—morning or evening. They played games, took exercise together, drilled and did some marching. They sang patriotic songs, invoked Bharat Mata and saluted the ancient Bhagwa [flag]. They discussed the nature of national problems. More important than the programme was the atmosphere. Here young and old of all castes and sects came together and developed into a vast joint family.[8]

Stripped of its effulgence, this is a valid description of the daily meeting of the *shakha* (local branch) of the RSS today.

In its first few years the RSS grew very slowly as Hedgewar preferred to gather around him a devoted core of workers who would later fan out through India to spread the message. In these early years most of the persons who became prominent in the RSS, and many who went into the Jana Sangh, made their first contacts with the organization. The highest membership before 1932 was perhaps 500 *swayamsevaks*. The organization operated only in

[6] *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 25.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 25. Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 12, states four others joined Hedgewar, and names them as M. N. Ghatate, Appaji Joshi, Bala Sahib Apte and Dada Parmarth. The last three became leaders in the RSS.

[8] *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 25.

Nagpur District. For this reason, the leadership of the RSS still is weighted toward Maharashtrians, and more particularly Maharashtrian Brahmins. The movement attracted the more educated young men and these were generally Brahmin, although membership of non-Brahmins including Harijans is recorded.[9] Curran notes: "The disciplined loyal membership of the RSS today is a memorial to the pains he took to nurse the RSS through its years of infancy." [10]

The RSS welcomed the Lahore resolution of the 1929 Congress which called for complete independence and each of the *shakhas* sent a congratulatory message to the Congress president, Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1930, the RSS participated actively in the Nagpur area in the Non-Cooperation Movement. Hedgewar himself was imprisoned. About this time he resigned his membership in the Hindu Mahasabha and apparently aroused the annoyance of Savarkar.[11]

After five years of limiting activity to Nagpur, Hedgewar decided in 1932, to expand the RSS to other parts of Maharashtra, including the Marathi-speaking areas of the then Central Provinces.[12] A few branches had been set up outside the Nagpur area earlier by RSS members whose business or educational activity had taken them from the city, but this was the first concentrated effort toward expansion.[13] A *shakha* had been set up in Banaras in 1931.[14] It is interesting to note that one of Hedgewar's companions on his tour was Nathuram Godse, the future assassin of Gandhi. Godse joined the RSS in 1930, gained laurels as an organizer, but resigned in 1934, when Hedgewar refused to take the RSS into direct political activity.[15]

During the next few years organizers were sent to almost every part of India. They achieved notable success in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Bihar, the Central Indian princely states and the Punjab. By 1938, membership was estimated at 40,000; by 1940, the RSS

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[10] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13. Savarkar was rebuffed by Hedgewar when the latter refused to bring his volunteers into an active Mahasabha relationship.
[12] Now part of Maharashtra, known as Vidarbha.
[13] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 13; *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 31.
[14] Golwalkar joined the RSS at Banaras in 1931, and was *sanghachalak*.
[15] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

claimed the adherence of 100,000 persons.[16] The new, more national character of the organization was recognized in 1938, when, at an Organizers' Training Camp Sanskrit was substituted for the original Marathi and Hindi in the prayer of the RSS.[17] In 1940, the camp had among its participants representatives of all provinces except Orissa and Assam and of most princely states—not, however, Jammu and Kashmir.[18]

The training of a cadre and the expansion which followed were successful from the RSS viewpoint, but they told heavily on the health of Hedgewar who had never been robust. At the camp in 1940, his health broke down completely, and in Nagpur on June 21, 1940, he died.

The Golwalkar Era—Before 1948

On his death bed, in the presence of the leadership of the RSS, Hedgewar designated Golwalkar as his successor. "Before giving this body finally in the hands of the doctors, I wanted to tell you that hereafter you look after the organisation and shoulder the whole responsibility." [19] In accordance with Hindu custom, Golwalkar formally assumed the offices of *sarsanghachalak* on July 5, 1940, the thirteenth day following Hedgewar's death. He has held the position ever since.

Golwalkar was born February 8, 1906, in Nagpur.[20] His father, a Brahmin, was a clerk in the Post and Telegraphs Department and later became a school teacher. Golwalkar took his first two years of college at Hislop College in Nagpur, a Christian mission school, and in 1924, transferred to Banaras Hindu University. A bright student, he took a B.Sc. in 1926 and an M.Sc. in 1928 in biology. He spent a brief period in fisheries research in Madras and returned to Banaras Hindu University to join the faculty in 1930. In the same year he first met Hedgewar and a year later founded the Banaras *shakha* of the RSS. Both as a student and as a faculty member he met and admired Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, one

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[17] *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 31.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 31. Jammu was to become a strong center of the RSS.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[20] Biographical information on Golwalkar is developed from Curran and *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*

of the founders of the university. Through Malaviya, Golwalkar was brought into contact with the Mahasabha and the Hindu nationalists, although he never actively associated himself with the party.

Golwalkar left the university in 1933 and returned to Nagpur at Hedgewar's request. There he worked in the RSS headquarters and also, at the behest of his parents, entered the Law College, receiving an LL.B in 1935. For the next two years he combined a law practice with RSS work.

He was, at this time, undergoing a period of spiritual torment. He became associated in Nagpur with the Ramakrishna Mission. In 1937, he left the RSS and went to Calcutta to become a disciple of Swami Akhandananda. Shortly after Golwalkar's arrival in Calcutta Akhandananda died suddenly. Golwalkar was shattered and fell into deep depression. He returned to Nagpur, met Hedgewar and was convinced that he could best serve Hindu society by a return to RSS work.

He progressed rapidly. He was charged by Hedgewar with several organizing missions, including setting up the first *shakha* in Calcutta. He wrote his principal work *We, or Our Nationhood Defined* in 1939, reportedly taking only three days to do so. In 1939, he was appointed *sarkaryavaha,* i.e. general secretary, of the RSS. During the incapacity of Hedgewar he acted in place of the *sarsanghachalak.*

Under Golwalkar's leadership the RSS pressed its expansion work. Further efforts were undertaken in Maharashtra, the Northern India Hindi-speaking areas, and Punjab. There is an almost exact parallel between the propaganda and organizational campaigns of the RSS and those undertaken later by the Jana Sangh. For the Jana Sangh, as well, the initial efforts were made in Northern India; as will be seen in later chapters the initial Jana Sangh successes in Bengal were not triumphs of organization but of the personality of Mookerjee. For the Jana Sangh the base point of operations was Delhi while for the RSS it was, and remains, Nagpur; hence, the Jana Sangh did not work organizationally in the Marathi-speaking areas to the extent the RSS did. Once organizational work was consolidated in the initial areas, each group looked west to Gujarat and south to the Andhra country and the Malabar

area. And each neglected Bengal, Orissa and Assam until much later.

While the RSS did not take the almost pro-British stand of the Mahasabha, the organization did not come out strongly against the British as did the Congress after war broke out in 1939. As an organization, the RSS did not support the 1942 Quit India movement:

> The Sangh viewed the movement sympathetically but did not participate in it on the organisational level. It was felt that it was the time to organise and strengthen the people, and not to land ourselves in jail and remain immobilised for years . . . All the same quite a few RSS workers participated in the 1942 movement in their individual capacity.[21]

Formally the RSS did not take part in active politics, but one writer notes: "It was non-political only in one sense: it did not take part in elections nor was it organised for electoral purposes." [22] Although Hedgewar had refused to make the RSS an organizational prop for the Savarkar-led Mahasabha, many of the individual *swayamsevaks* supported the Mahasabha and were office holders in the party. As in the case of the Mahasabha the strength of the RSS grew rapidly after the failure of the 1942 movement and the jailing of many Congress leaders. The rapid movement toward partition as a road to independence brought many Hindus closer to and into Hindu communal organizations. However, it seems clear that the accretion of strength to the RSS was much more enduring than the increase in Mahasabha membership, most of which fell away when the Congress returned to the political arena.

Just before independence, the RSS acquired an "unofficial" English weekly to publish its ideas. *Organiser* was first published in Delhi, July 3, 1947, under the editorship of A. R. Nair. A month earlier the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, had announced the plan of independence including the partition of the country. The first issue of *Organiser* contained an article by Mookerjee entitled *"Hindus Will Never Accept Partition."* [23] The paper announced in its December 18, 1947, issue the formation of Bharat Prakashan

[21] *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 33.

[22] Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 182–3.

[23] *Organiser*, I:1 (July 3, 1947).

(Delhi), Limited, a publishing concern which still operates in the printing and distribution of books advocating the RSS and Jana Sangh philosophy.[24] The RSS also tried to establish its own daily newspaper and set up the Hindusthan Prakashan Trust.[25] In Delhi, this has been unsuccessful.

Communal disturbances began in Bihar and Bengal in August, 1946, and reached frightful proportions. In the spring of 1947, the holocaust spread throughout northern India and the Punjab. After independence, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The RSS presumably had little to do with troubles in Bengal, as its strength there was minimal, but there is still much controversy over the role of the organization in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir; an RSS publication states:

> . . . there was the consideration of protecting Hindu life and honour throughout Northern Bharat. Muslim riots were going on all over. Who would save the Hindus in the absence of the R.S.S.? . . . it was the Sangh workers who saved millions of Hindus in Pakistan areas—including Congress ministers—from annihilation. And it was the R.S.S. which scotched the Muslim conspiracy to rise in revolt in East Punjab and Delhi, and annex the area to Pakistan. Also R.S.S. plunged itself into relief work.[26]

The Government of West Punjab (Pakistan) published a pamphlet in 1948, which, claiming official intelligence reports as its source, states that the RSS was deeply involved in a plot to eliminate Muslims in sufficient numbers in selected *tehsils* to change the composition of the population from a Muslim majority to a non-Muslim majority.[27] This report also alleged cooperation between the Akal Fauj of the Sikhs and the RSS. The report gives the membership of the RSS in undivided Punjab at 59,200 in June, 1947. Some time after the events, Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel said, in a letter to Golwalkar:

> There can be no doubt that R.S.S. did service to Hindu Society. In the areas where there was the need for help and organisation, the young

[24] *Ibid.*, I:25 (December 18, 1947).
[25] *Ibid.*, I: 44 (November 6, 1948).
[26] *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 34.
[27] *RSSS in the Punjab,* Lahore, Superintendent, Government Printing, West Punjab, 1948. Appendix.

men of R.S.S. protected women and children and strove much for their sake. No person of understanding could have a word of objection regarding that. But the objectionable part arose when they, burning with revenge, began attacking Mussalmans. Organising the Hindus and helping them is one thing, but going in for revenge for its sufferings on innocent and helpless men, women and children is quite another thing.[28]

In Kashmir, too, the RSS was active and there are two diametrically opposed views as to the nature of the activity. The first president of the Azad Kashmir Government has written:

. . . the Sikhs and the RSS had been transferred from Amritsar to Jammu. The RSS started their activities openly with a license from authorities. A plan was evolved to completely wipe out the Muslim population in the city of Jammu . . . All branches of the RSS were supplied with their quota of arms and ammunition, and the State Hindu officers were sent to give them proper instruction in the use of their arms.[29]

The other side of this tale is from an official RSS publication:

The R.S.S. role in saving Jammu and Kashmir was as important as it was silent. In Jammu the local Muslims were in league with Pakistan . . . In Jammu the Muslim plan was to stage a *coup*. To this end they had collected a big stock of arms . . . Then followed a Muslim riot. Initially taken aback, the Hindus, heartened by R.S.S. workers, mustered strength and retaliated. The tables were turned on the Muslims . . .[30]

After crediting the RSS with carrying ammunition on their backs across the Ravi at Madhopur and with widening the Srinagar airstrip, the account mentions several instances of RSS participation with the State army in defending the Valley against the tribal invaders.

This is not the place to enter into the controversy and assess the performance of the RSS during the partition rioting. Sardar Patel in the letter quoted above stated the widely held opinion of most observers, i.e., that the RSS helped the Hindus but also attacked Muslims. Curran has written:

[28] Patel to Golwalkar, September 11, 1948, reproduced in *Justice on Trial* (Bangalore, Kamal Printers, 1958), p. 25.

[29] Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, *The Kashmir Saga* (Lahore, Ripon Printing Press, 1965), p. 44.

[30] [illegible] *i, op. cit.*, p. 85.

Yet if one is to be fair in judging who was guilty of violence during the Partition, blame must be apportioned also to the Sikhs, many individual Hindus and a number of Congressmen, not to mention the Muslim groups that attacked defenseless Hindus.[31]

When independence came on August 15, 1947, the RSS proclaimed a day of mourning for the destruction of the "sacred indivisibility of Bharatmata." In 1956, the RSS again stated its position on partition:

Our Motherland has been partitioned. Some people ask me to forget this fact. But I, for one, can never persuade myself to forget it. I would appeal to you also not to forget this tragic episode. It is an abiding humiliation for us. We have to pledge ourselves resolutely not to rest content until we have wiped out this blot.[32]

In the preceding chapter the assassination of Gandhi on January 30, 1948, was described. The assassin, Nathuram Godse, had been associated with both the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS, and, as mentioned above, had accompanied Hedgewar on his first tour of Maharashtra in 1932. Following the assassination, the Mahasabha was suppressed and several of its leaders, including Savarkar and Deshpande arrested. The reaction of the Government of India to the RSS was much stronger: the organization was banned on February 4, following the internment of Golwalkar on February 3.

After independence both the Government and the RSS felt each other out. Nehru suspected and perhaps feared the organization. He was a convinced secularist faced with the immense task of governing a country torn by communal passions. A group which he saw as outright communalist was a danger. Gandhi, while certainly not subscribing to the narrow views of the RSS, apparently appreciated the rescue work being done by the *swayamsevaks,* and visited the RSS camp in Delhi on September 16, 1947. When he went on fast in January, 1948, he was visited by leaders of all communities including Lala Hansraj Gupta, the Delhi *sanghachalak*.[33] Patel tried to soften the criticisms of the Congress. In Lucknow, January 6, he said:

I appeal to the R.S.S. to use their wisdom and work in a proper way. I ask them not to be rash or tactless. Do not be aggressive.

[31] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[32] *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 70. "I" presumably is Golwalkar.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 35. Gupta is now Mayor of Delhi.

In the Congress those who are in power feel that by virtue of authority they will be able to crush the R.S.S. By *danda* [force] you cannot suppress any organisation, Moreover, *danda* is meant for thieves . . . Its use will not help much. After all, R.S.S. men are not thieves and dacoits. They love their country. Only their trend of thought is diverted. They are to be won over by Congressmen with love.[34]

According to his biographer, "Sardar Patel did not consider the R.S.S. volunteers criminals but only misguided patriots."

Immediately upon learning of the assassination, Golwalkar sent identical condolence telegrams to Nehru, Patel and Devadas Gandhi. He also directed all RSS *shakhas* to suspend "normal routine" for the thirteen days of Hindu mourning "out of respect and sense of sorrow at the tragic demise of Mahatmaji." [35]

The assassination had an overnight effect on public opinion. Where prior to the event the communalists had been riding a tide of anti-partition, anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim feeling, there was now a rapid turn against communalism, against the Mahasabha, against the RSS and violently against the Chitpawan Brahmin community in Maharashtra. The Government of India took advantage of the change to arrest Golwalkar on February 3, and to follow this with the arrest of some 20,000 *swayamsevaks.* In Maharashtra, in Poona, Nagpur and elsewhere, Brahmins were attacked physically, many were killed, and their property was destroyed. A mob attacked the RSS headquarters in Nagpur and stoned Golwalkar's residence. On February 1, Golwalkar issued a press statement in which he took a lofty view of the violence following the assassination:

In the presence of this appalling tragedy I hope people will learn the lesson and practice the doctrine of love and service. Believing in this doctrine, I direct all my brother swayamsevaks to maintain a loving attitude towards all, even if there be any sort of provocation born out of misunderstanding and to remember that even this misplaced frenzy is an expression of unbounded love and reverence, in which the whole country held the great Mahatma, the man who made the name of our motherland great in the world. Our salutations to the revered departed one.[36]

[34] K. L. Panjabi, *The Indomitable Sardar* (Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), p. 131.

[35] *Justice on Trial, op. cit.*, p. 61. However Patel in a letter to Golwalkar, September 11, 1948, said: "R.S.S. men expressed joy and distributed sweets after Gandhiji's death." (p. 25). The charge, never proven, is still levied.

[36] *Ibid.*, 62–3.

The statement is almost Gandhian in style.

The Government issued a communique on February 4, which declared the RSS unlawful. It ran, in part:

> The professed aims and objects of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh are to promote the physical, intellectual and moral well-being of the Hindus and also to foster feelings of brotherhood, love and service amongst them . . . Government have, however, noticed with regret that in practice members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh have not adhered to their professed ideals.
>
> Undesirable and even dangerous activities have been carried on by members of the Sangh. It has been found that in several parts of the country individual members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh have indulged in acts of violence involving arson, robbery, dacoity and murder and have collected illicit arms and ammunition. They have been found circulating leaflets exhorting people to resort to terrorist methods, to collect firearms, to create disaffection against the Government and suborn the Police and the Military. These activities have been carried on under a cloak of secrecy, and Government have considered from time to time how far these activities rendered it incumbent upon them to deal with the Sangh in its corporate capacity . . .
>
> It was then unanimously agreed that the stage when the Sangh should be dealt with as an association had not yet arrived . . . The objectionable and harmful activities of the Sangh have, however, continued unabated and the cult of violence sponsored and inspired by the activities of the Sangh have claimed many victims. The latest and most precious to fall was Gandhiji himself . . .[37]

This communique has been quoted in some detail. It charges that the RSS-"sponsored and inspired cult of violence" was responsible for the assassination of Gandhi. But "the Red Fort Trial in Old Delhi showed clearly that the R.S.S. was not connected with Gandhi's murder."[38] And in spite of the other charges of acts of violence made in the communique, so far as is known only one trial was held, and in that the accused RSS members were acquitted.

Golwalkar continued to act with a degree of dignity in the face of what was clearly a political act by the Government. From jail he issued a statement disbanding the organization on February 8. A series of letters from Golwalkar to both Nehru and Patel ensued. In each letter Golwalkar said, in effect, "If you have complaints of a

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 63–65.
[38] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

criminal nature against the RSS or against its members, try them in an open court of law but in fairness discontinue the broad, unproven charges of unlawfulness." Golwalkar was detained until August 6. During this period he was prevented from communicating with the Government. On his release he began the correspondence. His first letter to Nehru received no reply. A second letter to Nehru received a response from the Prime Minister's secretary which expressed Nehru's view that the "R.S.S. were engaged in activities which were anti-national and prejudicial." [39] The response also alleged that the Uttar Pradesh government had specific charges against the RSS; possibly these were the charges of inciting communal riot of which the accused were acquitted in the trial mentioned above. Golwalkar remained in Nagpur until October 16, when the restrictions on his travel were cancelled. He travelled to New Delhi and met Patel twice. No record of the meetings is available but it is clear they produced no result.

Writing to Nehru on November 3, Golwalkar made his most telling point:

> . . . in a Government by law in a free state, which propounds and maintains the fundamental rights of citizens and their right to associate and peacefully propagate their views, we claim it as a right to be placed in possession of the "evidence," so that we may meet the charges. It is unfair for a civilized government, that ours is, to charge any person or body of persons with crimes of a serious character, without laying sufficient weighty evidence on the table and giving the accused a chance to vindicate his innocence.[40]

The Government of India was not prepared to do this. Nehru replied with the same general charges.

Golwalkar was served on November 12, with a Government order directing him to return to Nagpur. He refused to leave New Delhi without some satisfaction and was arrested and returned to Nagpur under guard on November 14. He remained in custody until the lifting of the ban on July 12, 1949. On November 13, before he left New Delhi, Golwalkar issued a directive to all *sway-*

[39] A. V. Pai to Golwalkar, September 27, 1948. *Justice on Trial, op. cit.*, pp. 9–10.

[40] Golwalkar to Nehru, November 3, 1948. *Justice on Trial, op. cit.*, pp. 11–13. *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 37.

amsevaks in which he withdrew his earlier directive disbanding the organization.

Golwalkar then called upon *swayamsevaks* to defy the ban by holding *shakhas* beginning December 9.[41] In ordering the defiance Golwalkar took into consideration the change in the political climate. The wave of anti-communalism following Gandhi's murder was subsiding; Indo-Pakistan relations were deteriorating over the Kashmir issue, trade matters and the flow of Hindu refugees from Pakistan.[42] An RSS publication states that some 60,000 members were arrested, a figure approximating the Government's.[43]

Events then moved rapidly toward the removal of the ban. Golwalkar called a halt to the *Satyagraha* on January 14, 1949. He and Patel began a series of negotiations by letter and through intermediaries. In his letters Golwalkar wrote bluntly, and in at least one case offended the sensitivities of an Indian Civil Service officer on duty as Home Secretary.[44] The principal mediator was T. V. R. Shastri, president of the Indian Liberal Federation. Another person who came into the picture was Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma, then general secretary of the Civil Liberties Union, and later to become a controversial figure in Jana Sangh history.

The principal demand of the Government was that the RSS constitution be reduced to writing and become a public document. Another problem for the Government was the status of the RSS flag; Golwalkar accepted the State flag as the "object of reverence to all citizens," but commented that many organizations, including the Congress, have their own flags.[45] Golwalkar forwarded a written constitution to the Government on April 11.[46] A series of exchanges followed in which the Home Secretary continued to take exception to Golwalkar's language, but Golwalkar knew better than the civil servant the direction events were taking. The Government objected that the constitution did not provide for sufficient elective positions on the highest executive. Golwalkar replied that he had to

[41] *Shri Guruji, op. cit.*, p. 39.
[42] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[44] H. V. R. Iyengar to Golwalkar, May 24, 1949. *Justice on Trial, op. cit.* p. 48.
[45] Golwalkar to Mauli Chandra Sharma, July 10, 1949. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[46] Golwalkar to Patel through D. P. Mishra, April 11, 1949. *ibid.*, p. 36.

a large extent borrowed the plan from the constitution of the Congress Party.[47]

The Government never formally accepted the RSS constitution, but on July 11, 1949, it issued a communique ending the ban on the RSS. ". . . In March [sic] this year, the R.S.S. leader wrote to Government forwarding a draft constitution . . . The Government of India conveyed to the R.S.S. leader their reactions to the draft and he has now *generally accepted* the suggestions . . ." [48]

After the Lifting of the Ban

The RSS had never before issued a basic document: "one does not need a constitution to preach nationalism and to advance individual and national character." [49] The newly published document appears to have set down in writing basically the same policies and structure which were the practice prior to codification. The principal exception was specific provision for a degree of electoral activity in the selection of leadership, and thereby in the development of policy.

As the constitution describes the organization in detail, it will be useful to give an outline of it, with some full quotation: [50]

Preamble

Whereas in the disintegrated conditions of the country it was considered necessary to have an organisation:

(a) to eradicate fissiparous tendencies arising from diversities of sect, faith, caste and creed and from political, economic, linguistic and provincial differences, amongst Hindus;

(b) to make them realise the greatness of their past;

(c) to inculcate in them a spirit of service, sacrifice and selfless devotion to the Hindu Samaj as a whole;

(d) to build up an organised and well-disciplined corporate life; and

(e) to bring about an all-round regeneration of the Hindu Samaj; . . .

and whereas the Sangh had till now no written constitution;

and whereas in the present changed conditions, it is deemed expedi-

[47] Golwalkar to Sharma, *ibid.*, p. 56.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–92. Emphasis supplied.

[49] "An Epic of Achievement," *Organiser*, III:1 (August 22, 1949).

[50] The text of the Constitution is contained in *Organiser*, III:3 (September 6, 1949).

ent to reduce to writing the Constitution as also the aims and objects of the Sangh and its method of work . . .

Articles 1 and 2 establish the name of the organization and its headquarters at Nagpur.

Article 3:
The aims and objects of the Sangh are to weld together the diverse groups within the Hindu Samaj and to revitalise and rejuvenate the same on the basis of its Dharma and Sanskriti, that it may achieve an all-sided development of the Bharatvarsha.
Article 4:
(a) The Sangh believes in orderly evolution of the Society and adheres to peaceful and legitimate means for the realisation of its ideals.
(b) In consonance with the cultural heritage of the Hindu Samaj, the Sangh has abiding faith in the fundamental principle of tolerance towards all faiths.
The Sangh as such has no politics and is devoted to purely social work. The individual Swayamsevaks, however, may join any political party, except such parties as believe in or resort to violent and secret methods to achieve their ends; persons owing allegiance to such parties or believing in such methods shall have no place in the Sangh.
Article 5:
While recognising the duty of every citizen to be loyal to and to respect the State Flag, the Sangh has as its flag, the Bhagwa-Dhwaj—the age-old symbol of Hindu culture.

Article 6 sets the age limit of *swayamsevaks* at 18 and permits younger persons to join as *bal-swayamsevaks*. By *Article* 7 local registers are to be kept by each *shakha*.

Article 8 describes the breakdown of the RSS into province (*prant*), division (*vibhag*), district (*jila*), tehsil, and town organizations, with cities (*nagar*) of more than 100,000 population receiving the status of districts. This parallels the Congress party organization.

Article 9 provides for triennial elections.

Article 10 gives the franchise to all active *swayamsevaks* who have one year membership and specifically provides regarding qualification:

He (i.e. a Swayamsevak) who is an Office-bearer of a Political Party, shall not be eligible as a candidate for election or as an appointee to any post so long as he is such an Office-bearer.

Candidates for national elective or appointive posts must have been members for at least six years and must agree to serve full time without remuneration. For provincial posts the membership period is three years and the full time work without pay is not required. Only persons with one year membership may become *chalaks* of *shakhas.*

Article 11 lists the various offices of the RSS which are discussed in detail in the succeeding articles.

Article 12 describes the *sarsanghachalak* (supreme leader). He is the "guide and philosopher" of the RSS. He is entitled to nominate his successor "as and when the necessity arises, with the consent of the *Kendriya Karyakari Mandal*" (central working committee).

Article 13 provides for the election of the *sarkaryavaha* (general secretary) by the elected members of the working committee.

Article 14 describes the working committee. The *sarsanghachalak* is apparently considered to be above such a body and is not a member of it. The presiding officer is the general secretary. Other members include the joint general secretaries, physical training secretary, cultural secretary, publicity secretary and treasurer. While these are all appointive offices, there shall be "in addition not less than five members who shall be chosen from among the Karyakari Mandals of the provinces." In the working committee is vested the highest authority for the operation of the RSS, under the guidance of the *sarsanghachalak.*

Article 15 establishes the *Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha* (All-India Representative Body, corresponding roughly to the All-India Congress Committee). Its basic membership is elected by the provincial representative bodies, in a ratio of one member of the all-India group for each eight members of the provincial body. In addition the provincial *sanghachalaks* and *pracharaks* (organizers) are members as are all members of the working committee. Sessions are to be held at least annually. It is entitled to review the work of the working committee and prescribe general policy to be implemented by the working committee.

Articles 16, 18 and 19 provide for similar office holders and

committees for the provincial, divisional, district, city, tehsil and town levels of the RSS.

Article 17 describes the office of *pracharak*. He is to be a full time, unpaid worker

> . . . selected from amongst those devoted workers of high integrity, whose mission is to serve the society through the Sangh, and who, of their own free will, dedicate themselves to the cause.

The provincial organizer is appointed by Nagpur and can only be removed by the central office. The provincial organizer appoints organizers at the lower levels.

The remaining *Articles 20 through 25* are procedural and need not be discussed here, except to note that *Article* 22 states "all offerings, gifts, donations . . . shall constitute the Sangh funds." There are no dues in the RSS, funds being provided annually on "Guru Dakshina Day."

This discussion of the RSS constitution shows that the minimum demands of the Government were met, albeit sometimes grudgingly as in the case of the flag. The elective principle was given lip service but the power remained vested in Golwalkar as "guide and philosopher." The RSS went to great lengths to disclaim any political role for itself, although the very issue of *Organiser* which contained the constitution also contained an article urging the RSS to enter politics.[51] The matter of the RSS and politics will form a major portion of the next chapter.

There is a great deal of similarity between the RSS and Jana Sangh constitutions. In each the provincial president is primarily a symbolic leader while the real power is given to the secretary. The terminology is also much the same for the working committees and the representative bodies, as is the method of selecting the members of those bodies. The Jana Sangh, however, has a completely appointed working committee. The Jana Sangh has no supreme leader, as does the RSS. Jana Sangh presidents are elected annually and are often only nominal leaders. This has permitted opponents of the Jana Sangh to allege that it as well as the RSS acknowledges Golwalkar.

[51] With the by-line of Balraj Madhok. *Ibid.*

While printing the Constitution, *Organiser* gave pictures of many RSS leaders thus presenting the clearest identification of the leadership so far offered. At the top were Golwalkar as *sar-sanghachalak;* Bhayyaji Dani, general secretary; Appaji Joshi and Bala Sahib Deoras, joint secretaries; and Bala Sahib Apte, organizing secretary. Several others who were mentioned were to become prominent in the Jana Sangh. These included Dindayal Upadhyaya, later Jana Sangh general secretary and then assistant organizer in Uttar Pradesh; Bachhraj Vyas, president of the Jana Sangh in 1965, then Nagpur City secretary of the RSS; Bapu Sahib Sohoni, later an acting Jana Sangh president, then *sanghachalak* for Berar; and Vasant Krishna Oke, an early Jana Sanghi who left the party and who in 1949 was Delhi organizer. Among the founders with Hedgewar, we have named Joshi and Apte; Dada Parmarth was Madras organizer in 1949, and, although not pictured, Ghatate was then active in the RSS. Perhaps most important among those others on the list was the then organizing secretary for Bengal, Orissa and Assam, Eknath Ranade; he later became general secretary and is now cultural secretary and probably at present the leading exponent of RSS ideology to outsiders. Bhau Rao Deoras, brother of Bala Sahib, was then as now organizer for Uttar Pradesh. Similarly Madhu Rao Muley continues to hold his Punjab organizer position and has added Oke's Delhi territory. The list is long but the names given are the most prominent and serve to show both the continuity of the RSS leadership and its role as a training ground for the Jana Sangh. It also shows the predominance of Brahmins among the leadership, and particularly Maharashtrian Brahmins.

Organiser had its difficulties as did the RSS in the aftermath of the Gandhi assassination. After the murder it was banned until July 29, 1948. A number of issues in August and September were missed and then the publication was banned again until August 22, 1949. When it reappeared Nair had departed as editor and was replaced by Keval R. Malkani, who will be frequently mentioned as this biography proceeds. The new publisher was Brij Bhushan, a Delhi businessman with RSS associations.

In the years since the lifting of the ban, the RSS has continued to grow and to remain an important factor on the Indian scene. One writer predicted its demise:

> Although the hearings found no evidence of direct participation of either the Mahasabha or the RSS in Gandhi's murder, popular sentiment and unofficial government opinion held them responsible and their prestige fell drastically.[52]

Another wrote that after the murder the RSS "sunk out of sight."[53] While the first quotation may be correct in so far as the Mahasabha is concerned, both are far from the mark in regard to the RSS. The RSS and the Jana Sangh do, however, frequently face accusation as "murderers of Gandhi." These most commonly come from the Congress "left" or from the Communists, are used as political slogans, and, of course, show a disregard for the legal decision in the case.

The present active membership of the RSS has been estimated at from 700,000 to 1,000,000 by its supporters. There are no figures published, but it is probable that the membership is at least the lower of the two figures. The number of sympathizers, including former members who have dropped out of active participation but who generally continue to subscribe to RSS ideology, is undoubtedly much greater.

Through the years the RSS has continued to perform some notable work at times of local or more widespread disaster. It has worked in flood and famine relief and among refugees from Pakistan. As will be noted later, it has also participated in semi-political activities such as opposition to the Hindu Code Bill and agitation for legislation against cow slaughter. There is little question that at times it has been a factor in communal disturbances.

The ideology of RSS has spread abroad among overseas Hindus. A Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh existed in Burma and was headed by Dr. Mangal Sein, now a Jana Sangh member of the Haryana Legislative Assembly.[54] Similar groups have been formed in Kenya, Uganda, Fiji, Mauritius, Guyana and Malaysia.

In pre-Independence days the Mahasabha held the King of Nepal in a degree of reverence as the only independent Hindu ruler

[52] Richard L. Lambert, "Hindu Communal Groups in Indian Politics"; in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 215–6.

[53] W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan* (2nd ed.; Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 247.

[54] *Organiser*, ?:11 (October 23, 1950).

in the world. He is still looked up to by a number of Hindu groups. The RSS has for several years had sympathizers in Nepal and a largely RSS-controlled news agency, Hindusthan Samachar, has been active in Kathmandu. In 1965 a "most incredible spectacle" [55] took place when an RSS branch was opened in Nepal by Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya.

> . . . Why this staunchly leftist leader should inaugurate a body of this type was the subject of amused speculation. Presumably, however, it was part of a campaign to convince the King that the leftist intellectual bloc was not necessarily hostile to the King's increasing dedication to a traditional Hindu policy.[56]

This opening of the branch came after an equally incredible sequence of events. The press announced that King Mahendra would visit Nagpur on January 14, 1965, to address an RSS rally. The report went on to say that the Government of India was aware of the King's plans, but

> . . . if the King chose to associate himself with the R.S.S. it was entirely his business and no one is inclined to regard it as an attempt on the part of the King to maintain contacts with an organisation which has links with one of the parties opposed to the ruling Congress Party.[57]

Or was that the Government position? On January 9, it was reported the visit had been cancelled. The King is reported to have written to the RSS: "I hope you will kindly understand my difficulties and also appreciate how ruffled are my feelings in not being able to attend as a Hindu." [58] Nonetheless the King sent a message to the meeting which called on Hindus to "march forward to protect, strengthen and develop Hindu society and to revitalise Dharma." [59] Golwalkar said the visit cancellation showed that

> . . . King Mahendra has given proof of his friendship for Bharat and his keen diplomatic acumen.
>
> The same, however, cannot be said about our leaders . . . they cannot but have displeased him and have prevented the strengthening of the

[55] Leo E. Rose, "Nepal in 1965." *Asian Survey,* VI:2 (February 1966), p. 88.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Hindu Weekly Review,* January 4, 1965.
[58] *New York Times,* January 17, 1965, quoting a report in *Organiser.*
[59] Rose, *op. cit.,* p. 88.

only bond the Himalayan state recognises between itself and Bharat—that common Hindu Dharma, Hindu Sanskriti and Hindu people . . .[60]

However, all ended well. The RSS gained worldwide publicity and India eventually secured affirmation of Nepali support in Kashmir.

The RSS has never sanctioned a women's affiliate. However, in 1934, Mrs. Lakshmibhai Kelkar founded the Rashtra Sevika Samiti. She asked Hedgewar for assistance but he refused citing the *brahmacharya* vows of the RSS leaders and fulltime workers. Curran estimated the membership of the Samiti as 75,000 to 100,000 in 1951, concentrated in Punjab, Delhi and Maharashtra. He also notes that the connection between the two organizations is unofficial, but through family ties, is often very close.[61] A recent press report identified the Samiti as "the women's wing of the R.S.S."[62]

The RSS continued to take strongly communal positions after the lifting of the ban. Speaking at Agra on November 27, 1951, Golwalkar said:

The Congress cut the country into two. The Communists would cut it into ten. The sole aim of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is to generate forces for the consolidation of the country from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari . . . Muslims are lying low in wait for trouble. It is yet too early to base our policies on the assumption of their loyalty . . . I have the greatest regard for Jesus Christ. He was a great man. But Bharati Christians will have to mend their ways. Their subsidised attempt to impose their creed on poor Hindus is repugnant.[63]

Bhayyaji Dani, the general secretary, is reported to have said:

Hindus alone are loyal citizens of Bharat, as it is they who inherit everything in this land from times immemorial, with their nationality, language, history and religion inseparably bound up with the soil . . .[64]

As an organization solely for Hindus, including all castes and embracing Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists, the RSS does not pretend to act as a non-communal body. Christians, Muslims, and Parsis cannot join the RSS. Thus the RSS emphasis is on Hinduism while the

[60] *Hindu Weekly Review*, January 18, 1965.
[61] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[62] *Hindustan Times*, February 28, 1966.
[63] *Organiser*, V:16 (December 3, 1951).
[64] *Ibid.*, VI:10 (October 20, 1952).

Jana Sangh places emphasis on Bharatiya nationalism, a term which is intended to mean more than just Hinduism.

In recent years the RSS has been getting a better press in India. Golwalkar himself has been consulted by the Government and has been included in the "all-parties, all-groups" conferences which have been more frequent following the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Since the death of Nehru, it seems there has been an increase in the acceptance of Golwalkar and the RSS. For example, on November 1, 1964, at the Red Fort in Delhi celebrations commemorating the birth of Sardar Patel were held. The press reports the speakers to have been President Radhkrishnan, former Finance Minister Morarji Desai, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Satyanarain Sinha, Punjab Governor Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim, socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia—and Golwalkar.[65] The September, 1965, conflict between India and Pakistan gave another fillip to Golwalkar, who was described in a Pakistani newspaper as the "high priest of communalism." [66] Golwalkar's efforts, and those of Balraj Madhok, seem to have contributed to the easing of Hindu-Sikh tensions in Punjab after the 1966 partition of that state, and may have contributed to the Jana Sangh electoral success and subsequent coalition with the Akali Dal.

Thus the RSS continues as a virile organization dedicated to the revival of Hinduism and to the setting up of a Hindu Rashtra in India. As such it is feared by the secular successors of Nehru.

[65] *Times of India,* Bombay edition, November 2, 1964.
[66] *Pakistan Times,* Lahore edition, August 4, 1965.

CHAPTER IV

The Founding of the Jana Sangh

It has been said, with good reason, that the Jana Sangh resulted from a combination of a partyless leader, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, and a leaderless party, the RSS. We have traced the development of the RSS up to the time of the founding of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and have noted that its constitution barred it from entering politics as an organization. To this it has, in the narrowest sense, adhered. The constitution permitted individual *swayamsevaks* to do as they wished in political matters, subject only to the limitation that officeholders of parties could not hold offices in the RSS. We must now look at the movement toward political activity by the RSS, at the personality of Mookerjee, and finally at the formation of the new party.

The RSS and Politics

The first issue of *Organiser* published after the lifting of the ban on the paper contained the first of two articles entitled "The R.S.S. and Politics," by C. Parameswaran.[1] As has been noted, the issue containing the RSS constitution also printed an article by Balraj Madhok on the same topic.[2] These articles were followed in 1949 by a series by "Kamal" on the "Sangh and Growing Statism" [3] and in early 1950 an article appeared by Dadarao Parmarth on the

[1] *Organiser*, III:1 (August 22, 1949); III:2 (August 30, 1949).
[2] *Ibid.*, III:3 (September 6, 1949).
[3] *Ibid.*, III:14 (November 23, 1949), *et. seq.* "Kamal" is *Organiser* editor K. R. Malkani.

political role of the RSS.[4] Madhok called on the RSS to save the nation:

> So far the Sangh has confined its activities to the social and cultural field with the object of creating much needed unity and national character in the country on the basis of Bharatiya culture and ideals . . .
>
> But there are other problems whose proper handling and solution is as vital to the national health as unity and character. They are mainly political and economic which the Sangh has decided not to touch . . .
>
> It is necessary that the Sangh must give the lead to the country in regard to the political and economic problems of the country as well. It is essential for the very existence of the Sangh itself. Any institution or organization of the people which fails to guide its component parts about the vital questions influencing their lives is bound to lose the driving force which keeps any organisation alive.[5]

Such was the reasoning which put the RSS into politics. India needed not only Bharatiya culture and religion but, in order for these to flourish, a Bharatiya political and economic system as well. The true guardian of Bharatiya culture was the RSS. The opponents of the RSS were "anti-Dharmic" in Parameswaran's language.[6] "Kamal" wrote that the "only way to restore dharma" was "by putting the shoulder to the political wheel." [7]

It is inconceivable that these articles suggesting RSS entry into politics were published in the organization's semi-official journal without the virtual imprimatur of the RSS leadership. Not surprisingly, the press picked up the word and went further to say that Golwalkar had issued secret instructions to the provincial *sanghachalaks* to "make preparations to contest the coming general elections." [8] These reports were denied in *Organiser* with some vehemence: "All these stories, as far as we know, are entirely baseless, nay even mischievous." The *Organiser* denial contained the stock phrase that the RSS constitution barred political activity.[9] The paper of January 23, 1950, however, carried an article by one of the founding members, calculated to redress the balance but at the same time reiterate the dangers of the drift toward "anti-Dhar-

[4] *Ibid.*, III:22 (January 23, 1950).
[5] *Ibid.*, III:3 (September 6, 1949).
[6] *Ibid.*, III:1 (August 22, 1949).
[7] *Ibid.*, III:16 (December 7, 1949).
[8] *Ibid.*, III:19 (December 28, 1949).
[9] *Ibid.*

mism." In it Dada Parmarth characterized the contest as quadra gular, and dismissed each of the four "parties in the arena." Tl Congress "does not have the country's cause at heart . . . retentic of power is the only thing they have in mind." The Communis "believe in coercion and force of all types." The Socialists "la(leadership of the kind which could advance and enhance the con dence of the people." The Hindu Mahasabha has "something fu damental, essential and vital to say" but "a leadership of convictic and realism with a nucleus of followers has failed to emerge Parmarth added that the RSS "has officially and unofficially d clared that elections are beyond the purview of its mind" but he le the door open; if the parties failed, the RSS might heed a call fro the nation.[10] Parmarth's arguments against the Congress, the Cor munists, the several varieties of socialists and the Mahasabha ha been used through the years to explain the support of RSS membe for the Jana Sangh. Surely, the RSS members say, you could n expect us to support any of *those* parties; we naturally turn to party which stands for the true Bharatiya culture.[11]

With Parmarth's essay as background it is useful to look at tl relationship in late 1949 and 1950 between the RSS and tl established political parties.[12] The Communists were and are anat ema to the RSS which rejects anything foreign. The Communi Party was seen to have a loyalty outside India, a program whi(was anti-religious and a political system which was oppressive. Tl two groups wrote violently against each other. In Telengana, R! squads helped to defend some villages against the assault of Cor munist bands. On November 8, 1949, RSS volunteers clashed wi Communist sympathizers at Rajkot, during the first tour of Golwa kar to Saurashtra after the lifting of the ban. The Socialist Par was equally vituperous in its attacks on the RSS, although it evok(a milder response than did the Communists. In 1948, the Socialis started a Rashtriya Seva Dal to compete against the RSS in Mah

[10] *Ibid.*, III:22 (January 23, 1950).

[11] In a conversation on December 24, 1963, Eknath Ranade used essentia the same arguments to the writer. They were varied somewhat to reflect a bi against socialism in general and communism in particular.

[12] The material in the succeeding three paragraphs is largely drawn from Je A. Curran, Jr., *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics, A Study of the R.S.S.* (Ne York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), Chapter VIII.

rashtra. The Dal dressed in uniforms like those of the RSS, substituting a red Gandhi cap for the black headgear of the RSS.

Relations with the Mahasabha have been reviewed in Chapter III. It has been noted that Hedgewar dropped out of the Mahasabha and that he denied a request from Savarkar to associate the RSS with the Mahasabha. Nonetheless many RSS members retained their association with the Mahasabha. These tended to be older, more prosperous *swayamsevaks* who had given up active membership in the RSS while continuing to support the organization both in policy and with funds. The younger, more activist RSS members tended to view the leadership of the Mahasabha as senile. It was this group which urged the RSS into active politics and was instrumental in founding the Jana Sangh.

In the Congress, Nehru strongly opposed the RSS: "Frankly my Government does not trust the R.S.S. very much. We shall keep a very vigilant watch on it." [13] Nehru's opposition to the RSS was consistent with his secularism and his general anticommunalism. Sardar Patel, the party boss, feared the loss of the Muslim adherents of the Congress if the Congress associated closely with the RSS. Others, who were more "Hindu" in their views, thought the RSS would be an asset to the Congress party organization and would identify the Congress with the majority religion of independent India. One spokesman of this group, Pandit Dwarka Prasad Mishra, then Home Minister of Madhya Pradesh, said: ". . . when Congressmen did not object to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema's members joining the Congress despite the former's declaration to safeguard Islamic culture and welcomed those ex-Muslim Leaguers who played an important role in the country's tragic partition into the Congress fold, then why should they oppose Sangh members' entry into the Congress organisation." [14] In a series of reversals the Congress opened, partly closed and then fully closed the doors of its membership to the RSS. The Working Committee has adopted several resolutions on the subject, all of which continue the exclusion.

In 1951, there appeared a book written by a South Indian Christian which praised the RSS and from which two passages may

[13] Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 65.
[14] Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 65–6.

be quoted. The first states again the need for RSS participation in politics: "Today the neo-nationalism of the R.S.S., rooted in the neo-Vedantism and strong organisational and disciplinary strength, is the main national force. On this strong nationalism all citizens of India can unite to fulfill their patriotic mission as common children of Mother India." [15] The book, which was published as the Jana Sangh was being formed, thus presents the case for common, inter-communal accord on the basis of the historic Indian culture. The Jana Sangh holds this view. The author of the book though a Christian found the RSS use of ancient Hindu symbols and militant and rigid organization worthy of compliment:

> The R.S.S. from the very inception of the movement hoisted the *bhagva* flag, *Dharma chakra* and *satyameva jayate,* as their symbols, and have grown around these patriotic ideals. Hence, the R.S.S. youth, given more favourable circumstances, can be in India what was Hitler Youth in Germany, Fascist Youth in Italy and what the Mao's Youth is in China today. If discipline, organised centralism and organic collective consciousness means Fascism, then the R.S.S. is not ashamed to be called Fascist . . . The silly idea that Fascism and totalitarianism are evils, and parliamentarianism and Anglo-American types of democracy are holy, should be got rid of from our minds, if we want to approach problems realistically and bring solutions for them.[16]

It should be noted that this book did not specifically receive the imprimatur of the RSS, but the ideas that the author commends are the very ones which appalled Nehru and continue to appall many in India. To opponents of the Jana Sangh the party appears the Indian equivalent of the Nazi Party, the RSS as the Hitler Youth. To these groups is ascribed the view that the minorities of India like the Jews of the Third Reich constitute a group to be eliminated. It must be said that this estimate is overdrawn, but at times the actions and writings of both the Jana Sangh and the RSS give fuel to such opponents.

Within the RSS there were two opinions on entering politics. Many of the older *swayamsevaks* seem to have opposed it and apparently Golwalkar was not enthusiastic about the direction cho-

[15] Anthony Elenjimittam, *The Philosophy and Action of the R.S.S. for the Hind Swaraj* (Bombay, Laxmi Publications, 1951), pp. 148–9.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

sen by the younger members. This led to occasional contradictions in the statements of leaders. For example, RSS general secretary Bhayyaji Dani is reported to have stated categorically there would be no RSS participation in the elections (in the October 9, 1950, issue of *Organiser*) but two weeks later he was repeating the standard line about the RSS saving the nation and implying, at least, that this salvation must come from political activity.[17]

Among the younger activists in the RSS two in particular took to writing about plans for a new political party. One of these was Balraj Madhok, who had already contributed to *Organiser* the article which espoused a political role for the RSS and which was quoted above. Madhok was born in 1920, at Skardu in the Ladakh Division of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Although his family background was Punjabi, he has frequently considered himself a Kashmiri in politics. An Arya Samajist, he taught at the Srinagar Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College after completing his college studies. He joined the RSS as a young man. During the fighting between India and Pakistan he was a rallying point for RSS activities. In 1947, he was instrumental in founding the All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad and became its general secretary. In 1950, he came to Delhi where he joined the faculty of a Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College as professor of history, a position he still holds. He was used by the RSS, along with Vasant Krishna Oke, as a point of contact with Mookerjee, while his talented pen and his oratory served to launch and popularize the new party. Madhok has been president of the Jana Sangh and twice a member of the Lok Sabha. His career will be one of those followed closely as this biography unfolds.

The pen of *Organiser* editor Keval Malkani was used to publicize the philosophy of the yet-to-be-launched party. Under the pen name of "Kamal," Malkani wrote an article in *Organiser* entitled "Programme for a New Political Party." This article was a précis of a pamphlet he had written and published with an introduction by Mookerjee. Mookerjee, who had been almost one year in the wilderness, commended the proposed program and said: "If democracy has to live, parties must exist. Otherwise democracy may

[17] *Organiser*, IV:9 (October 9, 1950) and IV:11 (October 23, 1950).

degenerate first into a one-party rule and then into a one-man rule."[18] The program was adopted in large measure by the Jana Sangh, and as it was the first time Mookerjee and the RSS activists wrote together, the pamphlet is worth inspecting. Malkani saw the Congress under the sole leadership of Nehru: "Gone is the Hinduising influence of Gandhiji. And now gone too is the moderating influence of Sardar." Malkani put his finger on the dichotomy within the Jana Sangh: traditionalism *vs.* modernism: "The good government of Bharat . . . depends directly and fully on the formation of a nationwide party which will be as much revivalist of ancient values as it will be futurist in its targets." The new party should not depend on "foreign values, attitudes and manners," since "only national, i.e., Bharatiya, i.e., Hindu principles can make Hindus and Hindustan great."

> If . . . the unity of the country is to be made stronger and more integral, ancient foundations must be reinforced and amplified and *suitably modernised.* Unless we strengthen old bases and lay new ones we stand in considerable danger of falling apart. The principle of this reorganisation in Hindustan can only be "Hindutva" . . . Communism can be combated and conquered in Hindustan by the Hindus only through Hindutva . . .[19]

Thus the promise of the future lies only in the resurrection of old values and only a revivified Hinduism can stave off the dangers of communism. That the Jana Sangh (or the RSS, or both) is the final refuge against communism is an oft-repeated theme. To man the organization of the new party, Malkani proposed the *swayamsevaks,* "men for whom selfless service is the highest religion."

This new party, based on Hindutva and manned by the RSS, required a manifesto. Malkani proceeded to give some details of an economic program but did not propose a theory of economic development. His program was largely a criticism of Congress policy. The Jana Sangh lacked a comprehensive economic program at least until the 1962 manifesto when it adopted a program similar in general to that of the Swatantra Party. "Bharatiya economics" may be a catch phrase to the converted, but it is no more a comprehen-

[13] Malkani, K. R., *Principles for a New Political Party* (Delhi, Vijay Pustak Bhandar, 1951), p. ii. Quotations are from introduction dated March 23.
[13] Emphasis added.

Pakistan must answer for the property and lives of Hindus in East Bengal: "withhold water and electric power in order to bring Pakistan to its senses." And the establishment of an Islamic State in Pakistan is denounced, this by a writer who proposes Hindu Rashtra for India.

Malkani found it odd that a Maulana[20] should hold the key portfolio of education in a Hindu nation. He opposed English and supported Hindi as the national language and as the basic language for education. He also wanted the use of Devanagiri script for all Indian languages. Along with his opposition to Maulana Azad as education minister, he criticized the holding of the health portfolio by a Christian, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur. The principal function of that ministry, he held, should be the revival of the ancient ayurvedic system of medicine.

Mookerjee

The foregoing program for the RSS, drafted by Malkani, was endorsed by Mookerjee, the man who was to be the leader of the party and whose activities as a member of the Mahasabha have already been recounted in this biography.[21]

Syama Prasad Mookerjee was born in Calcutta, July 6, 1901. His father, Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, was one of India's most distinguished educators and was principal architect, as Vice Chancellor, of the educational program of Calcutta University. There the younger Mookerjee associated with many of India's most outstanding academic leaders including the philosopher Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the botanist Jagadish Chandra Bose and physicist C. V. Raman,—a Nobel Prize winner. He also was closely acquainted with India's other Nobel laureate, the poet Rabindranath Tagore. He was thus brought up in an erudite atmosphere and his academic record shows that he benefited from it. He stood first in his class in each of his endeavors in Calcutta. In 1921, he received a bachelor

[20] Abdul Kalam Azad.

[21] The authorized biography is Balraj Madhok, *Syama Prasad Mookerjee, a Biography* (Delhi, Deepak Prakashan, 1954). Much of the biographic material here is taken from this work. *See also,* Umaprasad Mookerjee, *Syama Prasad Mookerjee . . .* (2nd ed.; Calcutta, A. Mukherjee & Co., September, 1953), Appendix III, and *Organiser,* V:19 (December 24, 1951).

of arts in English; in 1923, a master of arts; and in 1924, a bachelor of laws. In 1926, he went to England to study law and was called to the bar from Lincoln's Inn in 1927; his stay in England overlapped with that of Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee and Umashankar Trivedi. Before his departure for England he was admitted to the bar of the Calcutta High Court in 1924, and was elected to the Senate of Calcutta University the same year. When Sir Ashutosh died in 1924, his son was elected to replace him on the Syndicate of the University. Mookerjee was married to Sudha Devi in 1922. They had two sons and two daughters. His wife died in 1933.

Mookerjee's political career began when he was elected to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1929, as a Congressman. In accordance with the Congress decision to boycott the councils, he resigned in 1930, and was elected again in 1931 as an independent. In 1934, he was elected Vice Chancellor of Calcutta University, following in his father's footsteps. The youngest person ever to hold the office, he served until 1938. He served in a number of academic positions during this period. He was a member of the Indian Institute of Sciences at Bangalore and chairman of the Inter-University Board. He received honorary degrees from Calcutta University and Banaras Hindu University. In Geneva, he was an Indian member of the League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, a forerunner of UNESCO. In 1943, he was elected the first Indian president of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal and served until 1945.

In the 1937 elections, held under the Government of India Act of 1935, Mookerjee was elected to the Bengal Legislative Assembly from the University constituency. He contested as an independent and won. His biographer says that Mookerjee became increasingly disenchanted with the Congress and opposed the Muslim League, and under the advice of Hedgewar and Savarkar, joined the Hindu Mahasabha in 1939. His friend and colleague Chatterjee joined at about the same time. It appears that this was Mookerjee's first encounter with the RSS and that he was much impressed with the organization and discipline of the group led by Hedgewar. At the Mahasabha session in Calcutta in 1939, Mookerjee played a

prominent role and was named to act for Savarkar during the president's illness. Mookerjee continued to hold office in the Mahasabha until his resignation from the party.

In Chapter II, Mookerjee's joining of the Bengal cabinet headed by Moulvi Fazl-ul-Haq was mentioned. Mookerjee was sworn in as Minister of Finance on December 11, 1941. During his term as minister he had the unique experience of being a minister in one province and a prisoner in another. This occurred when he was arrested along with Savarkar and others at the 1942 Bhagalpur session of the Mahasabha under the Defence of India Rules then in force. As a Mahasabha leader he took part in the Cripps Mission in 1942. On November 20, 1942, he resigned from the Ministry in protest against the firing on Midnapur demonstrators. His letter to the British governor of Bengal said:

> The political movement took a grave turn in some parts of Midnapore and none can say anything in respect of any legitimate measures taken to deal with persons guilty of serious offences against the law. But in Midnapore repression has been carried on in a manner which resembles the activities of the Germans in occupied countries as advertised by British agencies . . . Moslems have been instigated to loot and plunder Hindu houses . . .[22]

After his resignation Mookerjee went personally at great risk to investigate a communal disturbance in Dacca. Denied permission to enter the city, he went anyway and went directly to the home of the Nawab of Dacca, president of the Bengal Muslim League. This foreshadows his fatal visit to Kashmir in 1953, when he was also forbidden to enter.

In the elections in 1946, Mookerjee was again returned to the assembly from the University constituency, one of only three Mahasabhites to be elected in the country. He was elected also to the Constituent Assembly of India. On August 15, 1947, Nehru included Mookerjee in his cabinet as Minister of Industries and Supplies. At the same time, Nehru appointed another Bengali, K. C. Neogy to be Minister of Commerce. Neogy was not a Mahasabha member but apparently then held views very close to the moderate communalism of Mookerjee. In Chapter II, Mookerjee's

[22] R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India* (Calcutta, Firma Mukhopadhyay, 1963), III:655.

battles with the Mahasabha leadership over the questions of political activity and open membership have been discussed. Mookerjee retained his Mahasabha membership and his cabinet portfolio during the aftermath of the Gandhi assassination, but he resigned from the Mahasabha in December, 1948. All reports of Mookerjee's handling of the portfolio assigned to him are favorable, even laudatory. Several of India's important state-owned projects were begun during his incumbency including the Sindri Fertilizer works, the Hindustan Aircraft factory, and the Chittaranjan Locomotive factory. He initiated talks with foreign investors and governments for the technical assistance needed to build up Indian industry. To the extent that the Cabinet was divided into "Patelian" and "Nehruvian" sections, Mookerjee was undoubtedly closer to Patel. He supported the Deputy Prime Minister without reservation on the Hyderabad issue, when India took a "police action" to end the "independence" of the princely state on September 13, 1949.

Mookerjee sharply disagreed with Nehru on the question of Kashmir and on the handling of the East Bengal situation. The Kashmir story has been told many times and need not be repeated here; the RSS role has already been mentioned and Mookerjee's and the Praja Parishad's role in 1953 will be described in proper sequence. East Bengal, however, was the issue upon which Mookerjee resigned from the Nehru cabinet and was joined in his resignation by Neogy. After partition Hindus continued to leave East Bengal, claiming the Muslim majority had made life more than difficult for them. The year 1950 saw an increase in the number of refugees, each arriving in Calcutta with a tale of woe. Such tales were magnified in the telling as the refugees swarmed into Sealdah station. In April, Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan came to Delhi to meet Nehru. The result was the Liaquat-Nehru pact, signed on April 8, 1950. Mookerjee and Neogy resigned the same day.[23] The pact contained a pledge to maintain equal rights for minorities in each country. It also provided for the return of refugees without hindrance to place of origin and gave refugees the right to carry with them all movable property and to dispose of all immovable property and carry the proceeds along with them. Mi-

[23] After a brief period in the wilderness, Neogy joined the Planning Commission where he served until his retirement in 1964.

least as individuals, were closely tied to the political organizing which led to the Jana Sangh. He had written that "the initiative to create such an organisation lay with the R. S. S. leaders".[35] Speaking of Mookerjee Madhok wrote:

> His eyes then fell on the R.S.S., the only other organised, though non-political force in the country. He would have liked the R. S. S., with its well knit organisational structure and well-trained and disciplined cadre of workers, to take to politics and become such a platform. But the R.S.S. leadership was not prepared to change the character of the organisation and give up its role of honest critic of all the political parties in the interest of national solidarity and cohesion. It, however, permitted its workers to co-operate and collaborate with Dr. Mookerjee for the formation of a party which might reflect their viewpoint on national questions.[36]

Golwalkar himself described his relationship and that of the R. S. S. with Mookerjee in an article in *Organiser*.[37] He recalled his meetings with Mookerjee which had begun as early as 1940 when Mookerjee was in the Hindu Mahasabha. After Mookerjee's resignation and the lifting of the ban on the RSS "one of my colleagues," Oke, "developed a liking for political work to a degree uncommon and undesirable for a Swayamsevak", and met Mookerjee frequently. Mookerjee asked Golwalkar to bring the RSS into the new party. Golwalkar refused but "I chose some of my colleagues, staunch and tried workers, who could selflessly and unflinchingly shoulder the burden of founding the new party". Golwalkar thus sent to the Jana Sangh a substantial number of his workers of whom Dindayal Upadhyaya was the chief, but the RSS leader made it clear that he personally was not enthusiastic about the activities of some of his *swayamsevaks*. His lack of enthusiasm seems confirmed from other sources.

During his first year out of the Cabinet Mookerjee traveled extensively in India and met many individuals and groups, including the Delhi group mentioned above. With the Delhi group he maintained the closest contact. He also campaigned intensively in Bengal, often working closely with Chatterjee, who was still in the

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[36] Balraj Madhok, *Political Trends in India* (Delhia, S. Chand & Co., 1959), p. 45.

[37] *Organiser;* IX:45 (June 25, 1956).

Mahasabha. The consultations gave him an opportunity to assess the situation. While he surely did not picture a new party sweeping the polls either on an all-India level or in any province—he was too realistic for that—he came to believe there was a place for a new party. His decision was announced in an address at Gobardanga, near Calcutta, on April 8, 1951:

I have been out from the Central Cabinet for nearly a year. People from all parts of the country have been asking me as to what they should do. I have deeply thought over the matter. And in the course of the next few weeks I hope to give my considered opinion in the matter. One thing is clear. Congress policies are disintegrating the country. The need of the hour is a new All-Bharat political party to give a new programme, a new ideal and a more valid idiom to the country.[38]

On May 5, Mookerjee announced the formation of the "People's Party" in Calcutta. The party appointed Mookerjee leader and adopted an eight-point program: (1) United Bharat; (2) "reciprocity instead of appeasement" toward Pakistan; (3) an independent foreign policy "consistent with Bharat's paramount self-interest"; (4) rehabilitation of refugees with "suitable compensation from Pakistan"; (5) increased production of goods especially food and cloth and decentralization of industry; (6) development of a single "Bharatiya" culture; (7) equal rights for all citizens regardless of caste, community or creed and improvement of the standard of the backward classes; and (8) readjustment of the boundaries of West Bengal with Bihar.[39] While there is here the core of an all-India policy, it is largely a program designed to appeal to Bengalis—and possibly to annoy Biharis on point eight.

On May 27, the Delhi group formed the Bharatiya Jana Sangh at a meeting in Jullundur. Balraj Bhalla was elected president, Sharma, vice president, and Balraj Madhok, secretary. Among the members of the Working Committee was Rao Birendra Singh, later a Congress minister in Punjab and a Jana Sangh-supported non-Congress chief minister of Haryana. The territory of this group included Punjab, the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), Himachal Pradesh and Delhi. The general secretary—

[38] *Organiser*, IV:35 (April 16, 1951).
[39] *Ibid.*, IV:38 (May 7, 1951).

who was born in Kashmir of Punjabi stock and who therefore can and does pose as either Punjabi or Kashmiri when the occasion demands—said the Congress had failed to perform in its role of leader and the new party ". . . represents a well planned and concerted effort to fill this vacuum, give the country a new lead and leadership and restore the fast waning confidence of the people in the destiny of India".[40] The words "well-planned and concerted" will become clear as it is seen how state units sprang up in areas in which the RSS was strong.

Mookerjee continued to be active in Bengal before he began to tour. At Shraddhanand Park in Calcutta, he made it clear the People's Party would look to other groups for merger and that it needed an organization:

> Our party, though for the present confined to West Bengal will, I expect, soon align itself to similar organisations in other parts of India and be merged into an all-India body . . . A large number of parties and groups exists not only in this province but almost everywhere in India. It is of utmost importance that while they may not all merge into one organisation, they should be prepared to work on a common platform on the basis of a programme which should represent the greatest common measure of agreement amongst them . . .
>
> . . . but our efforts, however popularly supported, become almost nugatory in the absence of a well-knit and strongly built political organisation capable of creating effective sanction in the country.[41]

Mookerjee it appears was even then thinking of the looser confederation of parties and individuals which he created as the National Democratic Party after the 1952 elections.

The movement to form parties similar to the Punjab and Bengal groups began apace. Bhalla traveled to Delhi and spoke at the Gandhi Grounds to launch the party in the capital city as a branch of the group formed in Jullundur. He said:

> Our difference with the Congress, the Socialists, the Kripalanites and such others is one of principle and not of policy and that in short is why the Jana Sangh. When the Socialists or Kripalanites abuse the government, their quarrel is not with Congress principles but with Nehru, who, they charge, has failed to translate them into practice. It is here we differ

[40] *Ibid.*, IV:43 (June 11, 1951).
[41] *Ibid.*, IV:45 (July 2, 1951).

essentially, for we believe that it is in the vicious principles of the Congress that the malaise of our country stands rooted.[42]

Bhalla pointed up a feature of the Jana Sangh which no other party in India shares: the Jana Sangh is run and operated largely by persons who have little or no background in the Congress while the other opposition parties, even to a large degree the Communists, are offshoots of the Congress which led the country to freedom. In this sense the Jana Sangh is "illegitimate" in its birth and it is so regarded not only by the Congress but also by many of the moderate oppositionists in the Praja Socialist Party and the Swatantra Party.[43]

Bhalla's visit to Delhi was successful in that a Delhi unit of the party was established. The party was also active in setting up district units in the Punjab. Already the party was taking shape as a movement of the urban Hindu in the province, and was not effective in the rural, Sikh-populated areas. In his organizing Madhok was reported to be emphasizing that the Jana Sangh was not an offshoot of the Congress. Madhok also said the Jana Sangh would like to cooperate with the Ram Rajya Parishad and the Hindu Mahasabha, but that the Jana Sangh was "broader based."

At the end of June, Mookerjee visited Bombay and participated in the convention of the Democratic Swaraj Party led by Jamnadas M. Mehta.[44] Mookerjee reiterated his belief that provincial units must precede a national party and the Democratic Swaraj Party decided to become the Bombay unit of the Jana Sangh, although this decision never materialized.

Organiser announced, erroneously as it later turned out, that a unit had been formed in Orissa by a veteran Congressman, Pandit Nilakantha Das.[45] Das had indeed founded a new party in opposition to the Congress and had named it Swadhin Jana Sangh, Independent People's Party, but he never associated the Orissa group

[42] *Organiser,* IV:44 (June 18, 1951). "Kripalanites" refers to the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party led by former Congress president Acharya J. B. Kripalani. It had but recently broken from the Congress. After the 1952 elections it merged with the Socialist Party to form the Praja Socialist Party.

[43] I am indebted to Myron Weiner for the term "illegitimate" as applied here to the Jana Sangh.

[44] Mehta is apparently the same person who wrote the introduction to Elenjimittam, *op. cit.*

[45] *Organiser,* V:1 (August 15, 1951).

with the national Jana Sangh. Some time after the 1952 elections Das and his two supporters in the Orissa assembly rejoined the Congress and he became speaker of the assembly.

The *Organiser* continued to report the formation of new parties in other provinces—and with more accuracy. On September 2, in Lucknow, the Uttar Pradesh unit was formed. Bhalla delivered the inaugural address in which he stressed the Bharatiya aspect of the party's program and did so in such a manner that any non-Hindu would certainly have been frightened away. The party adopted a resolution calling for an all-India meeting. Rao Krishna Pal Singh, a former member of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council and one-time president of the provincial Hindu Sabha, was elected president and Din Dayal Upadhyaya was appointed secretary. Upadhyaya was, as shall be seen, to rise to the highest level of the Jana Sangh; Krishna Pal Singh left the party in 1953 and was elected to the Lok Sabha in 1962 on the Swatantra Party ticket.

Also on September 2, at Indore, the Jana Sangh of Madhya Bharat and Bhopal was formed. This meeting heard an inaugural address by the other member of the Punjab traveling team, Balraj Madhok. Badrilal Dave was elected president and Manoharrao Moghe was appointed secretary. In keeping with the now rapidly growing tradition, Moghe was from the RSS; he had been *pracharak* of the Malwa area, i.e., Madhya Bharat.

Mookerjee, Madhok and Bhalla convened a meeting in Delhi September 8 at which the then existing Jana Sangh units were represented. Krishna Pal Singh and Upadhyaya came from Uttar Pradesh and Moghe from Madhya Bharat. The meeting prepared a draft manifesto, called an all-India meeting for October and heard reports from such unrepresented provinces as Karnatak (Mysore), Bihar, Rajasthan and Orissa.

Madhok immediately resumed his traveling and journeyed to Jaipur. There he inaugurated the first meeting of the Rajasthan-Ajmer Jana Sangh on October 13. Chiranjilal Mishra of Jaipur was elected president. One of the two secretaries appointed was Sundar Singh Bhandari, an RSS worker. The Jana Sangh unit in Karnatak was founded in September under the presidency of G. Paramasiviah, a former Mysore High Court Justice. Other units began to fall in line. On October 2, at Satna, a unit was formed for

Vindhya Pradesh. In mid-November at Ahmedabad a unit was set up for Gujarat and Saurashtra. At a meeting in Gauhati on October 28, a unit was established in Assam. A Patna meeting on October 13–14, founded the Bihar unit, with Thakur Prasad as secretary.

This feverish activity set the stage for a meeting in Delhi on October 21 which was called to declare the Jana Sangh a national party. Formally the meeting was called by the Punjab Jana Sangh and Madhok was appointed convener. It was necessary to invite Mookerjee to take the leadership of the party. Madhok relates a visit he made on October 8, along with Lala Hansraj Gupta, Bhai Mahavir and Sharma, to Mookerjee's Delhi residence. Mookerjee is reported to have replied:

> It is a great responsibility that you want me to shoulder. I will try to do it in the spirit of humble duty to my motherland. But before I accept it, I want to be clear in my mind about the character and the future working of the organisation you want me to lead.[46]

This reads almost as though Mookerjee had never heard of the project before. While the most prominent individual in the Jana Sangh was speaking thus, a short time later the head of the organization which supplied the manpower said in Madras:

> In the coming general elections the R.S.S. will not back the Hindu Maha Sabha or any other party in particular. In the drama of elections we shall be mere spectators. The Swayamsevaks are free to do as they please. All our efforts will be diverted in to the constructive channels of character-building, infusing a sense of selfless service and teaching boundless patriotism. To create a well-knit organisation for a homogeneous nation is our aim. This alone can free the nation from poverty and misery.[47]

This statement, carried in the same issue of *Organiser* as the report of the Delhi meeting, seems to show that Golwalkar was still unhappy about RSS political activity or perhaps it was intended to be a public disclaimer of RSS sponsorship of the Jana Sangh.

It was also necessary to draw up an invitation list. Clearly all those units which had been formed would be invited: Punjab, Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Bihar, Rajasthan, Vindhya

[46] Madhok, *Mookerjee, op. cit.*, p. 62. One of Mookerjee's "demands" was open membership which was acceded to without question.

[47] *Organiser*, V:11 (October 29, 1951).

Pradesh, and Karnatak. But the conveners expected much more. They are reported to have received acceptances of invitations issued to Nilakantha Das of Orissa; Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, president of the Praja Parishad of Jammu; Maharaja R. N. Singh Deo of Patna, president of the Ganatantra Parishad of Orissa; R. Shankar, president of the Hindu Mahamandal of Travancore; and Pandit Dwarka Prasad Mishra, recently resigned from the Congress and from his post as Home Minister of Madhya Pradesh.[48]

Some of these invited persons and organizations will bear closer examination. One Orissa group—Das' Jana Sangh—was quite different from Mookerjee's. The Ganatantra Parishad will be described in more detail in Chapter IV in connection with the formation of the National Democratic Party. Of the Hindu Mahamandal it was written:

> In Malabar the increasing friction between the Hindus and the large Christian minority and the lack of nationalist sentiment on the part of the Muslim Moplah population have made for increasing Hindu consciousness among the population. This feeling has had much to do with the growing importance of the recently-created Hindu Maha Mandal, a religious-cultural organisation restricted to Malabar . . . The outlook of the Hindu Mandal is most stridently Hindu. The R.S.S. is actively co-operating with it.[49]

The Praja Parishad was founded in November, 1947, in Jammu and like the Jana Sangh was built on an R.S.S. base.[50] The first president was Hari Wazir and the general secretary was Madhok. Wazir was succeeded by Lala Rupchand Nanda. Nanda was arrested in 1949. The Parishad began an agitation against the Government headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah which was withdrawn when Abdullah agreed to release Nanda. Nanda resigned the presidency and withdrew from political activity. His successor as president was Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, who held the office until 1967. Dogra was born in Jammu in 1883. He studied Persian and history at Forman Christian College in Lahore, becom-

[48] *Ibid.*, V:10 (October 22, 1951).

[49] Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[50] Information on the Praja Parishad is taken from Balraj Madhok, *Kashmir Centre of New Alignments* (New Delhi, Deepak Prakashan, 1963), pp. 37–8, and from a special issue of *Kashmir Affairs*, II:3 (January-February, 1960). Biographic data on Dogra is from the latter and from *Indian Express* (Delhi edition), December 7, 1963.

ing one of the early Kashmir subjects to receive a college education. He then entered the Jammu and Kashmir State service, but was retired prematurely in 1931 for failing, in the opinion of his superiors, to use sufficient force to put down a Muslim demonstration. He then entered the Praja Sabha, the state legislature. Dogra was *sanghachalak* of the RSS in the state from the time of its formation until it was banned by the Abdullah government in 1948. The Praja Parishad became in effect the Jammu and Kashmir unit of the Jana Sangh although it retained its separate identity until 1964. In this biography of the Jana Sangh, the Parishad will be treated together with the larger party.

The story of Mishra is an involved one. At independence, Mishra was home minister, second-ranking member of the Cabinet and heir apparent of Chief Minister Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla. He and his chief were firmly in the Patel camp within the Congress, and both were considered to be staunch Hindus in the political sense. Mishra supported Purushottamdas Tandon, the Patelian candidate, against Acharya Kripalani, the Nehruvian candidate, in the election of the Congress president in 1950. One biographer of Nehru bluntly describes Tandon as a "Hindu communalist." [51] On September 9, 1951, Nehru forced Tandon to resign and assumed the Congress presidency himself. The same day Mishra resigned from his party and office. *Organiser* trumpeted both the Tandon and Mishra resignations; it kept a soft spot for Tandon, who though remaining in the Congress up to his death on July 1, 1962 did not hesitate to take positions close to those of the Jana Sangh when he felt so moved. Mishra's first out-of-state political trip was to Uttar Pradesh where he was given a rousing reception by the Jana Sangh workers. He spoke at the Delhi meeting of the Jana Sangh and visited Mookerjee but did not commit himself to join the new party.[52] On his return to Madhya Pradesh he founded the Bharatiya Lok Congress. As his party's only candidate in the 1952 elections, Mishra stood and was defeated in three assembly contests. He later joined and left the Praja Socialist Party. In 1962, he was permitted to rejoin the Congress and successfully contested a by-election which allowed him to become chief minister after the Kamaraj Plan

[51] Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 681.
[52] Madhok, *Mookerjee, op. cit.*, pp. 64–5.

in September, 1963. Jana Sanghis have felt that Mishra let them down in 1951. The party gained a victory over Mishra when, after the 1967 elections, it combined with Congress dissidents and the Rajmata of Gwalior group to bring him down.

The invitation list issued and the president agreed upon, the delegates assembled in the Ragho-Mal Arya Girls Higher Secondary School in New Delhi on October 21, 1951, to found the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. The 500 delegates[53] heard Mookerjee deliver his presidential address. He spoke after the convention, under the temporary chairmanship of Bhalla, had passed a resolution founding the party. Bhalla nominated Mookerjee. The new president said:

> . . . one of the chief reasons for the manifestation of dictatorship in Congress rule is the absence of well organised opposition parties . . . Bharatiya Jana Sangh emerges today as an All India political party which will function as the principal party in opposition . . . [opposition] does not mean senseless or destructive approach to all problems that confront responsible government. While, therefore, we may have to attack or criticise official measures or acts, our aim will be to approach all problems in a constructive spirit so that we may keep the public vigilant and make our humble contribution in developing a real democratic structure for the sound administration of the country.[54]

Mookerjee also declared his view that the party should be open to all Indians:

> We have thrown our party open to all citizens of India irrespective of caste, creed or community . . . the people must be united by a bond of fellowship and understanding inspired by deep devotion to the spirit of a common motherland . . . it is obviously for the vast majority of Bharat's population to assure all classes of people, who are truly loyal to their motherland, that they will be entitled to full protection under the law and to complete equality of treatment in all matters, social, economic and political. Our party gives this assurance unreservedly.

While there are some pitfalls in the interpretation of this statement, it was, and was intended to be, vastly more liberal, if that be the correct word, than the stand taken by the RSS as expressed, for example, by Golwalkar in his book *We, or Our Nationhood Defined*. Mookerjee represented the least communal wing of the Jana

[53] According to *Organiser*, V:11 (October 29, 1951).
[54] Madhok, *Mookerjee*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–8.

Sangh and his heirs are still battling with the more doctrinaire RSS alumni in the party.

Much of Mookerjee's speech was incorporated in the election manifesto of the Jana Sangh and properly belongs in the next chapter. To assist him in the national work of the party, Mookerjee selected Sharma and Mahavir as general secretaries. As private secretary, Mookerjee chose Atal Bihari Vajpayee. He was born in Gwalior, December 25, 1926, studied at the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College in Kanpur and was general secretary of the Arya Kumar Sabha, an Arya Samajist youth group, in 1944. Vajpayee joined the RSS in 1941, and after college graduation went into journalism for papers close to the organization; included were periods as editor of *Rashtra Dharma*, a monthly; and the important pro-RSS weekly *Panchajanya* of Lucknow.[55] Vajpayee will become a prominent character in the Jana Sangh cast.

Before proceeding to the Jana Sangh and the 1952 elections, this is perhaps the best point to introduce the third of the Hindu parties of North India, the Ram Rajya Parishad. Its name will crop up frequently in the story of the Jana Sangh. The party was founded in 1948 by Swami Karpatri. In theory it is by far the most orthodox Hindu of all the parties. In practice it has frequently been a political vehicle for members of the princely and zamindari orders in the former Indian states. One writer has said:

> The ideals of the Ram Rajya Parishad are so orthodox and so politically unconventional that the English-language press in India and the Westernized intelligentsia pay little attention to the program and activities of this party—in spite of the fact that over 2 million voters . . . gave it their support in the 1952 general elections.[56]

One reason for this lack of interest is no doubt to be found in the fact that few of the party's candidates and almost none of its victorious contestants subscribed with any enthusiasm to the philosophy of Karpatri.

About the program of the Ram Rajya Parishad, one writer comments: ". . . one must read through much of its 1951 manifesto before discovering that the organization is a political party.

[55] Biographic data from *Who's Who in the Rajya Sabha, 1964* (New Delhi, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 1964), pp. 312–3.
[56] Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 174–5.

This document is replete with Sanskrit quotation, moral exhortations, metaphysical subtleties, and even arguments for the existence of God."[57] From its name one can see that the party wishes to return India to the glorious and ideal days in which the hero of the *Ramayana* ruled. It is absolutely opposed to anything foreign, to such an extent that in comparison the nationalist Mahasabha and Jana Sangh are identified with the full range of Western ideas. The party even goes so far as to support the continuance of the caste system, which neither of the other two parties do. "Untouchables" are offered, in the 1951 manifesto, high posts in the sanitation departments and in the hide and leather trade. It is not necessary to detail further the obscurantist program of the Parishad.

Because of its enrollment of the feudal groups in Rajasthan and Central India, the Parishad has cut into Jana Sangh and Mahasabha areas of influence. The three parties undercut each other to some extent in each of the three elections. The Parishad in 1952 polled 2.03 per cent of the total Lok Sabha popular vote, including 14.2 per cent of the vote in Madhya Bharat and 9.4 per cent in Rajasthan.[58] It won three seats in the Lok Sabha, all in Rajasthan. It also won 32 assembly seats, 24 of these in Rajasthan, three in Madhya Pradesh, two each in Madhya Bharat and Vindhya Pradesh and one in Bihar. In 1957, election results for minor parties are clouded as the Election Commission report labels candidates of parties not recognized in separate states as "independents" in those states, a defect fortunately remedied in the 1962 report. According to the report the Parishad took 0.38 per cent of the Lok Sabha vote in the states in which it was recognized and won no seats. However, it won 22 assembly seats: 17 in Rajasthan and five in Madhya Pradesh. In 1962, while winning a Lok Sabha seat each in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh it polled 0.60 per cent of the national vote. In the assemblies it won 13 seats of which ten were in Madhya Pradesh and three in Rajasthan. The sharp drop in Rajasthan is largely the result of the switch in feudal loyalties from the Parishad to the new Swatantra Party. After the 1962 elections the

[57] Donald E. Smith, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 464.

[58] Election results taken from the official reports of the Election Commission. *See* bibliography for citations.

Lok Sabha member from Madhya Pradesh shifted his allegiance to the Jana Sangh, and the member from Rajasthan to the Swatantra Party; both were deafeated in 1967 running under their new affiliations. The 1967 results are also confused as the RRP candidates are listed again as independents. However, none of its Lok Sabha candidates were successful and apparently none in the assemblies.

To return to our narrative of the Jana Sangh, the party was now launched. It had but a few months before it was to face the electorate. We will turn now to a study of that first general election in India, in which the number of votes polled were the greatest in any democratic election up to that date.

CHAPTER V

Facing the Electorate (I)—1952

The Jana Sangh had barely two months before polling began in the 1952 general elections [1] to prepare for them. Candidates must be selected, a manifesto drawn up, approved and publicized and an organization put into high gear. For the leader, Mookerjee, a supporting cast was needed. And all this cost money. Fund-raising was to be an essential chore.

Status of the Organization

We have already noted that the backbone of the Jana Sangh organization was the RSS. It was from this highly disciplined association that the party could draw dedicated and hard-working young men. It was the "alumni" of the RSS—the more senior members who still subscribed to the principles but who had given up much of the discipline—that the Jana Sangh could call upon for donations and could select as candidates. Many of the senior RSS men were in small business, the urban Hindu shopkeeper. Others had gone into the professions, many into law, others into medicine and teaching.

The areas of real strength of the RSS were Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Punjab. In these provinces the Jana Sangh would do comparatively well in the 1952 elections and would build upon the RSS base for greater

[1] The elections actually began in December, 1951, and are therefore strictly speaking the "1951–52" General Elections. However, here they will be referred to simply as "1952".

successes in future elections. In Punjab, the Sikhs distrusted the RSS, but the organization was strong in the urban Hindu areas. One commentator on the Punjab elections touched both upon the RSS role and the selection of candidates:

> The Jan Sangh put up 65 candidates for the assembly and eight for the House of the People. The antecedents of most of them were not known. The Jan Sangh, itself being a newborn political party, welcomed all those who had ability and who could pay their way. Some members of the Hindu Mahasabha . . . were welcomed to stand on the Jan Sangh ticket. The Jan Sangh organisation mostly consists of workers who had close associations with the R.S.S. in all parts of the Punjab. Any one could see that . . . most of them were young men. Though the leaders of the R.S.S. did not stand on the Jan Sangh ticket yet their sympathies were wholeheartedly in favour of the Jan Sangh candidates.[2]

A report on the Uttar Pradesh election states: "The Jan Sangh was effectively helped by the volunteers of the R.S.S. About 100,000 people were working for the Jan Sangh during the election period." [3] Another noted that the RSS gave its support to the Jana Sangh in Madhya Pradesh.[4]

Outside of these areas the RSS had much less influence. In Rajasthan it had penetrated into the princely states and also in Saurashtra, but not to the same degree as in Madhya Bharat. In Maharashtra and in the Marathi-speaking parts of Madhya Pradesh the RSS was mainly a Brahmin organization and the tide was turning against Brahmins both as a result of the Gandhi assassination and in response to the revival of Maratha leadership. In the south and in the east the RSS was only beginning to organize itself.

Of course, the RSS was not the only source of membership for the Jana Sangh, although it was the primary source of organizational strength. When the party was founded, a sizable number of others came into its camp. Mookerjee and Sharma had no RSS connections in the sense that they were never full-time workers or active members of the RSS. A number of people came into the party who were thought to retain a degree of influence. One exam-

[2] Bodh Raj Sharma, *Report on Elections in the Punjab*, 1951–52 (Jullundur, Khanna Book Depot, 1952), pp. 16–7.

[3] S. V. Kogekar and Richard L. Park, ed., *Reports on the Indian General Elections, 1951–52* (Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1956). Article by the editors on Uttar Pradesh, p. 159.

[4] A. Avasthi, "Madhya Pradesh," in Kogekar and Park, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

ple was the election of P. B. Gole, a former Madhya Pradesh minister in the Khare and first Shukla cabinets, as president of the provincial Jana Sangh. Ex-judges seemed to be another popular category; the presidents of the Karnatak and Assam units belonged to this group. Many small businessmen joined and some who were important figures in business like Lala Yodhraj and Lala Hansraj Gupta—the latter the *sanghachalak* of the Delhi RSS. A number of zamindars and jagirdars enlisted in the Jana Sangh.

The organization of the Jana Sangh thus was based largely on the RSS supplemented by a mixed bag of others, and possessed but one nationally known leader. Mookerjee had hoped for a substantial number of defectors from the Congress conservative wing, but this wing, seeing the disappearance from the Congress of much of the left under Kripalani now (and earlier under Jayaprakash Narayan, Asoka Mehta and Ram Manohar Lohia), felt their chances of capturing the party were good. Thus, in spite of Nehru's victory over Tandon, they stayed on. After all, it was all but certain the Congress would win the election and ministerial posts go only to those who are on the winning team.

The task of selecting candidates was difficult and, judging by results, was done too rapidly and with little serious thought. It seems that in 1952 two qualities were required. First, a candidate should be able to finance his own election. Second, and only second, he should subscribe in general to the Jana Sangh manifesto. A quickly organized party is one without money and therefore cash rated above ideology in building a Jana Sangh ticket. In Chapter VII we will see how few of the 1952 candidates remained to nurse their constituencies and run again in 1957. We shall also see that many of those elected did not subject themselves to party discipline.

Manifesto

The party meeting at Delhi authorized a committee to draft and adopt a manifesto. This was published on October 29, 1951.[5] In general it followed the pattern proposed by Malkani.[6] In reading the document there is no doubt that the Jana Sangh is a political

[5] *Organiser*, V:11 (October 29, 1951). Quotations following are taken from this edition of the manifesto.
[6] *See* Chapter II.

party and a party that is greatly concerned with the development of a national—Bharatiya—system for India:

> The object of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh is the rebuilding of Bharat on the basis of Bharatiya *Sanskriti* and *Maryada* as a political, social and economic democracy granting equality of opportunity and liberty to individuals so as to make her a prosperous, powerful and united nation, progressive, modern and enlightened, able to withstand the aggressive designs of others and to pull her weight in the council of nations for the establishment of world peace.

The Jana Sangh stated its "fundamentals" as "one country, one nation, one culture and the rule of law." One country meant a united India: "Its recent partition, instead of solving any problem, communal or otherwise, has given rise to many new ones." The nationalism of the one nation "must naturally be based on undivided allegiance to Bharat as a whole." "Unity in diversity has been the characteristic feature of Bharatiya culture which is a synthesis of different regional, local and tribal growths." While "the very idea of a theocratic state is foreign to Bharat" secularism "is only a euphemism for the policy of Muslim appeasement". To the Jana Sangh secularism and theocracy are not the only alternatives; there is a middle ground "wherein men and women of various faiths, speaking different languages and residing in different parts of the country will live in an atmosphere of unity, freedom and goodwill" under the law.

On basic economic policy the party said little, but instead proposed in some detail policies for land and industry. The Jana Sangh saw the provision of "food, clothing and shelter" as "the most pressing economic problem before the country." It added "the middle class, which is the worst hit, has to be saved to avoid a breakdown of the entire intellectual and cultural activity." The party was asking for the support, in both funds and votes, of the urban Hindu middle class.

Under the heading "land policy" the Jana Sangh proposed a number of steps, many of them obvious, for the increase of agricultural production: consolidation of land holdings, better seeds, small irrigation and tube-well projects, greater mechanization. One step which was omitted was the increased use of fertilizers. The Jana Sangh has had a phobia about the use of chemical fertilizers and


when speaking on the subject of fertilizers has only suggested greater use of natural manures. A similar quirk has led the party generally to oppose such measures as BCG vaccination for tuberculosis. To popularize the new methods and ideas among the farmers, the party calls for the use of "bands of volunteer workers," the Hindi original using the term *swayamsevak,* though not apparently in the strict RSS sense.


The party gave some support to land reform, but tried to couch it in such terms that would not frighten away any landlords who might otherwise be inclined to join the Jana Sangh. The Hindu landlord in Uttar Pradesh has generally been a person of conservative religious and social views, and like his counterpart in Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat formed a base of support for the Jana Sangh and even more so for the Ram Rajya Parishad. "The party would take all steps to introduce land reforms so as to make the cultivator the virtual owner of the land." Presumably this meant the legal ownership of the land would remain with the zamindar but the cultivator would be given guaranteed tenancy and receive an increased share of the produce. However, the party did say:

> If it is found essential in the interest of the economy of the country the party would abolish Jagirdari and Zamindari with compensation and distribute the land to the tillers. Enough land however would be left with such Zamindars and Jagirdars as would settle down as land-owning farmers.

A rural works program was suggested in which the government and the people could work together to provide schools, access roads, and similar amenities. To take up idle time the party called for a restudy and development of cottage industries, and the location of small industry in rural areas. The land section concluded: "The party stands pledged to the prohibition of cow slaughter. Special steps will be taken to improve breeds of cow to make it an economic unit our agricultural life." No party pledged to Bharatiya culture could speak otherwise.

The land policy tried to steer a middle course between conservatism and radicalism and the industrial policy did the same. "The party stands for public ownership of industries especially catering to the essential defence needs of the country. As for other large industries, state ownership had generally not worked efficiently and eco-


JANA SANGH - 1952
Parliamentary and
Assembly Seats Won
Parliamentary Seats ■
Assembly Seats ●
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
MANIPUR
TRIPURA


JANA SANGH - 1952
Percentage of Popular Vote Polled in Assembly Contests By Districts
LEGEND
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE
0
1
5
10
20
30
50
100
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
NAGA LAND
MANIPUR
TRIPURA

nomically in this country." The Jana Sangh "will encourage private enterprise instead of talking vaguely about nationalisation." Expansion, however, should be "under the general control and regulation of the state in the interest of consumers and production alike." Industry should be decentralized, both to alleviate crowding in the cities and as it "will also be advisable from the point of view of defence."

Import of capital goods should be encouraged while import of consumer and luxury goods should be cut down. *Swadeshi* industries should be given "subsidies . . . and tariff protection against unfair foreign competition." Nonetheless "foreign capital would be welcomed particularly for starting capital goods industries. But care should be taken that political strings are not attached to it and foreign concerns provide adequate training facilities to the Indian workers." To mobilize domestic savings for investment in industry the party would cut down on government controls and "popularise banking and insurance in the rural areas to attract . . . surplus money."

The party proposed the decentralization of administrative powers to local units "as much as possible within the provincial framework." At this point, the Jana Sangh support of a unitary state for India had not yet developed. "Minorities and majorities based on religion will not be recognised by this party." Hindi is to be the national language of India, Devanagiri the common script for all Indian languages, and the study of Sanskrit—"the repository of Bharatiya culture and the source and mainstay of all Indian languages"—is to be promoted. Education should be given a "basis of Bharatiya culture" and is to be free and universal at the primary levels with scholarships to aid promising students who cannot pay the cost through the postgraduate level. Military training is to be a part of the higher educational curriculum. Ayurvedic medicine is to be promoted "while giving proper recognition to allopathy and other recognised systems." However, ayurveda is to be modernized.

Pakistan and Kashmir are the focal points of the proposals on foreign policy. Foreign policy is to be "guided primarily by the enlightened national self-interest." "In view of the fact that Bharat has not in any way benefited by remaining in the Commonwealth"

this question "needs to be re-examined." Withdrawal is not specifically suggested, although clearly inferred from the statement.

On Pakistan:

> *So long as Pakistan remains a separate entity*, the party will stand for a strict policy of reciprocity and not one of appeasement . . . In view of the fact that Pakistan Government has failed to accord reasonable security of life and property and honourable existence to the minorities which never wanted partition, this party deems it to be the sacred duty of Bharat to secure to them, through all means open to her, a civilised living with equality and honour.[7]

The rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan is "legally as well as morally the responsibility of Bharat," but "full compensation for property left by displaced persons in Pakistan" will be demanded. "Since Kashmir is an integral part of India," the complaint before the United Nations should be withdrawn "and there should be no further question of plebiscite." Kashmir should be fully integrated into the Indian Union—a demand on which the party was to demonstrate in conjunction with the Praja Parishad and others in 1953. There was, however, no mention of evacuation by Pakistan of the parts of Kashmir on her side of the cease-fire line; this no doubt was an omission and is not an indication that the Jana Saṅgh at this time accepted the cease-fire line as the border.

The party reiterated its ancient and modern ideas in the peroration of the manifesto:

> The ultimate aim of the policies of the party is to build up a modern and progressive society in this ancient land on its ancient roots and ideals which have stood the test of time, in which cooperation between individuals and their social, professional and religious groups for the common good of the whole nation . . . shall take the place of riotous individualism on the one side, and disruptive forces on the other.

There is much in the manifesto that is nationalistic, but little which is in the strictest interpretation communal. To be sure, all people of Bharat must adhere to Bharatiya culture and must devote themselves to the improvement of the nation. It is, however, in the exegesis of the manifesto by Jana Sanghis that the place of the

[7] Emphasis added.

religious minorities becomes clearer, as does the demand for the undoing of the partition of India.

Madhok said that the Congress leaders believe the demand for reunification to be "preposterous and unrealistic" but it "should shock nobody." He cited the universal support for the reunion of Poland, the wide support for the ending of the partition of Ireland and the Egyptian demand for union with the Sudan—"even though the Sudanese do not want it"—as examples of unification demands which do not shock. He demanded reunification, but one might paraphrase him and add "even though the Pakistanis do not want it." Madhok had no plan to offer but concluded: "It is a great objective, and ideal worth living and dying for." [8] Another commentator enumerated the many advantages to Pakistan and the Muslims in reunification. For example, so he said, all the Muslim holy places, except the Lahore Mosque, were left behind in India, and the "agony of the Muslim refugee in Pakistan is not less poignant than that of the Hindu refugee in India." Thus Pakistan should desire an end to partition.[9]

Muslims were seen as the most dangerous minority. Madhok wrote:

> . . . it is a fact that a majority of Bharatiyā Muslims have not yet learnt to own this land and its culture and treat them as their first love.
>
> The only way to check those tendencies is to educate the Bharatiya Muslims and to disabuse their minds of the Islamic exclusiveness which was exploited by the British and the Muslim League for their selfish ends . . . That is the only way that can make Muslims a part and parcel of the Bharatiya nation.[10]

Another exegesist said of the Muslims: "No other minority is a problem. It is a measure of the largeness of the Hindu heart that all minorities save one—and that too chiefly due to external pressures —are as happy and at home as anybody else." [11] He made it clear what was expected of the Muslims. They were to use Bharatiya names, give up "foreign" Urdu, the Arabic script, purdah and circumcision. About Muslims:

[8] *Organiser*, V:12 (November 5, 1951).
[9] "Free Thinker," in *ibid.*, V:18 (December 17, 1951).
[10] *Ibid.*, V:17 (December 10, 1951).
[11] "Free Thinker," *ibid.*, V:20 (December 31, 1951).

. . . [the Jana Sangh] considers them the flesh of our flesh, the blood of our blood. That is its basic, unalterable attitude towards them. The Jana Sangh invites them to accept our hand of brotherhood. It expects them to shed all those complexes which militate against this brotherhood. It looks forward to their disassociating foreign ways from the tenets of their religion. They are welcome to *worship* the Islamic way. They are expected to *live* the Bharatiya way.[12]

None of this was designed to win Muslim support in the forthcoming elections, although Sharma claimed some Muslims had joined the Jana Sangh.[13] It was certain to draw down upon the Jana Sangh the charge of communalism and this fell heavily especially from Nehru and the Congress and from Jayaprakash Narayan and the Socialists.

Tactics

It is customary for opposition parties in India to remind themselves that the Congress is a "minority party," in terms of popular vote, and that the only reason the Congress wins is that the opposition is divided. Hence, before every election there is a scramble for alliances or adjustments among the parties. But the differences between the opposition parties are so great that these alliances are seldom contracted and when contracted seldom work, although the 1967 elections may have signalled a new trend.

Some time before the elections and before the Jana Sangh was founded, Jayaprakash Narayan called a meeting of the opposition in Bombay. It met July 1–2, 1950, and included the Hindu Mahasabha, the party to which the *Organiser* was then closest. Khare, as Mahasabha president, put forward twelve points, many of which must have shocked the secularist Narayan. So far as the Mahasabha was concerned the attempt at broad agreement ended there.

The Jana Sangh attempted to enroll a number of the smaller parties under its label and failed. Both the Orissa Swadhin Jana Sangh and the Ganatantra Parishad in the same state declined to join and fought the elections under their own banners. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, however, did not contest in Orissa. Talks were held with the Santal Parganas and Chhota Nagpur Janata Party looking to merger or alliance but these failed. The Janata Party

[12] *Ibid.*, Emphasis in original.
[13] *Ibid.*, V:12 (November 5, 1951).

leader, Raja Kamakhya Narain Singh of Ramgarh, ran his candidates without alliance with any party. The Jana Sangh did not oppose Janata candidates, but this was only because it could not field candidates.

Perhaps the most natural allies of the Jana Sangh were the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad. Each party considered the Jana Sangh both a bit too radical and an infringer on its domain, but talks were held. Mookerjee had no difficulty in cementing an alliance with Chatterjee in West Bengal under which each party would run candidates under its own label with the support of the other party. Elsewhere the three parties were generally unsuccessful in resolving their differences. In Delhi, the Jana Sangh and the Mahasabha tried to set up an alliance for the civic elections in September and failed even though the issue was put to arbitration. The arbiter was Swami Anand, who as Mahashaya Khushalchand had edited the pro-Arya Samajist *Milap*. The Jana Sangh won five of 21 seats in the local board elections in spite of Mahasabha opposition.

In Uttar Pradesh the local secretaries of the Ram Rajya Parishad and the Jana Sangh arranged an alliance under which twenty-eight Parishad candidates would withdraw in favor of Jana Sanghis and two Sanghis would withdraw in favor of the Parishad. Upahdyaya signed for the Jana Sangh. A week later Parishad vice president, Prabhavati Raje, overrode her Uttar Pradesh organization and the deal was off. Several Parishad members resigned including Surendra Nath Dixit, who signed the agreement for the party.[14] In Uttar Pradesh, the Jana Sangh did come to a fairly solid agreement with the Uttar Pradesh Praja Party, an *ad hoc* party of local landlords.[15] Another agreement with a party of landlords was effective in Gurgaon and Rohtak Districts of Punjab with the Zamindar Party led by Rao Birendra Singh.[16] In Ajmer the Jana Sangh allied itself with the local Purusharthi Parishad.

In the campaign Mookerjee was of course the principal speaker for the Jana Sangh. The principal speaker against the party was probably Nehru himself who in the 1952 elections apparently

[14] *Ibid.*, V:21 (January 7, 1952) and V:22 (January 14, 1952).
[15] Park and Kogekar, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
[16] Bodh Raj Sharma, "Punjab", in Kogekar and Park, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

feared the nationalistic and reactionary right more than the socialist and communist left. In a note to the Election Committee of the Congress, of which Lal Bahadur Shastri was chief, Nehru said:

> The major struggle in India today, in the elections or elsewhere, is between the Congress, as representing a non-communal secular state, and the communal bodies which have an entirely different approach . . . These communal bodies often talk in terms of nationalism and sometimes even pretend to stand for social economic progress. Essentially, however, they represent reaction in every way . . . With the Socialist Party we have some difference, but there is much in common . . . Congress candidates must be chosen with particular care so that they might represent fully the noncommunal character and approach of the Congress . . . This is important, as there has been a certain infiltration in the past of communal elements in the Congress.[17]

Nehru replied to Mookerjee's denial of the charge that the Jana Sangh was communal:

> If there is any organization in India which is really communal it is the Jan Sangh. It is a wholly reactionary organisation. All the reactionary people in India—I say this deliberately—princes and jagirdars, who are to my mind the real backward classes, are behind the Jan Sangh. They are financing it.[18]

Nehru's feeling on the issue was strong, even though he had his facts a bit mixed up; the princes and jagirdars were not flocking to the Jana Sangh and, if going anywhere in the opposition, were attracted more to the Ram Rajya Parishad. Nehru was joined by the Socialists who described the Jana Sangh as a "reactionary, communal body dedicated to militant Hinduism" with whom there could be "no possible common ground." [19]

Mookerjee traveled widely concentrating in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Central India and the Punjab. In Ferozepur, November 7, as part of his "triumphal tour of the Punjab," he said:

> No artificial borders can keep Bharat divided, which is and has always remained one geographically, culturally and economically. [We are] determined to undo the wrong that has been done to the motherland by

[17] *Statesman*, September 27, 1951, quoted in *Nehru on Communalism* (New Delhi, Sampradyikta Virodhi Committee, 1965), pp. 223–4.
[18] *Statesman*, December 12, 1951, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 237.
[19] Hari Kishore Singh, *A History of the Praja Socialist Party* (Lucknow, Narendra Prakashan, 1959), p. 128.

the Congress-League conspiracy and restore her to her natural position.[20]

In reply to charges that the party was communal he said on November 12, at Simla:

It does not lie in the mouth of Pandit Nehru to call Jan Sangh a communal organisation when he himself betrayed the Khan brothers, the two really nationalist Muslims . . . . by accepting the League's demand for an election in the North West Frontier Province.[21]

And so in the heat of the election the charges went back and forth. At Lucknow in mid-December, Mookerjee said:

We do not want four crores of Muslims to go out of India, as ours is a secular state . . . Is Shri Nehru going to protect the four crores of Muslims who are living in India? If it is so, who will protect them after him? Only the Hindus will protect them, and the Muslims should try to win the confidence and goodwill of the Hindus.[22]

Nehru, of course, took the opposite stand: the Hindus should act in such a manner as to stop any fear the Muslims may have.

At Jaipur a few days later, Mookerjee returned to the reunification theme and admitted he had no formula for ending partition:

Akhand Bharat is no election slogan. With us it is an article of faith. A leading Congressman asked me how precisely Jan Sangh proposed to effect reunion. My answer to him was a question. I asked, "When the Congress first gave the call for freedom did or could anybody foretell the precise course the freedom movement would take?" This is no communal question. It is a national political problem. It is a challenge to our manhood and humanity alike.[23]

This then was the tone of debate at the leadership level. What was said in the lower levels, in the constituencies, is not documented in verbatim quotations, and must be left largely to hearsay. One writer speaking of Punjab reported:

No stone was left unturned to expose the alleged anti-Hindu policy of the Congress. The partition of the country, which had been responsible for the misfortune of the displaced persons, was laid at the door of the Congress. The difficulties in Kashmir, the sufferings of the East Bengal

[20] *Organiser,* V:14 (November 19, 1951).
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.,* V:18 (December 17, 1951).
[23] *Ibid.,* V:19 (December 24, 1951).

Hindus, the Hindu Code Bill and its effect in disrupting the Hindu society, all were emphasized as the achievements of the Congress.[24]

One suspects that on both sides there was a great deal of mud-slinging with such charges as "Nehru eats beef" being matched with "Jana Sangh murdered Gandhiji"—at least in 1962 these were not untypical charges.

The Verdict

When the election results were in they brought great dissappointment for the Jana Sangh in terms of seats won. Like most political parties, its members had indulged in a considerable amount of wishful thinking and imagined their candidates winning much greater successes than a more objective appraisal would have allowed.

The Election Commission had set a level of three per cent of the total popular vote as the minimum to be polled by a party to qualify it as an "all-India party." By a very narrow margin the Jana Sangh managed to do this; it polled 3.06 per cent of the Lok Sabha vote. The party was thereby entitled to have its election symbol—the *Deepak* lamp—reserved for the exclusive use of its candidates. Four other parties obtained all-India recognition: the Congress, the Communist Party of India, the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party. The latter two later merged into the Praja Socialist Party, leaving four national parties in the field.

Three Jana Sanghis were elected to the Lok Sabha. Mookerjee won the seat in Calcutta South-East by a substantial margin in what was essentially a three-cornered contest. The Congress and Communist candidates trailed. Durga Charan Bannerji (or Bandopadhyaya) relying heavily on Mookerjee's support won in Midnapur, the site of the disturbances in 1942 which led to Mookerjee's resignation from the Bengal Cabinet.[25] In Chittor, Rajasthan, the Jana Sangh candidate, Umashankar Muljibhai Trivedi, won in a fairly close race against Manikya Lal Varma, a former chief minister of Rajasthan. Trivedi, one of the more prominent Jana Sanghis

[24] Bodh Raj Sharma, *Report on Elections in Punjab, op. cit.*, pp. 108–9.

[25] *See* Chapter IV. Bannerji is all but unknown to Jana Sanghis today. I once inquired of several in a group at a party meeting about Bannerji's present whereabouts and received no information, some even forgetting he had ever sat in the Lok Sabha. He did not run for re-election in 1957.

without an RSS background, was born in Panchmahals District of Gujarat probably in 1905. He studied law at Lincoln's Inn at about the same time as Mookerjee. Trivedi lived in Burma, where he was president of the Arya Kumar Sabha for some time. He was evacuated after the Japanese captured Rangoon. On his return to India he settled in Neemuch, Mandsaur District in what is now Madhya Pradesh, where he built up a substantial law practice. He was in the Congress until 1951 when he joined the Jana Sangh.[26] His 1952 constituency is just across the Rajasthan border from Neemuch. In 1957 and 1962, Trivedi contested the Mandsaur seat, the first time unsuccessfully, the second successfully. In 1967 he switched to Bhilwara, Rajasthan, and was defeated.

Several others who were supported by the Jana Sangh, or at least not opposed by it, won seats. The most prominent of these was Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee, the Hindu Mahasabha leader and close friend of Mookerjee, who won from the Hooghly constituency in West Bengal in a tight contest against the Congress and the Communist Party. A partially complete alliance in Madhya Bharat with the Mahasabha led the Jana Sangh to avoid opposing the Mahasabha general secretary, V. G. Deshpande. Deshpande accomplished something never yet repeated: he won two seats to the Lok Sabha, from Guna and Gwalior.[27] The fourth successful Mahasabha candidate, Mrs. Shakuntala Nayar, in Gonda West, Uttar Pradesh, was opposed by the Jana Sangh.[28] The Jana Sangh also claimed to have supported Tulsidas Kilachand who won the Mehsana West seat in Bombay (Gujarat).[29]

In assembly elections, the results were very uneven. The detailed results by districts in each of the three elections appear in Appendix II. As Appendix II has been arranged, for purposes of comparison, according to the districts and states in 1967, a table of the results arranged according to the states as they existed in 1952 is presented on page 95.

Mookerjee's personality and his following, particularly in Mid-

[26] Biographic data from *Who's Who in the Lok Sabha, 1962* (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1962), p. 555.

[27] Deshpande resigned the Gwalior seat which was won in the by-election by Mahasabha president, N. B. Khare.

[28] In 1962 she was elected a member of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly on the Jana Sangh ticket, and in 1967 to the Lok Sabha.

[29] *Organiser*, V:16 (December 10, 1951).

TABLE I

JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS, 1951–52

Lok Sabha Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	PART "A" STATES	*Assemblies* Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
12	2	0	1	3.64	Assam	108	3	0	3	0.29
55	2	0	2	0.40	Bihar	330	45	0	42	1.18
45	..	..	..	..	Bombay	315	2	0	2	0.04
29	8	0	3	4.94	Madhya Pradesh	232	76	0	61	3.57
75	..	..	..	..	Madras	375	2	0	2	0.04
20	..	..	..	..	Orissa	140	..	..	..	..
18	10	0	9	5.60	Punjab	126	62	0	40	5.58
86	41	0	23	7.29	Uttar Pradesh	430	210	2	153	6.44
34	6	2	0	5.94	West Bengal	238	84	9	60	5.61
					PART "B" STATES					
25	..	..	..	..	Hyderabad	175	2	0	2	0.07
11	4	0	0	9.65	Madhya Bharat	99	41	4	14	9.74
11	4	0	4	4.16	Mysore	99	22	0	18	2.25
5	2	0	2	2.94	PEPSU	60	23	2	19	2.77
20	3	1	2	3.04	Rajasthan	160	50	8	30	5.93
6	..	..	..	..	Saurashtra	60	3	0	2	0.46
12	..	..	..	..	Travancore-Cochin	108	..	..	..	..
					PART "C" STATES					
2	1	0	0	16.20	Ajmer	30	16	3	5	12.19
2	..	..	..	..	Bhopal	30	9	0	6	4.92
1	..	..	..	..	Bilaspur	..	..	..	..	..
1	.	..	..	..	Coorg	24	..	..	..	..
4	3	0	0	25.92	Delhi	48	31	5	4	21.88
3	2	0	1	10.72	Himachal Pradesh	36	11	0	8	3.46
2	..	..	..	..	Kutch	..	..	..	..	..
2	..	..	..	..	Manipur	..	..	..	..	..
2	2	0	2	6.14	Tripura	..	..	..	..	..
6	3	0	3	12.71	Vindhya Pradesh	60	33	2	17	9.88
489	93	3	52	3.06	TOTAL	3283	725	35	488	2.76

Note: Seats—Total seats allotted to state in Lok Sabha or to be filled by election in assembly. Cont—Seats contested by Jana Sangh, i.e., number of candidates nominated less those who withdrew or whose nominations were rejected. Won—Seats won by Jana Sangh candidates. See footnote 30 for comment on Delhi. LD—Number of Jana Sangh candidates who forfeited their security deposits by failing to poll 1/6 of the vote in single member constituencies or 1/12 of the vote in double member.

Source: Adapted from the Election Commission report, see bibliography for full citation. The report contains a number of discrepancies, which have been altered to conform to the detailed results by constituencies.

napur District, brought the Jana Sangh successes in Bengal which were unrelated to the strength of the organization or of the RSS and which were not repeated in the 1957, 1962 and 1967 elections following Mookerjee's death. The party won nine seats, eight of them in Midnapur and one in 24 Parganas. In Midnapur the party contested only 18 of the 35 seats but polled 12.68 per cent of the

vote. It is a measure of the degree to which Mookerjee contributed to the successes that only three of the nine Jana Sangh winners contested for re-election in 1957 and only one stood again in 1962, and none of them won.

The greatest disappointment to Jana Sangh leaders came in the Punjab. Here the party was founded and here it expected to achieve major successes. It was totally shut out. Of ten candidates for the Lok Sabha only one retained his deposit, i.e., won one sixth of the votes. Lala Yodhraj contested two seats, Karnal and Kangra, and was badly beaten in both. Of 66 Jana Sangh candidates for the assembly, 43 lost their deposits. The RSS secretary for Punjab, Dharm Vir, was defeated in Jullundur City South East, although he finished second to the Congress winner. In Karnal, Hindu Mahasabha vice president Gokul Chand Narang incurred the wrath of his party and stood on a Jana Sangh ticket. He also finished second to the Congress. Party founder Balraj Madhok contested the Ludhiana City constituency and trailed far behind the winner, Congress Chief Minister Bhim Sen Sachar.

In neighbouring PEPSU the Jana Sangh won two assembly seats in Mahendragarh District. These however were transitory seats. One winner deserted the party almost as soon as the ballots were counted. The Jana Sangh, however, reorganized and in 1957 and 1962 the district was one of the stronger areas of the party.

In Delhi the Jana Sangh showed in 1952 signs of the strength which were to lead to near polarization between it and the Congress in 1962 and, in 1967, to the Jana Sangh victory. In Lok Sabha contests the party contested three of the four seats and each candidate retained his deposit. General Secretary Mauli Chandra Sharma ran for the Outer Delhi (General) seat and ran strongly against the Congress winner. The other two candidates also finished second in their contests. The Jana Sangh did not oppose Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani in New Delhi where she won on the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party list. The assembly results are more than a little confused. The Jana Sangh won either five or two seats.[30] The Election Commission report lists five Jana Sangh victors; however, three of

[30] In my article "The Jana Sangh, A Brief History," *South Asian Politics and Religion*, ed. Donald E. Smith (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 84, I use the figure four for the seats won by the Jana Sangh. I take this opportunity to disagree with myself, the correct figure is five according to the record and two according to the way people sat when the assembly opened.

them disowned the party immediately after the elections. One of these, Rana Jung Bahadur Singh, later ran as a Congress candidate in the New Delhi by-election won by Madhok in 1961.

Rajasthan was the only part of northern India where the Congress did very poorly. The ruling party returned only 82 of 160 candidates in the assembly and one of these seats had to be vacated as Tika Ram Paliwal ran for and won two assembly seats. The 78 opposition seats were divided among the Ram Rajya Parishad, 24; the Jana Sangh, 8; Krishikar Lok Party, 7;[31] Hindu Mahasabha, two; one each to the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, and thirty-five independents. The independents largely owed allegiance to Hanwant Singh, Maharaja of Jodhpur. Others from Bikaner and Ganganagar Districts were associated with Karni Singh, Maharaja of Bikaner. The rout of the Congress in the areas in which the influence of the maharajas, thakurs and jagirdars was exerted against the ruling party was enormous. We have noted that Jana Sanghi U. M. Trivedi defeated a former chief minister in the Chittor Lok Sabha seat. The then chief minister, Jai Narayan Vyas, chose unhappily to contest against Hanwant Singh for the Jodhpur assembly seat; he barely escaped with his deposit. Had the Maharaja of Jaipur and the Maharana of Udaipur joined the opposition it is unlikely Congress could have formed a government. They did not join: Jaipur was Rajpramukh of the state, Udaipur had just ascended the throne and had tax problems which suggested he stay out of politics. These contributed to the Congress retaining power but the major factor was the sudden death in an air crash of Hanwant Singh. He was one of the most colorful of the ruling princes. One official who had his share of trouble with him wrote: "Here was a prince, head-strong and emotional, with considerable organizing capacity."[32] Had he lived, it seemed possible that he

[31] The Krishikar Lok Party was led nationally by Prof. N. G. Ranga, an Andhra Congressman, who had broken with the Congress when Kripalani did. He joined the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, quarreled with T. Prakasam, later a Congress chief minister of Andhra, over the local leadership, and broke away to set up the Krishikar Lok Party. Ranga later returned to the Congress but in 1959 became the national chairman of the Swatantra Party, a position he still holds. Bharatpur District was the center of Krishikar Lok Party activity in Rajasthan, under the leadership of Raja Man Singh, brother of the Maharaja of Bharatpur.

[32] V. P. Menon, *The Integration of the Indian States* (Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1961), p. 113. Menon, later a Swatantra Party officer, wrote that Hanwant Singh offered him the Jodhpur Lok Sabha seat, which the Maharaja eventually contested and won in addition to his assembly seat, *ibid.*

would win over a number of Congressmen and be able to form a ministry. With his death, as we shall see in Chapter VI, the coalition fell apart, and Paliwal was able to form a Congress ministry.

We have digressed in discussing Rajasthan to give a classic example of the power of the traditional leaders in areas which have had little democratic experience. The Jana Sangh, though winning eight seats in Rajasthan and another three in Ajmer, was but a small part of the over-all picture. The state president, Chiranjilal Mishra, was defeated but finished second in the assembly contest from Johri Bazar in Jaipur city; the Jana Sangh won the same seat in the 1957, 1962 and 1967 elections with Satish Chandra Agarwal. In Sikar District the Danta Ramgarh seat was won by Bhairon Singh Shekawat, now president of the Rajasthan Jana Sangh, and the only Jana Sanghi who has been victorious in all four general elections. In the next chapter we shall see that disciplinary problems decimated the Jana Sangh in the Rajasthan assembly.

Another state made up of former princely states in which the Jana Sangh did fairly well in the face of Ram Rajya Parishad and Mahasabha competition was Madhya Bharat. There the party won four seats. Three of these were in Nimar (Khargone) District where Ramchandra Vithal Bade, a local pleader, has developed the Jana Sangh into the most powerful party in the district. Bade was born in Indore in 1906 and after completing his law training settled in Sendhwa, the principal town of the district.[33] He won an assembly seat in 1952 and in 1962 was elected to the Lok Sabha. His defeat in 1967 was one of the surprise results among Jana Sangh candidates. The Jana Sangh took 29.48 per cent of the vote in the district in 1952, 37.74 per cent in 1957, and 48.92 per cent in 1962. The fourth seat was taken by Vimal Kumar Chordia in Garoth in Mandsaur District. This district under the leadership of Trivedi and Chordia gave more than half of its votes to the Jana Sangh in 1962 and 1967. Chordia was re-elected in 1957 but did not stand in 1962 when he chose to devote himself to organizing the campaign. Born in the district in 1924, he is a lawyer and now a member of the Rajya Sabha.[34]

[33] *Who's Who in the Lok Sabha, 1962, op. cit.*, p. 20.

[34] *Who's Who in the Rajya Sabha, 1964* (New Delhi, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 1964), pp. 61–2.

Elsewhere in central India the Jana Sangh won two assembly seats in Vindhya Pradesh. In Madhya Pradesh, as then constituted, the party failed to win any seats, but it began the foundations of an organization which would win seats in the future in the Hindi-speaking Mahakoshal area. The Mahakoshal president, Bimal Chandra Banerjee, contested the Jabalpur North Lok Sabha seat. In Vidarbha, the Marathi-speaking section of Madhya Pradesh and the home of the RSS, the Jana Sangh did quite poorly. The party president, ex-minister P. B. Gole, barely managed to keep his deposit in the Buldana-Akola Lok Sabha contest.

In the vast expanse of Uttar Pradesh the Jana Sangh won but two assembly seats, one in Gonda District and the other in Budaun. In the latter, Onkar Nath, was defeated for re-election to the assembly in 1957, but was elected to the Lok Sabha from Budaun in 1962 and 1967. The party showed strength in some of the northern and central districts including Bareilly, Gonda, Kheri, Budaun, Hardoi and Sitapur. Here in particular and throughout the state in general the beginnings were made which were to bring the Jana Sangh in 1962 and 1967 to the position of largest opposition party in Uttar Pradesh. The future assembly leader, Madho Prasad Tripathi, ran close to the Congress in an assembly constituency in Basti District. Here he won on the third try in 1962, only to lose again in 1967. In Bulandshahr District, Himmat Singh gained his first electoral experience by challenging the Congress for a seat he won in 1957, 1962 and 1967. The state party president, Rao Krishna Pal Singh, finished second in the Etah Lok Sabha constituency. One of his successors in the office, Raj Kumar Srivastava, placed second to Congress in a Lucknow assembly contest.

In the other states the party made but a token show. A few candidates managed to retain their deposits. An indication of the hastiness of candidate selection and the lack of organization is that only one of the forty-five assembly candidates in Bihar ever stood again on the Jana Sangh ticket. In Assam the party did not contest at all in 1957, and in Tripura it did not contest again until 1967.[35]

[35] There is some question as to whether or not the Tripura candidates were actually Jana Sangh in spite of the Election Commission designation. Present members of the party have little or no recollection of there being a party in the state in 1952.

Mysore has been indicated as the first area of expansion in the south; in 1952 a bare beginning was made.[36]

Appraisal of the election

Perhaps the best appraisal is self-appraisal when that self-appraisal is done with a certain amount of objectivity and with a view toward correcting the errors which have been made. Madhok said of the election:

> Viewed in the light of the serious handicaps under which Jana Sangh contested the elections, it was a remarkable achievement. Being the youngest party it hardly had any time to make itself known to the people . . . Lack of political and electoral experience in its workers, who were mostly young men, and paucity of resources badly handicapped it. But perhaps the greatest fact against it was the concentrated and systematic attack on it by Pt. Nehru whose virulent denunciations of Jana Sangh were echoed by almost the entire press and all the leftist parties in the country . . .[37]

Malkani, writing as "Kamal," said it this way:

> A major factor in Jan Sangh's election fight was the inexperience of its workers . . .
>
> The Jan Sangh would think of caste and community and sub-caste and of what the Muslims and moneyers would think of him before selecting its candidate.
>
> In the case of Jan Sangh, if the candidates were poor financially, the organisation was even poorer in that respect.
>
> . . . taken as a whole they [the Muslims] voted mostly for the Congress . . . The matter assumed a certain decisiveness by virtue of the fact that Muslims were concentrated in the North where the hope of the Jan Sangh particularly lay.
>
> Another serious difficulty was the absence of supporting sectional organisation . . . It did not have a women's organisation . . . Also there was no Jan Sangh organisation on the Harijan front . . . And above all the Jan Sangh lacked a Labour Front . . .[38]

These two leading writers in the Jana Sangh camp have identified most of the Jana Sangh difficulties in 1952. Soon after the elections

[36] The seats listed for Bombay and Madras in Table I are in districts which are now part of Mysore.

[37] Balraj Madhok, *Political Trends in India* (Delhi, S. Chand & Co., 1959), p. 62.

[38] *Organiser,* V:29 (March 3, 1952).

the Working Committee moved to solve some of these problems. It asked party workers to propagandize among Harijans, laborers, students, women, displaced persons, and farmers and gave suggestions as to the line the organizing work should take with each group. The party also set up a four-anna membership fee but added: "The Pradeshes be further requested to give the names of at least some persons as undertake to contribute regularly to the Centre funds." [39] In a speech at Ludhiana, February 17, Golwalkar gave the Jana Sangh a "well done" and said the party should not be pessimistic and "should go ahead with calm confidence in themselves and their mission." [40]

The historian of the Mahasabha said "at many places the Hindu Mahasabha lost seats by a few votes . . . on account of the opposition of Jan Sangh." [41] Frequently when talking to oppositionists in India one hears the lament "if only we had allied with so-and-so we both would have won more seats; the Congress wins only because we are split." We have noted that the natural allies of the Jana Sangh in 1952 were the Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad. Prakash's complaint assumes that had one party withdrawn its candidate in favor of the candidate of the other party, all votes secured by the withdrawing candidate would have been polled by the candidate remaining in the contest. At best this is a dubious assumption as many factors need to be considered beyond mere affinity of the parties. However, taking the assumption at face value it is instructive to see just how many seats were "lost" among the three parties. These "might-have-beens" can best be studied in tabular form by states. In assembly contests:

Assam: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha opposed in one seat in which total votes of the two parties was less than the winning poll.

Bihar: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha opposed in one, Jana Sangh and Parishad in six, in all of which total votes were less than winning poll.

Madhya Pradesh: Jana Sangh and Parishad opposed in four

[39] *Ibid.*, V:27 (February 18, 1952).

[40] *Ibid.*, V:28 (February 25, 1952).

[41] Indra Prakash, *A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sanghatan Movement*, Delhi, Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha, 1952, second edition, p. 328.

seats of which the Parishad won one and the other three garnered a total vote less than the winning poll.

Uttar Pradesh: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha faced each other in twenty seats, of which the Jana Sangh won one, the Mahasabha "might" have won one, and the other eighteen were not affected. Jana Sangh and Parishad faced each other in thirty-five seats, of which none "might" have been won. Parishad and Mahasabha faced each other in six, none of which were affected. All three parties contested eight, of which the Mahasabha won one and the other seven were not affected.

West Bengal: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha faced each other in three, Jana Sangh and Parishad in eight, Mahasabha and Parishad in one, and all three faced each other in one; in none of the seats did the contests affect the outcome.

Madhya Bharat: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha opposed in three, of which Jana Sangh won one and "might" have won two. Jana Sangh and Parishad contested against each other in eighteen, of which Parishad "might" have won three, Jana Sangh "might" have won one and other fourteen did not matter. Mahasabha and Parishad faced each other in six, of which Mahasabha won three and "might" have won one, Parishad won one, and one was not affected. All three parties contested one seat which "might" have been won by Jana Sangh.

Rajasthan: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha met in three, of which Mahasabha won one and "might" have won one and Jana Sangh "might" have won one. Jana Sangh and Parishad faced each other in seventeen, of which Parishad won six and "might" have won five with the other six unaffected.

Bhopal: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha opposed in one to no effect.

Delhi: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha met in four, of which Jana Sangh won one and the others were not affected. Jana Sangh and Parishad met in three to no effect..

Himachal Pradesh: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha met in one which was not affected.

Vindhya Pradesh: Jana Sangh and Parishad met in nine, of which Parishad won one and eight were not affected.

Summary: Jana Sangh opposed Mahasabha in 37 seats, of which each party won two, Mahasabha "might" have won four, Jana Sangh "might" have won one, and 28 were not affected by the contest. Jana Sangh and Parishad opposed each other in 100, of which Parishad won eight and "might" have won eight more. Jana Sangh "might" have won one. The other 83 were not affected. Parishad and Mahasabha met in 13, of which Parishad won three and "might" have won one, Mahasabha won one, and eight were not affected. In ten seats, the three parties all contested. Of these the Mahasabha won one, the Jana Sangh "might" have won one, and eight were unaffected.

Thus in assembly contests, assuming the full transference of votes from the withdrawing party to the party remaining in the contest, the Jana Sangh could have gained but three seats (Rajasthan, one; Madhya Bharat, two). The Mahasabha might have added five (Madhya Bharat, three; Uttar Pradesh, one; Rajasthan, one). The biggest gainer in this game of "might-have-beens" would have been the Parishad, which could have picked up eight (Rajasthan, five; Madhya Bharat, three). To further deflate the thesis, of the total of 160 assembly seats in which the parties opposed each other by two's or all three, 127 were unaffected.

In Lok Sabha contests the Mahasabha and Parishad did not oppose each other in any seats. This was not by design. The five contests which pitted the Jana Sangh against the Mahasabha (Uttar Pradesh, four; Delhi, one) found the Mahasabha winning one seat and the other four unaffected. The Jana Sangh and Parishad tangled in 17 seats (Uttar Pradesh, nine; Punjab, two; Madhya Pradesh, one; West Bengal, one; Delhi, one; Vindhya Pradesh, two; Madhya Bharat, one). Of these the Jana Sangh "might" have won one in Vindhya Pradesh and the Parishad one in Madhya Bharat.

While our study shows that the competition was not a serious matter, the Jana Sangh was nevertheless to try to find a means to merge the Mahasabha and the Parishad into itself in order that the three parties standing for Bharatiya culture should work together.

The elections of 1951–52 were now history. The party had made a reasonable showing, was recognized as a national party and

had a nationally known leader to carry on both in Parliament and in the organization. It also had the substantial backing of the RSS and had drawn in a number of non-RSS people. The party saw its shortcomings and was prepared to use the ensuing five years to build itself into a stronger force before the next general election.

CHAPTER VI

Mookerjee, Sharma and the RSS: 1952–1957

Mookerjee was the cornerstone upon which the Jana Sangh hoped to build itself into a national party which could eventually challenge the Congress for supremacy. The RSS alone did not feel that it could do this. A national leader needed an effective vantage point from which to speak; Mookerjee found this on the front bench of the opposition in the Lok Sabha. Yet no matter how skilled the parliamentarian and how polished the orator, being a leader of but three members was not an enviable position.

National Democratic Party

With the exception of Nehru of the Congress and Jaipal Singh of the tribal Jharkhand Party of Bihar, Mookerjee was the only party president returned to the Lok Sabha in the general elections. Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party president Acharya J. B. Kripalani and Socialist Party general secretary Asoka Mehta were to enter shortly through by-elections, and Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani was successful in the general election from New Delhi.

At the opening of Parliament Mookerjee was clearly the best known and most experienced leader in the opposition. Even before Parliament opened he began consultations toward assembling a joint opposition parliamentary party. On March 28, 1952, a group of 45 Lok Sabha members met in New Delhi under the chairmanship of Mookerjee. These included, in addition to Jana Sanghis, members of the Hindu Mahasabha, Ganatantra Parishad, Akali Dal

and Jharkhand Party and a number of independents.[1] As the talks continued some of the smaller parties from the south joined the discussions including the Tamil Nad Toilers Party and the Commonweal Party, but the Ram Rajya Parishad stayed away throughout. Mookerjee attempted to enlarge the area in which he was negotiating and is reported to have met Asoka Mehta and Mrs. Kripalani.[2]

Meanwhile, the left was also negotiating for some parliamentary alliance. A. K. Gopalan, leader of the Communist group, the largest in the opposition, attempted to persuade both the Socialists and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party to join the Communists in a "leftist front" which would also include some of the smaller leftist groups such as the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Peasant and Workers Party. Neither the Socialist Party nor the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party was willing to join hands with the Communists, but the two parties already were making the plans which resulted in their merger into the Praja Socialist Party.

In June, after the opening of Parliament, Mookerjee was able to put together a bloc of 32 MPs who followed his leadership in the Lok Sabha. These are listed in Table II along with the Rajya Sabha members who came together at the same time.

The composition of the National Democratic Party (NDP), as the group was called, is remarkable for several reasons. Among the members Mookerjee was clearly the outstanding person. He therefore was faced with a minimum number of contenders for the leadership and was able to parcel out speaking assignments with little challenge. When he thought it appropriate he could use most of the allotted time himself.[3] His party members by and large did

[1] Balraj Madhok, *Syama Prasad Mookerjee* (New Delhi, Deepak Prakashan, 1954), pp. 98–9, and *Organiser*, V:31 (March 17, 1952). *Organiser*, V:33 (March 31, 1952), in an article against Christian missionaries unaccountably attacked Jaipal Singh. The Jharkhand Party did not join the NDP and it is possible its refusal was already known; otherwise, it appears to have been a blunder on the part of *Organiser*.

[2] Sisir Gupta, "Parties Between the Elections," in *National Politics and 1957 Elections in India*, S. L. Poplai, ed. Delhi, Metropolitan Book Co., 1957), pp. 33. The author says the Socialists remained out of the Mookerjee grouping as they objected to the inclusion of the Hindu Mahasabha.

[3] Lanka Sundaram, "The Role of an Independent Member," in *The Indian Parliament*, ed. A. B. Lal (Allahabad, Chaitanya Publishing House, 1956), p. 65.

TABLE II

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Name	*Lok Sabha Party*	*Constituency*
Syama Prasad Mookerjee	BJS	Calcutta South East, West Bengal
Bezwada Ramachandra Reddy	Ind	Nellore, Madras
Rajendra Narayan Singh Deo	GP	Kalahandi-Bolangir, Orissa
V. G. Deshpande	HMS	Guna, Madhya Bharat
V. Mannuswami	TNTP	Tindivanam, Madras
Bahadur Singh	Akali	Ferozepur, Punjab
Umashankar M. Trivedi	BJS	Chittor, Rajasthan
Annie Mascarene	Ind	Travancore, Travancore-Cochin
Narayan Bhaskar Khare	HMS	Gwalior, Madhya Bharat
Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee	HMS	Hooghly, West Bengal
Hukum Singh	Akali	Kapurthala-Bhatinda, PEPSU
A. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar	Cwl	Kanchepuram, Madras
N. R. M. Swami	Cwl	Wandiwash, Madras
Doraiswamy Pillai Ramachandra	Cwl	Vellore, Madras
A. Jaya Raman	TNTP	Tindivanam, Madras
V. Veeraswamy	Ind	Mayuram, Madras
V. Boovarghasamy Padayachi	TNTP	Perambalur, Madras
N. D. Govindaswamy	TNTP	Cuddalore, Madras
S. K. Kandaswamy Baby	DK	Tiruchengode, Madras
N. Sathinathan	Ind	Dharampuri, Madras
Edward Pal Mathuram	Ind	Tiruchirappalli, Madras
N. Ramasheshiah	Ind	Parvathipuram, Madras
B. Rajagopala Rao	Ind	Srikakulam, Madras
Shiv Murthi Swami	LSS	Kustagi, Hyderabad
Lal Singh	Akali	Ferozepur, Punjab
Nathbar Pandey	GP	Sambalpur, Orissa
D. C. Bannerji	BJS	Midnapur, West Bengal
Shakuntala Nayar	HMS	Gonda West, Uttar Pradesh
P. Subba Rao	GP	Nowrangpur, Orissa
Ajit Singh Sarhadi	Akali	Kapurthala-Bhatinda, PEPSU
Lakshmidhar Jana	GP	Keonjhar, Orissa
Giridhar Bhai	GP	Kalahandi-Bolangir, Orissa
	Rajya Sabha	
Chandrako Sambhaji Rao	HMS	Madhya Bharat
Prafulla Chandra Bhanj Deo	GP	Orissa
Surendra Mohanty	GP	Orissa
Guraj Singh Dhillon	Akali	PEPSU
Deva Prasad Ghosh	BJS	West Bengal
T. V. Kamalaswamy	TNTP	Madras

Abbreviations: BJS: Bharatiya Jana Sangh; GP: Ganatantra Parishad; HMS: Hindu Mahasabha; TNTP: Tamil Nad Toilers Party; Akali: Akali Dal; Cwl: Commonweal Party; DK: Dravida Kazhagam; LSS: Lok Sevak Sangh; Ind: Independent.

Source: For Lok Sabha: *Organiser*, V:46 (June 30, 1952). For Rajya Sabha: *Who's Who in the Council of States*, New Delhi, Council of States Secretariat, 1952.

The unification of the NDP in Parliament had little effect in the states. The parties did overlap in certain states, most notably in Madras where the parties cooperated and elected T. V. Kamalaswamy of the Tamil Nad Toilers Party to the Rajya Sabha. In West Bengal a combination of Hindu Mahasabha and Jana Sangh votes elected Acharya Deva Prasad Ghosh to the Rajya Sabha. However, in both states the conservative opposition to the Congress was much smaller than the leftist opposition and there was little prospect of a combination presenting itself as an alternative government.[7] A similar pooling of votes secured a seat for the Hindu Mahasabha in the Rajya Sabha from Madhya Bharat.

The only state in which conservative unity could be effective was Rajasthan. We noted in the last chapter that the Congress had won a bare majority in that state assembly. As the assembly opened the Congress had 81 seats and the opposition 77 with two seats vacant.[8] Tika Ram Paliwal formed a Congress ministry. By the death of Maharaja Hanwant Singh of Jodhpur the opposition lost its dynamic leader, but it formed the Samyukta Dal under the leadership of Kunwar Jaswant Singh of Bikaner. It claimed the support of the Ram Rajya Parishad, Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Krishikar Lok Party and Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party as well as a large number of independents.[9] All of these except the members of the Krishikar Lok Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party had been supported by the Kshatriya Mahasabha, an organization of Rajput jagirdars and rulers. The coalition adopted an orthodox Hindu program in keeping with its membership. It opposed the Hindu Code Bill and supported the prohibition of cow slaughter.[10] The Rajasthan Jana Sangh membership in the Legislative Assembly was to become a major disciplinary problem for the party.

Cooperation on a national level continued to interest Mookerjee. There was some wooing of Raja Kamakhya Narayan Singh of Ramgarh and his Janata Party: "his only fault, according to the

[7] With the rise of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation) this has, of course, changed.

[8] Paliwal had won two seats and resigned one; the other vacancy arose on the death of Hanwant Singh.

[9] *Organiser*, V:28 (February, 1952).

[10] Irene Tinker-Walker, "Rajasthan," in S. V. Kogekar and Richard L. Park, *Reports on the Indian General Elections, 1951–52* (Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1956), pp. 227–8.

Congress, is that his views are similar to those of the Jana Sangh."[11] But the major effort was expended on the Ganatantra Parishad. In April, Mookerjee traveled to Orissa to address the annual session of the party:

> Dr. Mookerjee pleaded for merger of all parties agreed on going to the Left [sic] of the Congress and on the paramount validity of liberal principles. In other words, it was a call for united political action on the basis of Socialism and Liberalism. We would only add a third implied basic principal—that of Bharatiya culture as the basis of State organisation—which Dr. Mookerjee evidently considered too obvious to mention . . .[12]

The editor could not avoid chiding the party leader for this failure to mention the obvious. Socialism and an absence of Bharatiya culture—these showed Mookerjee was prepared to move some distance beyond the orthodox conservatism of the RSS.

In September, Mookerjee met Asoka Mehta in Bombay. Mehta said the object of the meeting was "to discover ways to co-ordinate efforts, on certain specific issues of grave importance, between nationalist and democratic parties." He said there was not talk of merger of the two parties.[13]

The Jana Sangh was preparing for its first annual session, at Kanpur, December 29–31, 1952. Mookerjee was re-elected president at the session. Mauli Chandra Sharma was retained as one general secretary, but Dindayal Upadhyaya was named to replace Bhai Mahavir as the second general secretary. Upadhyaya held the office until 1967. He was born in Mathura in 1916 and took his college degree from Allahabad University. He joined the RSS as a student, became a full-time worker and eventually became joint organizing secretary for the RSS in Uttar Pradesh. When the Jana Sangh was floated in 1951 he switched to the political party as secretary of the Uttar Pradesh unit.

Several other organizational changes had taken place or were to follow closely on the Kanpur session. The party rearranged its organization in Bombay state by separating the Gujarat and Saurashtra units and beginning units in Greater Bombay, i.e., the city

[11] *Organiser*, V:33 (March 31, 1952).
[12] *Ibid.*, V:36 (April 21, 1952).
[13] *Ibid.*, VI:4 (September 8, 1952).

and suburbs, and Maharashtra. In the Greater Bombay unit Vasant Kumar Pandit, an RSS worker, was named organizing secretary. Balraj Madhok was called to the central office and was replaced as general secretary in the Punjab by Kishen Lal.[14] The Rajasthan and Ajmer units were merged in December with Hari Dutta, a member of the Legislative Assembly from Bharatpur, as president. He had been elected on the Krishikar Lok Party ticket. Sunder Singh Bhandari continued as secretary. The party session called for the merger of Ajmer into Rajasthan.

The Kanpur session was organized by Nana Deshmukh, organizing secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Jana Sangh and formerly Upadhyaya's fellow joint organizing secretary of the RSS in the state. The party invited all members of the NDP to take part in the session and also issued invitations to Kripalani, Akali leader Master Tara Singh and Ganatantra Parishad president Prafulla Chandra Bhanj Deo. At the session Bhanj Deo announced the merger of the Ganatantra Parishad into the Jana Sangh. He said he had "unofficially" directed the merger. The party organ lauded the "decision":

> The merger of the Ganatantra Parishad into the Bharatiya Jan Sangh will be a landmark in the politics of Orissa . . . The decision of the Swadhin Jan Sangh of Sri Nilakantha Das and some independents also to merge [is hailed] . . .[15]

The sighting of the landmark was premature. Bhanj Deo returned to Orissa and his "unofficial" action was repudiated by his party. The Jana Sangh, however, continued to look for a merger with the Ganatantra Parishad and refrained from contesting the 1957 and 1962 elections in Orissa. Just prior to the 1962 elections the Ganatantra Parishad finally agreed to merge into a national party and became the Orissa unit of the Swatantra Party. In 1963, the Jana Sangh opened its organizing work in Orissa as a branch of its Madhya Pradesh work, and contested elections for the first time in 1967.

In his presidential address Mookerjee spoke at length of the East Bengal and Kashmir issues which were of particular interest to

[14] *Ibid.*, VI:20 (January 5, 1953).
[15] *Ibid.*, VI:25 (February 2, 1953).

him and to the party. He also defended his open membership policy, which was necessary if the party was to expand away from the Hindu right, while at the same time he called for a rooting of the society in the Hindu past in order to assuage any ill feeling among the RSS segment.

> . . . Our party is open to all citizens of India irrespective of caste, creed or community. It would be a fatal mistake to confine the membership of any political party in Free India to sections of the people based on caste, community or religion. Equality of rights of Indian citizens, irrespective of any consideration, forms the basis of the Constitution of India, as indeed it must be a primary characteristic of any democratic country. Pakistan's recent proposals for basing her constitution, including minority rights, on Islamic law and principles of communal separation flagrantly expose the reactionary character of that State . . .
> . . . Our party, though ever prepared to extend its hand of equality to all citizens, does not feel ashamed to urge for the consolidation of Hindu society, nor does it suffer from an inferiority complex to acknowledge proudly that the great edifice of Indian culture and civilisation . . . has been built most of all by the labour, sacrifice and wisdom of Hindu sages, savants and patriots . . .[16]

He remembered the chiding he had received from *Organiser* when he addressed the Ganatantra Parishad meeting.

Two issues predominated at the Kanpur session. We shall leave a discussion of the Jana Sangh and Kashmir, to look first at the other major issue, East Bengal. During the latter half of 1952, a number of meetings were held on the question of Hindu refugees from East Bengal. In October, Mookerjee presided over a meeting in Calcutta which called for "quick and firm" action to ensure "the safety and protection of minorities in East Pakistan." [17] In early November, Kripalani presided over an inter-party meeting in Delhi at which Mehta, Mookerjee, and Chatterjee also spoke. This meeting called for economic sanctions against Pakistan. November 23, was designated All-India East Bengal Day by a group of opposition leaders including both Kripalanis, Mookerjee, Mahasabha leaders Chaterjee and Khare, Akalis Master Tara Singh and Sardar Hukum Singh, former Indian National Army leader General Mohan Singh, socialist H. V. Kamath, Prafulla Chandra Bhanj Deo of the Gana-

[16] *Ibid.*, VI:20 (January 5, 1953).
[17] *Ibid.*, VI:11 (October 26, 1952).

tantra Parishad, Tridib Choudhury of the Revolutionary Socialist Party and Soumyendra Nath Tagore of the Revolutionary Communist Party. The declaration called for the people to ". . . mobilise public opinion for putting effective pressure upon the Government so that it may take suitable remedial measures before it is too late . . . the Government of India cannot absolve itself of responsibility in the matter . . . We also appeal to the people of goodwill in Pakistan . . ." [18] In his presidential address at Kanpur Mookerjee said "we do not call for an immediate declaration of war" but he believed the cautious policy of the Nehru government had "emboldened" the Pakistan Government to make life difficult for the minorities.[19] Mookerjee would do little more on East Bengal for he was about to enter upon the final struggle of his life in Kashmir.

The Kashmir Satyagraha

The recent position of the Jana Sangh on Kashmir has been rigid: Kashmir in its entirety is Indian by virtue of the accession of the Maharaja; there is no question of a plebiscite; the only matter remaining to be settled is the full and complete evacuation by Pakistan of the areas occupied by Pakistan or the Azad Kashmir Government. More recently, there has also been the demand for the evacuation of the Chinese from the areas occupied by them. The steady repetition of this position has had its effect on the policy of the Government of India. One writer states:

> The shift in India's official policy from moral and political plane to a purely legalistic one—based on Maharaj Hari Singh's signature on the instrument of accession and the resolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State—may, at least partly, be attributed to the pressure that the Jana Sangh was able to build up in the country . . .
> . . . In fact, as far as Kashmir is concerned, the Jana Sangh did not have a more brilliant spokesman of its policies than Mr. [V. K. Krishna] Menon, after Dr. Mookerjee.[20]

In Chapter IV, we recounted the founding of the Praja Parishad mainly by RSS workers in Jammu and Kashmir including Madhok. Prem Nath Dogra assumed the leadership shortly after the founding and has retained the leadership since. The Parishad prepared to

[18] *Ibid.*, VI:15 (November 24, 1952).
[19] *Ibid.*, VI:20 (January 5, 1953).
[20] Balraj Puri, "Sangh's Influence on India's Policy," *Kashmir Affairs*, II:3 (January–February, 1960), pp. 22–3.

fight the 1952 elections in the state. Faced with wide-scale rejection of the nomination papers of its candidates and with other forms of repression, the party decided to boycott the elections. As a result the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah secured all of the 75 seats in the Constitution Assembly without contest.[21] In this situation it was not strange that the Parishad turned to other means to achieve its ends.

The Parishad strongly objected to the provision in the Indian Constitution which awarded Jammu and Kashmir a special status. It also objected to the permission granted to the state to have its own constitution, unlike any other state in the Indian Union. This gave rise to the Parishad war cry:

Ek desh men do vidhan	In one country, two constitutions,
Ek desh men do nishan	In one country, two flags,
Ek desh men do pradhan	In one country, two prime ministers,
Nahin chalenge	Will not be tolerated.[22]

The first demonstration came in February, 1952, when the students of Gandhi Memorial College in Jammu shouted the slogan during a visit of Yuvraj Karan Singh, who had succeeded his father.[23]

To the extent that *Organiser* was representative of Jana Sangh opinion two of its editorials in February are interesting. On Ladakh:

> The head lama of all Ladakh—Kushak Bakula—has spoken . . . Kashmir valley, he says, might in case of a U.N. plebiscite, choose to opt for Pakistan. In that case, he makes it clear, there can be no question of Ladakh being dragged into Pakistan . . . Ladakh . . . would sooner join up with Tibet . . . The demand is as fair as it is democratic. We would also suggest accession [for] Jammu . . . Facts must be faced. The State of Kashmir . . . is basically *a territory comprising three linguistic, ethnic, geographic and historic regions . . . The only thing they have in common is their government.*[24]

This surprising statement was followed by one even more surprising:

> . . . the break-up of the present territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh—with the first con-

[21] Balraj Madhok, *Kashmir, Centre of New Alignments* (New Delhi Deepak Prakashan, 1963), p. 123.

[22] Madhok, *Kashmir, op. cit.*, p. 124.

[23] Madhok, *Mookerjee, op. cit.*, p. 133.

[24] *Organiser*, V:25 (February 4, 1952). Emphasis added.

asked the people to boycott his reception and observe *hartal*. As a matter of fact, Shri Karan Singh received a warm welcome from large crowds in Jammu city. Some Praja Parishad volunteers tried to interfere with this reception by destroying some of the gates and decorations that had been erected by the people. Stones were thrown on the cars following the Sadar-i-Riyasat's car. There was defiance of authority in various ways and provocative speeches were made. The State Government, however, took no action against the demonstrators or the Parishad for two days while this continued . . . [Nehru detailed various actions taken in Jammu and other cities and towns through December 5] . . .

. . . The leaders of the Praja Parishad have been in constant touch with leaders of some organizations in India and more especially in East Punjab. These organizations are the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha. The leaders of Bharatiya Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha have publicly supported the Parishad's agitation and have called for observance of "Jammu Day." The RSS has taken a special interest in the agitation . . .

Master Tara Singh also issued a statement supporting the Praja Parishad's agitation in Jammu . . . We have received information that the Praja Parishad has collected some money in the Punjab and Delhi. Also that rations and some arms and ammunitions have been stocked.

The house will appreciate the objectionable, anti-social reactionary and subversive character of this movement.[32]

The Prime Minister's account accords in general with other accounts of the beginnings of the movement though Madhok, naturally, does not mention arms and ammunition and there is possibly some exaggeration in Nehru's charge.

At the Kanpur session of the Jana Sangh, the party passed a strong resolution on Kashmir. It gave Jana Sangh support to the satyagraha and authorized Mookerjee to lead an Action Committee to turn the movement into an all-India one. In his presidential address Mookerjee saw the party's demand for full integration as consistent with "full nationalism" and rejected the communal argument:

. . . We are often told that if there is any undue pressure for the application of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir, the Muslims of Kashmir Valley may break away from India. This argument is totally unintelligible. If our Constitution had been so devised as to make Muslims feel nervous about their future fate or about the possibil-

[32] Quoted in *Nehru on Communalism* (New Delhi, Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee, 1956), pp. 245–7.

ity of their not receiving equal treatment, one could have understood the force of the argument. When, however, that is not so, what can possibly be the ground for this hesitation? . . . Let me repeat and state categorically that I do not want Jammu and Kashmir to be partitioned. But if Sheikh Abdullah is adamant, Jammu and Ladakh must not be sacrificed but Kashmir valley may be a separate state within the Indian Union receiving all the necessary subventions and being treated constitutionally in such manner as Sheikh Abdullah and his advisors may wish for . . .[33]

It is interesting to note that in Mookerjee's speech as well as in the two *Organiser* editorials and the Sharma statement quoted above the possibility of a partition of Jammu and Kashmir is seriously considered. It has been earlier noted that Mookerjee, in 1947, sensing that partition of India was inevitable worked for the partition also of Bengal and Punjab. In short, the idea of partition is wrong, but if it is inevitable let us face it squarely and do the best we can under the circumstances. The Jana Sangh under Mookerjee retained a degree of pragmatism which was typical of the man who led it. The emphasis on Jammu also pointed clearly to the fact that the strength of the Praja Parishad was exclusively in that province of the former princely state.

A writer in the Socialist Party weekly saw a good deal of similarity between the goals of the National Conference and the Praja Parishad. To him the Abdullah-dominated National Conference was a Kashmiri party which was not unfavorable toward a separation of Jammu from the Vale. His analysis is interesting:

Praja Parishad, it appears, suited Kashmiri leaders better than even the National Conference in Jammu. The increased tension between Jammu and Kashmir did not disturb the following of the Sheikh. Moreover the Praja Parishad provides an excellent justification or, say, excuse for the separatist tendencies of Sheikh Abdullah who has always been thinking in terms of getting Kashmir Valley a semi-independent status within India or under U.N.O. Division of Jammu and Kashmir, a sweet thing to the heart of Sheikh Abdullah also seems to be the target of the Parishad. For the R.S.S. in India has always considered the Muslim majority area of Kashmir as a best guarantee for the secularism of the country and has been planning to get it isolated from India to fulfil the dream of 'Hindu Raj.' Again, any opposition other than Praja Parishad and secular in character could easily win over a large number of

[33] *Organiser*, VI:20 (January 5, 1953).

Muslims and Kashmiris who have been pitiable victims of a regimented set up, corrupt and inefficient administrative machinery and general repression as also of deteriorating economic conditions. Parishad due to its anti-Muslim and anti-Kashmir character makes Sheikh Abdullah's following more secure. With Praja Parishad in opposition Sheikh Abdullah cannot only count upon the support of Kashmiri Muslims but also of the non-communal parties of India.[34]

The writer goes on to propose the division of the state into its cultural regions and hopes for the division of the political parties thereafter into ideologically compact groups. Within the Jana Sangh we shall see the conflict between the nationalistic demand that Kashmir remain in India regardless of the wishes of the people and the communalistic goal of a Hindu Raj within which the Muslim majority of the Kashmir Valley, as indeed the Muslims and other non-Hindus of all India, would be antithetical.

Mookerjee and Chatterjee constantly challenged Nehru in Parliament on the issue. Mookerjee also opened correspondence with both Nehru and Abdullah.[35] Little was accomplished by the exchange of letters. Each party stated and restated its position and at times each injected some personal criticism. Meanwhile the satyagraha continued. Mookerjee proposed a series of steps beginning with the withdrawal of the movement and the release of prisoners, to be followed by a round table discussion of the outstanding subjects by all concerned. He continued to hedge on the question of further partition:

Both parties reiterate that the unity of the State of J. and K. will be maintained and that the principle of autonomy will apply to the province of Jammu as a whole and of course also to Ladakh and Kashmir Valley.[36]

This was a prime example of fence-straddling. The proposal also set the pre-conditions that Nehru and Abdullah agree to new elections after the constitution was drawn and the use of the Indian flag to the exclusion of the Kashmir flag. Later Mookerjee in a letter to

[34] Gurcharan Singh Bhattia, "Sheikh Abdullah and Praja Parishad," reprinted in *Kashmir Affairs*, II:3 (January–February, 1960), pp. 18–21 with note "Originally published in *Janata* in early 1963."

[35] These have been published as *Integrate Kashmir* (Delhi, Bharatiya Jana Sangha, no date). References to letters will be from this publication.

[36] Mookerjee to Nehru, February 17, 1953, *ibid.*, p. 92.

Abdullah tried, with little success, to clarify his stand on autonomy, partition and unity:

It is wrong to suggest that I want or the Praja Parishad wants that Jammu must be separated from Kashmir Valley. The integrity of the State must of course be maintained. What I, however, said was that in case the people of Jammu wanted full accession with India and the people of Kashmir Valley wanted to lose integration, clash and conflict were inevitable. One possible solution might be to form Kashmir Valley into a separate State and give it whatever it wants for its development . . . But let us drop this idea altogether and think in terms of united Jammu and Kashmir and find out how to consolidate it with the will and co-operation of the entire people.[37]

The hedge of 1947 continued in Mookerjee's mind in 1953.

Events in the satyagraha now began to move with greater speed as they went toward the tragedy of the Jana Sangh in June. In February, the party working committee passed a long resolution supporting the Parishad and appointing a committee of Sharma, Trivedi, Guru Dutt Vaidya and Rajkumar Srivastava to meet with other parties to plan a unified and wider based movement. The Praja Parishad now had the full support of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad among political parties as well as the Jana Sangh, and it also received much support from Punjab Arya Samajists and from RSS workers. The Punjab Government arrested a number of Jana Sangh leaders in the state. Restrictions on public meetings were imposed in both Punjab and Delhi. In the midst of the agitation, four by-elections were held to the Delhi assembly. The Jana Sangh won three in a campaign in which Kashmir was a major issue.

On March 5, the three parties planned to hold a public meeting in Delhi on Jammu and Kashmir Day and announced their intention to do so in spite of the ban. Just prior to the meeting the ban was withdrawn. Swami Karpatri of the Ram Rajya Parishad presided. The other speakers included Mookerjee, Chatterjee and Sharma. The next day the ashes of some who were killed in Jammu arrived in Delhi. Mookerjee, Chatterjee and Nand Lal Shastri, a Ram Rajya Parishad member of the Lok Sabha, planned to take the ashes in procession for immersion in the Jumna River. The ban on

[37] Mookerjee to Abdullah, February 23, 1953, *ibid.*, pp. 113–4.

meetings had been reimposed and the three men were arrested. Mookerjee remained in detention until March 11. After this Mookerjee traveled in much of north and west India to publicize his ideas on Kashmir and to propagandize for the Jana Sangh. In this he was assisted mainly by Atal Behari Vajpayee, who was beginning to develop the oratorical talents which were to make him perhaps the party's best speaker in Hindi.

The travelling resulted in the sending of batches of volunteers from other parts of India to participate in the satyagraha by courting arrests. Few of these managed to get past the Punjab-Kashmir border and many were a law and order problem to the Punjab authorities. The number of arrests in Punjab increased. The RSS organizing secretary, Madhu Rao Muley, was among those arrested, and when detained issued a statement:

> . . . the present pro-Parishad satyagraha, to curb which the authorities are taking recourse to the Preventive Detention Act, has been started by the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, and the Ram Rajya Parishad. The R.S.S. being no party to the movement, has kept itself busy with its normal cultural activities . . .[38]

With good reason, the Punjab government thought otherwise.

By early April, three Jana Sangh state presidents were in Punjab jails: Srivastava of Uttar Pradesh, Raj Kishore Shukla of Vindhya Pradesh and Shiv Kumar Dwivedi of Bihar. There was danger of the movement erupting into violence and, it appears, Mookerjee exerted his influence to prevent this. He attempted to send Trivedi and Deshpande to Jammu but they were refused permission to enter Jammu and Kashmir. Mookerjee, therefore, decided to go to Jammu himself without applying for a permit:

> Mr. Nehru has repeatedly declared that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been hundred per cent complete. Yet it is strange to find that one cannot enter the State without a previous permit from the Government of India. The permit is even granted to Communists who are playing their usual role in Jammu and Kashmir, but entry is barred to those who think or act in terms of Indian unity and nationhood.
>
> I do not think that the Government of India is entitled to prevent entry into any part of the Indian Union which, according to Mr. Nehru

[38] *Organiser*, VI:34 (April 6, 1953).

himself, includes Jammu and Kashmir. Of course, if anyone violates the law after entering any State, he will have to face the consequences.[39]

The statement, issued on Mookerjee's departure from Delhi on May 8, was strangely prophetic in that he was not challenged by the Government of India—the permit-issuing authority—but was arrested by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

Mookerjee passed through Punjab en route to Jammu. On May 10, he met Master Tara Singh at Amritsar and told the Sikh leader of the Jana Sangh opposition to Punjabi Suba. The same day he also received a message from Abdullah saying his visit to Jammu would be "inopportune." Nonetheless Mookerjee proceeded and crossed the Ravi River at Madhopur at about 4 P.M. on May 11 and was arrested. The Jammu and Kashmir government order said Mookerjee "has acted, and is acting and is about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and peace." The arrest would "prevent him from acting in the aforesaid manner."[40] Arrested with him were Guru Dutt Vaidya and Tek Chand. They were taken to Srinagar and lodged in a cottage near the Nishat Gardens where he was to be kept under arrest. The three were joined by Prem Nath Dogra, who was moved from the central jail on June 19. Mookerjee's visitors were few. His biographer mentions only two, his NDP colleagues Hukum Singh and Trivedi, who was also his legal adviser.

Mookerjee fell ill shortly after his arrival in custody. He complained of a pain in his right leg in late May. He developed a fever and chest pain which were diagnosed on June 22 as "dry pleurisy." That day he was moved from the cottage to the State Hospital in Srinagar. At 3:40 A.M. on June 23, he was dead of a sudden heart attack.

This news was relayed to Calcutta by Jammu and Kashmir Deputy Home Minister Durga Prasad Dhar to Mookerjee's brother, Justice Rama Prasad Mookerjee. A special aircraft was arranged for by Deputy Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and the body, accompanied by Trivedi, arrived in Calcutta about 9 P.M.

[39] *Ibid.*, VI:39 (May 11, 1953).

[40] Umaprasad Mookerjee, ed., *Syamaprasad Mookerjee; His Death in Detention; A Case for Inquiry* (2nd ed.; Calcutta, A. Mukherjee & Co. September, 1953), pp. 3–4.

There one of the largest funerals in the history of the city was given to one of its most distinguished sons.

Mookerjee's death, and the circumstances surrounding it, have given rise to many rumors that he was murdered or that when he became sick was allowed to die.[41] The Jana Sangh to this day each June 23 raises the same allegations. The Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir have given the critics an opportunity by neglecting to institute an inquiry into the medical treatment given to Mookerjee. But it seems fair to say that the allegations have not been substantiated. In any event, medical incompetence, which is possible though unproven, is something far different from criminal negligence. The last seems unbelievable to the present writer.

The death of Mookerjee had the immediate effect of ending the satyagraha. Dogra, Vaidya and Tek Chand were immediately released. In early July the joint action committee of the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad withdrew the agitation as did the Praja Parishad. The detenues were released. The parties resolved to continue to press for the full accession of Kashmir to India. Dogra and Bakshi agreed in December to drop the satyagraha, withdraw the cases against the demonstrators and restore their civil rights.

The Jana Sangh claimed to see in the program of Sheikh Abdullah a demand for an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir. With remarkable rapidity after the death of Mookerjee and the end of the satyagraha the star of Abdullah descended in the eyes of Nehru. On August 9, 1953, the Sheikh was arrested and deposed as prime minister of the State. He was replaced by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who had been Abdullah's deputy prime minister. Bakshi, whose regime lasted until September, 1963, when he was dropped under the "Kamaraj Plan," was welcomed by *Organiser*. His picture appeared with the caption "the chosen saviour of the Kashmir people, who says 'Jai Hind,' " and Malkani wrote:

> . . . For once New Delhi has taken a right decision on Kashmir. The choice of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad is wise.
> Ever since the Criminal of Kashmir [Abdullah] began hob-nobbing with

[41] *See* for example, *ibid., passim;* Madhok, *Mookerjee, op. cit.*, pp. 276 ff.; and *Organiser*, special issue dated June 23, 1953.

imperialist America, he has lost all respect of the public . . . Correspondingly honest Bakshi rose in public esteem . . . Completely free from communal complexes. Bakshi is even proud of his Brahmin ancestry . . . Small wonder his emergence has relieved grave anxiety in New Delhi and check-mated American designs on this subcontinent.[12]

The honeymoon between *Organiser* and Bakshi was short lived. The paper soon began to call Bakshi corrupt in most violent terms.

Effects of Mookerjee's Death

With the death of Mookerjee the Jana Sangh representation in the Lok Sabha was reduced to two, the dilligent Trivedi and the all but inactive Bannerji. In November a by-election was held to determine Mookerjee's successor in the Lok Sabha. The Jana Sangh was trounced and its candidate lost his deposit. The seat was won by Sadhan Gupta, a Communist, with a margin equal to that of Mookerjee in the general election.

At best the NDP was still a loose confederation at the time of Mookerjee's death. The groups comprising the parliamentary party had failed to merge into the Jana Sangh at the time of the Kanpur session and some NDP members were alienated by the participation of the NDP leader in the Jammu satyagraha, a matter of rather little concern to a member from South India. So long as Mookerjee lived, however, many were willing to follow his lead. Until recently, he was the only former central minister ever to sit in the opposition in India and this alone gave him a status few oppositionists then or since have been able to attain.

Chatterjee attempted to hold the NDP together. He was a skillful parliamentarian with a quick mind and an ability to develop his arguments with precision and legalistic logic. However, he was a representative of a party more clearly identified as communal, the Mahasabha, and although personally close to Mookerjee in his near secularism he had great difficulty in overcoming what was a handicap in his relations with South Indian and Sikh members of the NDP. He also was not clearly recognized as a leader of the group in the same sense as Mookerjee had been. Within a very short period the NDP was finished and Chatterjee turned his efforts toward a

[12] *Organiser*, VII:1 (August 15, 1953).

merger of the Mahasabha with the Jana Sangh under his leadership. This will be discussed below.

For the Jana Sangh, Mookerjee's death was a calamity. He was the only nationally known leader of the party. He gave it a degree of respectability which the RSS group was then unable to give. He held the RSS and non-RSS members of the party together; with his death the in-fighting between the two groups began. To replace him the Jana Sangh named Sharma acting president. It is likely that the leading Jana Sanghis felt at the time that this would be only a temporary replacement to be effective while the party searched to find another Mookerjee. Balraj Madhok writing a month and a half after Mookerjee's death, i.e., after Sharma had assumed office at least on a temporary basis, wrote that the successor of Mookerjee "must be a living link between *dharma* as represented by the R.S.S. and *artha* and *kama* as represented by the Jana Sangh." [43] It seems evident Madhok did not consider Sharma filled the bill.

Mookerjee's death brought the immediate tributes which are customary in India—flowery and laudatory—though it is interesting that none came from Prime Minister Nehru. It is, however, in the comments on his life written much later that one must look for an estimate of his place in recent Indian history. One British writer on the subcontinent has said: "Dr. Mookerjee was no wild-eyed fanatic; he was a constitutionalist and parliamentarian; a conservative in the best sense." [44] From all conversations the present writer has had with members of Parliament and politicians, Congress, Jana Sangh and others, this seems a fair appraisal.

Merger Talks with Mahasabha

The formation of the National Democratic Party in Parliament gave an opportunity for closer cooperation between the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha.[45] The two leaders, both Bengalis, worked very closely together and the parties put aside for the time being the antagonism which persisted between them during the 1952 elections. The Jammu satyagraha drew the Ram Rajya Paris-

[43] *Ibid.*, VII:1 (August 15, 1953).
[44] Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan* (London, Pall Mall, 1962), p. 120.
[45] The question of merger is discussed in detail in Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957), Chapter 10.

had into the group of Hindu parties operating together. There were also other matters upon which the three parties could work together politically, such as the demand for a ban on cow slaughter and their opposition to the Hindu Code Bill.

In the Mahasabha leadership the one person who stood firmly in favor of merger of his party into the Jana Sangh was Chatterjee. At a meeting in Delhi on the last day of the mourning period for Mookerjee, Chatterjee said it was Mookerjee's dying wish that the three parties unite and that it was the duty of all to carry out that desire.[16] Chatterjee upstaged Jana Sangh acting president Sharma on the occasion as he assumed, and was accorded, the leadership of the Joint Action Committe which was to remain in being. This has led some Mahasabha leaders to assert that Chatterjee wanted to replace Mookerjee in the leadership of the Jana Sangh and that the Jana Sangh wanted the merger in order to obtain the services of Chatterjee.[17]

For a short time it seemed possible the merger would take place. The three parties had before them the example of the merger of the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party to form the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). It seemed to them at the time that the new PSP was a stronger party with internal cohesion which could make it a party of the democratic left capable of challenging the Congress. They also saw the PSP picking up some smaller parties, like the Ruikar wing of the Forward Bloc, and thought it might add some other small but locally influential parties. The three Hindu parties thought they might consolidate the democratic, Hindu right. They, of course, did not foresee the difficulties through which the PSP would pass as that party saw the group led by Ram Manohar Lohia split off even before the next general elections; as it saw the retirement from politics of one of its most prominent leaders, Jayaprakash Narayan; and as it faced many other problems and was finally routed in later elections and deserted by still another leader, Asoka Mehta, and his followers in favor of the Congress. From mid-summer 1953 the future looked bright both to those in the PSP and to those working for a merger of the three Hindu parties.

[16] *Organiser*, VII:16 (November 30, 1953), and Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–2.
[17] *See ibid.*, pp. 207–8, for the views of Indra Prakash.

It seems that no clear proposals were ever negotiated by responsible leaders of the three parties. Each party had its own ideas of how the merger should take place, and there were contrary views at least within the Mahasabha. The Jana Sangh view was that both the Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad should give up all political work and should become cultural, non-political organizations. The two parties then would come under the banner of the Jana Sangh both organizationally and programmatically. Another proposal was that all three parties should dissolve and a new party be created from the membership of the dissolved parties. Still another proposal incorporated varying degrees of confederation, electoral alliances and parliamentary alliancies.

By mid-August doubts were beginning to be expressed by leaders of each of the groups. Swami Karpatri of the Ram Rajya Parishad is reported to have said in a press conference: "If the other parties sincerely wanted a merger, they should take concrete steps toward it. The Parishad was willing for cooperation but he emphasized that they would not forsake their principles in respect of religion." [48] Sharma said the Jana Sangh was willing to merge with the Mahasabha "if the Mahasabha accepts our policies." [49] The historian of the Mahasabha, who also edited the party's paper, *Hindu Outlook,* reported that Chatterjee would resign if the merger did not take place. He expressed the opinion that the merger talks were a Congress plot to split the Hindu movement, which to him meant the Mahasabha. He saw the Jana Sangh as non-communal; Mahasabhites saw communalism as "bliss." [50]

In November, Sharma gave a press conference in Bombay which angered the Mahasabha. The *Organiser* report reads:

> . . . Explaining the relations of the Jana Sangh with the Hindu Mahasabha and the R.S.S., Pt. Mauli Chandra Sharma stated that his recent discussions with Swatantrya Veer Savarkar showed that there were no possibilities of unison between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jana Sangh. The Hindu Sabha is a communal body and welcomes princes, zamindars and other vested interests in its midst. Consequently the merger of the Sabha in the Jana Sangh is not possible. The R.S.S. on

[18] *Hindustan Times,* August 27, 1953, quoted in *ibid.,* p. 202.
[49] *Ibid.* 202.
[50] Indra Prakash, in *Hindu Outlook,* August 20, 1953, quoted, *ibid.,* pp. 202–3.

the other hand is not a political organization at all. It is because a few workers of the Hindu Sabha and the R.S.S. are members of the Jana Sangh that some say all three are one and the same. But this is not so. In the meeting held on the Shraddha Day of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee Hindu Sabha President Shri Chatterjee expressed the departed leader's desire that the two parties should become one. This, however, is not possible as long as the Hindu Sabha sticks to its communal policies . . .[51]

The Mahasabha reacted sharply to this and announced it was ending the merger talks. Sharma tried feebly to retrieve the situation with a press statement in early December in which he said the "door was still open,"[52] but it soon became clear to all that while the door of the Jana Sangh was open the Mahasabha as a party was not prepared to walk through it.

Chatterjee had failed to carry his party with him although he was the president, one of the party's four members of Parliament and one of the few active members of any consequence. Two former presidents, who were retired from active political campaigning but who continued to exercise influence on the Mahasabha, Bhopatkar and Savarkar strongly opposed merger. Each of them opposed the open membership of the Jana Sangh, a stand reminiscent of Bhopatkar's opposition to Mookerjee in 1948.[53] One is permitted to wonder why Chatterjee did not bolt the Mahasabha and cross to the Jana Sangh as an individual together with any who might wish to follow him. He did not do so. It is possible he was not assured of the Jana Sangh presidency, which it is reasonable to suspect would be his price for changing parties. Chatterjee remained in the Mahasabha and was defeated for re-election to Parliament in 1957. He then joined the newly formed Swatantra Party in 1959, as an officer of the West Bengal unit, but left after a controversy with party general secretary Minoo Masani on the number of seats to be contested in the 1962 elections in West Bengal by Swatantra candidates. In a by-election in the Burdwan Lok Sabha constituency in December, 1963, Chatterjee was elected as an independent candidate with the support of most opposition parties, including the Communists, and, unofficially, some of the Bengal Jana Sanghis. He was re-elected in 1967. While he has

[51] *Organiser*, VII:16 (November 30, 1953).
[52] *Organiser*, VII:18 (December 14, 1953).
[53] *See* Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–10, for reports of the interviews.

embraced leftist causes which seem unlikely for a one-time Mahasabhite, Chatterjee has been one of the leading oppositionists.[54]

The 1953 merger project was finished but in 1955 there was another flurry of activity in the Mahasabha and the Jana Sangh. On July 13, Upadhyaya told the press in Calcutta that the president of the Jana Sangh, Prem Nath Dogra, was:

> . . . hopeful about the merger. He had already contacted leading members of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad. They had generally accepted the principles of Akhand Bharat, Indian culture and traditions and admission of all Indian citizens irrespective of caste and creed to the proposed integrated body.[55]

In October, Hindu Mahasabha general secretary Deshpande said the merger talks "have not failed" and are continuing.[56] But again the parties began to castigate each other. Vajpayee, while touring Maharashtra, volunteered the information that the "Sabha is as good as dead" there, that the younger members wanted merger but the "old guard" in Poona was blocking it.[57] A writer in *Organiser* accused the Mahasabha of "hurling abuses" at the memory of Mookerjee.[58]

On January 24, 1956, the press reported an agreement on merger between the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha would "be announced in a few days." Under the agreement the Mahasabha would turn its political work over to the Jana Sangh and become a cultural society. The Jana Sangh would adopt the goal of Hindu Rashtra rather than Bharatiya Rashtra, and the open membership would continue. The Ram Rajya Parishad would not be included. Karpatri objected not only to Muslim membership but also to Harijan membership. He also wanted the constitution of the new party to be based on the shastras. The Jana Sangh could have gone along with some of the communal demands of the Mahasabha but the obscurantist program of the Ram Rajya Parishad was too much.[59]

[54] West Bengal Jana Sanghis have confirmed to the writer their assistance to Chatterjee as did Chatterjee in a speech made to a welcoming tea at the Imperial Hotel in New Delhi after his election. The tea was organized and largely attended by "rightists" who hoped he would associate with them in Parliament.

[55] *Organiser*, VIII:49 (July 25, 1955).

[56] *Ibid.*, IX:10 (October 17, 1955).

[57] *Ibid.*, IX:11 (October 24, 1955).

[58] *Ibid.*, IX:14 (November 14, 1955).

[59] Gupta, *op. cit.*, in Poplai, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–7.

So near and yet so far is the lament of those in the Jana Sangh who still favor a merger—and they are a small and dwindling number. In February, Upadhyaya explained the Hindu Rashtra-Bharatiya Rashtra change proposal to the Punjab Jana Sangh:

. . . The basic misunderstanding about us in the minds of Hindu Sabha leaders about our concept of Bharatiya Rashtra has been removed. Ever since our inception we have been persistently treating Hindu Rashtravad as synonomous with Bharatiya Rashtravad.[60]

Differences continued to be found in the points of view of the two parties. Golwalkar was enlisted as mediator but he too failed to work out a compromise as a basis for merger. In March and April Vajpayee and Deshpande exchanged unpleasantries.[61] Once again merger was dead.

We shall look at the electoral penalties of the failure of the three parties to unite in the 1957 and 1962 elections in Chapters VII and IX, as we have already looked at the 1952 elections in Chapter V. Electorally the Jana Sangh was hurt but little by the failure to ally with the two parties. Given the very strongly communal positions of the two parties, it is possible a full merger would have been detrimental to the Jana Sangh, although this is an arguable point.

Over the years since 1956, the Jana Sangh has managed to gain a number of locally important Mahasabhites and a few Ram Rajya Parishad members. At the time of the 1957 elections the Punjab Mahasabha president, Captain Keshub Chander, switched to the Jana Sangh. A former organizing secretary of the Mahasabha, Hardayal Devgun, is now president of the Delhi Jana Sangh and a member of the Lok Sabha. Niranjan Lal Verma, now a Jana Sangh member of the Rajya Sabha from Madhya Pradesh, was once a leader of the Mahasabha in Vidisha District of the state, and the Maharaja of Jashpur, a Jana Sanghi in the Lok Sabha, crossed from the Ram Rajya Parishad. In 1966 Deshpande also crossed to the Jana Sangh.

Sharma

Mauli Chandra Sharma became acting president of the Jana Sangh upon the death of Mookerjee. Born in 1900, Sharma graduated from Delhi College, and later took a law degree. He had been

[60] *Organiser*, IX:26 (February 6, 1956).
[61] *Ibid.*, IX:33 (March 26, 1956), and IX:34 (April 2, 1956).

associated with the party from its founding as general secretary and was defeated for election to the Lok Sabha from a Delhi constituency. Like Mookerjee he had no RSS membership background; it was hoped he would be able to achieve a level of balance between the RSS and non-RSS wings close to that of his predecessor. Sharma's father, Pandit Deen Dayal Sharma, had once been president of the Hindu Mahasabha but the family belonged to the Sanatan Dharma group of Punjabi Hindus rather than to the Arya Samaj. Sharma was active in the Civil Liberties Union, of which Chatterjee had been president and took a go-between role in the Golwalkar-Patel negotiations for the removal of the ban on the RSS. A staunch advocate of Hindi as the national language of India, he became a member of the Official Language Commission after he left the Jana Sangh. When Trivedi declined to accept the presidency, Sharma was re-confirmed as president of the party at the Bombay session in January, 1954. At that time there was no clear indication of the difficulties which were to lead to his acrimonious departure from the Jana Sangh.[62]

There is almost no published material on the events leading up to the "treacherous blow" of Sharma's resignation. In his review of the "Five Years of Bharatiya Jana Sangh" Madhok wrote:

> The selection of a new captain to take his [Mookerjee's] place was not an easy one. Jana Sangh had to make experiments and arrive at a correct choice through trial and error. That choice was Pt. Prem Dogra . . .
>
> Under Pt. Dogra's leadership Jana Sangh not only recovered from the blow of Dr. Mookerjee's untimely death and Pt. Mauli Chandra Sharma's betrayal but also forged ahead in all spheres . . .[63]

Despite this off-hand dismissal of the Sharma period there are certain points which indicate a very early questioning by the RSS wing of the advisability of another non-RSS Jana Sanghi in the presidential office.

After the Bombay session, *Organiser* wrote as follows in the final paragraphs of its "color" piece on the meeting:

> The man who stood head and shoulders above all others, and who in a way dominated the whole session was the lean, thin, unassuming Din

[62] *See Ibid.*, VII:25 (February 1, 1954), for biographical data.

[63] *Organiser*, X:9 (October 22, 1956). As mentioned above the party did ask Trivedi to become president at the Bombay sessions. When he declined the acting president was made president in his own right.

Dayal Upadhyaya, the young General Secretary of the young Organisation. His clarity of thinking, lucidity of expression and robust common sense impressed all. His idealism and spirit of self-abnegation, coupled with the experience and worldly wisdom of Pt. Mauli Chandra Sharma, can surely put the Jan Sangh on the road to success . . .

It is to be hoped that Pt. Mauli Chandra Sharma . . . will succeed in securing the willing cooperation of the Swayam Sevak Sangh workers who form the core of the Jan Sangh . . . Let Pt. Mauli Chandra Sharma carry them with him and build a great edifice on these foundations.[64]

The writer of this article, undoubtedly an RSS member, surely expressed some doubt that Sharma would be able to pull with the RSS. He gave top billing to the general secretary rather than to the president, a general secretary who had been recruited into the Jana Sangh directly from his position as an RSS organizer in Uttar Pradesh.

Upadhyaya has dominated every president since Mookerjee. The degree of domination by the general secretary and his RSS fellow central and state RSS secretaries may have been greater or less depending on the president but the domination was there. On Sharma it grated and grated to the point where it caused the most serious rupture in Jana Sangh history.

At the Indore session of the Pratinidhi Sabha (All India Committee) of the Jana Sangh in August, Sharma was absent and his address was read for him. The senior star of that session was Dogra who delivered the inaugural address. It is likely that Sharma was already aware that the RSS group had selected Dogra, and not Sharma, to be the next president. Sharma in his address made some suggestions on the reorganization of the party. These were criticized in the meeting presumably by Upadhyaya and other RSS workers in the Jana Sangh.[65] The internal dispute became more and more public as time passed. One RSS member of the working committee, Vasantrao Oke, supported Sharma's contention that the Jana Sangh should greatly expand its non-RSS membership; he, also, eventually left the party.[66]

On November 3, 1954, Sharma resigned from the party and its presidency alleging "domination and interference by the R.S.S."

[64] *Ibid.*, VII:26 (February 8, 1954).
[65] *Ibid.*, VIII:13 (November 8, 1954).
[66] Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

and describing "a vigorous and calculated drive on its part to turn the Sangh into a convenient handle." [67] From Upadhyaya's return statement it appears that Sharma wished to call a meeting of the Pratinidhi Sabha to discuss the different points of view prevailing in the leadership. Upadhyaya charged that Sharma "had deliberately avoided" going to Indore. He said that Sharma "had not the courtesy even to send a copy" of his press statement "to the Jana Sangh office." Upadhyaya noted that the Pratinidhi Sabha had taken "strong exception to certain views" in Sharma's Indore address and "passed a unanimous resolution seeking clarification of those points," which dealt with organizational matters effecting the RSS.[68]

On November 7, the working committee officially relieved Sharma of his office and appointed Bapu Saheb Sohoni of Madhya Pradesh acting president. Sharma's resignation-cum-expulsion did not result from any policy differences. Sharma took the same positions on basic questions as did other members of the Jana Sangh leadership. His "crime" was his attempt to assert his personal leadership as did Mookerjee. He was no Mookerjee, the RSS knew it and refused to accept his leadership. Jana Sangh members have also alleged that Sharma made contacts with the Congress prior to leaving the Jana Sangh and cite as evidence his early appointment to the Official Language Commission.

Sharma was not the only leader to leave the Jana Sangh and its affiliates. On November 6, in his presidential address to the Praja Parishad, Dogra announced that the party would seek affiliation with the Jana Sangh in the same way in which the National Conference was affiliated to the Congress.[69] This prompted the resignation of Thakur Dhanantar Singh, vice president of the Praja Parishad. Dhanantar Singh also protested the RSS dominance in the party and alleged that the Praja Parishad was open to Hindus only. This Dogra denied strongly and repeated the party's open membership policy. Dhanantar Singh started a Progressive Praja Parishad which amounted to little or nothing in the Jammu political scene.[70]

[67] Gupta, *op. cit.*, in Poplai *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[68] *Organiser*, VIII:13 (November 8, 1954).
[69] *Ibid.*, VIII:14 (November 15, 1954).
[70] *Ibid.*, VIII:13 (November 8, 1954).

The same working committee session which expelled Sharma also listened to tales of lack of discipline in the Delhi Jana Sangh. A committee comprising Vajpayee, Srivastava and Raj Kishore Shukla was appointed to look into the question. The Committee took some time to take action, but on September 23, 1955, fifteen Delhi Jana Sanghis were expelled. Among those expelled was Kanwar Lal Gupta, a member of the Legislative Assembly. According to the Organiser report, Gupta, Amarnath Bajaj and Vasantrao Oke had allied themselves with Sharma in an effort to form a new party. "Realising the impossibility of the adventure, they left Panditji [Sharma] in the lurch and stayed on." Madhok charged that the three continued "to cause dissensions." He also said that Gupta's charge that the party was being run by the RSS which "had a strangle-hold" on the Delhi Jana Sangh was "amusing."[71] Oke though implicated did not leave the party at this time, but remained for a short period longer. After leaving the party, Oke apparently had second thoughts and met with Jana Sangh president Deva Prasad Ghosh in May, 1956. Ghosh told Oke he was welcome to rejoin Jana Sangh but that he must accept party discipline.[72] Oke did re-join, and contested the Chandni Chowk Lok Sabha seat in the 1957 elections as candidate on the Jana Sangh ticket. But he again left the Jana Sangh after the elections, this time to join the Swatantra Party. He was that party's nominee for the Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, Lok Sabha seat in 1962.

Discipline was a constant problem for the Jana Sangh. Immediately after the elections three of the five members of the Delhi Legislative Assembly who had been elected on the party ticket disassociated themselves from the Jana Sangh and so did one of the two elected in PEPSU. One of two Uttar Pradesh members of the Legislative Assembly was dropped for breach of discipline. He was from Gonda District, a district which was to cause the Jana Sangh disciplinary problems in the 1957–62 period as well.

Rajasthan presented a particularly acute disciplinary problem. As has been mentioned earlier the opposition in Rajasthan combined to form the Samyukta Dal, which initially gained the support

[71] *Ibid.*, IX:17 (September 26, 1955). Gupta returned to the Jana Sangh later and is now a member of the Lok Sabha.

[72] *Ibid.*, IX:43 (June 11, 1956).

Jodhpur, was presided over by Prem Nath Dogra, whom we have already met as president of the Praja Parishad. Both the Jaipur session in April, 1956, and the Delhi session in December, 1956, were presided over by Acharya Deva Prasad Ghosh. Ghosh was born in Bakergunj Thana in East Bengal in 1894 and studied both mathematics and law in Calcutta. He was professor of mathematics at Ripon College, Calcutta, 1914 to 1941 then became principal of Carmichael College, Rangpur, East Bengal. His biography indicates that he remained in East Bengal after partition until 1950 when he retired. He was associated with a number of Bengal nationalist movements and was a member of the Mahasabha. A close friend of Mookerjee, he joined the Jana Sangh on its founding in 1951. He served two years in the Rajya Sabha, 1952–54, and held a number of offices in the Bengal Jana Sangh.[76] Ghosh has served longer than anyone else as president of the Jana Sangh.

A number of by-elections, mid-term elections and civic elections also took the attention of the party. We have noted the loss by a wide margin of the Lok Sabha seat made vacant by Mookerjee's death. The resignation from the Lok Sabha of Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, sister of the Prime Minister, caused a by-election in Lucknow. The Jana Sangh nominated Atal Behari Vajpayee for the March, 1955, poll. He finished third to the Congress winner and the PSP candidate but polled twenty-eight per cent of the vote. The vote set off some rethinking about Jana Sangh strength in the state. Vajpayee had made a three-cornered race out of what was expected to be a two-party contest.

In assembly by-elections the Jana Sangh retained two seats in the Ajmer assembly in October, 1953. One of the two retaining his seat was Raja Kalyan Singh, who later joined the Ram Rajya Parishad and afterwards was a member of the Swatantra Party until his death in 1962. In Delhi, the Jana Sangh showed its greatest by-election strength winning four by-elections for a net gain of three seats. In the first of the series in 1952, Jana Sanghi Sham Charan Gupta retained his seat following an election petition. The next two saw Jana Sanghis win seats from the Congress. In June 1954, Jana Sanghi Kanwar Lal Gupta won a seat from the Congress, only to be expelled from the party fifteen months later. In the

[76] *See Organiser*, IX:38 (April 30, 1956), for Biographical data.

same by-election series the Jana Sangh unsuccessfully supported Balraj Khanna of the Hindu Mahasabha in another constituency. Khanna later joined the Jana Sangh and is now deputy mayor of Delhi. The party was unsuccessful in by-elections in Uttar Pradesh and in Madhya Bharat where it lost a seat which it had won in the general elections.

Combining with the Hindu Mahasabha, the Jana Sangh won a seat in the West Bengal Legislative Council in 1952. On its own the party won its first seat in the 1954 biennial elections to the Bombay Legislative Council. Uttam Rao Patil, later a Jana Sangh member of the Lok Sabha, won the election from Central Division Graduates Constituency. In the 1956 Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council elections Pitamber Das defeated Congressman Govind Sahai in the Northwest Local Bodies Constituency. Sahai was at that time vice-president of the All-India Peace Council and had written a pamphlet condemning the RSS in strong terms.

The Jana Sangh expressed itself as being pleased with the performance of the party's candidates in the civic elections in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. The Delhi municipal elections in October, 1954, were a source of special satisfaction for the party. It polled 35 per cent of the vote while taking 17 of the 58 elective seats. In the 1951 elections the Jana Sangh obtained its first electoral experience and won four seats while the Congress took 52. In the intervening by-elections the Jana Sangh increased its strength to eight and the Congress dropped to 48. The 1954 elections saw the Congress winning but 28 seats and losing its majority in the corporation. The party gave the major credit to Kidar Nath Sahni, later a deputy mayor of Delhi, and Vijay Kumar Malhotra, now Chief Executive Councillor of Delhi.

The mid-term elections in PEPSU were a disaster for the Jana Sangh. In the general elections the party had contested 23 of the 60 seats, winning two and forfeiting 19 deposits while polling 2.77 per cent of the vote. One of the two candidates elected immediately defected from the Jana Sangh. In the mid-term elections the party contested eleven seats, won none, forfeited ten deposits and polled only 1.08 per cent of the vote. Only in Mahendragarh District, in which the two seats were won in 1952, did the party in 1954 retain a deposit and poll more than 5 per cent of the vote.

Mid-term elections were also held in Travancore-Cochin in 1954. One lone Jana Sanghi contested from Trivandrum District and secured 403 votes. Needless to say he lost his deposit but the party entered the list in an area which was to become part of Kerala with 0.01 per cent of the vote. The separation of the Telugu-speaking areas from Madras State led to a special election in 1955 in Andhra. There six Jana Sanghis contested; all lost their deposits and collectively they polled 0.10 per cent of the vote.

The Indore session of the Pratinidhi Sabha in August, 1954, which was not attended by Sharma and which criticized him, adopted a new manifesto for the party. The new program contained a number of radical changes—some shortlived—and strengthened some other provisions. The most radical revisions came under the head of economic policy where seven points were emphasized. First, the party proposed that the Fundamental Rights provisions of the Constitution should be amended to include the right to work, i.e., "every citizen can have the right to expect employment from the State and the State can be compelled to provide employment." Second, "economic development of the country can be achieved only on the strength of small and cottage industries" and small industries should be "saved from competition by big ones." Third, foreign capital is still welcome, provided no political strings are attached, but Indian participation in the capitalization should not be less than two-thirds and that ratio should also apply to employment at all levels in the joint venture concerns. Fourth, "labour may be made a co-partner in the profits and management of industry." Fifth, although "labour's right to strike has been accepted," it should only be a last resort and conciliation attempts should precede a strike. Sixth, a minimum and a maximum income should be established at Rs.100 and Rs.2000 per month with a one to ten ratio as a goal. Finally, zamindari should be abolished immediately without compensation to the zamindars. Each of these seven points represented either a diametrically opposite program from the 1952 election manifesto, or, at a minimum, a change of emphasis. Perhaps the most radical change, and the one which survived the shortest period, was the abolition of zamindari without compensation.

On the socio-political side the manifesto also made changes. One which has remained a Jana Sangh policy, but which is fre-

The Niyogi Committee, officially the Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee of Madhya Pradesh, was appointed in 1954 to study the mission work in that state.[78] Dr. M. B. Niyogi, a Brahmin, was formerly Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh. A similar body was set up at about the same time in Madhya Bharat. As the Niyogi report and its conclusions and recommendations form the basis of the anti-missionary stance of all communal Hindu political parties, of such Hindu groups as the Arya Samaj and the Sanatan Dharm, and of many conservative Hindus in other political parties and in non-political activities, the conclusions and recommendations of the committee will be summarized before the Jana Sangh position is set forth. Without seeking to appraise the work of the committee, it should be noted that the committee having made up its mind in advance as to what it would find, not surprisingly found exactly that. To call the report the result of an unbiased study would require a sizable effort of imagination.

After a study of nearly two years the committee concluded:

1. There has been "an appreciable increase of American personnel" since independence. Evangelistic teams have been sent.
2. "Enormous sums of foreign money flow into the country for missionary work, comprising educational, medical and evangelistic activities."
3. "Conversions are mostly brought about by undue influence, misrepresentation, etc." Money-lending and educational facilities are among the "various inducements."
4. "Instances of indirect political activities" were reported to the Committee.
5. "As conversion muddles the convert's sense of unity and solidarity with his society, there is danger of his loyalty to his country and state being undermined."
6. The "vile propaganda against the religion of the majority community" creates "an apprehension of breach of public peace."
7. Missionary work "appears to be a part of the uniform world policy to revive Christendom for re-establishing Western supremacy." "The objective is apparently to create Christian minority pockets" which can "disrupt the solidarity on the non-Christian societies."

[78] For a discussion of the Niyogi report by an American scholar *see* Donald E. Smith, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 207–14. Smith also noted that the Brahmin Niyogi joined the movement led by Dr. Ambedkar for conversion of Harijans to Buddhism and himself became a Buddhist, p. 167. An abridgement of the report has been published by the All India Arya (Hindu) Dharma Seva Sangha (Delhi, 1956), for wide, inexpensive circulation. The Sangha is the highest propaganda body of the Arya Samaj.

8. Schools, hospitals and orphanages are used to aid evangelization.
9. Tribals and Harijans are special targets.
10. The Madhya Pradesh government has been neutral and has not interfered with missionaries or with Christians.[79]

The recommendations which the Commission demanded be enforced were numerous. Missionaries "primarily engaged" in evangelization should be sent home and new inflow of missionaries "should be checked." All inducements to conversion including schools, medical facilities, etc., should be prohibited. The Indian churches should establish an independent and united Christian Church in India which would not receive foreign support. The state should take over missionary facilities and operate them. The Constitution should be amended to make it clear that the right to propagate a religion is available to Indian citizens only. The state should approve and regulate social and medical activities by non-official and religious groups.

The Jana Sangh saw dangers from Christian missionary activities not only in Madhya Pradesh and Madhya Bharat but also among the tribals of Assam, Bihar and Orissa. The Chhota Nagpur area of Bihar which extends into the tribal belt of the states of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa was the center of activities of the Jharkhand Party led by Jaipal Singh, who was also president of the All-India Adivasi Mahasabha.[80]

Organiser editorialized in 1952:

> Jharkhand Party wants to have a separate state of Jharkhand . . . As an individual Oxford-educated Jaipal Singh, M.P., is able and earnest. He, however, does not seem to realise why foreign missionaries are supporting him . . . [He] praised the 'freedom loving spirit of the Nagas of Assam' . . . the Christians of Chhota Nagpur [are] demanding a separate Christian Pakistan . . . Their unashamedly frank demand is inspired and supported by European bishops and other clergymen who are working in the Christian Missions of Chhota Nagpur . . .[81]

[79] *Report of the Christian Missionary Activities Enquiry Committee* (Nagpur, Government Printing, Madhya Pradesh, 1956), Vol I, pp. 131–2. Paraphrased except where quotations are indicated. The recommendations are contained in pp. 163–5.

[80] "Adivasi," "adimjati," and "vanavasi" are terms used variously to describe the tribal people of India. The first two indicate the original residents of India; the last, those who dwell in the forest.

[81] *Organiser*, V:33 (March 31, 1952).

Thus the opposition of the Jana Sangh to missionaries was not only based on its unhappiness that some Indians should be weaned from the Hindu fold but also on the presumed danger that tribal Christians, allegedly abetted by missionaries, could add another division of the Motherland, already rent by partition and preparing to undergo the linguistic reorganization of the states. The party also opposed the presumed interference of foreigners in the domestic political scene. The Jharkhand problem passed over, but the problems of Nagaland and now of the Mizos continue as does the demand, mainly from Christian tribals, for a separate hill state in Assam.

From time to time before the publication of the Niyogi committee report the Jana Sangh or the *Organiser* expressed themselves on missionaries and foreign controlled churches. Dindayal Upadhyaya claimed that missionaries in India were "not carrying on missionary work but were conducting propaganda for the Anglo-American bloc." [82] The paper also found fault with the distribution of American commodities through church organizations, including Church World Services and the National Catholic Welfare Council. The paper echoed a familiar charge that the commodities were being used to win converts and to sustain them.[83]

After the publication of the Niyogi report, the working committee of the Jana Sangh addressed itself to the question in a formal resolution. It endorsed the report in its entirety, accepted the conclusions and called for implementation of the recommendations. An independent church, the resolution said, "should constitute a devoted and loyal and valued section of the citizens of India." [84] This was the last major step taken by the party on this topic before the 1957 elections.

Earlier in this chapter we have mentioned various Jana Sangh pronouncements on the general subject of Pakistan and on specific subjects such as the Islamic State in that country, the treatment of Hindus residing in East Pakistan and the occupation of part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan forces. The Jana Sangh has not differentiated between the areas incorporated into

[82] *Ibid.*, VIII:2 (August, 23, 1954).
[83] *Ibid.*, IX:5 (September 21, 1955).
[84] *Ibid.*, IX:50 (July 30, 1956).

Pakistan, such as Gilgit, Hunza and Baltistan, and the areas included in the Azad Government of Jammu and Kashmir. It considers the latter to be a mere puppet of Pakistan. After Mookerjee's death the Jana Sangh continued to press the Government of India *to take stronger action against Pakistan for the alleged mistreat*ment of Hindus in the East Wing of that divided country. It is not necessary here to repeat them, as they followed closely the views expressed during Mookerjee's period of leadership.

The Jana Sangh participated actively in the movement for the expulsion of Portuguese power from the sub-continent. The Portuguese showed no indication of leaving the enclaves except under pressure of military force. Indeed, in December, 1961, they were driven out by the Indian military. The United States was subjected to criticism for its presumed stand on the Goa issue. The basic Jana Sangh resolution on foreign enclaves was passed by the working committee in December, 1953. It read:

> The existence of small territories in the possession of foreign powers on the soil of India is inconsistent with the sovereignty . . . India which stands for the abolition of colonialism all over the world cannot tolerate *its existence on its own soil. The struggle for independence carried on by* the people of these areas has recently been subjected to ruthless suppression . . . such show of military force by a small country like Portugal has been made possible by the help that it receives both in money and weapons from U.S.A. Considering that U.S.A. has decided to enter into a military pact with Pakistan these territories are likely to be used as military bases on the soil of India . . . The Jana Sangh urges upon the government to take energetic action to liquidate these pockets . . .[85]

American arms can be used against India. This will be a familiar cry both from the NATO connection with Portugal and much more from the American alliance with Pakistan. The French were not mentioned as negotiations leading to the Indian takeover on November 1, 1954, were under way.

The Jana Sangh reiterated its views on Goa regularly at the meetings of the various units of the party. In April, 1955, as the Goa satyagraha was taking shape, the party appointed its Mysore secretary Jagannathrao Joshi as convener of a special committee to tour the Goa border. The satyagraha was launched in the first days

[85] *Ibid.*, VII:20 (December 28, 1953).

of July, 1955, with full Jana Sangh-RSS participation. Joshi was captured by the Portuguese; Vasantrao Oke was wounded by a Portuguese rifle shot. The parties participating in the satyagraha were extremely bitter over the failure of the Nehru government to assist the satyagrahis. Upadhyaya spoke for the Jana Sangh: "Nehru must bear the responsibility for the loss of lives . . . All parties except the Congress are united in the demand for police action."[86]

American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles came in for strong criticism from the Jana Sangh, and others, when he recognized Goa as a province of Portugal in a communiqué following his talks with the Portuguese Foreign Minister. *Organiser* said:

> . . . The backing of Bharat [on Goa] by World Communism, though for obvious political purposes, places our American ally [sic] in an extremely delicate position. And things have been taken from bad to worse by Mr. Dulles' joint statement with the Portuguese Foreign Minister accepting Goa as a Portuguese province . . .[87]

The paper commented on Dulles' visit to India under the title "Dulles Should Only Come If . . .":

> . . . Mr. Dulles is visiting India in March—evidently to make up for his Goa bungle. Perhaps the cut in U.S. aid to our country was also restored to the same end . . . He need not come unless he is prepared to make amends for his excesses against our country. He need not come unless he is prepared to accept our claims on Goa, our position in *Goa* and our stand on the Baghdad Pact . . .[88]

Jana Sangh views on Indo-American relations were very much wrapped up in the question of Goa, American military aid to Pakistan and American assistance to Indian economic development. The Jana Sangh tended to measure friendliness between India and any other country solely in terms of that country's support to policies cherished by the Jana Sangh. Nonetheless, the party made frequent remarks about the need for close relations between the oldest and largest democracies in the world. It seems fair to say that of the four major political parties in India, in spite of tirades on

[86] *Ibid.*, IX:3 (August 29, 1955).
[87] *Ibid.*, IX:18 (January 2, 1956).
[88] *Ibid.*, IX:22 (January 30, 1956). The italicized Goa is in the original. In context it appears "Kashmir" is meant.

specific subjects, the Jana Sangh and the Praja Socialist Party probably exhibited a greater degree of support for the American policy of the containment of communism than did the Congress or, of course, the Communist Party.

The Jana Sangh showed no enthusiasm for the Soviet Union. It is strongly anti-communist in its views and did not lend support to the leading communist country. It welcomed Soviet support on specific matters, but it was not fooled as to the reasoning behind a particular item of Soviet support for India. The Soviet Union, through the Communist Party of India, saw the Jana Sangh as the epitome of reaction; in this it shared the view of Nehru. The mutual antagonism of the two Indian political parties did not deter them from combining on specific issues, as in the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti.

The Jana Sangh was of two minds on China. It feared the communism of China, which it could not see as anything but potentially expansionist. This was not always the attitude, however, for the visit of a Chinese cultural delegation in October, 1951, was welcomed by *Organiser* in the first significant reference in the paper to Sino-Indian relations. The paper said: ". . . Since the dawn of history Bharat and China have been friends . . . We loved and respected each other. Today we reinforce those ancient foundations of friendship. The Chinese Mission will experience an immense fund of good-will for China in this country."[89] The Chinese take-over in Tibet opened the eyes of many in India, including the Jana Sangh, to the expansionism of Chinese communism. The party stated its position in a resolution in December, 1953:

> In view of the fact that the Communist Government of China is becoming increasingly more aggressive in the northern frontier of India, that it has overrun Tibet through her troops destroying her age-old autonomy, that she . . . is constructing military bases within striking distance of Northern India . . . that she is issuing maps containing many areas of Indian territory . . . showing them as her own territory, the Jana Sangh is of the opinion that the Government of India should instruct her . . . representative in Peking to protest emphatically . . . and to declare categorically that the MacMahon Line existing between China and India must stand intact . . .[90]

[89] *Ibid.*, V:12 (November 5, 1951).
[90] *Ibid.*, VII:20 (December 28, 1953).

The following year Upadhyaya in a press conference gave this answer when asked his opinion of the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu:

> . . . That China should have shouted for the conquest of Formosa so soon after the Geneva and the Nehru-Chou talks is not a very convincing proof of Chinese eagerness for peace . . . *After all Formosa is ruled by the Chinese. There was therefore no reason for China to talk of liberating Formosa* . . . Take again the case of Tibet . . . We consider this as the creation of a new colony. If the P.M. is against colonialism he should not hesitate to declare himself for the freedom of this newest colony in the world.[91]

Thus the Jana Sangh saw China as an ancient partner of India, one to which India had exported its Buddhist religion, but now under communist rule the cultural partner had become a country to be feared and guarded against.

The Jana Sangh without variation pressed for the total prohibition of cow slaughter. No Hindu party could do otherwise. Whether or not the Vedas demand reverence of the cow and prohibit killing the animal is of little importance. The reverence is deeply ingrained in the Hindu mind. Coupled with the Jana Sangh demand for banning cow slaughter was a nebulous proposal for upgrading the quality of the cattle in India. The party also looked askance at chemical fertilizers and therefore required the cattle as the major producer of natural fertilizers.

The Jana Sangh and the RSS designated October 26, 1952, Anti-Cow Slaughter Day and began the collection of signatures on a petition. The number of signatures received is reported to have been more than seventeen and a half million.[92] The Jana Sangh ritually but not regularly passed resolutions on the subject. There is no doubt the matter is one of deep feeling for the party, which in this matter obtained the support not only of the other Hindu parties but also of many within the Congress, such as Seth Govind Das, Purushottam Das Tandon and Thakur Das Bhargava. In a related matter, Upadhyaya expressed his opposition to pasteurization, another example of the Jana Sangh's distrust of modern chemistry. Said Upadhyaya: ". . . scientific opinion was veering round

[91] *Ibid.*, VIII:5 (September 13, 1954). Italics in original.
[92] *Shri Guruji, The Man and His Mission* (Delhi, Bharat Prakashan, 1956), p. 90.

to the opinion that the excessive heating and cooling of milk involved in Pasteurisation destroyed vital elements of milk." [93]

The Hindu Code Bill engaged much of the time of the Jana Sangh and the other Hindu parties.[94] The Jana Sangh opposed the codification of the traditional Hindu law, while the prime minister considered the bills (there were eventually a number of individual bills) a key issue for his regime. In its attack on the measures the Jana Sangh charged the Congress with communalism. In short, said the Jana Sangh and its allies, any bill which applies to only one community has no place in a secular state. Any codification should apply equally to all communities. This is the secular approach and the government's approach is communal. The argument is attractive and an interesting case of taking an opponent's own arguments to attack him. On April 9, 1955, the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad jointly sponsored an all-India conference in Delhi. The meeting mustered a roll of speakers from the three parties, from the conservative side of the Congress and from other groups. The effort failed as the bills passed through Parliament.

Before turning to the 1957 elections we must next examine the Jana Sangh and the States Reorganization Commission, with a special look at the Punjab and the Akali demand for a separate Punjabi Suba. *Organiser* found much with which Jana Sangh could agree in the 1952 election manifesto of the Akali Dal, but:

> . . . the formation of linguistic provinces is facilitated by a united demand for them. When only a section of the Punjabis demand a Punjabi-speaking province, that section must seek and secure the support of other sections of Punjabis before it presses its point . . . We believe absolutely and completely in Hindu-Sikh unity. To us they are one and the same. It is time they abandoned their separate platforms, and thought, planned and worked together to achieve their common interests and objectives . . .[95]

Although the Jana Sangh opposed a separate Punjabi Suba, the Akalis joined the NDP and worked closely with Mookerjee in the Kashmir satyagraha and with the Jana Sangh in a number of other

[93] *Organiser*, VIII:33 (April 4, 1955).
[94] For a detailed discussion *see* Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 277–91.
[95] *Organiser*, IV:49 (July 30, 1951).

causes including opposition to the Hindu Code Bill. Mookerjee, on his trip to Kashmir, stopped in Amritsar, May 10, 1953, and talked with Master Tara Singh. He reiterated the Jana Sangh opposition to Punjabi Suba. The Jana Sangh placed before the Commission a demand for a Maha-Punjab which would include Punjab, PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh. The party combined its state units into a Maha-Punjab Jana Sangh and held to that position until the bitter end, an end which saw the creation of Punjabi Suba in 1966. We shall see more activity in the Punjab in the next inter-election period.

While the Commission was sitting the Jana Sangh brought other proposals to the body's notice. For example, it proposed a "Washington status" for Delhi but with a municipal corporation. The report was published in September, 1955, and remained to be implemented. It was then that groups from all over the country began to press their ideas on Parliament. The Jana Sangh resolution in October called for the acceptance of the report with three changes. It suggested that the proposed state of Hyderabad, comprising the Telugu-speaking areas of the former princely state which remained after the Marathi-and-Kannada-speaking areas had been ceded to Bombay and Mysore, be combined with the existing Andhra state to form a single Telugu-speaking state. It questioned constituting the Marathi-speaking areas of Madhya Pradesh a separate state called Vidarbha. It suggested either that Vidarbha be merged into a bi-lingual Bombay state or that separate Gujarati- and Marathi-speaking states be formed with the latter including Vidarbha. The new state of Madhya Pradesh it alleged would be unwieldy. The party proposed two states, one comprising Madhya Bharat and Bhopal and the other including Mahakoshal and Vindhya Pradesh. Alternatively, it proposed the inclusion of the northern parts of Madhya Bharat with Uttar Pradesh. One proposal to settle the objections raised to a bi-lingual Bombay state was a city-state of Bombay city. Upadhyaya speaking for the party opposed this.[96] He welcomed the short-lived proposal made by the chief ministers of Bihar and West Bengal that their states merge. The working committee rejected a proposal to set up two zones in

[96] *Ibid.*, IX:14 (November 21, 1955).

the new Punjab state, one zone representing the majority areas of each of the two major languages.[97]

The party's units in Maharashtra and Gujarat found some difficulty in arriving at a position on the bi-lingual state. We shall review a part of the vacillation, leaving the outcome for the next chapter when electoral alliances will be discussed. In August, 1956, the Bombay and Mahagujarat units backed the bi-lingual state. The former endorsed the inclusion of Bombay city in the bi-lingual state. The latter saw the bi-lingual state as a first step toward the unitary state ideal of the party and also as a solution to the issue of Bombay city. The Maharashtra-Vidarbha unit also endorsed the bi-lingual state. So much for ideology. Practical politics entered the scene and turned the tables on these three resolutions. We shall pick up the story in the next chapter and find Trivedi in a meeting of the Mahagujarat Janata Parishad.

The inter-election period was one of continued activity for the Jana Sangh. It had lost one president by death and another by desertion. It had perhaps strengthened itself through the second loss. That question would be answered when the Jana Sangh faced the electorate for the second time.

[97] *Ibid.*, IX:33 (March 26, 1956).

CHAPTER VII

Facing the Electorate (II)—1957

In 1957, India held its second general elections for the members of the Lok Sabha and of the state legislative assemblies.[1] The states had been reorganized into what is with few exceptions the map of India today.[2] The Jana Sangh as a political party had prepared itself for 1957 during the inter-election period. It contested in all states except Assam, Orissa, Kerala and Madras.

Status of the Organization

The death of Mookerjee had, of course, left the Jana Sangh without a nationally known leader. Chatterjee who might have filled the place of Mookerjee failed to achieve the merger of the Hindu Mahasabha into the Jana Sangh and for reasons of his own did not come into the Jana Sangh. The burden of leadership thus fell on the younger members of the party most of whom came from the RSS. On the national speaking circuit Madhok and Vajpayee were the most important of these younger leaders. But even more it was the local leaders who were dedicated to the ideals of the Jana Sangh and the RSS who carried the weight of the party's electoral

[1] The term of the members of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly who were elected in 1955 in the special election in the coastal areas was extended to coincide with the term of those elected from the former Hyderabad areas in 1957. No election was held in 1957 in the coastal areas except for Lok Sabha candidates.

[2] In 1960, Bombay was split into Gujarat and Maharashtra. In 1966, Punjab was divided into Punjabi Suba and Haryana, and some territory was transferred to Himachal Pradesh. Other changes included statehood for Nagaland and the addition of Goa, Daman and Diu.

program. They often were required to finance the cost of the elections from their own pockets and from small contributions solicited locally. There were few large contributors to the Jana Sangh coffers in 1952 and many of these had deserted the party in the intervening years. While not formalized as was the Guru Dakshina Day of the RSS, the financing was similar.

The Jana Sangh had lost many members through desertion or from lack of discipline but this can be viewed as a refining process. The doubtful members, those who could not take the discipline and the disappointments of the period, left the party either voluntarily or by invitation. Many who departed objected to the increasingly strong role of the RSS in the party, not the least of these being Sharma. But with the departure of the objectors, the RSS could take the unchallenged lead in the party. Disciplinary problems were not totally absent but they were sharply reduced. The party continued to use non-RSS persons who were, or were presumed to be, locally influential as candidates and some of these after election turned out to be disloyal. The dominance of the RSS cut two ways. Discipline and devotion increased, but the leaven of those not totally committed to the ideology of the RSS was missing. This left the party open to attacks, many of them justified, that it was a monolithic group wedded to a single philosophy and demanding total acquiescence.

The Jana Sangh organizations at the state level were of varying strength and effectiveness. The Hindi-speaking area in the north was the heartland of the Jana Sangh. Outside this area the party was either non-existent or very weak. The party undoubtedly strengthened itself in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, in the latter especially in the areas formerly comprising Madhya Bharat. In Delhi the party was effective and provided the leading opposition both in the municipal corporation and in the legislative assembly. (The latter was disbanded under the reorganization of the states.) In Punjab, the party was most active in the cities of the Punjabi-speaking part of the state, where it won a sizable number of seats in the municipal bodies. It was weak in Haryana and in the rural areas of the Punjabi-speaking part. In Punjab it was a party of the urban Hindus. In Rajasthan, too, the party had made its gains in the urban areas. The party in Bihar was in its early formative stages.

Of the Hindi-speaking states, it was in Bihar that the RSS was weakest.

As we shall see, the Jana Sangh following in West Bengal was the result of the personality of Mookerjee and not of the RSS base. With the death of Mookerjee the following all but vanished. What passed for a Jana Sangh in Assam in 1952 disappeared and the party had no unit there. Still hoping for a merger with the Ganatantra Parishad the Jana Sangh had not entered Orissa. The south had units of the Jana Sangh in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Mysore but these were small and ineffective. In these states and in Madras the strong advocacy of Hindi as the national language was a deterrent factor in the growth of the Jana Sangh, though the party tried to capitalize on the anti-Muslim feeling among Hindus in the Malabar districts of Kerala. Bombay was a special case. The RSS was strong in some parts, particularly the Marathi-speaking areas of Vidarbha and central Maharashtra but it continued to be mainly a Brahmin organization in a state in which the dominant Maratha caste was asserting itself politically. We shall see that the peculiar circumstances of the movement against a bi-lingual state permitted the Jana Sangh to win some seats, but this was a transient advantage. In some parts of Gujarat too the RSS had strength but it was largely urban, Brahmin and against the grain of Gandhian Gujarat. The Jana Sangh in Bombay city was largely captured by refugee Sindhis, a group somewhat less than popular among the majority Marathi-speaking labor population of the city and among the older, established trading communities.

It appears that the Jana Sangh was much more careful in the selection of its candidates than it had been in 1952. For legislative assemblies the Jana Sangh ran 725 candidates in 1952. Only 47 of these candidates are identifiable as being candidates again in 1957 for legislative assembly seats, and eight more as transferring from assembly seats to Lok Sabha contests.[3] Of the 35 assembly seat

[3] The figures in this sentence may not be absolutely accurate. A study of the names of the candidates contesting each election in each district resulted in the figure of 47. It is possible candidates changed districts and were overlooked. While an effort was made to identify candidates whose names appeared differently in the Election Commission reports on each election it is possible that two Ram Singhs, for example, were not the same person. The figures, however, do give an indication of the magnitude of the changes in candidacy

winners, only 14 were renominated, and only one of the three Lok Sabha winners. The missing 21 assembly seat winners and two Lok Sabha members are accounted for by death, retirement from politics, elimination of the Delhi and Ajmer assemblies, unseating in election petitions and defeat in by-elections as well as the problems of deserting the party and expulsion for breach of discipline. To look more specifically at some cases, the Lok Sabha decrease was caused by the death of Mookerjee and the retirement from politics of Bannerji. Five in Delhi were eliminated both by desertion and breach of discipline and in the end by the abolition of the assembly. Five of the six winners in what had become Madhya Pradesh were renominated and five of the eleven in Rajasthan; of the other six, four had been expelled for breach of discipline and another had crossed to the Ram Rajya Parishad. One of two renominated in Uttar Pradesh, the other having been ousted for indiscipline. West Bengal presented a special case to the parliamentary selection committee. Only three of the 85 candidates who ran in 1952 were renominated in 1957; each had won a seat in 1952. Most of the other 82 including six of the 1952 winners, had deserted the party after Mookerjee's death.

Manifesto

This then was the organization which the Jana Sangh took into the 1957 elections. We should now look at the platform upon which the candidates ran. The manifesto was basically the same in philosophy and program as that presented to the electorate in 1952. In a "platforms at a glance" type of book, Madhok wrote of the Jana Sangh:

> Jana Sangh aims at democracy, nationalism, unitary form of government and full integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with the rest of India, together with greater attention to national defence, in the political side. Its economic objectives are a fair deal to the common man through abolition of sales tax and reduction in other direct taxes, appointment of a National Wage Board and guarantee of economic work to all through decentralization of economic power and a fair field for free enterprise . . . Along with safeguarding democracy, Jana Sangh aims at strengthening the forces of nationalism and unity to check mate the separatist forces from within and the forces of aggression from without.[4]

[4] Balraj Madhok, "Bharatiya Jana Sangh and the Elections," in S. L. Poplai, ed., *National Politics and 1957 Elections in India* (Delhi, Metropolitan Book Co., 1957), p. 62.

With this summary as background, we should look at some of the details of the manifesto, particularly in so far as they differ from the revised manifesto adopted in 1954.[5]

The first item dropped from the 1954 manifesto pertained to the abolition of zamindari without compensation. The 1957 manifesto continued the call for abolition but fuzzed the question by saying zamindars should be "rehabilitated." In the field of domestic policy the manifesto added a specific demand that the Preventive Detention Act be repealed. Mookerjee had led the opposition to the renewal of the act while he led the NDP. It is safe to say that no opposition party has supported preventive detention if for no other reason than that the act is used almost exclusively against them. The party also found the legislative councils—the upper houses in several, but not all, states—to be an expensive addition to the legislative machinery with little return.[6] The party supported the separation of the judiciary from the executive by taking magisterial powers away from the district collectors and deputy commissioners.

The party went beyond its earlier statement that workers should participate in management and profits to endorse instead union membership for industrial workers. In July, 1955, the Jana Sangh had started its own affiliated labor organization, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, with Dattopant Thengade as general secretary. In keeping with its nationalistic program the Jana Sangh called for further Indianization of foreign companies and for the complete Indianization in capital and management of plantation industries. The party also would place a limit on the repatriation of capital and earnings by foreign owned companies.

The foreign policy sections showed no marked difference. Pressure should be brought to bear on Pakistan: "The leaders of Pakistan having declared Bharat to be their only enemy should be prepared for such treatment." The party opposed the use of force to achieve reunification but by implication force might be used to regain the areas of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan occupa-

[5] Text of the 1957 manifesto is contained in *Organiser*, X:25 (February 25, 1957).

[6] Legislative councils exist in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, Mysore, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. There are no councils in Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Nagaland, Orissa and Rajasthan.

tion. China began to play a greater role in the manifesto as the Jana Sangh saw a potential enemy to the north.

As a final comment on the manifesto, the Jana Sangh statement on national unity may be quoted:

> For the preservation of national unity:
> 1. Creating a feeling of equality and oneness in the Hindu Society by liquidating untouchability and caste-ism.
> 2. Nationalising all non-Hindus by inculcating in them the idea of Bharatiya Culture.
>
> The recommendations of the Niyogi Committee and the Rege Committee will be implemented to free Bharatiya Christians from the anti-national influence of foreign missionaries.[7]

The party also labelled the Akali Dal demand for Punjabi Suba, the Dravidistan movement and the Naga rebellion "anti-national."

Tactics

When the last chapter closed we found the various units of the Jana Sangh in the areas comprising the bilingual state of Bombay giving support to the bilingual concept on the ideological ground that this could be a first step toward the unitary state. It did not take any high level of political perception to see that a party opposing the bilingual state and supporting a unilingual state of Maharashtra would make considerable headway in the Marathi-speaking area. Also strong, but not as strong, was a feeling in Gujarat for a unilingual Gujarati-speaking state. It was not difficult for a single party to support both demands as they were complementary. More difficult was an attempt to give support to the Vidarbha separatists who were centered in Nagpur. The Jana Sangh and most other opposition parties, therefore, supported the Gujarat and Maharashtra movement and opposed or ignored the Vidarbha movement. The alliance which was put together in Maharashtra, in fact, did not operate in the Vidarbha areas and there the parties operated on their own.

In November, 1956—about three months after endorsing the bi-lingual state—the working committee of the Mahagujarat Jana Sangh passed a resolution which, after nodding in the direction of the unitary state concept, made a complete *volte face:*

[7] The Rege Committee was the Madhya Bharat counterpart of the Niyogi Committee of Madhya Pradesh. Its findings were similar.

Jana Sangh believes it is inconsistent with democracy to form states on the basis of language alone . . . the ruling Congress Party reorganised the states keeping in view not the interests of Bharat, but its party interests only, and the undemocratic way adopted by the Government to merge Gujarati-and Marathi-speaking people in one state roused the feelings of the people . . . Under such circumstances, the Committee believes that the State of Maha Gujarat should be formed to honour the wishes of the people.[8]

The same issue of the party paper reports that Trivedi attended a meeting of the Maha Gujarat Janata Parishad to protest the bi-lingual state and that Ghosh announced Jana Sangh participation in the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra Committee).

The Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti began its work in February, 1956. It was partly, at least, the creation of the Communist Party:

The strong sentiment in favor of the creation of single-language states . . . has provided a fertile field for Communist agitation and one in which the device of the front organization is particularly appropriate . . . although it would be a mistake to assume that these were as firmly controlled by the CPI as some of the other front organizations. Indeed, so great is the popular enthusiasm for the causes advocated by the regional fronts that the leaders of various parties are drawn into participation to an extent that makes the locus of power difficult to detect . . .[9]

The communists quite naturally will support any movement which is divisive or which can create a turmoil. The Maharashtra movement did both. While the CPI was the largest group in the Samiti, the formal leadership went to a Poona PSP leader, S. M. Joshi, a trade unionist who is now the chairman of the Samyukta Socialist Party. The Samiti was a strange congeries of parties. The leftists including the (Lohia) Socialist Party, the Peasants' and Workers' Party and some of the smaller groups joined the CPI and the PSP. And the Hindu right came along in full force as the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad joined in. The Jana Sangh allotment of assembly seats was small, only six, but it won four of them. It was also assigned three Lok Sabha seats in the

[8] *Organiser*, X:12 (November 12, 1956).

[9] Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959), pp. 438–9.

area in which the Samiti operated and won two of them. The Jana Sangh grumbled about the small number of seats they were assigned and threatened to withdraw from the Samiti. It was an empty threat as the party knew its chances of winning any seats outside the Samiti were almost zero. The political forces had polarized around the Congress and the Samiti.

The Mahagujarat Janata Parishad was a less well-put-together organization. It was led by Indulal Yajnik, a one-time peasant leader who has frequently lent his name to CPI-front organizations. He was for some time president of the All-India Kisan Sabha. Associated with the Yajnik group were the Communists led by Dinkar Mehta and the Republicans led by K. U. Parmar. The Jana Sangh was assigned no Lok Sabha seats and but five assembly seats none of which it won. The Jana Sangh had much less to offer in Gujarat where the RSS was less strong. Four of its assigned seats were in the former princely areas of Saurashtra and the other in the former Baroda State. On the other hand the Jana Sangh had something to offer to the Samiti in terms of workers, who though disproportionately high in Brahmins, were nonetheless dedicated and tireless.

The basic policy of the Jana Sangh was declared by Upadhyaya to be opposed to national alliances with any party. He said the party would agree to local adjustments with all parties except the Communists and the communal parties, e.g., the Akali Dal, the Muslim League, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. Ghosh also included the PSP in the group with whom adjustments would not be made: "The Jana Sangh believes in the building up of Indian Society on India's age-old ideals and not on a shoddy Western model." [10] The Bombay alliances were exceptions based purely on hopes of political gain.

In the Punjab the Congress and the Akali Dal came to an election agreement under which Master Tara Singh's party agreed to run its candidates under the Congress label. *Organiser* published a report that the Congress invited the Jana Sangh to come into its fold. The report seems dubious, has not been confirmed elsewhere but has not been retracted by *Organiser*. According to the report the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee president, Giani Guru-

[10] *Organiser,* X:1 (August 20, 1956).

person or party. But as a Hindu . . . I make bold to express my personal views and to make a few suggestions . . .

I address myself to the great Hindu people . . . I pray to them to rouse themselves in their self-consciousness and freely and boldly exercise their right of vote without being misled, without being distracted or frightened into upholding any individual or party. Let them be alert and discriminate, and resolutely vote for men and parties dedicated to the Hindu People and the Hindu Cause.[13]

In the campaign the Jana Sangh relied on its few better known speakers to some extent, but turned mainly to the local workers. Two of the better known speakers, Madhok and Vajpayee, had their own Lok Sabha contests; Vajpayee, in fact, ran from three constituencies, which left little time for work outside. Ghosh is a rather ineffective speaker who can address a meeting only in English and Bengali.

The party was once again branded by its opponents as communal. The Congress, particularly Nehru, worked hard against the Jana Sangh. The PSP and the CPI also bore down hard on the Jana Sangh, except, of course, in Maharashtra and Gujarat where the parties were allied. It was again a rough campaign and much was said in the heat of the battle which would be forgotten, if not regretted, after the elections were over. But the secularist and socialist Congress of Nehru again feared the Hindu parties of the right more than the parties of the left.

Verdict


When the results were counted the Jana Sangh had made considerable gains over 1952. It increased its Lok Sabha representation only slightly from three to four seats, but increased its share of the poll from 3.06 per cent to 5.93 per cent. In the contests for state assemblies the party won 46 seats as compared to 35 in 1952. This time all the 46 remained with the party at least until the assemblies opened whereas in 1952, four deserted as soon as the votes were counted. In assembly elections the party polled 4.03 per cent of the vote as compared with 2.76 per cent in 1952. The detailed results for assembly contests by districts are given in Appendix II and for the Lok Sabha by states in Appendix III.

With two Lok Sabha seats and 17 assembly seats, Uttar Pra-

[13] *Ibid.*, X:24 (February 18, 1957).

desh became the leading state in terms of Jana Sangh representation. Vajpayee won the Balrampur Lok Sabha seat by a small margin in a straight contest with a Muslim Congressman. He ran a near second to a Congressman in Lucknow but lost his deposit in Mathura. The other Lok Sabha seat was won by Shiv Din Drohar in the Hardoi Reserved seat. Vajpayee managed to pull two of the five underlying assembly constituencies into the Jana Sangh column, but Shiv Din could not pull in any of his five. In Jaunpur, the influence of the Raja of Jaunpur was sufficient for him to win his own assembly seat and to put Jana Sangh candidates for the two Lok Sabha seats in the district into second place behind the Congress. One of these two, Brahmjeet Singh, won the Jaunpur Lok Sabha seat in 1962. Kunj Behari Lal Rathi, the Uttar Pradesh unit general secretary, was beaten badly by PSP candidates both in the Kheri Lok Sabha seat and the Srinagar assembly seat in Kheri District. In Lok Sabha contests in Uttar Pradesh the party raised its share of the poll from 7.29 per cent to 14.79 per cent.

In the assembly poll in the same state the Jana Sangh raised its vote from 6.44 per cent to 9.77 per cent. In two districts, Kheri and Mirzapur, it received more than one-quarter of the vote and in three others, Hardoi, Gonda and Bijnor its poll exceeded 20 per cent. It contested seats in all districts except Bahraich and Tehri Garhwal in an effort to make the party better known, although only in Kheri and Pilibhit did it contest all seats. Significantly the party reduced the number of candidates who forfeited their deposits from 73 per cent to 56 per cent. The only sitting member of the assembly from the Jana Sangh was defeated for re-election, but in 1962 he won a Lok Sabha seat. The most prominent among the winners was Yadhuvendra Dutt Dubey, the Raja of Jaunpur; a Brahmin doing a Rajput's work. Dubey, at one time *sanghachalak* of the RSS in Jaunpur, became successively leader of the Jana Sangh group, leader of the opposition after 1962, and president of the Uttar Pradesh Jana Sangh. The care with which candidates were selected also increased, as 12 of the 17 elected stood for re-election in 1962 although four were dropped from the party for breach of discipline. Among the more prominent Jana Sangh losers were Madho Prasad Tripathi from Banda District and state president Raj Kumar Srivastava in Lucknow City.


JANA SANGH - 1957
Parliamentary and
Assembly Seats Won
Parliamentary Seats
Assembly Seats
MMU
AND
KASHMIR
HIMACHAL
PRADESH
MANIPUR

Sanghis were elected to the assembly and contributed greatly to the quality of the opposition in the state. Bhairon Singh Shekawat was re-elected from Sikar District and was joined by party secretary, Jagdish Prasad Mathur, from the same district.[11] Satish Chandra Agarwal, currently Jana Sangh president in Rajasthan, was elected from Jaipur city. Kotah was the strongest district for the party. There it polled more than 30 per cent of the vote and won two seats. In Udaipur and Chittorgarh the party also polled more than 10 per cent but won no seats. In all three districts, located adjacent to each other in the southeastern corner of the state, the Jana Sangh built a base from which to grow in 1962 and 1967.

Punjab was both a failure and an improvement for the party. Again the party failed to do well in Lok Sabha contests, but, drawing on the urban Hindu vote it won nine seats in the assembly. The party contested 16 of the 22 Lok Sabha seats and gained 16.04 per cent of the vote. With the exception of Delhi this was the highest percentage polled in any state by the Jana Sangh. In Amritsar, party stalwart Kishen Lal ran a strong race against the president of the Pradesh Congress Committee, Giani Gurumukh Singh Musafir, finishing second in the contest ahead of the Communist candidate Sohan Singh Josh. In Mahendragarh District the Jana Sangh won all three seats it contested and polled more than one-third of the vote. Three candidates who won in 1957, were prominent in the assembly and won also in 1962 and 1967 were Balram Das Tandon, Baldev Prakash of Amritsar, and Mangal Sein of

In Madhya Pradesh, the Jana Sangh contested 21 of the 36 Lok Sabha seats and polled 13.96 per cent of the vote. It won no seats but reduced its forfeiture of deposits to six. Trivedi ran in the Mandsaur seat, having yielded the Chittorgarh, Rajasthan, seat from which he won in 1952 to another Jana Sangh candidate. Although he lost, three of the seven Jana Sangh candidates in the assembly constituencies comprising the Mandsaur Lok Sabha seat won their assembly seats. Both he and Ramchandra V. Bade from Khargone ran second to their Congress opponents and both won the seats in 1962. The Jana Sangh did not oppose Praja Socialist leader Hari Vishnu Kamath in Hoshangabad, Mahasabha organizing secretary Hardayal Devgun in Bhopal or Mahasabha general secretary V. G. Deshpande in Guna. Devgun and Deshpande later joined the Jana Sangh. Sita Ram Goel, a frequent contributor to *Organiser*, contested unsuccessfully from Khujaraho. The Congress won 35 of the 36 Lok Sabha seats. The other went to Brij Narayan Brajesh of the Mahasabha who was also unopposed by the Jana Sangh.

The Jana Sangh contested 127 of the 288 assembly seats, won ten and had 64 candidates lose deposits. The party won 9.88 per cent of the vote. The seats were all won in the former Madhya Bharat area (eight) and the former Vindhya Pradesh area (two). Four districts of the state gave the Jana Sangh more than one-third of the votes: Shajapur, Mandsaur, Nimar (Khargone) and Dewas. The party won three seats in Shajapur and Mandsaur and one each in Nimar (Khargone) and Dewas. All these districts were in Madhya Bharat before the states reorganization. Vimal Kumar Chordia, who became leader of the party in the assembly, and Virendra Kumar Saklecha, who became leader after 1962 and a minister in 1967, were returned from Mandsaur District. Bade was upset in his bid for re-election to the assembly from Nimar (Khargone) District.

In Rajasthan, the party contested only seven of the 22 Lok Sabha seats, winning none, but losing no deposits, while polling 11.10 per cent of the vote. For the assembly the Jana Sangh contested only 47 of the 176 seats, winning six, losing 26 deposits and polling 5.42 per cent of the vote, a decline in both seats won and percentage of vote from 1952. However, three key Jana

Sanghis were elected to the assembly and contributed greatly to the quality of the opposition in the state. Bhairon Singh Shekawat was re-elected from Sikar District and was joined by party secretary, Jagdish Prasad Mathur, from the same district.[14] Satish Chandra Agarwal, currently Jana Sangh president in Rajasthan, was elected from Jaipur city. Kotah was the strongest district for the party. There it polled more than 30 per cent of the vote and won two seats. In Udaipur and Chittorgarh the party also polled more than 10 per cent but won no seats. In all three districts, located adjacent to each other in the southeastern corner of the state, the Jana Sangh built a base from which to grow in 1962 and 1967.

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Pursuant to the abolition of the Delhi Legislative Assembly elections were held only for the five Lok Sabha seats. The Jana Sangh contested all five, won none and lost two deposits while polling 19.72 per cent of the vote. Madhok finished a distant second to Mrs. Kripalani, who was now the Congress candidate. In Chandni Chowk, Vasantrao Oke also finished second as did Shyam

[14] There are two persons with the name Jagdish Prasad Mathur in the leadership of the Jana Sangh. The Rajasthan member is not to be confused with the office secretary of the party who is also a member of the working committee and is from Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.

Charan Gupta in Delhi Sadar. Jana Sangh candidates finished well back in the double-member Outer Delhi constituency. There Mahasabhite Ram Singh finished second among the general seat candidates.

Maharashtra presented a special case. The Jana Sangh won two of the seven Lok Sabha seats it contested and four of eighteen assembly seats. In the area covered by the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti the party won two of three Lok Sabha seats and four of six assembly seats and it lost no deposits in this area. The victories for the Jana Sangh were almost solely attributable to the alliance on the unilingual state issue. The Lok Sabha winners were Uttamrao Patil from Dhulia and Premjibhai Assar from Ratnagiri. The only loser in the Lok Sabha elections was beaten by S. K. Patil. The assembly winners came from Ratnagiri (two), Jalgaon and Poona districts. Ramchandra K. Mhalgi assumed leadership in the assembly.

In West Bengal the rout of the Jana Sangh was all but complete. The sitting Lok Sabha member did not contest for re-election and only three of the nine elected to the assembly in 1952 stood again. All were defeated, although each retained his deposit. The vote polled for assembly constituencies dropped to 0.98 per cent and for Lok Sabha seats to 1.43 per cent. In the Howrah Lok Sabha constituency Haripada Bharati finished third but polled more votes than the difference between the CPI winner and the Congress loser.

Elsewhere the party showed little strength. Seats were contested for the Lok Sabha in Mysore (five), Bihar (two) and Andhra Pradesh (one), but with the exception of the candidate in Belgaum, Mysore, all lost their deposits. Assembly seats were contested in these states as well as in Gujarat but only in Rajkot District of Gujarat and South Kanara District of Mysore did the party poll more than five per cent of the vote.

Appraisal of Political Progress

Malkani assessing the early returns from the election wrote: "The Jana Sangha progress is real but hardly spectacular."[15] The working committee met in April to discuss the results. Its resolution said, in part:

[15] *Organiser,* X:28 (March 18, 1957).

. . . The Committee feels that the Jana Sangha, in spite of the odds against it, has registered a definite advance both in respect of votes polled and seats won . . .

In respect of state assemblies the election results in U.P., Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab and Bombay have been quite encouraging . . .

Jana Sangha, however, has got a set-back in West Bengal—where it has not been able to maintain the position it had secured in the last elections—as also in Bihar and Karnatak . . . Lack of solid organisational base and lack of resources were found to be the main factors responsible . . .

The Committee feels deeply concerned over the important part played by casteism and communalism, particularly Muslim communalism . . .[16]

In spite of the moderate satisfaction expressed by the working committee, Malkani's appraisal seems closer to the truth: good, but nothing extra was the performance of the Jana Sangh.

The quinquennial question of alliances with the Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad again occupied the attention of the Jana Sangh leaders, though not to the extent that it did following the 1952 elections. Steps were taken after the elections to attempt a union of the Jana Sangh and the Parishad in Rajasthan under which the two parties would operate as a single assembly bloc.[17]

The number of contests between the three Hindu parties was greatly reduced from the number in 1952, although the Jana Sangh and the Ram Rajya Parishad still contested against each other in

[16] *Ibid.*, X:34 (April 29, 1957).

[17] The Election Commission report on the 1957 elections is less useful for a study of party vote than the reports for the 1952 and 1962 elections. In the 1952 and 1962 reports every candidate who stood with a party label, whether the party was recognized or not, is clearly identified. In the 1957 report candidates who stood on the tickets of unrecognized parties are entered simply as "independents." Thus it is impossible to ascertain with certainty the vote of such parties as the (Lohia) Socialist Party nationally or the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras. The following paragraphs are based on identified candidates only. For the Jana Sangh this was all candidates in all states. Of the states mentioned in the discussion the Mahasabha was not recognized in Uttar Pradesh or Rajasthan or the Ram Rajya Parishad in West Bengal. There may have also been contests in other states in which neither of the two parties was recognized. Thus the information given is accurate to the extent possible from the report, but there may have been a few additional contests. The 1967 report is but little better than that of 1957 as it again designates candidates of unrecognized parties as "independents," but the candidates of parties formed after 1962, e.g., the Jana Kranti Dal of Bihar, are indicated.

forty-seven assembly constituencies in the states in which both parties were recognized. For assembly constituencies, the following summarizes the result of the contests, assuming once again that all votes could be transferred from one party to another:

Bombay: Jana Sangh faced Mahasabha in one and Parishad in two, with no effect on the result. Mahasabha faced Parishad in one, also with no effect on the result.

Madhya Pradesh: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha contested each other in nine seats. Of these the Mahasabha won one and "might" have won another. Jana Sangh and Parishad faced each other in seventeen, of which the Jana Sangh won two, "might" have won another three and the Parishad eight. Of eight the Mahasabha won two and "might" have won another two in contest against the Parishad. All three parties entered for three seats, of which the Jana Sangh won one and "might" have won another. It was in Madhya Pradesh that the contests cost the most.

Rajasthan: Jana Sangh and Parishad contested each other in nine seats of which each won one and the Jana Sangh "might" have won another.

Uttar Pradesh: Jana Sangh and Parishad faced each other in nineteen, of which the Jana Sangh won one and "might" have won another.

West Bengal: Jana Sangh and Mahasabha faced each other in two, of which Mahasabha "might" have won one.

Summary: Jana Sangh contested Mahasabha in twelve. Of these Mahasabha won one (Madhya Pradesh) and "might" have won two (Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal). Jana Sangh and Parishad faced each other in forty-seven, of which Jana Sangh won four (Madhya Pradesh, two; Rajasthan one; Uttar Pradesh, one) and Parishad won three (Madhya Pradesh, two; Rajasthan, one). The Jana Sangh "might" have added five more (Madhya Pradesh, three; Rajasthan, one; Uttar Pradesh, one). Mahasabha and Parishad opposed each other in nine of which Mahasabha won two (Madhya Pradesh) and "might" have won two more (Madhya Pradesh). All three parties contested three of which Jana Sangh won one (Madhya Pradesh) and "might" have won one (Madhya Pradesh).

The contesting against each other might have cost the Jana Sangh (Shajapur) and the Ram Rajya Parishad (Bilaspur) each a

Lok Sabha seat in Madhya Pradesh. None of the parties won a Lok Sabha seat in the face of opposition from another of the Hindu parties. There were a total of thirteen such contests, eight in Madhya Pradesh, three in Uttar Pradesh and one each in Bombay and Delhi.

With the exception of the special case of the seats won in Maharashtra, the Jana Sangh became almost exclusively a party of the Hindi-area. In the next chapter we shall see some of the attempts made to extend the party work in the south and east. We shall also study the validity of the charge that the Jana Sangh is a party of the urban middle class and find that in 1957 it was very much just that.

The party had now faced its second electoral challenge. It had increased its seats slightly in Parliament and markedly in the states, especially when allowance is made for the abolition of the Delhi and Ajmer assemblies. In each state and in Parliament it had one or more talented spokesmen: Vajpayee in the Lok Sabha, Bhairon Singh Shekawat in Rajasthan, Mhalgi in Maharashtra, Dubey in Uttar Pradesh, Chordia in Madhya Pradesh and Tandon in Punjab would become leading oppositionists and some of them would have much ability in their supporting casts. Beyond seats, the party had developed a good base from which to expand in some of the states, most notably Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. It was now ready to refine and develop further in the period between the 1957 and 1962 elections.

CHAPTER VIII

Strengthening the Organization: 1957–1962

The 1957 elections were over. The Jana Sangh had improved its record in seats won and votes polled. In preparing for the next general elections in 1962 the party set itself several tasks. It wished to make the best possible use of the legislative bodies as a platform to put forward its views on national and local matters. In each of the legislatures it had a number of men who were to display a high level of parliamentary competence. Press coverage of the party would be greatly expanded by the coverage given to the speeches of these men. The goal set by the party for the 1962 elections was to achieve the status of official opposition in its two strongest states, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, and to expand in the other states in which the party had seats. In the remaining states the goal was to build up organizations of sufficient strength so that representation could be assured in the assemblies. This projected a particular effort in the south and east. It would be necessary to reshape the organizational structure of the party. To acquire publicity for causes supported by the Jana Sangh, the party would resort to extra-parliamentary activities, many of which followed on those we discussed in the 1952–57 period. In some cases, indeed, it seemed as though the Jana Sangh subscribed to the theory that even bad publicity was better than no publicity at all. In its effort to weld together a national conservative party, the Jana Sangh would be faced by the emergence of the newly created Swatantra Party.

Parliamentary Work

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was to become the star performer in the Lok Sabha. He became leader of the parliamentary party of four in 1957 and, although he was defeated for re-election in 1962, he retained his position by being elected to the Rajya Sabha, and returned to the Lok Sabha in 1967. His three colleagues were of varying ability. Among them only Uttamrao Patil of Maharashtra came close to Vajpayee. The parliamentary group increased to eight before the 1962 elections, including one member of the Rajya Sabha. In the Lok Sabha the most notable addition came when Balraj Madhok won the New Delhi by-election in 1961. Harish Chandra Sharma, who had been elected from Jaipur as a member of the Socialist Party, crossed to join the Jana Sangh. With the disintegration of the Socialist parliamentary group, Sharma became an independent and joined the Jana Sangh group in April, 1961.[1] He has since left the party. Just prior to the 1962 elections the Lok Sabha group was increased to seven members by the addition of Motisinh B. Thakore of Patan, Gujarat. He had been elected as an independent under the auspices of the Maha Gujarat Janata Parishad.

The Jana Sangh was involved in two key by-elections to the Lok Sabha. The first of these was Gurgaon, the southernmost constituency of Punjab. The seat had been won by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Education Minister, in 1957 and became vacant on his death. The largest single group in the constituency was the Muslim Meos. The Muslims presumably voted *en bloc* for Azad in his straight contest against a Jana Sangh candidate in 1957. Azad won the election by slightly more than a two-to-one majority. In the by-election the Congress gave its place on the ticket to Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma, then a member of the Official Language Commission and formerly president of the Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh relished the opportunity to oppose its former president whose desertion had been the cause of much acrimony in 1954. The largest group in the constituency after the Meos is the Arya Samajist Jats.

[1] *Organiser*, XIV:38 (May 1, 1961). Sharma did not contest in 1962. The Jana Sangh did not oppose Maharani Gayatri Devi who won the Jaipur seat on the Swatantra ticket.

A thirty-five year old independent Arya Samajist, Prakash Vir Shastri, entered the contest. Shastri, though from Moradabad Disrict in Uttar Pradesh, was well known for his Arya Samajist work in all areas in which the Samaj was prominent. He could draw upon support not only from the Jana Sangh but from the highly organized Arya Samaj bodies. It is likely that he also drew some support from the Meos who were not pleased to have the Congress nominate a non-Muslim. When the returns were in Shastri had polled 94,517 votes to Sharma's 56,554. Shastri had almost reversed the Maulana's percentage receiving 61 per cent of the vote. While not a victory for the Jana Sangh as such, the support given by the party was well known and largely credited for Shastri's victory.

The second key by-election came in April, 1961, in the prestigious New Delhi constituency. The seat had been won in 1952 and 1957 by Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani. In the first election she ran on the ticket of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party of which her husband was chairman. Before the 1957 elections she crossed over to the Congress and won the seat again on the ruling party's ticket, taking about three-fourths of the vote to defeat Balraj Madhok of the Jana Sangh. In December, 1960, she resigned from the Lok Sabha to accept a place in the newly formed ministry in Uttar Pradesh headed by Chandra Bhan Gupta. In the by-election the Jana Sangh again nominated Madhok. The Congress set up Rana Jang Bahadur Singh who had won a seat in the Delhi assembly in 1952 as a Jana Sangh candidate. (He deserted the party as the votes were being tallied and joined the Congress) Jang Bahadur Singh belonged to the "Congress left" and was a vice president of the All-India Peace Council. Mrs. Manmohini Sahga), who had been the unsuccessful Congress candidate against Mrs. Kripalani in 1952, entered the by-election as the much ballyhooed candidate of the Swatantra Party. The Jana Sangh relied for campaigning on its large cadre of workers in the Delhi area; *Organiser* claimed 10,000 put forward the case for Madhok. The result was a victory for Madhok, by a margin of about 10,000 votes over Jang Bahadur Rana. Except for Jung Bahadur Rana and Madhok the candidates lost their deposits. The result was a morale-builder for the Jana Sangh, even though the party lost the seat in 1962. It was a signal to the Delhi Congress that it faced a very strong challenge from the

Jana Sangh and one which would mature in 1967. It was at the same time a humiliating defeat for the new Swatantra organization in Delhi, so much so that the party did not contest in Delhi in 1962 and has been able to do little to form a party there. The two conservative parties could have learnt a lesson from this: that they were more likely to hurt each other than the Congress if either tried to expand into areas in which the other was already strong.

It is difficult to judge parliamentary performance, especially of the smallest group of the national opposition parties. Vajpayee spoke best in Hindi and generally used that language to address the House. This cut him off from many of the members from the south and east who do not follow Hindi, especially the Sanskritized variant used by Vajpayee. Relatively young and inexperienced he could not come close to achieving the stature of a Mookerjee, but the five years saw much growth in him. By the end of the term he was widely recognized as an able parliamentarian. His colleague after 1961, Madhok, began his career in the Lok Sabha with an over-exuberance which soon disappeared. An advocate of closer cooperation with other parties he tried to work with his fellow oppositionists, especially those in the Swatantra Party, and with some of the independents. Madhok generally spoke in English which he speaks at a remarkably fast pace. More outgoing than Vajpayee, he was seen frequently at social functions, not excluding those of foreign missions.

The Jana Sangh returned to the Rajya Sabha in March, 1958, for the first time since the departure of Deva Prasad Ghosh in 1954. In the biennial elections for the Upper House in Uttar Pradesh the Jana Sangh agreed with a few other opposition parties on a pooling of votes for the Rajya Sabha and Legislative Council elections. The result was the election of Raja Ajit Pratap Singh to the Rajya Sabha. The party paper was proud to announce that Singh topped the poll with "more votes than any other candidate even including Pandit Pant," the Union Home Minister.[2]

In Uttar Pradesh the Jana Sangh trailed both the Praja Socialist Party and the Socialist Party among the opposition groups. The leaders of both of these parties were prominent and strong parlia-

[2] *Ibid.*, XI:29 (March 31, 1958).

mentarians, although throughout the history of the Socialist Party its legislators at the center and in the states have been singularly noted for disrupting the proceedings. The Uttar Pradesh Socialist Party leader, Raj Narayan Singh, probably holds the record for times expelled from the House in a five-year period. The Jana Sangh veered between emulating the relatively sedate PSP and the rambunctious Socialists, with the choice more firmly in favor of the former as the term of the legislature drew to a close. The five years were a good training period for the Jana Sangh as it would be the official opposition after the 1962 elections and participate in the Ministry in 1967. The party was led capably by Yuduvendra Dutt Dubey, the Raja of Jaunpur. Brahmins and Rajputs predominated in the Jana Sangh group. In Uttar Pradesh the party extended its membership in the Legislative Council. Pitamber Das was already in the Council when the 1957 elections took place. He later became national president of the party. He was joined in the Council by several others including Madho Prasad Tripathi, the party leader in Basti District, and Onkar Singh, a former member of the Legislative Assembly and later a member of the Lok Sabha.

In Rajasthan the Jana Sangh was second to the Ram Rajya Parishad among the opposition parties. As we have noted before the Parishad was an ill-disciplined party; few of its members went down the line in subscribing to the obscurantist program of Swami Karpatri. Shortly after the elections some of the legislators from the Parishad proposed an assembly alliance between the two parties. Thakur Madan Singh of Danta actually crossed over to the Jana Sangh. He later became president of the Rajasthan Jana Sangh and, still later, presented a minor disciplinary problem for the party.

The general lack of cohesion in the Ram Rajya Parishad gave the small Jana Sangh group in the assembly an influence out of proportion to its numbers. Bhairon Singh Shekawat became the unofficial leader of the opposition and was supported by Jagdish Prasad Mathur and Satish Chandra Agarwal. When Rajasthan Congress politics dictated the elevation of former Chief Minister Tika Ram Paliwal to the Rajya Sabha his Mahuva assembly seat in Sawai Madhopur District became vacant. In a by-election held in June, 1958, a Jana Sangh candidate was elected by a margin of more than four thousand over a Muslim Congress candidate.

The Jana Sangh with ten seats placed just behind the twelve of the PSP in Madhya Pradesh, but was an at least equally effective group. Chordia and Saklecha provided the party leadership while the elder former parliamentarians Trivedi and Bade coached from the sidelines. In a by-election important to the party in Sehore in June, 1958, the Jana Sangh candidates defeated the Congress. The constituency had a sizable concentration of Muslims and was carried in the general election by Maulana Tarzi Mashriqi, who was a former minister in the Bhopal cabinet and after the 1957 elections a minister of state in the Madhya Pradesh cabinet of Kailas Nath Katju. Mashriqi was unseated following an election petition. The Jana Sangh again nominated its 1957 candidate, Diwanchand Mahajan. The Congress nominated a Rajput, non-Muslim, but brought into the campaign two Muslim central ministers, Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim and Abid Ali. Following a campaign in which communalism was not avoided by either party the Jana Sangh won in a landslide. The Jana Sangh assembly votes were given to A. D. Mani, an independent, in his successful bid for the Rajya Sabha in December, 1960. Mani, who was editor of Hitavada, only moderately shares the views of the Jana Sangh.

With nine seats in the Punjab assembly the Jana Sangh was the largest opposition party. Baldev Prakash, Balram Das Tandon, and Mangal Sein were among the outstanding oppositionists in the rough-and-tumble assembly of the Kairon days. The 1958 elections to the council saw two more prominent Jana Sanghis enter the legislature; Sri Chand Goel and Kishen Lal were elected from the graduates constituencies.

In Maharashtra the Jana Sangh was not happy in its association with the leftist parties in the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti. After much bickering the formal break came on February 26, 1958.[3] Thereafter the Jana Sangh would go it alone in Maharashtra. The Samiti itself soon lost its *raison d'etre* when the Congress agreed to divide Bombay into separate Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking states. The election of Uttamrao Patil to the Lok Sabha deprived the Jana Sangh of its only representative in the Legislative Council. It soon recouped the loss when Bachhraj Vyas was elected from the Vidar-

[3] *Ibid.*, XI:26 (March 10, 1958).

bha Graduates constituency in 1958. In 1960 the party added two more seats in the council from the Poona Graduates and the Greater Bombay Teachers seats. The appeals of the Jana Sangh in Maharashtra have been to the better educated voters in the graduates and teachers constituencies where many of the voters are Brahmins.

A similar appeal to the educated Hindu could be made in other states and the Jana Sangh contested a number of the graduates and teachers seats in Andhra Pradesh and Mysore. It was successful in one. A. Rama Rao, later a Jana Sangh president, was elected from the Circars Graduates seat in Andhra Pradesh in 1958. Then 68 years old, Rama Rao knew no Hindi but was selected to be the first, and so far only, southern president of the party. He is a lawyer, trained abroad, whose early background was in the Liberal Party. He is a Theosophist and was associated with Annie Besant.

Jammu and Kashmir is a state which we did not consider in the previous chapter on the 1957 elections. The Jana Sangh affiliate, the Praja Parishad, entered the 1957 elections in contrast to the 1952 boycott of the poll. In the 1957 elections 43 of the 75 seats were won without contest by the ruling National Conference led (after the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah) by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Of the 32 contests the Praja Parishad entered 22 and won in five, lost four deposits, and polled 24.63 per cent of the vote. One of the candidates was a Muslim. Prem Nath Dogra won the Jammu City North seat by a wide margin, but was defeated in the Jammu City South seat in a close contest. The party's general secretary, Rishi Kumar Kaushal, was defeated for the Riasi seat by a few votes. Other seats were won in Basohli, Akhnoor-Chamb (both reserved and general), and Jammu Tehsil. Dogra was the outstanding man on the small opposition bench, even after he was joined in the opposition by Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and the band of leftists who broke away from Bakshi to form the Democratic National Conference in 1958. Sadiq and most of his followers returned to the National Conference proper in 1960, leaving the Parishad almost alone in opposition.

Membership in civic bodies provided another opening for Jana Sangh activity. In October, 1957, elections were held to municipal bodies in Uttar Pradesh. The elections excluded the corporations of

the five major cities: Kanpur, Agra, Banaras, Allahabad, and Lucknow. In contests for 104 municipalities the Congress won absolute majorities in 29, the Jana Sangh in two. Of the 2222 seats the Congress won 856 and the Jana Sangh took 187 for second place among the organized parties.[4] It was a strong showing for the Jana Sangh in the urban areas.

On March 21, 1958, the municipal corporation of Delhi was elected. The result was a crashing setback for the Congress which lost its majority in the corporation. Of the 80 elective seats the Congress took 31 and the Jana Sangh 25. Eight Communists, one Mahasabhite, one Praja Socialist, and 14 independents were also elected. The Congress polled 39.8 per cent of the vote and the Jana Sangh 26.4 per cent.[5] The Congress gained the support of the Communists and a few independents to achieve the election of former communist Aruna Asaf Ali as mayor. However, a year later the Jana Sangh combined with the Communists to re-elect Mrs. Asaf Ali and to install Jana Sanghi Kidar Nath Sahni as deputy mayor. When Mrs. Asaf Ali resigned she was replaced by Trilok Chand Sharma, the 1962 Jana Sangh Lok Sabha candidate from Outer Delhi.

The Delhi corporation elections also brought loss of Congress control over the electoral college which is called upon to elect a Delhi member of the Rajya Sabha. By September when the election was to be held changes in the party position in the corporation and the complexion of the ten additional members who make up the electoral college left the party line-up—Congress 38, Jana Sangh 27, CPI 7, Hindu Mahasabha 1, PSP 1, and independents 16. The Congress nominated the president of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind; the opposition supported Mirza Ahmad Ali. Ahmad Ali won 48–42, moving *Organiser* to editorialize:

> This election has made it clear that the Congress is very much on the way out in Delhi. Also that it is thriving only on the divided vote of the opposition. In supporting Mirza the Jana Sangh taught Congress quite a few lessons. One of these is that, contrary to Congress propaganda, it has no animus against Muslims as such. Secondly, it has prevented the election of a known communal leader of the Muslim priestly class. And

[4] *Ibid.*, XI:8 (November 4, 1957) and XI:9 (November 11, 1957).
[5] *Ibid.*, XI:28 (March 24, 1958) and XI:29 (March 31, 1958).

thirdly, it has reminded the Congress that it cannot overlook the place of Jana Sangh in the political life of the Capital.[6]

The coalition, however, did not hold together and a Congress candidate was elected to the Rajya Sabha in 1960.

The Punjab civic elections gave a further indication of Jana Sangh voting power in the urban areas of northern India. In March, 1959, 43 urban areas went to the polls to choose members of the municipal boards. Punjab Jana Sangh secretary Yagya Dutt Sharma claimed that the Jana Sangh won 65 of the 392 seats and that 49 more Jana Sanghis were elected as independents. This total of 115, he indicated, was in excess of the number of Congressmen returned. Sharma claimed outright Jana Sangh majorities in five towns, including Karnal, Rohtak and the industrial town Ballabhgarh. Previously the Congress had controlled 40 of 43 towns.[7]

The most important to the Jana Sangh in the series of civic elections held between the two general elections were the October, 1959, elections in the five large cities of Uttar Pradesh. The Jana Sangh made an all out effort to succeed in these elections. It issued a manifesto which called for increased efficiency (including incentive awards for outstanding municipal workers), mobile clinics to provide free medical treatment, abolition of beggary, abolition of cycle tax, banning of obscene posters, opening of primary schools to provide education for all and the adoption of Hindi at all levels of administration. In kicking off the campaign in Lucknow, Upadhyaya condemned the Congress and the PSP for having concluded an electoral alliance with the Muslim League in Kerala. "The nationalist democratic forces should consolidate their ranks by supporting the Jana Sangh," said Upadhyaya.[8] When the results were in they showed that the Jana Sangh had moved from fourth place into second behind the Congress. The Congress won none of the cities outright, although it was the largest party in four cities. In

[6] *Ibid.*, XII:2 (September 22, 1958).

[7] *Ibid.*, XII:26 (March 16, 1959), and XII:27 (March 23, 1959). The results of elections to civic bodies are always hard to come by. The almost perpetual shifting of allegiances, especially among those elected as independents, makes it all but impossible to determine the current membership of the bodies in a given state.

[8] *Ibid.*, XIII:8 (October 12, 1959).

Lucknow the Jana Sangh was the largest party. The results are summarized in Table III.

The Jana Sangh was understandably pleased with the results in Uttar Pradesh. The party paper quoted press comments which supported its contention that the Congress was declining in Uttar Pradesh while the Jana Sangh was rising. Jana Sanghi Raj Kumar Srivastava was elected mayor of Lucknow. The Congress elected

TABLE III

UTTAR PRADESH MAJOR CITY CIVIC ELECTIONS—1959

City	*Seats*	*Congress*	*JS*	*PSP*	*SP*	*CPI*	*Independents*
Agra	54	16	7	1	..	..	30
Allahabad	54	18	5	10	2	..	19
Banaras	54	17	14	..	..	6	17
Kanpur	72	33	4	3	3	3	26
Lucknow	63	13	26	6	..	2	16
Total	297	97	56	20	5	11	108

Source: *Organiser*, XIII:12 (November 9, 1959)

mayors of the other four cities. In succeeding years the Jana Sangh retained control of the Lucknow mayoralty. G. D. Rastogi and Dr. P. D. Kapoor followed Srivastava in the office.

Organizational Development

Having reviewed the Jana Sangh as a parliamentary group and having looked at the more important of the party's electoral activities during the five-year inter-election period, we turn to the organization of the party which supported the parliamentary group and conducted the elections. There were a number of significant changes in the party organization as the Jana Sangh tried to build a more effective cadre of workers and to establish clearer lines of authority from center to village and of reporting from village to center.

The Jana Sangh held five national sessions during the period although the final one just before the elections was technically not a national session but a meeting of an augmented Pratinidhi Sabha. For the first two sessions, at Ambala in 1958 and Bangalore in 1959, Deva Prasad Ghosh was continued as president of the party. His four year term constitutes the longest individual presidency and

he was to be called upon again in 1963 to replace Dr. Raghu Vira before being elected to yet another term in 1964. The 1960 session at Nagpur was presided over by Pitamber Das of Uttar Pradesh. A. Rama Rao of Andhra Pradesh was elected president for the Lucknow session in 1961 and continued in office at the Banaras session of the enlarged Pratinidhi Sabha in November, 1961. He was thus the president who led the Jana Sangh into the 1962 elections.

The Jana Sangh developed a three-tier system of organization by inserting the zonal secretary between the general secretary and the state Jana Sangh unit. The system continued, with some modifications from its beginning at the Ambala session up to the time Upadhyaya was elevated from general secretary to president at Calicut in 1967, although a change was also required when Madhok became president at Jullundur in 1966. Upadhyaya as general secretary exercised overall control of the party organization, although detractors of the Jana Sangh maintained that he had to "check with Nagpur," i.e., with Golwalkar.[9] Principal assistant in the day-to-day matters of central organization is the office secretary, Jagdish Prasad Mathur. Upadhyaya, Mathur and Upadhyaya's successor as general secretary, Sunder Singh Bhandari, all come from the ranks of the RSS and pursued the bachelor life of the full time worker. Also stationed at the center was Vajpayee, first with the rank of secretary and then as Upadhyaya's successor as president. As secretary he was charged with parliamentary work and as president he has continued to be leader of the parliamentary party. Policy was formulated principally by a three member group including Upadhyaya, Vajpayee and Madhok. They were the drafting committee for the 1962 election manifesto.

The zonal set-up, created in 1958 and continued through the 1962 elections, allotted the entire country to four zones. The zones had as their core states in which the Jana Sangh was reasonably well established, the new areas being attached to the established areas. Therefore the division does not appear to be logical geographically but is organizationally useful. The northern zone under Madhok included Punjab, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu

[9] Upadhyaya gave some credence to this when he visited Nagpur immediately upon his return from overseas before he proceeded to Delhi.

and Kashmir. Madhok was the only one of the zonal secretaries who was not a full time worker. He retained his professorship of history at the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College in New Delhi. His wife, Kamala, is active in the women's wing of the Jana Sangh and has been a member of the working committee. Madhok is one of the party's ablest speakers in English and, as such, is often sent to propagate the Jana Sangh program in non-Hindi-speaking areas. He is a prolific writer of books and also of articles in *Organiser* and in a wide range of non-Jana Sangh magazines and papers. Since 1964, Madhok has traveled outside India several times and has visited Europe, Israel, southeast Asia, Taiwan and the United States. We shall see him as president of the party for the 1967 elections.

Nana Deshmukh, in pre-Jana Sangh-days Upadhyaya's fellow organizing secretary of the RSS in Uttar Pradesh, has charge of the eastern zone. His core state is Uttar Pradesh and he is based in Lucknow. He is in charge of Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Manipur and Tripura. On matters of policy Deshmukh is frequently the party spokesman on the issues of border policy in the North East Frontier Agency with China and along the East Pakistan frontier. He takes the line that Pakistan is deliberately infiltrating Muslims from East Pakistan into Assam with the intent of converting that state into a Muslim majority state. This and other topics relating to the Eastern reaches have been the subject of resolutions in the party meetings many drafted by Deshmukh. He has a reputation for being a tough, competent party boss who brooks no nonsense. His iron hand has reportedly caused some ill feeling in Uttar Pradesh. He is one of the older members of the inner group, having been born in 1917 in Hyderabad State. He became a full time RSS worker in 1940 after graduating from Birla College in Pilani, Rajasthan.

The western zone, which incongruously extends from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal, was placed under the direction of Sunder Singh Bhandari of Rajasthan. His core states were Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh with the states of Gujarat and Orissa attached. His headquarters were in Jaipur, but after 1964 Bhandari moved to Delhi with a position which might be described as deputy general secretary. By that time Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh had well established Jana Sangh organizations; Gujarat was placed

under the center, and Orissa was operated as an extension of Madhya Pradesh. The work in Orissa did not commence until after the 1962 elections which saw the merger of the Ganatantra Parishad into the Swatantra Party. Bhandari, who is from Udaipur and who was an RSS worker in that area, was the first secretary of the Rajasthan Jana Sangh. He is now a member of the Rajya Sabha.

The attempts to extend the Jana Sangh into the south will be one of the topics of this chapter. The zonal secretary appointed in 1958 was Jagannathan Rao Joshi. He was born in Dharwar District, then a part of Bombay Presidency and now a part of the State of Mysore, on June 23, 1920. He received a degree from a college in Poona in 1942 and then enlisted in the army where he served until the end of the Second World War. After leaving the army he went into full time RSS work and joined the Jana Sangh as general secretary of the Karnatak (Mysore) unit in 1951. He was active in the Goa satyagraha in 1955, was captured by the Portuguese, and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In the partial amnesty following the satyagraha he was released. As zonal secretary with headquarters in Bangalore he was assigned Maharashtra, Mysore, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Madras. The former French enclaves, now grouped as Pondicherry and the now "liberated" Goa, also came under his jurisdiction. Joshi unsuccessfully ran for the Lok Sabha from Poona in 1962 and also unsuccessfully contested the Belgaum by-election for the Lok Sabha in April, 1963, but was elected from Bhopal in 1967.

In the states the Jana Sangh, almost without exception, has a full time worker as secretary. This secretary is also, almost without exception, some one drawn from the RSS. The secretary is the point of control in the party. Like the national president the state presidents are usually drawn from the older members and usually have no association with the RSS or have only an "alumni" relationship. While the secretary is often a bachelor whose whole life is devoted to the Jana Sangh, the presidents are more commonly family men whose business or professional occupations preclude their full time attention to the organization and the party. There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern but it holds in the majority of the cases. An additional official, the organizing secretary, was often assigned when one or more of three conditions existed: the secretary was not

an RSS trained person, the secretary was not a full time Jana Sangh worker, or the unit was in need of an extra hand to further development work. For example, Haripada Bharati, Secretary of the West Bengal unit, was a full time professor in Calcutta University; he, therefore, needed assistance in his secretarial work.

The Jana Sangh fully recognized that it was concentrated in the Hindi-speaking areas and even so was very weak in Bihar. It therefore set in motion a process through which it hoped to gain more adherents in the south and east. A unit was founded in Madras in August, 1958, under the presidency of V. K. John, a Syrian Christian advocate, who had been a fellow law student of Mookerjee in London.[10] John had been on the periphery of politics for a number of years and ran unsuccessfully as an independent for a seat in the legislative council in 1952. The election of a Christian as president was welcomed by the Jana Sangh as an indication of the party's acceptance of nationalist non-Hindus. However, John died suddenly in December of the same year. He was replaced by V. Rajagopalacharya, an aged Brahmin, in a state which had rejected Brahmins in leadership positions. The working committee of the Jana Sangh had had representatives from what was to become Andhra Pradesh and Mysore since the founding of the party. The first representatives from Madras, Rajagopalacharya, and Kerala, N. Narayana Menon, joined the working committee at the Bangalore session in 1959. Assam was not represented until the Vijayawada session in 1965 and Orissa not until the Jullundur session in 1966.

To assist in its advancement in the south and east the Jana Sangh consciously held its sessions or sessions of the Pratinidhi Sabha in those sections of the country. The 1959 general session was held in Bangalore. A meeting of the Pratinidhi Sabha was held in Hyderabad in 1960. Ghosh described his trip to Bangalore as a "pilgrimage to Dakshinapath" and his presidential address was full of references to the great past of South India. He said the reason for the meeting was two-fold. First, "the South should know more intimately the message of the Jana Sangh." Secondly, ". . . the South as such had many local problems of her own—problems

[10] *Organiser,* XII:1 (September 15, 1958).

peculiar to its position and its people . . . I thought accordingly that, in order that the Jana Sangh might develop a broad All-India outlook and might really claim to represent India as a whole, it must extend its activities to the South and feel its pulse and heart-beats . . ." [11] In a review of the session Upadhyaya wrote:

> . . . After the session when I had an occasion of meeting some of our delegates from Punjab . . . they confessed that while their visit to the South had made them less insistent on the pace of introduction of Hindi as the all-India official language, it has also helped them to overcome their nervousness at the reported wide-spread opposition to Hindi in the South. They could see that there was no antagonism to Hindi, but surely there were difficulties and apprehensions which needed to be sympathetically removed . . .[12]

The Jana Sangh position on Hindi is one of its major drawbacks to the south, although since the 1967 elections there are signs of some mellowing.

Although the Jana Sangh has been very much a men's organization the party has attempted to form women's groups to work with the formal organization. The first woman member of a legislature to be elected on the Jana Sangh ticket was Mrs. Shakuntala Nayar in Uttar Pradesh in 1962. The working committee first had a woman in its membership at the Ambala session in 1958, when Mrs. Hirabai Iyer of Lucknow was named to the committee. Mrs. Iyer had been a leading member of the Lucknow City Jana Sangh and an officer of the Uttar Pradesh Jana Sangh. At Bangalore in 1959 Mrs. Malati Paranjpe of Maharashtra replaced Mrs. Iyer. The 1960 list after the Nagpur session contained no woman member, but Mrs. Kamala Madhok, wife of Balraj Madhok, was named at Lucknow in 1961. Again the "woman's seat" remained vacant until 1966 when Madhok, as president, named Mrs. Sumati Bai Suklekar of Maharashtra.

The Jana Sangh, so far as the writer is aware, has never gone on record as opposing any of the pet projects of the women's organizations in India, except in so far as it opposed the Hindu Code Bills as a package for reasons other than the potential enhancement of the

[11] The full text of Ghosh's presidential address is contained in *ibid.*, XII:16 (January 5, 1959).

[12] *Ibid.*, XII:18 (January 19, 1959).

position of women in Hinduism. Yet its record of enrollment of women contrasts poorly with the other major parties of India. At the Ambala session a Mahila Sammelan became a regular part of the Jana Sangh session. Mrs. Paranjpe inaugurated the meeting over which Mrs. Madhok presided. According to the report Mrs. Madhok "exhorted the audience wrest the leadership of Indian womanhood from the hands of a few Westernized fashionable ladies." [13] In his report Upadhyaya noted that one-third of the party's membership in Maharashtra were women but "work has not been done in other provinces." He added: "Let us resolve that we shall not have any committee without a lady member on it." [14] The general secretary's resolve was broken many times, but the Mahila Sammelan was now a regular part of a Jana Sangh session.

In what might be called the Jana Sangh complex there were a number of organizations which were allied with the political party in policy and to some extent overlapping membership. Generally the roster of officers of the several organizations did not overlap. The most important of the allied groups was the RSS which we have discussed in detail in Chapter III. It was both a parent of the Jana Sangh and its close ally in electoral and extra-parliamentary activities. Some non-Jana Sanghis believe that Bachhraj Vyas is the link between the two organizations. Vyas, who presided over the Jana Sangh session at Vijayawada in 1965, resides in Nagpur and was secretary of the Nagpur city RSS in 1949. His close connection with RSS headquarters has led to the belief that he is a link, but this need not be so for there is an observably close relationship between RSS leaders and Jana Sangh leaders at all levels. Neither the RSS nor the Jana Sangh denies this. What they both deny is that either has policy direction and control over the other.

On the labor front the Jana Sangh is closely associated with the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS). The founder and general secretary of the BMS, Dattopant Bapurao Thengade, was elected a Jana Sangh member of the Rajya Sabha from Uttar Pradesh in 1964. Thengade was born in Wardha District, now in Maharashtra, on November 10, 1920. After graduation from the Law College in Nagpur he became an organiser for the RSS in Kerala, Bengal, and

[13] *Ibid.*, XI:31 (April 14, 1958).
[14] *Ibid.*

Assam from 1942 to 1948. He also served in another allied organization, the Vidyarthi Parishad (Student's Association) as president of the Nag-Vidarbha unit in 1949. He entered the labor movement as an organizing secretary for the Congress-sponsored Indian National Trade Unions Congress in 1950 and 1951. He worked for the Madhya Pradesh Jana Sangh from 1952 to 1954 and founded the BMS on July 23, 1955, at Ujjain.[15] The initial conference declared BMS to be the "labour front of the Jana Sangh" and repeated much of the then current Jana Sangh labor philosophy in its resolutions.[16] Thengade wrote a series of articles for *Organiser* which sought to explain the "Philosophy of B. M. S." but did so in such high flown Sanskritic phraseology that it is highly doubtful that any factory worker understood it. The BMS has continued but has achieved no notable gain in membership and is not recognized by the Government of India as one of the four national labor federations. Conservative political parties whose connections in the Urban areas are mainly with shopkeepers, small industrialists, and professional people are not good prospects as sponsors of labor fronts. Perhaps seeing this more clearly, the Swatantra Party stands alone among the major parties in that it does not sponsor a labor federation.

In—of all places—the Independence Day, 1962, issue of the PSP weekly *Janata* there appeared the following advertisement:

AKHIL BHARATIYA VIDYARTHI PARISHAD

The pro-Jana Sangh and pro-RSS elements among students organised the A.B.V.P. in 1953. This organisation has been active in Delhi, M. P., U. P., and several other states. It has sought to propagate the ideals of India culture and tried to make students conscious of the glory of India. It holds regular debates and seminars wherever possible. It fights against fee-rise and champions other causes appealing to students, but it also makes students conscious of their responsibilities. It also professes to emphasize the need to build national character and tries to help students in doing so.

The Vidyarthi Parishad has organised a number of rallies and demonstrations calling for resistance to Chinese aggression.[17]

[15] *Who's Who in the Rajya Sabha, 1964* (New Delhi, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 1964), pp. 307–8.

[16] *Organiser*, VIII:50 (August 1, 1955).

[17] *Janata*, August 15, 1962.

Except for an error in the year of founding, which should be 1948, this is a good self description of the work of the Vidyarthi Parishad. The historian of the RSS has noted that the Parishad is not officially a part of the RSS but it is run mainly by swayamsevaks and others sympathetic to the cause of the RSS.[18] We have already noted that both Vajpayee and Thengade have been in the Parishad. The Parishad has a suprising record of attracting nationally known leaders to address its meetings. The first reference to it in *Organiser* reports that R. R. Diwakar, then Minister of Information and Broadcasting, presided over a session and Thengade gave a vote of thanks.[19] For elections, demonstrations, marches, and similar endeavors the Jana Sangh can call upon the members of the Parishad. The Parishad has been successful to an unknown degree in countering the influence of the Communist-sponsored All-India Students Federation. As the Jana Sangh and its affiliates see the final struggle in India to be one between the Hindu forces and the communists, the party is trying hard to win the minds and allegiance of young men while they are in college. And the party can offer them political work and political advancement soon after they leave their studies. The youth of Jana Sangh delegates to national sessions is something which strikes any observer, particularly one who has seen the elderly gathering at meetings of the Congress.

There are a number of publications, mostly weeklies, which support Jana Sangh policies. *Organiser,* the English weekly published in Delhi, is the chief one. It was organized as an RSS mouthpiece and swung easily into the same role for the Jana Sangh. Since its resumption of publication on August 22, 1949, K. R. Malkani has been editor. A Sindhi RSS alumnus, Malkani has taken an editorial stance which is strongly pro-Hindu and anti-Pakistan. Malkani was awarded a Nieman Fellowship to study at Harvard University in 1961. During his absence Lalchand K. Advani was acting editor. Also a Sindhi, Advani was secretary of the Sind RSS and had been a joint secretary of the Rajasthan Jana Sangh

[18] J. A. Curran, Jr., *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics, a Study of the R.S.S.* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), pp. 36, 46. *See* also, Philip G. Altbach, "The Transformation of the Indian Student Movement," *Asian Survey,* VI:8 (August, 1966), pp. 448 ff, especially pp. 456–7. Altbach also incorrectly gives the date of the founding of the Parishad; he gives 1955.

[19] *Organiser,* IV:9 (October 9, 1950).

before moving to Delhi to join *Organiser*. He has held a number of offices in the Delhi State Jana Sangh and is now chairman of the Delhi Metropolitan Council. Among the directors of Bharat Prakashan, publishers of *Organiser*, are such stalwarts of the Jana Sangh and RSS as Hans Raj G. Gupta, Raja Yaduvendra Dutt Dubey of Jaunpur, Eknath Ranade and Vasant Krishna Oke. The inclusion of Oke who twice deserted the party strikes one as a bit odd.

The Jana Sangh receives the support of some papers other than *Organiser*. The most important of these is the Hindi weekly *Panchajanya* of Lucknow with which both Vajpayee and Deshmukh have been associated. It is also RSS controlled. Outside of the directly controlled press one Urdu daily in Delhi has often supported the Jana Sangh—*Pratap*. This paper was founded in Lahore by Mahashya Krishan, a staunch Arya Samajist, who gave encouragement to the Jana Sangh at its founding. After partition the paper printed editions in both Delhi and Jullundur, run by the founder's sons, Narendra and Virendra, respectively. Narendra in Delhi has taken up the Jana Sangh cause on most issues and was the chairman of the reception committee for the Jana Sangh Delhi session in 1956. Virendra was in the thick of the Hindi agitation in Punjab, has supported the anti-Kairon wing of the Congress in Punjab, and was a member of the Legislative Council. In 1962 Virendra ran for the Lok Sabha on the Congress ticket from Karnal against Jana Sanghi Swami Rameshwaranand, also an Arya Samajist. Karnal is in the circulation territory of the Delhi edition of *Pratap*. Narendra opposed his brother's candidacy; Virendra was narrowly defeated by the Swami.

Before leaving the subject of the development of the Jana Sangh organization during the second inter-election period we should take note of the sharp decline in disciplinary problems. Oke again went out his private revolving door, this time to stay away from the Jana Sangh and to join, at least temporarily, the Swatantra Party. In July, 1959, two Uttar Pradesh assembly members from Gonda District were expelled "on charges of gross indiscipline, conspiring against the party's district unit and failure to pay party dues."[20] Gonda had been a problem in the 1952–57 period as well. The

[20] *Ibid.*, XII:46 (August 3, 1959).

party also faced lack of discipline in Mirzapur District of Uttar Pradesh. In June, 1961, Thakur Madan Singh of Danta, president of the Rajasthan Jana Sangh, who had been elected a member of the assembly on the Ram Rajya Parishad ticket, resigned from the Jana Sangh. According to the resolution accepting his resignation Madan Singh objected to Muslim membership in the Jana Sangh.[21] On balance, however, there was a greater degree of loyalty in the party than in the earlier period.

Extra-Parliamentary Activities

In Chapter VI we looked at some of the issues which concerned the Jana Sangh enough so that it organized meetings and agitations by itself or with others. Most of these continued to evoke a Jana Sangh reaction in this period as well. We will defer discussion of some of these to the next section of this chapter. Here, however, it should be noted that cows were still being slaughtered and the Jana Sangh continued to press for legislation forbidding this. The Hindu Code Bills had been enacted but this did not lessen the outcry against them as iniquitous and communal.

Various local Jana Sangh units participated in agitation on a wide range of subjects, most often on strictly local issues, and frequently in collaboration with parties which otherwise would be anathema to the Jana Sangh. The major issue on which the Jana Sangh was active was the Punjab question. The Shiromani Akali Dal, led by Master Tara Singh, pressed its demand that a separate state be created for the Punjabi-speaking areas of Punjab. The Hindus, led by the Jana Sangh, the Arya Samaj, and the Hindu Mahasabha, countered with a demand for a unilingual state of Maha Punjab in which Hindi in the devanagiri script should be the only official language and Punjabi should be relegated to the status of a minority language. The States Reorganization Act provided for a Punjab which would have both Punjabi, in the Gurumukhi script, and Hindi as official languages. Within the legislature two committees were set up to represent each region. The Act also excluded the former hill states from Punjab, retaining Himachal Pradesh as a union territory and merging Bilaspur into it. Amusingly enough the

[21] *Ibid.*, XIV:46 (July 3. 1961).

battle between the two language groups was, as Nehru once remarked, largely fought in the Urdu press. *Pratap,* of which Virendra was editor, and *Milap,* another Jullundur Arya Samajist paper, were in the forefront of the press battle. The Akalis used *Prabhat* and *Qaumi Dard,* also Urdu dailies from Jullundur, as their principal mouthpieces.

We need not go into great detail on the Punjabi Suba question, a question which has now been decided against the Jana Sangh and the Arya Samaj by the agreement of the Government of India to divide the state into Punjabi Suba and Haryana. The party's working committee met in New Delhi on June 1, 1957, just after the Hindi Raksha Samiti had begun its agitation for the continued use of Hindi in education in the areas of the state in which Punjabi speakers formed the majority. The Jana Sangh saw the regional formula, under which the state was to be divided for language purposes into Punjabi- and Hindi-speaking zones, not only as a payoff to the Akalis for their electoral support to the Congress in the 1957 elections but as ". . . a policy of appeasement of communal and separatist forces, to which the Jana Sangh has always been opposed. It will lead to serious results about which no true nationalist can remain indifferent."[22] The same issue of *Organiser* published an article by a leading Arya Samajist, Dewan Alakh Dhari, which set forth the Samajist demands and, by inference, the demands of the Punjab Jana Sangh. The principal of the seven demands was explained by Alakh Dhari: "There should be one uniform language formula for the whole of Punjab . . . both the languages and both the scripts should be treated as legal tender and current coin throughout the State. There should be provision for instruction in both the scripts in all public schools of the State and every student should enjoy the freedom to any of the two languages or both of them . . ." The focal point of the problem and the center of the agitation was Jullundur division in which the Sikhs held a small majority over the Hindus. By reason of the Sikh (presumed to be Punjabi-speaking) majority the division had been included in the Punjabi zone to the annoyance of the largely urban Hindu population.

[22] *Ibid.,* X:40 (June 10, 1957).

The agitation continued until January, 1958, when the Punjab government and the agitators worked out a compromise. The government offered safeguards for the speakers of the minority language which, while short of the demands of the Hindi Raksha Samiti, were a reasonable compromise. It is notable that the future agitations for change came from the Sikhs and not from the Hindus. The Jana Sangh announced on January 3 that it was "in full agreement" with the suspension of the agitation.[23]

In the 1958 elections to the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) the Akali Dal led by Master Tara Singh was unexpectedly defeated. Tara Singh interpreted this as a rejection of his acceptance of something less than a Punjabi Suba which to him meant a Sikh State within or without the Indian Union.[24] Tara Singh maneuvered within the SGPC to cause a vote of no confidence in the president of the committee and to force new elections in 1960. In these he and his Akalis won an overwhelming victory of 136 seats out of 140. This he interpreted as a mandate for renewed agitation for Punjabi Suba. He had already renounced the Akali-Congress electoral pact. The agitation was launched and before it was completed both Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh, then his principal lieutenant, had gone on fasts unto death. Each fast ended with some minor concession by the Government of India though Tara Singh was required to do penance for breaking his pledge to have Punjabi Suba or die. A later upshot of his failure to keep his pledge was a split in the Akali Dal with the Sant Fateh Singh faction gaining the majority of the Akalis and control of the SGPC. The split came after the 1962 elections in which the Akalis won three Lok Sabha seats and 19 assembly seats.

Throughout this Sikh activity the Jana Sangh opposed the Akalis, but this opposition was largely in the form of resolutions and speeches. Some agitational activity occurred but this was usually short-lived. In July, 1958, Yagya Dutt Sharma was arrested in Jullundur, and released shortly thereafter. The Jana Sangh continued to oppose the concept of the regional committees although its assembly members attended the meetings of the committees. It

[23] *Ibid.*, XI:18 (January 13, 1958).

[24] Donald E. Smith, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 446.

still pressed for the formation of a Maha-Punjab which would include Himachal Pradesh and indeed it set up its Punjab unit on a Maha-Punjab basis. However, the *status quo* was much more acceptable than the only practical alternative which would be Punjabi Suba. We shall return to the Punjab demand in Chapter X.

Shortly after the withdrawal of the 1957–58 agitation Madhok, himself an Arya Samajist though not of fanatic views, had appealed to his fellow Samajists to reject the Congress and join the Jana Sangh. Asking the question, "Can a true Arya Samajist be a Congressman at the same time?", he answered, "Either they are untrue to the Congress or they are deceiving the Arya Samaj." He concluded: "The sooner Arya Samaj decides to get out of the stranglehold of the Congress and join the national parties spearheaded by the Jana Sangh . . . the sooner will come the day of fulfillment of the ideals for which Rishi Dayanand created the Arya Samaj."[25] It is worth noting again that the backbone of the Jana Sangh in Punjab is the Arya Samaj. Although it is impossible to say what proportion of Arya Samajists support Jana Sangh, it is reasonable to say that the overwhelming proportion of the Jana Sanghis are Arya Samajists, including almost the entire leadership of the state unit.

Policy Development

As a nationalist party the Jana Sangh naturally developed an almost isolationist foreign policy while, as a party both devoted to *Bharatiya Sanskriti* and calling for the development of India, it faced a paradox. To hark back solely to the Sanskritic past would be obscurantism of the same variety as that of the Ram Rajya Parishad; to look to a secular and largely Westernized modernity would seemingly result in a sharp break with tradition. There were and are supporters of both policies in the Jana Sangh but in the second interelection period the party began to develop policies, which compromised the extremes.

To look first at foreign policy, we find that Pakistan continued to occupy first place in the thoughts of the Jana Sangh although the incursions of the Communist Chinese in Ladakh led some in the

[25] *Organiser,* XI:35 (May 12, 1958).

party to place the dangers from China ahead of the dangers from Pakistan.[26] The very existence of Pakistan did violence to a basic tenet of the Jana Sangh, the unalterable unity of Bharat Mata as expressed in Akhand Bharat. The claims made by China on territory claimed by India similarly posed the threat of further erosion of the sacred soil. As these claims matured into actual occupation of territory in Ladakh, China assumed a place along side Pakistan as an enemy of India.

During the period covered by this chapter two major agreements were reached by the Nehru government with Pakistan and the Jana Sangh opposed both. In October, 1958, Nehru and Malik Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Prime Minister of Pakistan, met in Delhi and concluded what is now known as the Nehru-Noon agreement.[27] On October 11 the working committee met and passed a resolution against the agreement and also proclaimed November 2 a day of protest. The agreement related primarily to East Pakistan and its border with India. Among other items it provided for the division of the Berubari Union between the two countries in an effort to straighten out the badly drawn border. At this writing the issue still has not been settled, much to the dismay of Pakistan, as several court cases have been filed alleging the agreement to be in violation of the Indian constitution.

Before the working committee could meet to express its disapproval of the Nehru-Noon agreement Noon himself was out of office. On October 7 Pakistan President Iskandar Mirza proclaimed martial law, dismissed Noon, and appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as martial law administrator.[28] The same working committee which condemned the Nehru-Noon agreement condemned the military coup: "democracies all over the world should take serious note." The party expressed its fear that the new military

[26] Whether either or both dangers are real or are imagined is a question beyond the scope of this work. The Jana Sangh has always considered the danger from Pakistan real and by the time under discussion here it also considered the danger from China to be great.

[27] *See* Firoz Khan Noon, *From Memory* (Lahore, Ferozsons, 1966), pp. 284 ff. Noon writes that he felt the agreement was the first of a series which could have led to an agreement on Kashmir had he (Noon) not been thrust from office. p. 287.

[28] On October 27, Ayub in turn pushed Mirza out and assumed the presidency.

regime would be strongly antagonistic toward India and thought that it would use its American arms to attack in Kashmir.[29]

The second major agreement came on September 19, 1960, when Ayub and Nehru signed the Indus Waters Agreement in Karachi. The agreement came after years of patient, and often frustrating, negotiations under the sponsorship of the World Bank. All of the six rivers under the agreement rise or flow through India —at least, India as defined by the Jana Sangh, i.e., including Jammu and Kashmir. To the horror of the party Indian rights to the waters of the three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, were signed away and India was committed to pay a substantial amount into a fund for the diversion of the western rivers into the canal system in Pakistan originally fed by waters of the three eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. This, said the Jana Sangh, was too much.[30] However, unlike the Berubari Union question the Canal Waters agreement has not suffered continued attack from the Jana Sangh, except for the fuss in November, 1967, when Mrs. Gandhi congratulated Ayub on the completion of Mangla Dam.

In addition to these new issues concerning Pakistan, the Jana Sangh continued to register its protest against the alleged mistreatment of Hindus in East Pakistan with the same vigor it had shown when Mookerjee was alive and leading the party. The Jana Sangh also saw a Pakistani plot aimed at turning Assam into a Muslim majority state through "infiltration" of Muslims from East Pakistan into the state. Nana Deshmukh adopted this issue as his own in the inner circles of the party. Pakistan was also accused, with perhaps some justification, of aiding and abetting the insurrectionists in Nagaland who owed allegiance to A. Z. Phizo. When Phizo took a route through Pakistan to England the Jana Sangh saw this as evidence of the correctness of its view.

The prime continuing issue with Pakistan was, of course, Kashmir. Here the Jana Sangh adhered to the stand it developed after the death of Mookerjee. No longer was any talk heard of dividing the state nor even of a plebiscite. The party took its stand on the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir into India through the abrogation of the special constitutional provisions pertaining to the state,

[29] *Organiser,* XII:6 (October 20, 1958).
[30] *See* the party's resolution contained ibid., XIV:22 (January 9, 1961).

and it demanded the "vacation of the aggression" of Pakistan in the areas once forming part of the state. This was the public stand but one is led to believe that few, if any, Jana Sanghis really thought the frozen wastes of Gilgit and Baltistan and the less than desirable lands of Azad Kashmir were worth the war which would be necessary to regain them for an Indian Jammu and Kashmir. Yet it was not until after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 that a Jana Sangh leader openly expressed the opinion that a partition of the state was the "only feasible and practical solution of the problem" of Kashmir.[31] In his book Madhok gave some details of a proposed partition which, in his view, would give Pakistan more than it then held on its side of the cease fire line. Madhok wrote:

> . . . by willingly accepting the Colombo Proposals, which leave the fruits of aggression in Ladakh in the Chinese hands, the Government of India was virtually abandoned even the moral right to reclaim Pakistan's fruits of aggression from her. Pakistan cannot be blamed if she thinks them to belong to her as a matter of right.
>
> It is, therefore, being taken for granted that the partition line to be acceptable to Pakistan now has to be more favourable to her than the existing Cease Fire Line. . . .[32]

Madhok left no doubt that he felt a settlement along the lines he proposed was necessitated by an American and British desire to see India and Pakistan join in defending the sub-continent against the Chinese threat. But his acceptance of the need and even more his suggestion of a partition less favorable to India than the cease-fire line—albeit short of Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite—was a step far beyond any previous Jana Sangh proposal. Since Madhok wrote much has happened including the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 which hardened the attitude of most Indians on the Kashmir issue. Nonetheless, Madhok's presidential address at Jullundur in April, 1966, and the resolutions passed at the Jullundur session contain no specific demand that Pakistan yield the areas on her side of the cease fire line. It, therefore, seems possible that the experiences of August and September, 1965, have convinced even the Jana Sangh that recapturing the areas of the state occupied by Pakistan is to all intents and purposes impracticable.

[31] Balraj Madhok, *Kashmir, Centre of New Alignments* (New Delhi, Deepak Prakashan, 1963), p. 157.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

China, however, achieved a place equal to Pakistan in the Jana Sangh chamber of horrors. In Chapter VI we noted that the Jana Sangh was prepared to look upon China as an Asian brother who was also trying to develop its economy and improve the living standards of its people. The Jana Sangh did not approve of the communistic method being tried by the Chinese. At the same time, the party expressed its concern about actions by the Chinese that it saw as expansionist. The Chinese takeover of Tibet was specifically condemned by the Jana Sangh. By the time of the 1957 elections the party was basically hostile to China.

In the inter-election period this feeling grew rapidly. Public knowledge that China had occupied areas in Ladakh claimed by India sealed the hostility of the party to China. On March 30, 1959, the Jana Sangh demonstrated in front of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, the first of a number of such demonstrations. The party accused Nehru of taking an equivocal stand on the issue. Upadhyaya stated the policy of the Jana Sangh:

> . . . If our betrayal of the Tibetan people's cause and justification of uncalled for aggression by Communist China be the price for Sino-Indian friendship, it is not worth that sacrifice . . . An atmosphere conducive to mutual trust and goodwill can hardly exist when the Chinese army is concentrated on our borders, especially when China has already created serious suspicions in our minds, due to mischievous cartography . . . Those who demand a submissive attitude by India, stand not for respectable relations between two equals but the ultimate enslavement of India by the Communist world . . .[33]

Some in the Congress and elsewhere held views close to those of the Jana Sangh. Dr. Raghu Vira, then a Congress member of the Rajya Sabha and a noted orientalist, edited a booklet which concluded with a denunciation of the Chinese activity.[34] Raghu Vira eventually broke with the Congress and joined the Jana Sangh.

The first Jana Sangh session, which took specific note of

[33] *Organiser*, XII:36 (May 25, 1959).

[34] Raghu Vira, *Tibet, a Souvenir* (Preparatory Bureau, Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet and Against Colonialism in Asia and Africa, April, 1960). The chairman of the Preparatory Bureau was Jayaprakash Narayan; the treasurer, Hans Raj Gupta, RSS *sanghachalak* of the northern zone. Among the members were M. R. Masani, Asoka Mehta and the editor of the *Indian Express*, Frank Moraes. There were no Congressmen (except Raghu Vira) included. Among the active political workers the Praja Socialist Party and the Swatantra Party dominated.

Chinese occupation of India-claimed territory, was that at Nagpur in January, 1960. In his presidential address Pitamber Das said the government "has failed completely to discharge its responsibilities." He added "for a long time it kept the people and Parliament entirely ignorant of the fact of aggression." [35] The resolution passed at the session said, "Communist China has created a crisis by posing a challenge to the freedom of the countries of South and South East Asia." The party saw the "lull created in Europe" by the Soviet Union as "being utilized by China" and saw this as evidence of a joint world communist plan: "Russia has never condemned the Chinese efforts to disturb peace and create an atmosphere of war." In discussing India's problem with China the party saw China using both military means and "fifth-column" methods to subject "Vietnam, Indonesia, and Laos" as well as India and said the Chinese must be faced jointly on all fronts. Beside calling for the military expulsion of the Chinese the party asked: (1) the recognition of Tibetan independence; (2) the withdrawal of Indian support for China's admission to the United Nations; (3) a close watch on "pro-Chinese elements" in India; and (4) increase in India's military capacity. While these demands have changed in detail or have been more strongly emphasized they remain the basic posture of the Jana Sangh toward Communist China. The visit of Chou En-Lai to Delhi in April, 1960, gave the Jana Sangh an opportunity to address a memorandum to Nehru as to the evil designs of the Chinese on India.

With the party's opposition to China went its strong denunciation of Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon of whom Upadhyaya wrote: "There is not merely a suspicion but a firm belief in the minds of most diplomats at the U.N. that he has communist leanings." The general secretary went on to say; "At a time when our northern borders are seriously threatened by Communist China, Sri Krishna Menon's silence has confirmed the people's belief in his leanings." [36] Menon's stand on Pakistan, however, was occasionally appreciated when, for instance, the delegate to the United Nations set a record for marathon speechifying.

The Jana Sangh view of the United States can be characterized

[35] *Organiser*, XIII:24 (February 1, 1960).
[36] *Ibid.*, XIII:1 (August 24, 1959).

both as generally favorable and as dependent upon American actions with regard to Pakistan. The bilateral agreement for supply of arms by the United States to Pakistan aroused sharp criticism which has continued with little abatement. When Pakistan did not come directly to India's assistance in the fall of 1962 this was taken as "proof" that the arms were not accepted by Pakistan to resist international communism but to use against India and, of course, when August and September, 1965, saw conflict between India and Pakistan, the Jana Sangh again had "proof" of the evil intentions of a Pakistan emboldened by American arms.[37] Nonetheless, the Jana Sangh continued to hold that the "oldest and largest" democracies in the world must pull together. Madhok in his Jullundur presidential address again expressed this view: "mutual interests of India and U.S.A., apart from their common attachment to the democratic way of life, point to closer relations between them in the days to come." [38] In the early days of the party none of the top leadership had visited the United States, but this was changed when Vajpayee was given a Leader Grant under the Education Exchange Program to observe the 1960 American presidential elections. Malkani visited the United States as a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University and, after the 1962 Indian general elections both Upadhyaya and Madhok toured the United States privately.

The Jana Sangh did not share Nehru's enthusiasm for wide participation in world affairs. The party said it stood not only for nonalignment but also for non-involvement in matters which were not directly India's concern. Thus the writer once heard Vajpayee at the Bhopal session in 1963 call for the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Congo both because the Congo was "none of India's affair" and because the troops were needed more urgently at home to defend against China. Within Asia, however, the Jana Sangh takes a more active interest. It sees Israel, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines as democratic nations with whom India should have the closest of relations. The last three, together with Taiwan and South Korea, are nations viewed as potential allies against an

[37] Having been stationed in Lahore in September, 1965, the writer heard, of course, the opposing arguments from Pakistanis about the arms assistance given to India following the Sino-Indian conflict.

[38] "Presidential Address by Prof. Balraj Madhok," pamphlet issued by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh Central Office (Delhi, 1966), p. 21.

expansionist China. A Jana Sangh supporter who is an alumnus of the RSS and a close associate of Madhok, Ram Swarup Sabharwal, acts in New Delhi both as a publicist for Israel and as a resident agent of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League. At functions arranged by Sabharwal, in either of his two capacities, the gathering invariably includes a number of Jana Sanghis and RSS members. A number of Jana Sanghis have visited Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam as have several members of the Swatantra Party, PSP, and, more recently, a few Congressmen. Sabharwal often arranges the financing for these trips. The Jana Sangh is the only party in India, with the exception of some Swatantra leaders, which gives a measure of support to the American actions in Vietnam. Its stand on Israel is to some extent a reaction against the Muslim neighbors and enemies of Israel and probably not insignificantly due to Sabharwal's publicity. On the other hand the party looks askance at Pakistan's allies in CENTO and Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), Turkey and Iran. The question of overseas Indians pervades the Jana Sangh view toward both Burma and Ceylon. Toward Nepal the Jana Sangh takes a step-fatherly stance which is not much appreciated by the Nepalese. Seeing Afghanistan as a potential enemy of Pakistan, the party gives lip service to a separate Pukhtoonistan, but cannot forget that the Khyber, if not the Hindu Kush, was once the boundary of the Hindu empire.

Domestically, the Jana Sangh continued to be charged with communalism. It was further charged with being implicated, along with the RSS, in several communal riots, most notably in Raipur and Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh. In Raipur, August 26, 1957, the Gass Memorial Center, a YMCA-type institution operated by the American Evangelical Mission, was burned and rioting ensued.[39] The Jana Sangh was accused, along with the RSS and the Arya Samaj, of stirring up the trouble. The party felt that the inquiry into the incident cleared it of blame while the operators of the Center felt the blame had not been placed where it should.[40]

One of the most serious communal disturbances since independence occurred in February, 1961, in Jabalpur and elsewhere

[39] *See* Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 437–8, for a summary of the incident.
[40] *Ibid.*, and *Organiser*, XI:21 (February 3, 1958).

in Madhya Pradesh. According to the Hindus the riots resulted from the rape of a Hindu girl by two Muslim boys; the Muslims deny this. Before the rioting was over 55 persons had been killed and the deep distrust between Hindus and Muslims reinforced. Again the Jana Sangh, the RSS, and other Hindu groups, including some individuals in the Congress, were accused of causing, abetting, or leading the riots against Muslims. There is no evidence so far produced that the Jana Sangh or the RSS *as organizations* have been instrumental in communal incidents, notwithstanding some cases where rioting has been proven against members of each organization. The Jana Sangh and the RSS are convenient whipping boys for the ruling party which is, at least officially, pledged to secularism.

The aftermath of Jabalpur produced a Muslim Convention in Delhi at which a number of leading Congressmen and Muslim divines and politicians joined in condemning "Hindu communalism," particularly that communalism they saw in the Jana Sangh. A group of Hindus, principally members of the Hindu Mahasabha, called a Hindu Convention in October, 1961, and replied in kind to the Muslims. Within the Congress a movement was started to ban communal parties. This clearly meant Hindu parties for the Congress had, for tactical reasons, found it possible to ally itself with the Sikh Akali Dal in Punjab in 1957 and with the Muslim League in Kerala in 1960.

The Congress Party in Parliament appointed a committee headed by Ajit Prasad Jain to consider means to ban communal parties.[41] The committee in its report harked back to the partition of the country and the assassination of Gandhi as results of early communalism, but maintained that communalism "must primarily be fought on the political level through mass propaganda and mass contact." [42] Overriding the objection of two members [43] the committee called for legislation to ban communal parties. The committee decided the use of a denominational name could not be the only

[41] The "Jain Committee" report was published in pamphlet form by the Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee (New Delhi, no date).

[42] "Jain Committee" report, p. 7.

[43] The two members were Mahavir Tyagi, a Hindu, and Ali Mohammad Tariq, a Muslim from Kashmir. Both men felt a legislative ban on certain parties would be a negation of democracy and a "stifling of the opposition." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

basis for banning a party since the Jana Sangh was a party "which bears an innocuous name but whose activities are far more vicious and harmful than those of some parties bearing communal names." [44] The recommendations of the committee have not been put into legislation and are unlikely to be enacted into law in the near future, but the demand for legislation is pressed frequently by the left wing of the Congress and by others who proclaim their support of secularism.

Before turning to the prelude to the 1962 elections we should note one aspect of domestic policy which drew much attention from the Jana Sangh. This was the area of agriculture and particularly of cooperative farming. While the Jana Sangh did not oppose in principle the Congress program of land reform and land ceilings, it came out strongly in opposition to collectivization of holdings as proposed by the Congress at Nagpur.[45] In this it found common ground with the Swatantra Party. Jana Sangh policy on agriculture was stated most clearly in October, 1959, in a thirteen point program.[46] Among the points were; equal application of the land ceilings in all states, special efforts to bring waste land under cultivation; ownership of land by the cultivator who would pay compensation based on ten times the annual rent to the dispossessed landlords; a "crash program" on tubewells; increased use of cow dung as manure and less dependence on "dangerous" chemical fertilizers; the establishment of a price parity system for farm produce similar to the Wallace program in the United States; the setting aside in each village of a common grazing area; and the encouragement of cooperative societies for such matters as credit, seed development, and marketing—this to be done with a minimum of government interference. This program can hardly be considered reactionary and is in many ways quite progressive.

Swatantra Party; Raghu Vira

During the inter-election period between 1957 and 1962 there were signs that the Jana Sangh was moving—perhaps slowly—toward the position of a moderate conservative party. It was still

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[45] Upadhyaya's statement, *Organiser*, XII:19 (January 26, 1959).
[46] *Ibid.*, XIII:7 (October 5, 1959).

basically Hindu, but this, after all, was the religion of 85 per cent of India. Its handicaps seem to have been not so much its communalistic bias but its essentially north Indian character. Positions taken on the language question hindered very much the possibility of growth into the non-Hindi-speaking areas. The rigid disciplinary system and its root in the RSS repelled many conservative political thinkers who were brought up in the more relaxed discipline of the Congress. These appear to be some of the factors which led the conservatives to avoid joining the Jana Sangh and to consider the establishment of a new all-India non-communal, non-linguistic, loosely disciplined political party.[47]

This new party was the Swatantra Party, founded formally in Bombay in August, 1959, under the leadership of Chakravarty Rajagopalachari, a former governor general, once home minister of India and twice chief minister of Madras. Rajagopalachari had believed for some time that a conservative party was needed. *Organiser* published the text of the speech in Madras on August 14, 1957, in which the elder statesman called for a strong rightist opposition party to counter the "centrist" policies of the Congress. In the speech Rajagopalachari stressed what in America would be called states' rights.[48] As time passed Rajagopalachari gained the support of such veteran politicians as K. M. Munshi, former central agriculture minister; Professor N. G. Ranga, several times a Congressman and leader in 1952 of the Krishikar Lok Party; N. C. Chatterjee, the former Hindu Mahasabha president; and Minoo Masani, onetime Congress Socialist now turned conservative. By the time of the 1962 elections the party had gathered a mixed group comprised largely of conservative Congressmen, including a few who nostalgically followed Gandhi and Patel.[49] Added to these were adherents of some regional parties among which were the Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa and the Janata Party in Bihar. A number of the members of the princely and landlord order, of

[47] This is not intended to be a comprehensive statement on the founding of the Swatantra Party, but is intended to contrast the two parties. *See* on Swatantra and conservative politics in general two articles by Howard L. Erdman: "Conservative Politics in India," *Asian Survey*, VI:6 (June, 1966), pp. 338–47, and "India's Swatantra Party," *Pacific Affairs*, XXVI:4 (Winter 1963–64), pp. 394–410.

[48] *Organiser*, XI:1 (August 26, 1957).

[49] Including Patel's son, Dahyabhai V. Patel, who has been a Swatantra member of the Rajya Sabha since the beginning of the party.

which the Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur was the most celebrated, also supported the party together with a few industrialists, retired civil servants, and medium land holders. The overlapping of membership targets with the Jana Sangh was almost exclusively among the conservative gentry and only in the northern part of the country.

We are concerned here with the reaction of the Jana Sangh to a new party which could be considered as much its rival as the rival of the Congress. Following the preliminary meeting held in Madras on June 4, 1959, at which the decision to launch the Swatantra Party was taken, *Organiser* editorially "welcomed" the new party but queried whether it would add to or detract from the work of the Jana Sangh and of conservative politics in general. The paper also saw a weakness in the new party's lack of workers and surfeit of name politicians.[50] Herein perhaps is the beginning of a position taken by some in both parties, namely that the merger of the Jana Sangh with its dedicated and disciplined organization and the Swatantra with its noted leaders and possibly better finances would be advantageous to both parties.

Balraj Madhok, writing just before the Madras and Bombay meetings but with knowledge of Rajagopalachari's plans, took a critical view of the new party. His comments are worth quoting in some detail:

> In the South, Shri C. Rajagopalachari has been advocating for some time the formation of a new conservative party which may act as a brake on the Congress party and work for preserving and conserving what is good in the traditional Indian way of life . . . The economic programme of the proposed middle-of-the-road party of Mr. Masani and the role visualised for the "brake" party of his conception by C. R., however, do not seem to be much different from . . . the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. As such ideologically there is little scope or need for the creating of any such new party except that it will provide a new platform to the intellectual and economic aristocracy which is finding itself out of tune with the new rhyme of the ruling party but considers it below its dignity to join the ranks of the Jana Sangh . . .
>
> The one good that such a party can and may do is to create a better understanding and appreciation for the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which has already made its mark as a forward-looking and open-minded conserva-

[50] *Organiser*, XII:39 (June 15, 1959).

tive party of India. The Jana Sangh circles, therefore, are indifferent about the formation of such a party though they would like all those who sincerely feel the need for it to study Bharatiya Jana Sangh more closely and objectively before plumping for a new party.[51]

Madhok also questioned whether the "essentially religious" Rajagopalachari and the "Western materialist" Masani would be able to work together. There is in Madhok's view not a little of hurt feeling that his party should be looked upon as unworthy of the "aristocracy," but Madhok himself has been among the Jana Sanghis who favor closer cooperation between the two parties. He has found it easier to work with the sophisticated Masani than the wily old Brahmin from Madras. To consult with Rajagopalachari the Jana Sangh used a new member, Dr. Raghu Vira.

Raghu Vira was a scholar turned politician. He was born in Rawalpindi in 1902 and was educated in Lahore, London, and Utrecht.[52] He received a doctorate in Indic studies and in 1934 founded the International Academy of Indian Culture in Lahore. Just prior to partition the Academy shifted to Nagpur and later was set up in New Delhi where it continues under the direction of Raghu Vira's son, Lokesh Chandra. Raghu Vira's first political office came when he was elected in 1949 to the Constituent Assembly from Madhya Pradesh. He continued to serve in New Delhi as a member of the Rajya Sabha, having been elected in 1952 (for a four-year term) and in 1956 (for the regular six-year term). Raghu Vira found himself usually in the conservative wing of the Congress Party and generally took the "Hindu" side of such issues as national language, the Hindu code bill, and cow slaughter.[53] He did not figure prominently in party organizational matters and held no party offices.

Raghu Vira differed sharply with Nehru and Krishna Menon on India's China policy. He had visited China in the early days of "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai" on scholarly missions connected with his

[51] Balraj Madhok, *Political Trends in India* (Delhi, S. Chand, 1959), pp. 142–4.

[52] Biographical information from *Who's Who in the Rajya Sabha, 1958* (New Delhi, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 1958), pp. 209–12.

[53] His first article in *Organiser* was entitled "Hindi as the Lingua Franca of Hindustan," I:20 (November 13, 1947). He was a frequent contributor on linguistic and, later, on Sino-Indian matters.

study of Mongol and Tibetan texts relating to Buddhism and Hinduism. He found the Chinese cooperative in permitting him to use manuscripts. However, the takeover of Tibet by the Chinese Communist regime and the news filtering in from the Chinese occupation in Ladakh (which India considered hers) soured Raghu Vira. As we have noted above he wrote a booklet on Tibet which sharply criticized the Chinese. For reasons not entirely clear even after a talk with Raghu Vira, the breaking point with the Congress came in December, 1961. Raghu Vira delivered a speech highly critical of Menon and, by extension, of Nehru. He was called upon by the Congress leadership to explain his action. Rather than do so he submitted his resignation from the party. At the time of the resignation it seems clear he did not intend to join another political party. However, within a short time he joined the Jana Sangh on December 24. The adherence of a well known Congressman was a major event for the Jana Sangh.

We have now considered the activities of the party in the second inter-election period and have seen the steps taken in the parliamentary and organizational spheres as well as the development of policy and the challenge from the Swatantra Party. We can now move on to a consideration of the third electoral test.

CHAPTER IX

Facing the Electorate (III)—1962

The opposition went into the 1962 elections with hopes of unseating the Congress Party at the center and in the states. These hopes were, without exception, doomed to failure. However, the elections saw a slight decline of the leftist national opposition to the Congress in that the Praja Socialist Party lost ground while the Communist Party of India and the Socialist Party (of Ram Manohar Lohia) barely held their ground. The Congress itself won ten fewer seats in Parliament and a reduced proportion of the votes polled. The major gainers were the parties of the right, the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra Party. The Jana Sangh picked up ten seats in Parliament to match the Congress loss while the new Swatantra Party won 22 seats in its first election as a single party. Polling was held for assemblies in each of the states except Kerala and Orissa in which off-year elections had been held in 1960 and 1961 respectively.[1]

Status of the Organization

The Jana Sangh had used the inter-election period to good advantage in strengthening the organization of the party. The lines of authority from the top down and the lines of communication from the local units up had been made clear and active. While the party gave the appearance of being almost monolithic the meetings of the Pratinidhi Sabha and the general sessions were forums of

[1] Again the Jana Sangh did not contest in Orissa, but it made an appearance in Kerala in the 1960 mid-term elections and for the Lok Sabha in the 1962 elections. *See* appendices II and III.

active debate. It can be assumed that the private meetings of the working committee also faced differences of opinion which had to be resolved before a motion could be brought before the larger bodies of the party. The writer's experience in attending political meetings is that the Jana Sangh operates somewhere between the near anarchy of the PSP and the "no amendments accepted" procedure which had been typical of the Congress. The fact that a young saffron-capped Jana Sanghi could stand on his feet and suggest changes in the manifesto or in a resolution and not be rebuffed by some bigwig of the party led to greater acceptance of the finished resolution or manifesto by the rank and file. Thus factional and programmatic disputes rarely occurred in the Jana Sangh. However, once policy was decided the membership was expected to adhere strictly to the line.

The record of Jana Sangh legislators seems on balance to have helped the public image of the party. There were some incidents of disruption of assemblies but these incidents decreased as time went on and knowledge and appreciation of parliamentary procedure increased. It must be remembered that only two of the Jana Sangh legislators had held seats in 1952–1957: Bhairon Singh and Vimal Chordia, the leaders of the assembly parties respectively in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. The largest group, in Uttar Pradesh, contained no one with legislative experience, nor did the Punjab or Lok Sabha groups. The principal legislators in the states became well known through press reports of their work and through increased travel programs. In the Lok Sabha the voices of Vajpayee and Madhok were heard frequently.

In selecting candidates for the 1962 elections the Jana Sangh had a much higher re-nomination rate than it had shown in 1957 as compared with 1952. There had been no major split in the party as had happened when Sharma left after Mookerjee's death. Disciplinary problems among legislators were minimal with only minor cases in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Rajasthan. The Jana Sangh nominated primarily from among persons experienced in the organization but there were some notable exceptions. Dr. Raghu Vira, who had so recently joined the party, was selected to contest the Banaras (Varanasi) Lok Sabha seat against senior Congressman Thakur Raghunath Singh, whose views sometimes sounded

like those of the Jana Sangh. Former Punjab minister, Chaudhury Lehri Singh, was selected to contest the Rohtak Lok Sabha seat; Lehri Singh had left the Congress in opposition to Pratap Singh Kairon and in favor of a separate Haryana State.[2] From the ranks of Arya Samajist swamis the party chose Swami Rameshwaranand to contest from Karnal for the Lok Sabha. These, however, were exceptions and do not vitiate the policy of the party.[3]

With but few exceptions the Jana Sanghis elected to legislatures in 1957 and remaining with the party were renominated in 1962. Of the eight members of Parliament, seven, including the sole Rajya Sabha member, were nominated for Lok Sabha seats and, as we shall see, only the Rajya Sabha member was successful. The member not renominated, Harish Chandra Sharma, yielded his seat to Swatantra's Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur whom the Jana Sangh did not oppose. Thirty of the 46 members of legislative assemblies elected in 1957 were renominated, i.e., 65 per cent. At least nine of those not renominated were dropped for disciplinary reasons, while another, Vimalkumar Chordia of Madhya Pradesh was placed in charge of elections and was later elected to the Rajya Sabha. Of the 30 renominated 16 retained their seats: 5 of 7 in Madhya Pradesh; 3 of 4 in Punjab; 2 of 4 in Rajasthan; 6 of 12 in Uttar Pradesh; and none of 3 in Maharashtra. In addition to the renomination of the sitting members, a much larger number of candidates who lost in 1957 were given another opportunity in 1962 than was true in 1957 over 1952. Not a few successful Jana Sanghis in 1962 had had previous electoral experience and some won their seats on the third try. The Jana Sangh was thereby building up a core of experienced campaigners, yet it was also not unwilling to drop a 1957 candidate when he did very poorly or, more importantly, when he failed to nurse his constituency in the inter-election period. The tradition of RSS discipline led candidates who were asked to stand down to accept the decision with very little public complaint.

Although the party organization itself was now quite strong and

[2] With Kairon gone and Haryana won, Lehri Singh departed from the Jana Sangh to rejoin the Congress. *Statesman* (Delhi edition), March 15, 1966.

[3] Dindayal Upadhyaya, "The Jana Sangh and the General Elections," S. L. Poplai, ed., *1962 General Elections in India* (Bombay Allied Publications, 1962), pp. 52–53.

well developed, the support of the RSS continued to be a major factor. In Madhok's campaign, for example, in New Delhi the volunteers working for him were often members of the RSS. So far as can be determined financing again came mainly from the middle classes. Certain larger contributors, such as Hans Raj Gupta and Amrit Lal Jindal of Delhi, aided the party and individual candidates. Jindal ran for the Chandni Chowk Lok Sabha seat himself.

Manifesto

The manifesto adopted by the party at the Banaras session of the Pratinidhi Sabha in November, 1961, contained little that was different from the program of the Jana Sangh in the 1957 election. It was drafted by a committee comprised of Upadhyaya, Vajpayee, and Madhok.[4] A few changes in the draft were made at the Banaras session. The present writer, who attended the session as an observer, sat much of the time with Jindal who forcefully presented an amendment against the BCG vaccination for tuberculosis; it was rejected.

The first segment of the substantive proposals of the party pertained to national defense and it placed defense against Pakistan and against China on an equal footing.[5] Specific measures were suggested to augment military strength and in general national unity was stressed as the basis of national defense. Bharatiya culture was to be the matrix for the unity of India. The party saw Kashmir as the point at which India was threatened by both China and Pakistan and said, prophetically, "any attack on Kashmir [is] an attack on India."

In domestic matters the party reaffirmed its opposition to the Preventive Detention Act. It also repeated its demand for the elimination of the legislative councils, although it had members in the councils in Andhra Pradesh and Mysore without having members in the directly elected assemblies and in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Maharashtra. Again the unitary form of government was proposed, at least in theory, with democratic decentralization to the district level. Hindi should be the national language and the language of

[4] *Organiser*, XV:5 (September 18, 1961).

[5] *See* the English version of the Manifesto printed by the Central Office of the Jana Sangh.

communication between the states; the regional languages should be used within the states. An Indian system of education should be developed which would accept much of the *gurukul* methods and reject much of the Western.

Economics received more attention than in earlier Jana Sangh manifestos. The policies proposed agreed in most respects with the policies of the Swatantra Party and where they differed it was more a matter of emphasis than of substance. The party would continue planning but would curtail the powers of the Planning Commission and would try to cut the plan to fit the cloth of the resources available to India. Agriculture would be given the highest priority with small-scale and rural industries given second priority. In the agricultural sector: "All possible steps will be taken to free agriculture from its dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon." The party proposed a crash program of small irrigation works including tube wells, the damming of rivulets, and the building of storage tanks. It also called for immediate revision and improvement of the drainage system and for the repair and rechanneling of existing major canal systems. This was all to be done with a decrease in water rates and with no provision for alternative sources of revenue to finance the projects. However, looking back on the serious monsoon failures in several years since the 1962 election and on the inability of the Congress Party to cope adequately with the resulting problem, it is possible to imagine that the Jana Sangh proposals, if carried out, might have gone far to avert the disaster of famine.

The party came out squarely in opposition to the Nehru-proposed joint cooperative farming program of the Congress, a program which has, in any event, never got off the ground. Voluntary service cooperatives received the party's support but they were to be free from government control. The party also wanted increased attention to be given to the forests, not only for forest products but for the curtailing of erosion and the improvement of soil. "The Bharatiya Jana Sangh will amend the Constitution to prohibit the slaughter of the bovine species . . ." Again the Hindu basis of the Jana Sangh comes out in the perennial demand for the preservation of the cow, whether healthy or diseased, whether useful or a parasite on limited food supplies.

In the area of social policies, the Jana Sangh hinted at a change in its total opposition to the Hindu Code Bill: "Without changing

shall consider the possible effect of the failure once again to contract binding alliances.

While the Mahasabha and the Parishad still retained pockets of influence and were able, here and there, to attract locally important persons to grace the party ticket, the two parties were even weaker collectively than they had been in 1957. The principal partner for an effective alliance was the Swatantra Party. The areas of potential overlapping of strength between the two parties were Rajasthan and the northern Terai districts of Uttar Pradesh. As we shall note the two campaigned against each other in both places, but some adjustments were made. One of these was in Udaipur District of Rajasthan where the two parties opposed each other in only one of the 13 assembly constituencies, and, as a result, held the Congress to five victories while Swatantra likewise won five and Jana Sangh three. A Jana Sangh leader told the writer that the Swatantra leaders were surprised that the Jana Sangh could order candidates to stand down in favor of a Swatantra candidate and have the order obeyed. He complained that a Swatantra candidate dropped from the party sponsorship in favor of a Jana Sanghi would simply contest as an independent. On this presumed lack of discipline in Swatantra negotiations in Rajasthan foundered. In some other instances tacit agreements were made. For example, it has been said that Swatantra kept a Muslim candidate in the Lok Sabha contest in Balrampur, Uttar Pradesh, to help Jana Sanghi Vajpayee.

Instead of forming alliances the Jana Sangh went in the other direction and flooded the election lists with candidates. The Jana Sangh ran more candidates both for Lok Sabha seats and for assembly seats throughout India than any party except the Congress itself. (Even so, it would not have had a majority in the Lok Sabha even had it won all the 196 seats it contested.) In no state, except Delhi, did the party contest all Lok Sabha seats but it did contest a majority of the seats in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab and half the seats in Rajasthan. No Lok Sabha seats were contested in either Orissa or Assam.[7]


[7] Any hopes the Jana Sangh still entertained of the proposed merger with the Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa were ended when just before the election the Parishad announced its intention to merge with the Swatantra Party after the election. The Parishad contested the election on its own better known election symbol. The Jana Sangh immediately began a small organization in the state but it was not prepared to set up candidates.


In the assemblies the Jana Sangh contested 377 of 430 seats in Uttar Pradesh and 195 of 288 in Madhya Pradesh. The only other states in which more than half were contested were Punjab and Rajasthan but the numbers were only marginally above half. The party did put up candidates in each state holding assembly elections. As noted earlier, Orissa and Kerala did not have assembly elections. The other side of the coin was that the Jana Sangh candidates lost more deposits than those of any other party.

The presence of the *dipak* symbol throughout India on the ballot papers came at the end of the campaign during which the party used its many candidates to publicize its program. The saturation technique could not fail to bring the Jana Sangh to the notice of the voters in 40 per cent of the assembly constituencies and a slightly higher percentage of the Lok Sabha constituencies. The frequent frontal attacks against the "communal" Jana Sangh by the Congress, especially by Nehru and Indira Gandhi, gave the party some free mass publicity.

For its own public speaking the party depended again primarily on local workers, many of whom were *swayamsevaks* of the RSS. Local leadership most frequently was drawn from college graduates in the professions. A party survey of candidates in Maharashtra gave the following occupational breakdown of 120 candidates: attorneys, 16; medical practitioners (Western and Ayurvedic), 10; traders and businessmen, 27; agriculturalists, 33; social workers, 9; teachers 6; journalists, 4; and "others," 15. The number of graduates was not given but it was stated that 26 were double graduates. The survey also noted an age range of 26 to 66 and said 20 candidates were under age 30.[8] It is difficult to obtain information on members of legislative assemblies, but it is usually the case that Jana Sangh legislators are younger and above the average in educational attainments as compared to those of other parties. In Parliament, based on the biographic material available on 15 of the 16 Jana Sanghis who entered the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in 1962, only three did not have degrees or the equivalent. These included two of the three Jana Sanghis elected from reserved constituencies. Seven of the 15 had advanced degrees, including six with law degrees. Among the occupations were lawyers, six; agri-

[8] *Organiser*, XV:20 (January 1, 1962).


JANA SANGH - 1962
Parliamentary and Assembly Seats Won
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
SITAPUR
JAUNPUR
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
MANIPUR
Parliamentary Seats
Assembly Seats



JANA SANGH - 1962
Percentage of Popular Vote
Polled in Assembly Contests
By Districts
(Kerala, 1960)
LEGEND
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE
0
1
5
10
20
30
50
100
MMU
AND
KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
NAGA LAND
MANIPUR
TRIPURA

in Maharashtra as a result of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti alliance were lost in 1962.

Uttar Pradesh continued to be the key state for the Jana Sangh. The Lok Sabha membership increased from two to seven and the assembly strength from 17 to 49. Vajpayee contested two Lok Sabha seats. He was beaten in Balrampur—the seat from which he was elected in 1957—by Subhadra Joshi of the Congress by less than one per cent of the total vote. A Muslim Swatantra candidate drew more than 10 per cent of the vote, presumably most of it from Mrs. Joshi, who was the secretary of the Jain committee on communal parties. A Mahasabhite candidate took about 2 percent of the poll; had he withdrawn it is conceivable Vajpayee might have won the seat. The five assembly seats underlying the Lok Sabha seat went four to the Jana Sangh and one to the Congress. Vajpayee also contested the Lucknow seat and lost by a substantial margin finishing second to a Congressman. The Jana Sangh defeated Union Minister of State Satish Chandra when Brijraj Singh won the Bareilly seat. Raghu Vira was defeated in Banaras by Raghunath Singh, a veteran Congressman. A former U. P. Praja Party leader, Yuvraj Dutt Singh, won the Shahabad seat and also carried along four of the five assembly seats. The only Jana Sangh sitting in Rajya Sabha, Ajit Pratap Singh, was elected to the Lok Sabha from Pratapgarh.[12] In all, the Jana Sangh contested 74 of the 86 seats, won seven and lost 33 deposits while polling 17.57 percent of the vote.

One of the assembly elections designated by observers as "key" was the contest in Jaunpur between Jana Sangh assembly leader and incumbent Yadhuvendra Dutta Dubey, Raja of Jaunpur, and the state Home Minister, Hargovind Singh. The result was a substantial win for the Raja and an embarrassing defeat for the Congress. Dubey's strength in the district underlay the Jana Sangh victory in the Lok Sabha seat.[13] Including the Raja, the twelve sitting members who ran for re-election scored a fifty percent success. Among the newly elected members was Mrs. Shakuntala

[12] Singh resigned from the Jana Sangh and joined the Congress. *Hindustan Times*, March 15, 1966.

[13] The winner, Brahmjeet Singh, died September 8, 1962. The Jana Sangh lost the seat to the Congress in the by-election.

Nayar, the only Jana Sangh woman ever to have been elected to office. Mrs. Nayar was a Mahasabhite in the first Lok Sabha and is now a Jana Sanghi in the Fourth Lok Sabha. Madho Prasad Tripathi was elected on his third try from a seat in Basti District. The party made significant gains in almost every district of the state. In only seven districts did the percentage of votes decline and these included four of the mountainous districts in the northwest of the state in which the Jana Sangh has done little organizational work. In ten districts more than 25 percent of the votes were cast for Jana Sanghis. In spite of these gains, however, more than half of the party's candidates lost their deposits by failing to poll at least one-sixth of the vote. The gains, as we shall note in the last section of this chapter, were largely in the rural areas of the state where the Jana Sangh made substantial efforts in the inter-election period of popularize the party program, to enroll workers, and to enlist the support of some of the local zamindars.

Madhya Pradesh also returned a Jana Sangh official opposition in the assembly and sent three Jana Sanghis to the Lok Sabha. Umashankar Trivedi was returned from Mandsaur as part of a rout of the Congress in that district while Ramchandra Bade won from Khargone, a district in which the Congress failed to win a single assembly seat. Trivedi was to become the leader of the Lok Sabha group; he was the only Jana Sanghi elected to Parliament who had previous parliamentary experience. Bade had been a member of the Madhya Bharat assembly from 1952–57 and was defeated for the Lok Sabha seat in 1957. The Jana Sangh also won the Dewas Scheduled Caste seat with Hukamchand Kachwai. The Jana Sangh received a higher percentage of the vote—17.87—in Madhya Pradesh than in any other state. The party contested 28 of the 36 seats, winning three and losing 13 deposits.

In another prestige contest a Jana Sanghi, Laxminarayan Jamnalal Pandey, defeated Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Kailas Nath Katju, by a small margin. In the previous election Katju had defeated Pandey by more than two-and-a-half to one. Such were the fortunes of the Congress in the Mandsaur parliamentary seat which included the seven seats in Mandsaur District together with the Jaora seat in Ratlam District in which Pandey defeated Katju. In 1957 the Congress won the Parliamentary seat and five of the eight

assembly seats. In 1962 the Jana Sangh won the Lok Sabha seat and seven of the eight assembly seats. The Jana Sangh assembly leader Chordia did not re-contest and was elevated to the Rajya Sabha. To him goes much of the credit of the Jana Sangh victory. His successor as assembly leader, Virendra Kumar Saklecha, was re-elected from his seat. The Jana Sangh polled 55.76 percent of the vote in Mandsaur District, the only district in which the party secured more than half the votes.

In 1957 in Nimar (Khargone) District the Congress won the Lok Sabha seat with trade unionist Ramsinghbhai Verma over Bade in a rather close contest. The Congress also won seven of the eight assembly seats; the Jana Sangh won the other. In 1962 Bade won the Lok Sabha seat from Kanhayalal Khadiwala—a former president of the Madhya Bharat Congress—by a substantial margin and carried seven of the eight assembly seats into the Jana Sangh column; the eighth was won not by the Congress but by a Jana Sangh supported independent. The Jana Sangh took 48.92 percent of the vote and would have had more than half if the votes for the independent had been included. The writer discussed Khargone with a person who was present in Khargone, but who is not a Jana Sanghi. He mentioned the carefully arranged organization led by the advocate Bade and assisted by tribal leaders. (Four of the eight assembly seats are reserved for scheduled tribes.) The Jana Sangh office is available for advice and assistance to the tribal folk who come into the district headquarters as to legal and financial matters. When the 1957 election was lost the Jana Sangh began immediately rebuilding the organization and designating candidates. When nominations were filed the Jana Sangh filed early and correctly while the Congress often filed just before the deadline and risked having a nomination rejected. The Jana Sangh parliamentary candidate was known in the district and had been selected, in effect, before the 1957 elections. The Congress switched its sitting members from Indore (Khadiwala) and Khargone (Verma) just before the filing of nominations with the result that both men were late in starting their campaigns. One suspects that each thought the old phrase attributed to Motilal Nehru still held true: give a lampost a Congress ticket and it will win the election. Khadiwala was not enthusiastic about contesting a strong, and ultimately successful

Communist Homi Daji in Indore. Verma was equally unenthusiastic about facing Bade. The delay in switching undoubtedly contributed to the debacle.

Both Khargone and Mandsaur are in the area formerly in Madhya Bharat. In 1957 all the ten seats won by the Jana Sangh were either in Madhya Bharat or in Vindhya Pradesh. When in 1962 the number of seats quadrupled to 41, the old Madhya Pradesh part of the state also contributed to the total. Ten seats were won in the old Madhya Pradesh area including three in Raipur, the home district of former Chief Minister Ravi Shankar Shukla and his family. Vindhya Pradesh contributed five seats compared to two in 1957. Madhya Bharat continued to be the strongest area for the Jana Sangh. The party won 26 seats, of which half were in Mandsaur and Khargone. The Jana Sangh also won four of six seats in Dewas and four of five in Shajapur. In addition to defeating the chief minister in Jaora, the Jana Sangh candidates defeated three deputy ministers in the Katju cabinet. Of the seven Jana Sanghis who ran for re-election five succeeded. The Madhya Pradesh elections showed clearly the Jana Sangh ability to grow upon an earlier base in Madhya Bharat and to establish a new sphere in old Madhya Pradesh.

Rajasthan saw substantial gains by the Jana Sangh in the election for the assembly; the number of seats won increased from six to 15 as compared to 1957 and the percentage of the vote rose from 5.42 percent to 9.15 percent. The party also won a Lok Sabha seat although its share of the poll for the Lok Sabha decreased as four of the eleven candidates lost their deposits while none of the seven contesting in 1957 did so. The Lok Sabha winner was Onkar Lal Berwa who won the Scheduled Caste seat from Kotah which had been won by the Congress in the first two elections. He won this seat, which had five Kotah District assembly seats and three from Bundi District underlying it, in spite of the success of the Maharajkumar of Kotah, Brij Raj Singh, on the Congress ticket in the neighboring Jhalawar Lok Sabha constituency. Berwa also carried five of the assembly candidates along to victory and four of these were in Kotah District. Berwa's record is indicative of the persistence of Jana Sangh candidates. In 1952 he had been defeated for an assembly seat; in 1957 he finished third among Scheduled Caste

candidates for the double member Lok Sabha constituency; in 1962 he won the seat against the Congress incumbent by a comfortable margin; he retained the seat in 1967. Three other Jana Sanghis finished second to Congress winners in areas where the party had previously shown some strength: Ajmer, Chittorgarh, and Sikar.

The assembly results recorded the return of Bhairon Singh Shekawat, the only Jana Sanghi who has been a member of a legislative assembly or Parliament continuously since 1952. Shekawat transferred from the Sikar District seat which he had won in 1952 and 1957 to contest in Jaipur City. The municipal corporation of the city had been controlled by the Jana Sangh. In spite of Swatantra opposition on the home grounds of Maharani Gayatri Devi, Shekawat won by a wide margin over the Swatantra candidate; the Congress candidate, Home Minister Ram Kishore Vyas, was a distant third. Thus Jana Sangh assembly party leaders in both Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh defeated the state home ministers in key contests. Along with Shekawat, the leader of the Jaipur City Jana Sangh, Satish Chandra Agarwal won an assembly seat from Jaipur City. He won by a considerable margin over Muslim candidates from both Swatantra and Congress, the latter being the Nawab of Loharu. Agarwal was re-elected, but another leading Jana Sanghi, Jagdish Prasad Mathur, was defeated in his bid for re-election from a Sikar constituency. The southeastern reaches of the state were the strongest areas for the party: in Kotah it contested all of the seven seats and won four; in Udaipur where an agreement with Swatantra was partially in effect the party contested six of the 13 seats and won three; and in Bundi it won one of the two seats it contested. These eight together with single seat wins in Chittorgarh and Jhalawar account for ten of the 15 seats and all are in the former Udaipur Division. The other five were in Jaipur Division, the two mentioned in the city of Jaipur and three others in Sawai Madhopur District. In the sandier areas of the state the Jana Sangh could raise barely a whisper notwithstanding a bit of the urban vote in Ajmer and Jodhpur. Perhaps the most interesting Jana Sanghi to win was Abdul Jabbar Khan, a Muslim, from Nimbahera in Chittorgarh District.[14] Jabbar was described as "an

[14] Another Muslim ran unsuccessfully for the Madhya Pradesh assembly from the Mhow constituency on the Jana Sangh ticket.

old party worker" by a Jana Sangh working committee member. He stayed with the party until mid-1966 but resigned to sit as an independent.[15]

The Jana Sangh seems habitually to enter the elections in Punjab with hopes which are wrecked by the hard facts of the returns. The election in 1962 was to repeat the disappointments that were suffered in 1952 and 1957 in the "founding state" of the party. The record was erratic: in the Lok Sabha three seats were won where none had been won before and the voters gave the Jana Sangh more than 15 percent of their votes; in the assembly the number of seats dropped from nine to eight while the percentage rose but moderately from 8.76 percent to 9.72 percent. Two of the winning Lok Sabha candidates had not been members of the party a few months before the polling and the third—Yudhvir Singh Chaudhary of Mahendragarh—was not an active Jana Sanghi. All three of the seats lie in the area which is now included in Haryana where the Jana Sangh received at least some of the largely Jat Arya Samajist protest vote in favor of a separate "Haryana Prant." In Rohtak the Jana Sangh candidate was Chaudhuri Lehri Singh who for more than seven years had been a Congress minister in Punjab. In Karnal the seat was won by an Arya Samajist leader, Swami Rameshwaranand, in a contest against another distinguished Arya Samajist, Congressman Virendra, the son of Mahashe Krishan, publisher of *Pratap* and a participant in the founding of the Punjab Jana Sangh. As mentioned in Chapter VIII this contest saw the phenomenon of the Delhi edition of *Pratap* edited by Virendra's brother Narendra supporting the Jana Sangh while the Jullundur edition naturally supported its editor, Virendra. The three candidates could carry only four of the 21 assembly seats underlying their constituencies into the Jana Sangh column. Several of the Jana Sangh losers were prominent in the party. With Prakash Vir Shastri transferring successfully to the Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, Lok Sabha seat, the Jana Sangh put up former Mahasabhite Hardayal Devgun for the Gurgaon seat. Devgun, now president of the Delhi Jana Sangh and a Delhi Lok Sabha member, finished a poor third and lost his deposit. State vice-president and a member of the Legislative Council, Kishan Lal, challenged Congressman Giani Guru-

[15] *Statesman* (Delhi edition), September 16, 1966.

mukh Singh Musafir for the second time in the Amritsar constituency. Kishan Lal hoped to draw sufficiently on urban Hindu votes to offset an expected split in the rural Sikh vote between Musafir and an Akali candidate in 1962 and between Musafir and a Sikh Communist candidate in 1957. In neither election was he close to being successful. A similar bid for the urban Hindu vote came in Ferozepur where Kulbir Singh finished second to a Congressman in the Lok Sabha seat but also contested and won the assembly seat from Ferozepur city.

Although the party had a net loss of one seat in the assembly it retained four of the seats it held as three of the four incumbents running for re-election were successful and another seat was secured by a newcomer. The three holdovers are among the more active and promising of the younger leadership of the party. Two from Amritsar, Baldev Prakash, a doctor, and Balramdas Tandon, a lawyer, won in the downtown city areas which are largely populated by Hindus. Mangal Sein was re-elected in Rohtak. As mentioned above Kulbir Singh won in Ferozepur and was joined by a Jana Sanghi from Fazilka town in the same district. Again the Hindu vote was decisive in the election. The Jana Sangh was to be in the forefront of an agitation for the inclusion of Fazilka tehsil in Haryana.

In Delhi the Jana Sangh sharply increased its share of the Lok Sabha vote from one fifth to one-third but lost the only seat it had had before the election. There is no assembly in Delhi, but elections to the Delhi Municipal Corporation were held simultaneously with the Lok Sabha polling. Here, too, the Jana Sangh increased its share of the vote from 26.36 percent in 1958 to 30.97 percent and saw the number of seats held drop from 25 to eight. While the results in terms of seats won were more than disappointing to the Jana Sangh, the extension of support for the party to new high levels and in all areas of the Union Territory was a source of encouragement. Madhok, who could spend only part time in his New Delhi constituency, was beaten by a 3–2 margin by Union Minister Mehr Chand Khanna. Khanna held the Rehabilitation portfolio at the time of the election and by some adroit steps managed to woo away much of the refugee support upon which Madhok was counting and of which he had been the beneficiary in

the 1961 by-election. Former Jana Sangh general secretary Bhai Mahavir lost the Delhi Sadar constituency by about the same 3–2 margin but that contest had another candidate, former Jana Sanghi Kanwar Lal Gupta, who drew votes in excess of the margin between Mahavir and the winner. The Chandni Chowk seat was contested by Amrit Lal Jindal, a Jain, against Congressman Sham Nath, also a Jain. Sham Nath was credited with being able to control the substantial Muslim vote in the constituency—at least in the absence of a Muslim candidate. However, a Muslim candidate did enter the race. The votes he took from Sham Nath were not enough to influence the outcome of the election, but it has been widely rumoured that the campaign of the Muslim candidate was financed by Jindal. Whether this be true or not, it illustrates the tactic which can be used by political parties to split communal or caste votes. Despite the losses in the Corporation elections the party gained experience. It did return the party group leader, Vijay Kumar Malhotra, and the former Mahasabhite Balraj Khanna, each of whom would become prominent in the proceedings of the Corporation.

In Jammu and Kashmir the Jana Sangh affiliate, the Praja Parishad, entered the elections for the Legislative Assembly. No elections were held for the Lok Sabha; the six members representing the state were nominated to their seats. For the first time elections in the disputed state were held under the direction of the Central Election Commission. In spite of the overseeing by the Commission there were the usual charges of interference by the State administration in the elections. In the last chapter we noted that the ruling National Conference, led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad since the downfall of Sheikh Abdullah, had won a majority of the seats—43 out of 75 without contest. In the 1962 elections also, an uncommonly large number of seats were decided without contest though the number (34) was smaller than in 1957 and did not produce an automatic majority.

In 1962 the Parishad renominated four of the five candidates it had elected in 1957. Of the four only Prem Nath Dogra, the party's perennial president, was successful. The octogenarian leader seems to be invincible in his Jammu City (North) constituency. The Parishad entered 25 of the 41 constituency contests, all of them in Jammu Province. In this section of the state there are 30 constitu-

encies. In only one did the National Conference win without opposition; the Parishad thus contested 25 of the 29 seats. The party won three seats and lost six deposits. In addition to Dogra, the party's general secretary, Rishi Kumar Kaushal, was elected from Reasi and Shiv Charan Gupta was elected from the neighboring Landar Tikki constituency. Abdul Rehman, the only Muslim on the Parishad ticket, was defeated in Bhaderwah. Rehman has been active in the Parishad for some years; the writer has heard him speak in several Jana Sangh meetings. The election gave a clear indication of the strength of the Parishad in Jammu Province. While throughout the state in the 41 contested constituencies the Parishad was outpolled by the National Conference 66.96 percent to 17.47 percent, the difference between the two parties in Jammu Province was less: 60.01 percent to 24.45 percent.

In one state the Jana Sangh lost the representation which it had won in 1957 while in another it entered the assembly for the first time. Before looking at the losses in Maharashtra the gains in Bihar should be mentioned. In Bihar the Jana Sangh had shown almost no progress at all between the 1952 and 1957 elections. The RSS base was relatively weak in comparison with other states of the Hindi-speaking area. There appeared before the elections little likelihood that the Jana Sangh could break into the assembly even though the Congress was a far-from-united force. The Congress, the other opposition parties, and the Jana Sangh would also be caught up in the intricate caste politics of Bihar. The gains of the Jana Sangh were modest. The party won three seats in the assembly; one each in Gaya, Patna, and Saran Districts, and added a fourth seat from Monghyr in a by-election shortly after the general elections. It contested but 75 of the 318 seats and 61 candidates lost their deposits. The percentage of the vote received by Jana Sanghis more than doubled, but it was still a tiny 2.77 percent. The party also contested 13 of the 53 Lok Sabha seats, lost ten deposits, and polled 2.34 percent of the vote. While the record was not outstanding it was a beginning upon which to build in 1967.

In 1957 the Jana Sangh won two Lok Sabha seats and four assembly seats in Maharashtra. In 1962 the party increased its share of the vote two-and-a-half times—to five percent—and won no seats either in the assembly or in Parliament. The increase in the

vote is illusory for it was attained only by increasing the number of candidates from 18 to 127 for the assembly and 100 of them lost deposits. Not only did the three sitting members who were nominated meet defeat but only one of them retained his deposit—party assembly leader Ramchandra K. Mhalgi. The two Lok Sabha members also were renominated and were defeated but each did retain his deposit. The parliamentarians were from Dhulia and Ratnagiri districts and it was in these two districts and in Buldana that the Jana Sangh polled more than one-tenth of the vote. The debacle is not difficult to explain. The seats in 1957 had been won on the strength of Jana Sangh participation in the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti. The Jana Sangh early withdrew from the Samiti and in any case the *raison d'etre* of the Samiti disappeared when the object of their alliance, a separate Maharashtra state, was attained on April 1, 1960. The Congress by conceding a popular demand brought increased popularity to itself and fragmented the opposition alliance. In 1957 the Congress had barely won a majority of the seats in the areas that were to become Maharashtra. In 1962 it achieved in Maharashtra its largest victory in India. The Jana Sangh was simply swept aside. The party also continued to pay the penalty in Maharashtra for a large Brahmin membership and for its association with the RSS—"the murderers of Gandhi" charge was still a millstone around Jana Sangh necks.

The remaining states can be written off with little notice. In each state except West Bengal the Jana Sangh increased its share of the votes. Most of its candidates lost their deposits but in a few areas some support appears to have been gained; in parts of Saurashtra in Gujarat, a fact which would be important in the 1963 Rajkot by-election; and in some parts of the coastal and northern areas of Mysore. We shall have something to say about the concentration of the Jana Sangh in the Hindi-speaking areas in the next section.

Appraisal

In appraising the 1962 elections we want to consider the aspects we studied after the previous elections but also to appraise some of the characteristics of the Jana Sangh vote. The question of alliances in the 1962 election became not so much a question of

the Jana Sangh's relations with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad as of the party's relations with the new, secular, democratic, and conservative Swatantra Party. We shall look at four presumed patterns in Jana Sangh voting and assess each: (1) the party is concentrated in the Hindi-speaking areas; (2) the party received more support in areas in which the Muslim population is relatively large; (3) the party scores primarily in urban areas and is weak in rural areas; and (4) opposition parties including the Jana Sangh stand a better chance to win against the Congress in straight contests than in multi-cornered contests.[26]

Before turning these patterns we note that the party itself was generally pleased with the results of the election notwithstanding some bitter disappointments and that commentators in the press and elsewhere were by and large impressed, if not surprised, by the level of voting for the Jana Sangh. The party held a lengthy critique at a session of the Pratinidhi Sabha in Kotah in May. Upadhyaya gave a detailed report on the elections which made a rather objective appraisal of the party's performance.[27] Upadhyaya noted that the party "decided to set up candidates in as many areas as was organisationally possible" but added: "it must however be mentioned that, except in some cases, there was an inordinate delay in fixing up candidates." He criticized the Congress and the Communist Party for "slandering" the Jana Sangh as being anti-Muslim and as being responsible for the murder of Gandhi. Upadhyaya concluded that the Jana Sangh had shown "marked progress in numbers but was still far behind the strength necessary for the fulfilment of the historic task assigned to it." He said "the results in Maharashtra and Delhi have been below expectations" but was generally satisfied with the pattern in other states.

The party held a full dress debate at Kotah on Upadhyaya's report. The debate centered primarily on the question of the number of candidates. Speaking for the Punjab, Mangal Sein "was categorical in affirming that the Punjab unit had been strained beyond its capacity" by contesting so many seats. Sein thought the

[26] The tables and other material comparing the 1957 and 1962 elections were prepared prior to the 1967 elections. They are retained in this chapter, and further comparisons will be made of the 1967 elections with reference to this chapter.

[27] The full text is in *Organiser*, XV:41 (May 28, 1962) from which the quotations are taken.

party would have done better had it concentrated on fewer seats. The Maharashtra unit concurred and suggested that the Jana Sangh decision against electoral alliances permitted other opposition candidates to combine against the Congress and the Jana Sangh to the particular detriment of the Jana Sangh. Harish Chandra Srivastava of Uttar Pradesh and Ramchandra V. Bade of Madhya Pradesh took the opposite view that the high level of success in the two states was the result of fielding many candidates and avoiding electoral alliances. Upadhyaya replied by saying that the objective of the Jana Sangh was to become the first party in India: "Once this objective becomes clear it would easily be seen that the number of candidates we set up was really small, and that we set up this number because we could not set up more." [18] Thus the official central party line supported many candidates in many areas to achieve maximum exposure of the party's personalities and programs in the belief that this would pay long run dividends even though it might be conducive to set-backs in the short run.

The Indian press commented on the increase in Jana Sangh votes and representation. The *Times of India* noting the "strong showing" of Swatantra and Jana Sangh said: "The vote received by these two parties must . . . be regarded principally as a vote against the Congress Party's socialism." [19] The *Hindu* also linked the increase in Jana Sangh votes with the emergence of Swatantra:

> If any clear outline is to be traced at all in the contradictory, and party confusing, shift of electoral opinion in the various states, it must be sought primarily in a developing contest between pragmatic socialism of the Congress . . . and the extremism of the Communists, on the one side, and, on the other, the progressive liberalism of the Swatantra and Jana Sangh parties, with their emphasis on limits to the State's incursions in the economic field and greater realism in planning.[20]

It is interesting to note that both the *Times of India* and the *Hindu* omitted to charge communalism to the Jana Sangh and further to note the *Hindus'* coupling of the Jana Sangh with the Swatantra Party as "progressive and liberal." The Communist Party journal

[18] The debate is reported *ibid.*, XV:42 (June 4, 1962).

[19] *Times of India* (Delhi edition), March 2, 1962, quoted in *Organiser*, XV:32 (March 26, 1962).

[20] *Hindu*, March 3, 1962, quoted *ibid.*

1957. Hence, these Lok Sabha seats and the few assembly seats won in the same states in the same elections are exceptions. Every other Lok Sabha and assembly seat won by the Jana Sangh in the first three elections was in the northern states. As noted above, the Jana Sangh won 13.77 percent of the Lok Sabha vote in the Hindi-speaking areas; outside it won less than one and a half percent. About 47 percent of the Jana Sangh candidates in the Hindi area lost their deposits; outside the area it was 86 percent. Of the 7.4 million voters who were recorded for the Jana Sangh, just under six million, or slightly more than 80 percent, did so in the Hindi areas. In 1957 the percentage of votes received in the Hindi areas was just under 80 percent, thus showing, if anything, a tiny increase in the dominance of the Hindi sectors.

Jana Sangh vs. Muslims

It has been alleged that the Jana Sangh polls more strongly in areas which have a high concentration of Muslims, in which it is presumed communal tensions would be stronger, than in those where the number of Muslims is small. It is often stated generally that the Hindi-speaking areas have a substantial percentage of Muslims while those which are non-Hindi-speaking do not and that this in part explains the lack of support for the Jana Sangh outside the Hindi areas. This does not seem to be a valid conclusion. First, the reasons why the Jana Sangh does not poll well outside the Hindi-speaking areas are probably to be found principally in the party's position on Hindi and the weakness of the RSS. Secondly, many of the districts of highest Muslim concentration are not in Hindi-speaking areas but in West Bengal and Assam and in the Kashmir Valley. Conversely, the concentration of Muslims outside Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Bihar in the Hindi-speaking sections is rather low.

The only state which combines a fairly wide-spread activity on the part of the Jana Sangh and a relatively high percentage of Muslims is Uttar Pradesh. In other states one or both factors is missing. Table IV gives the ten highest Muslim districts and the Jana Sangh vote: This erratic pattern cannot be used to support the contention that the Jana Sangh gains from the presence of Muslims. The support for the Jana Sangh was plotted for each district against the percentage of Muslims with the result that dots were scattered

TABLE IV
JANA SANGH VOTE AND MUSLIM POPULATION IN UTTAR PRADESH, 1962 and 1967

District	*Muslims*		*Jana Sangh Vote 1962*		*Jana Sangh Vote 1967*	
	Percent	*Rank*	*Percent*	*Rank*	*Percent*	*Rank*
Rampur	45.01	1	20.25	14	18.04	32
Morabadad	37.25	2	20.59	13	19.07	28
Bijnor	36.54	3	25.97	9	21.35	23
Saharanpur	31.07	4	12.79	31	11.90	49
Bareilly	29.87	5	16.93	21	34.74	5
Muzaffarnagar	27.95	6	8.24	41	6.64	51
Bahraich	25.57	7	6.43	46	44.50	1
Pilibhit	21.06	8	22.02	12	22.87	21
Meerut	20.97	9	8.58	39	11.90	44
Gonda	20.89	10	28.92	6	26.95	14

Sources: Muslim percentage from Census of India, Paper No. 1 of 1963, 1961 Census, Religion, published by Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1963. Jana Sangh vote from Election Commission reports.

all over the graph. While it does seem likely that communal issues contribute to support from Hindus to the Jana Sangh there is no discernable pattern to this.

Urban and Rural Vote

Often the Jana Sangh has been pictured as a party which draws its support from urban areas and is correspondingly quite weak in the rural sections. Two states lend themselves to an attempt to test this theory: Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. In the latter the Jana Sangh has in each of the last two elections contested seats distributed widely across the state. In Punjab the areas now comprising Punjabi Suba are largely Sikh in the rural areas with the Hindus in the Suba being very much concentrated in the urban areas. In the study made of the Jana Sangh vote in 1957 and 1962 in the two states certain criteria were required. A strictly urban constituency might be considered only to be one which was located entirely within the municipal limits of some major city. On the other hand the Election Commission has found that the percentage of voters in urban areas has regularly and significantly been higher than the percentage of electors exercising the franchise in rural areas. It would seem then that the "citified" voters would generally wield an influence on the result of the vote greater than their actual numbers. While it is admittedly a subject for debate among political scientists, for the purposes of this review we have considered as urban any assembly constituency in which the population of the place giving the constit-

uency its name is one-third or more of the population of an average sized legislative assembly constituency.

In Uttar Pradesh 45 assembly constituencies qualified in 1962 under this definition as urban, the remaining 385 being classified as rural. In the urban areas in 1957 the Jana Sangh contested 34 of the seats, winning two and polling 16.69 percent of the vote. The Jana Sangh record in 1962: 43 contested, four won including one of those won in 1957, 22.69 percent of the vote. In the rural areas in 1957 the Jana Sangh contested only 201 of the 385 seats, winning 15 and polling 8.73 percent of the vote. In 1962 the rural record was 334 contested, 45 won and 15.58 percent of the vote. Thus while there was an appreciable increase in the share of the vote received by the Jana Sangh in the urban areas—an increase of 36 percent—it was in the rural areas that the party made its greatest inroads—an increase of 78 percent. The party still received a better poll in the urban areas as was to be expected of a party whose active workers are largely persons concentrated in the towns rather than representing locally prominent landed interests. The Jana Sangh, however, did attract a share of the landed gentry and the increase in rural vote may be attributed to their influence as well as to a decline in Congress popularity. In any event it can be said that the Jana Sangh had in 1962 overcome its alleged urban bias. It remains to be seen from the detailed results of the 1967 elections whether this is a trend or simply an event and we shall consider this in discussing the 1967 elections.

In Punjab in 1962, in the rural areas the Jana Sangh contested in each election only a few more than one-third of the seats and polled a tiny fraction of the vote, although one rural seat, Fazilka, was won by the party in 1962. In the urban sector about one-quarter of the voters supported the Jana Sangh with a small decrease noted in 1962 compared to 1957. It seems evident that urban Hindu voters—many of them Arya Samajists—tended to give support to a party which showed itself unalterably opposed to Punjabi Suba.

Multi-cornered Contests

In each election the opposition parties have tried to combine forces by electoral alliances and adjustments in order to present a

Mandsaur, and the others won isolated victories in Durg and Raipur District. When the detailed results of the constituencies are studied it appears that generally, even though due allowance has been made for some names which do not indicate caste, at least one other moderately strong candidate has had the same caste as the Congress candidate. It can be assumed that this candidate drew votes from the Congress candidate, possibly sufficiently to have permitted the Jana Sanghi to win. Such conclusions must, of course, be tentative but it does seem that the theory of multi-cornered contests helping the Congress and harming the opposition is open to serious question. Nonetheless alliances continue to be proposed and, occasionally, contracted and honored.

We shall turn now from the general question of multi-cornered contests to the specific election feuds of the Jana Sangh with other "Hindu" parties and also with the conservative Swatantra Party. The strength and importance of both the Ram Rajya Parishad and the Hindu Mahasabha continued to decline. Ideological followers of the Parishad seemed to be few and far between but the party was again a vehicle for some of the princely class in both Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. The Jana Sangh and the Ram Rajya Parishad faced each other in 26 Lok Sabha contests—Bihar, two; Madhya Pradesh, ten; Punjab, three; Rajasthan, four; and Uttar Pradesh, seven. In no case did either party prevent the other from winning and in one case (Dewas) the Jana Sangh won in spite of Parishad opposition. In 98 assembly seats the two parties faced each other and in 77 cases the result was not affected. Although opposed by the Parishad, the Jana Sangh won nine seats (Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, three each; Punjab, two; and Rajasthan, one) and had it cooperated with the Parishad might have won four more in Madhya Pradesh. The Parishad won three seats against Jana Sangh opposition (Madhya Pradesh, two; Rajasthan, one) and might have won five more (Madhya Pradesh, four; Uttar Pradesh, one).

The Jana Sangh's conflict with the Mahasabha was perhaps more costly. They opposed each other for 25 Lok Sabha seats—Bihar, two; Gujarat, one; Madhya Pradesh, seven; Rajasthan, one; Uttar Pradesh, twelve; Delhi, one; West Bengal, one. The Jana Sangh opposed Mahasabha president Mahant Digvijaynath in Go-

rakhpur and probably caused his defeat in a close contest. The Mahant in retaliation kept Mahasabha contestants in the races in Balrampur and Basti against the Jana Sangh. In Basti, he ran himself against K. K. K. Nayar and contributed to Nayar's loss to Union Oil Minister K. D. Malaviya. In Balrampur the Mahasabha candidate was perhaps a factor in the defeat of Vajpayee by Subhadra Joshi. The Jana Sangh also opposed Mahasabha general secretary Bishan Chandra Seth in Etah but Seth won to become the only Mahasabhite in the Third Lok Sabha. The Jana Sangh handicapped the Mahasabha in three Madhya Pradesh contests including those in which former general secretary V. G. Deshpande and sitting member Brij Narayan Brijesh contested.

The Jana Sangh-Mahasabha conflict in the assembly contests was not as much a battle of party titans as was the Lok Sabha conflict. The two parties opposed each other 105 times mainly in Madhya Pradesh (34) and Uttar Pradesh (56). In 72 contests the result was clearly not affected. The Jana Sangh won 16 seats (Uttar Pradesh, twelve; Madhya Pradesh, two, and Bihar and Rajasthan, one each) in spite of the Mahasabha and might have taken seven more (Uttar Pradesh, five; Madhya Pradesh, two). The Mahasabha won seven seats against the Jana Sangh (Madhya Pradesh, six; Uttar Pradesh, one). In the election they won a total of only eight and were opposed by the Jana Sangh in seven. Co-operation with the Jana Sangh might have brought the Mahasabha three more seats (Madhya Pradesh, two; Rajasthan, one).

The Parishad and the Mahasabha, as in 1957, managed by design or otherwise largely to avoid opposing each other. They faced each other in only two assembly contests and in one Lok Sabha contest and in no case was the result affected. The discussion above is concerned with contests in which two of the Hindu parties contested. There were also nine assembly contests in which all three parties were entered. The Jana Sangh won one assembly seat and might have won another in Uttar Pradesh. There was also one three party Lok Sabha contest where the result was not affected.

Once again the three parties managed to do some apparent harm to themselves, though it was mainly the Jana Sangh which suffered. There were some key Lok Sabha battles of the Mahasabha as well. The area of conflict was almost exclusively Hindi-speaking,

a sector in which the Jana Sangh has far eclipsed its Hindu rivals but the one where the other two parties also find almost their only followers.

The emergence of the Swatantra Party brought a rival to the Jana Sangh in its role of conservative party as distinct from the role it plays as a Hindu party. They faced each other, often with disastrous results, for 397 assembly seats and for 64 Lok Sabha seats. The Lok Sabha contests were: Andra Pradesh, three, all with no affect on the result; Bihar, eleven, of which Swatantra won one; Gujarat, four, with no affect; Madhya Pradesh, five, with no affect; Mysore, three, also with no affect; Punjab, five, of which the Jana Sangh won two; Rajasthan, four, of which Swatantra won two and might have won another; Uttar Pradesh, 29, of which Swatantra won two and might have won another while the Jana Sangh won one and might have won five more.

In the assembly contests the two parties ran heavily against each other. The Jana Sangh won 37 seats against Swatantra candidates—Uttar Pradesh, 18; Madhya Pradesh, nine; Rajasthan, seven; Punjab, two; Bihar, one—and might have won another 29—Uttar Pradesh, 19; Punjab, four; Madhya Pradesh, three; Rajasthan, two; Andhra Pradesh, one. The Swatantra Party won 38 seats against the Jana Sangh's candidates—Rajasthan, 16; Uttar Pradesh, ten; Bihar, six; Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab, two each—and it might have won an additional 19—Uttar Pradesh, nine; Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, three each; Punjab, two; Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, one each. From this analysis it would seem that Uttar Pradesh was the area of greatest conflict. This, however, is perhaps overstated as the areas within the state were fairly clearly demarcated and the Jana Sangh was using a scatter approach to setting up candidates. Possibly more important are the potential conflicts in Rajasthan and in Gujarat.

The 1962 elections brought a much stronger Jana Sangh, prepared to play the role of official opposition in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh and ready to make its voice heard more frequently in the Lok Sabha and, with the election of Vajpayee and Chordia, also in the Rajya Sabha. The party was to meet and to create issues in which its nationalist Hindu voice could be heard.

CHAPTER X

Building on the Base: 1962–1967

The years between the 1962 and 1967 general elections were among the most momentous in the political life of India. As a country, India faced military encounters with China in October and November of 1962 and with Pakistan in the spring and again in August and September of 1965. The country and the Congress Party twice experienced vacancy in the office of prime minister—upon the death of Nehru in May, 1964 and that of his successor, Shastri, in January, 1966. The party also went through the Kamaraj Plan, the fall of its government in Kerala and a disastrous mid-term election in that state, the gross factionalism in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and just before the elections the defection of a number of Congressmen in West Bengal and elsewhere. The decline of the Congress was to be a major result of the 1967 elections. The Communist Party of India presented the picture of a party split, at first by bickering and finally by a formal rupture in which the "pro-Peking, leftists" formed a separate and competing Communist Party-Marxist. The socialists, too, were not without difficulties. The Praja Socialist Party saw the defection of a substantial number of its members, led by Asoka Mehta, to the Congress. The remnant then took up the slogan of "Socialist unity" and merged in 1964 with the Socialist Party which was led by Lohia into the Samyukta Socialist Party. The merger was shortlived. Many former PSP members soon withdrew and re-formed the PSP, but the membership, according to party officials, was barely more than one third of what it had been before the Mehta defection and the unhappy merger.

The Swatantra Party appeared to gain some strength as the Ganatantra Parishad formalized its merger into the Swatantra Party; but it too had its troubles. Chief among these was the defection of almost the entire Bihar unit when the Raja of Ramgarh left the party.

While the Jana Sangh was not entirely without problems, it among the major parties seemed best equipped to capitalize on the difficulties of its political opponents and the problems of the country. In a nation apparently beset with foreign enemies the intense nationalistic philosophy of the Jana Sangh could not help but gain supporters as did its dedicated and well disciplined organization. In the party the triumvirate of Madhok, Vajpayee and Upadhyaya, along with Raghu Vira until his death in May, 1963, held the major positions. The Lok Sabha delegation, although increased, was relatively without distinction but the election of Vajpayee to the Rajya Sabha gave the party an effective spokesman in Parliament. Madhok's adroit handling of the Punjabi Suba situation recouped a potentially difficult situation for the party there. The November, 1966, cow slaughter demonstration in New Delhi, while hardly to the credit of the organizers, seems to have redounded to the party's advantage. As the organizational development of the party was treated in some detail in Chapter VIII we will limit ourselves here to the major events of the 1962–67 period.

The Raghu Vira Presidency

The first session of the Jana Sangh after the elections was scheduled for Bhopal in December, 1962. However, before the session could be held much was to happen to the Jana Sangh and to India.

The 1962 elections gave the Jana Sangh fourteen seats in the Lok Sabha, but among the fourteen there were none of the members of the Second Lok Sabha and only one person who had had previous experience in New Delhi. That person was Umashankar M. Trivedi who had finished the First Lok Sabha as the only Jana Sanghi in that body. When the fourteen gathered for the opening of Parliament, Trivedi was selected as leader of an inexperienced and relatively undistinguished group. He worked hard for five years as the principal Jana Sangh spokesman in the lower house but al-

though a talented lawyer he was not an orator who could command the attention of the House or, perhaps more important, of the press gallery. Among his supporters were few who were able to compete with the brilliance of some of the other parties on the opposition benches. Trivedi also had his share of misbehavers, notably Swami Rameshwaranand and Hukum Chand Kachwai, both of whom were more than once ordered to leave the House by the Speaker. Of Rameshwaranand we shall hear more later in connection with the cow protection agitation in November, 1966.

In April, 1962, the biennial elections to the Rajya Sabha took place and the Jana Sangh had sufficient legislators in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh to elect one member from each state in the indirect election. From Madhya Pradesh, Vimal Kumar Chordia, a former leader of the Jana Sangh in the state assembly, was elected. More important was the election of Atal Bihari Vajpayee from Uttar Pradesh. Vajpayee, already a secretary of the party, had been leader of the parliamentary group in the Second Lok Sabha. After his election to the Rajya Sabha he was selected as leader of the combined Lok Sabha-Rajya Sabha parliamentary group. His presence on the opposition front benches brought frequent press notice as he performed most capably as a spokesman for the Jana Sangh.

The 1962 elections had also given the Jana Sangh the status of official opposition in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. To succeed Chordia in Madhya Pradesh the party designated Virendra Kumar Saklecha, also from Mandsaur District. Saklecha developed the party in the assembly into an effective opposition to the Mandloi and Mishra ministries. The party added a number of tribal members from Bastar District who had been elected to the assembly as independents with the support of Pravin Chandra Bhanj Deo, Maharaja of Bastar. That tribal leader was killed under circumstances which are still under investigation but in which the Mishra government was accused, with or without justification, of a degree of complicity. The tribal adherents to the Jana Sangh have continued with the party and several were elected in 1967. Saklecha, like Trivedi, had a few unruly members in his group. The assembly expelled three Jana Sanghis toward the end of the term. One of them threw a shoe in the house.

gress Party were able to force Nehru to drop him from the Cabinet. The Jana Sangh moved to capitalize on the national feeling and on its own historic opposition to communism and to Communist China. It also stood firm on Kashmir by opposing any deal with Pakistan on the subject in return for Pakistani guarantees or assistance in the war against China.

The initial Jana Sangh reaction was typical of the non-communist parties. Individual Jana Sangh leaders led by Vajpayee called for strong resistance to China in defense of Indian soil, but the official party line was drawn on November 1 when the Working Committee met in New Delhi under the presidency of Rama Rao. The party, of course, reminded the country that it had warned against China and had opposed the *panch shila* policy of Nehru. More specifically it called for a retailoring of the five year plan to concentrate on defense production, for procurement of arms from other countries, for conscription, and for the dismissal of Krishna Menon from the portfolio of Defense Production to which he had been moved by Nehru from Defense. The Jana Sangh also asked for a ban on the Communist Party. It kept an eye on Pakistan and called for vigilance on the borders with the Islamic neighbor.[1] Pursuant to the resolution Upadhyaya issued a statement in which he called upon Jana Sanghis to cooperate with the Government in the emergency: "Our fight today is not with the Congress, but with the Chinese." He added that Jana Sanghis should not expect recognition from the Congress for their services but should perform them anyway.[2]

The arrival of American and British missions to New Delhi headed by Averell Harriman and Duncan Sandys was worrisome to the Jana Sangh in that the missions not only talked about assistance for India's defense but also persuaded India to open talks with Pakistan. A joint statement was issued on November 29, by Ayub and Nehru. Talks were held on six occasions between December, 1962, and May, 1963, on all aspects of Indo-Pakistan problems including Kashmir. The talks broke up without any concrete advance toward settlement of the issues between the countries. The

[1] *Organiser*, XVI:13 (November 5, 1962).
[2] *Ibid.*, XVI:16 (November 26, 1962).

Jana Sangh reacted as expected. Upadhyaya was again the spokesman and wrote sharply against the talks and against the Anglo-American initiative.[3]

In a period of national crisis the Jana Sangh prepared to hold its annual session at Bhopal. Even without the Chinese attack it seemed likely that the party would turn to a nationally known figure, Dr. Raghu Vira, to replace the Rama Rao as president. The Chinese action reinforced this decision as Raghu Vira was an acknowledged authority on China who had warned against Chinese intentions and resigned from the Congress on this issue.

Foreign policy dominated the session. Vajpayee delivered a major public address in which he called upon India to come closer both to the West and to the countries of South East Asia which "share the threat from China." He also said India should withdraw troops from the Congo and the Middle East and attend to problems close to home rather than try to operate as a global power. The party disapproved any talks with Pakistan on Kashmir and supported the Government in the war effort against China. The session was enthusiastic in its proclamations of nationalism and devotion to the national cause. The delegates were disciplined but were not stopped from disagreeing with the leadership or from moving amendments to resolutions. Every state was represented with a fairly substantial number from the south.

The Chinese attack and the emergency had resulted in the cancellation of by-elections to all legislative bodies. By May, 1963, when the ban was lifted there were four vacancies in the Lok Sabha, three in Uttar Pradesh, including the Jaunpur seat, and one in Gujarat. Each of these was billed as a key by-election and in each the Jana Sangh was to play a key role. The Jana Sangh contested only the Jaunpur seat where its candidate was General Secretary Upadhyaya. The party counted on the demonstrated strength of the local unit led by the Raja of Jaunpur. But it had not counted on an uncharacteristic pulling together of the factionalized Uttar Pradesh Congress Party nor had it looked carefully at the past results in the constituency. Each of the three winners in the general elections had

[3] *Ibid.*, XVI:18 (December 10, 1962).

been a local Rajput. Upadhyaya was a Brahmin outsider. He was defeated by a substantial margin.

This was, however, to be the only one of the four by-elections won by the Congress. The others had been won by Congressmen in the general elections, two of whom had died and one resigned his seat. Thus the Congress ended with a net loss of two seats but more important three of the four opposition leaders who contested were sent to the Lok Sabha. In the Amroha, Uttar Pradesh, by-election the Jana Sangh gave full support to the political veteran, Acharya J. B. Kripalani. The seat became vacant upon the death of Maulana Hifzur Rehman, a distinguished nationalist Muslim. The Congress selected Irrigation Minister Hafiz Mohammed Ibrahim, a brother-in-law of Hifzur Rehman. Congress leftists led by Menon and K. D. Malaviya supported Ibrahim, who had a safe Rajya Sabha seat, in a contest in which he was badly beaten. Kripalani's campaign was to a large degree aided by the Jana Sangh (and RSS) volunteers who worked for him. Farrukhabad, also in Uttar Pradesh, saw the Jana Sangh back another winner in Socialist leader Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. Here the PSP also had a candidate against a Congressman who had once been a minister in New Delhi. Lohia won substantially and his victory moved one newspaper to say: "The socialists have won a resounding victory but they may lose their leader as the next Jana Sangh Fuehrer." [4] The fourth of the series was in Rajkot, Gujarat. U. N. Dhebar, a former Congress president, had inexplicably resigned his seat and thereby provided an opening for the Swatantra Party to return its general secretary, Minoo Masani, to Parliament. Masani was supported by the local Saurashtra princelings but the margin for his narrow victory may well have been supplied by the strong Jana Sangh cadre in Rajkot city. Indeed the only assembly seat won by the Jana Sangh in 1967 was the Rajkot seat.

The Jana Sangh was struck by tragedy during the campaigns for the by-elections. On May 14, 1963, while travelling from Farrukhabad to Jaunpur, Dr. Raghu Vira was fatally injured in an automobile accident. For the second time the Jana Sangh had lost a

[4] *Hindustan Times,* May 28, 1963.

nationally known leader, again one whose special talents were keyed to the political situation at the time of his death. Raghu Vira, while he held views which were rigidly Hindu on many subjects, had during his brief association with the party and his presidency done much to temper the communal image of the Jana Sangh and had initiated discussions with Rajagopalachari and the Swatantra Party. His death was not only a loss to the party but also to the prospects for conservative unity.

Ghosh and Vyas

To replace Raghu Vira the working committee looked in a familiar direction and chose Deva Prasad Ghosh to be acting president. He was retained in the presidency at the Ahmedabad session in December, 1963. The elderly Bengali thereby extended his record of having been Jana Sangh president longer than anyone else, but he could not achieve the status of his fellow Bengali, Mookerjee, and does not appear to have had much influence on the policies and actions of the party. While Raghu Vira occasionally acted on his own initiative, the initiative in the party returned very much to Delhi and Upadhyaya during the Ghosh presidency. In the press he was rarely mentioned; there Vajpayee as the parliamentary spokesman drew the headlines.

The Jana Sangh officially entered Orissa on June 9, 1963, with the first session of the state unit. It was said one hundred delegates attended; the roster of names makes it appear that the bulk of them came from the western areas which were formerly princely states.[5] A unit, which had not so far contested any elections, was formed in Goa in October.[6] Although a unit had existed in Assam shortly after the founding of the party it had ceased to exist after Mookerjee's death. For some time after the 1957 elections the Jana Sangh had detailed Ramesh Kumar Mishra, a former RSS worker, to work in Assam. The "first session" of the Assam Jana Sangh was held in November, 1963, at Gauhati and Mishra was designated secretary.[7] The Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad which had long operated as a *de facto* Jana Sangh unit merged itself formally into

[5] *Organiser*, XVI:44 (June 17, 1963).
[6] *Ibid.*, XVII:12 (October 28, 1963).
[7] *Ibid.*, XVII:20 (December 23, 1963).

the party as a state unit in October, 1963.[8] With that action the Jana Sangh had units in every state (except Nagaland) and almost all union territories.

At the Ahmedabad session attention as usual seemed focussed on political issues but the party tried to give a greater share of time to economic matters.[9] A professor of economics who tended toward Swatantra views was brought in to give a lecture to the delegates. The economic resolution urged the government to give up its theories and adopt a pragmatic approach to all economic matters. The party went on record as opposing bank nationalization, a pet demand of the Congress left, and also opposed family planning. The party listened to a report from Nana Deshmukh on the increase in the number of Muslims in Assam and resolved that a ten mile belt along the border should be cleared of Muslims. Other parts of the resolution made the expected denunciations of Pakistan which should "be treated as a hostile country like China."

At the opening meeting the Jana Sangh the leaders shared the dais with Bhailabhai Patel, head of the Gujarat Swatantra Party. This gave rise to some chatter that he was preparing for a closer arrangement with the Jana Sangh, but while the session was going on the two parties opposed each other vehemently in the Rajasthan municipal elections. The Jana Sangh lost control of the Jaipur corporation which it had previously held but gained in many other places including Udaipur where it won control from the Congress.[10]

The 1964 biennial elections brought two more Jana Sanghis into the Rajya Sabha. Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh general secretary Dattopant B. Thengade was elected from Uttar Pradesh. From Madhya Pradesh Giriraj K. Kapur of Jabalpur was elected. Kapur had for several years been president of the Madhya Pradesh unit and was a popular and witty speaker at the Jana Sangh meetings. He died in office in August, 1965. Jana Sanghis were successful from the two graduates constituencies in Punjab. Kishan Lal was re-elected in the north seat and Sri Chand Goel in the south seat. In Maharashtra Dr. Vasantkumar Pandit was elected to the council. In civic elections in May, 1964, in Punjab the Jana Sangh secured

[8] *Ibid.*, XVII:11 (October 21, 1963).

[9] Reported in *Organiser*, XVII:23 (January 13, 1964).

[10] *Ibid.*

control of the Ambala committee and became the largest party in Ludhiana and Jullundur.

In late December, 1963, the reputed hair of the Prophet Muhammad disappeared from a mosque in Srinagar in Kashmir. Large scale riots broke out there, one result of which was the displacement by Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq of Khwaja Shamsuddin, hand picked successor of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Following the disturbances in Kashmir riots against Hindus began in East Pakistan and were answered in kind by riots against Muslims in West Bengal. After a short period of quiet further anti-Muslim riots broke out in Orissa, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. The RSS was widely blamed but as usual no proof was presented. On April 12, Upadhyaya joined with Socialist Ram Manohar Lohia in a statement which ended in an appeal to end the "artificial situation" of two separate countries and for the setting up of an "Indo-Pak Confederation." The two men said they could understand the anti-Pakistan feelings resulting from communal disturbances in East Pakistan but "our appeal to the people is that this indignation should be directed against the Government and should in no case be given vent against the Indian Muslims."[11] A confederation had long been a Lohia proposal but its endorsement, albeit transitory, by Upadhyaya is surprising in that it would envisage a coordinate relationship between two equally sovereign states. That would not be Akhand Bharat.

The Jana Sangh decided to hold its next session in the south and chose the city of Vijayawada (formerly Bezwada) in Andhra Pradesh. As president to succeed Ghosh the party selected Bachhraj Vyas of Nagpur. Vyas, who was born in Rajasthan in 1916, had been a member of the party since its founding and had an active role in the RSS prior to 1951. He was secretary of the Nagpur RSS when the ban on the organization was lifted. Vyas was hardly the best known of national party leaders although he had been frequently a member of the working committee, had been the party's candidate for the Nagpur Lok Sabha seat in 1962, and had been thrice elected a member of the Maharashtra Legislative Council. To some, at least, his selection was seen as a reassertion of RSS control

[11] *Ibid.*, XVII:38 (April 20, 1964).

of the party. Vyas was reputed, due to his residence in Nagpur, to be a channel through which Golwalkar spoke to the Jana Sangh.

The major work of the session was the final adoption of the statement on "Principles and Policy" which had been given general approval at a session of the Pratinidhi Sabha at Gwalior. The document was primarily the draft of Madhok, Upadhyaya and Vajpayee, but several amendments and revisions had been suggested and some incorporated in the draft submitted at Vijayawada.[12] The document was mainly a compendium of already well-known Jana Sangh policies, to which was prefixed a philosophical statement relating modern democracy to Hindu traditions. While devotion to Bharatiya *sanskriti* (culture) and *maryada* (rectitude) was restated, the object of the party was to be Dharma Rajya: "The nearest English equivalent of Dharma Rajya is Rule of Law." Dharma Rajya can be attained only through democracy: "The institutional form can vary from time to time and from country to country." Democracy (*loktantra*) "is a means for upholding *lokadhikar* (people's rights) and promoting *lokkartavya* (people's duty)." The party said it wanted democracy in the economic and social fields as well as the political:

> The main feature of political democracy is the right to elect representative rulers and to be elected as such. Freedom of occupation and free choice of goods are imperative for economic democracy. Any social democracy arises from equality of status and opportunity.

In the economic field, private property rights must be upheld, although measures for social control are permissible. While the equality provisions of social control might lead non-Hindus to think the Jana Sangh had reversed its reputed stand, the slogan of "one country, one people, one culture, one nation" would dilute any such hopes. The bulk of the statement contained a detailed listing of proposals which would be carried out by the Jana Sangh if it assumed national office. It contained little that was new but did serve as the basis of the 1967 election manifesto.

[12] The final title reads "Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Principles and Policy" (Delhi, Arjun Press, 1965), from which quotations here are taken. The first English edition contained a classic error (p. 17): "The two-nation theory . . . and the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic state have combined to reduce the non-Hindus [sic] in Pakistan to the status of second-class citizens." This has been corrected!

The Vyas presidency saw relations between India and Pakistan break into open warfare along the western border in 1965. In April and May fighting broke out along the disputed border between the two countries in the area of the Rann of Kutch. Despite a threat by Prime Minister Shastri to retaliate at places and times of India's choosing the Indians and Pakistanis agreed to a proposal made by the British that the dispute be referred to an arbitration tribunal. An agreement to that effect was signed by the two countries on July 1. To the Jana Sangh this was, to use the title of a party pamphlet, *The Great Betrayal.*[13] The party maintained that despite statements that the territory was not in dispute, the acceptance of the tribunal indicated clearly that there was a dispute. To reinforce its displeasure the party organized a march in Delhi on July 1 in which Vajpayee was among those arrested. The party called for a national protest on July 4 and meetings were held in a number of cities.[14] At a meeting of the working committee in Jabalpur the agreement was again criticized and again the demand was made for a ten-mile security zone in Assam.[15] On the reopening of Parliament the Jana Sangh on August 16, again marched in Delhi, when the press reported 50,000 in the demonstration.[16]

By that time the party was also protesting a new development in Indo-Pakistan relations—the disturbances in Kashmir which the Indians said were stimulated by infiltrators from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line.[17] As the cease fire line clashes escalated to the Indian thrust toward Lahore and Sialkot on September 6 the Jana Sangh's call for action rose in a crescendo. Madhok, Dogra and others visited the Jammu areas under Pakistan attack and aided in refugee operations. With the action of September 6, the Jana Sangh called for an all out effort to settle problems with Pakistan militarily and acceptance of the cease fire the Jana Sangh saw as another "betrayal."

The Tashkent Declaration of January 10, 1966, was strongly

[13] (Delhi, Navchetan Press, July 1, 1965).
[14] *Times of India* (Delhi), July 1 and July 5, 1965.
[15] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1965.
[16] *Statesman* (Delhi), August 17, 1965.
[17] The writer does not intend here to get into the debate about who started the September conflict. Others from each country have done so and their books may be consulted. Here the Jana Sangh reaction is reported.

opposed by the Jana Sangh (as indeed it was by some in Pakistan). The working committee in Kanpur on January 15 described the declaration as "against the national interest" and Vajpayee said the withdrawal from areas which were "legally Indian" would betray the sacrifice of Indian troops.[18] The party decided to organize a protest on February 6, which they designated "Haji Pir Day" after the pass occupied by Indian troops in August. Again meetings were held in many cities addressed by the party leaders, but the withdrawal to lines held in early August was carried out on schedule.

During this period another topic was agitating the Jana Sangh. Shortly before the Indo-Pakistan conflict Sant Fateh Singh had renewed his demand for a Punjabi Suba to be carved out of the existing Punjab state. In Chapter VIII we discussed the question and ended the discussion by noting the fasts of Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh. The Akali Dal contested the 1962 elections on the Suba issue and returned three members to the Lok Sabha and 19 members to the Punjab assembly under the assembly leadership of retired High Court Justice Sardar Gurnam Singh. Shortly after the elections the Akali Dal split into two sections with the followers of the Sant refuting the leadership of Master Tara Singh. The Sant group generally, though not always, took a more moderate line on the Suba, which they said should be a truly linguistic division and should be a part of the Indian Union. At times the Master group worked for a religious state which might leave the Indian Union. After the death of Nehru a commission set up to look into allegations against Chief Minister Pratap Singh Kairon issued its report and Kairon resigned. He was replaced by Chaudhury Ram Kishen.

After about a year of relatively non-agitational demands, the Sant, in August, 1965, announced plans to go on a fast to be followed by self-immolation if the Suba demands were not granted. After much persuasion the Sant agreed to postpone his action at least for the duration of the emergency with Pakistan. The Jana Sangh opposed Punjabi Suba as strongly as ever. An Arya Samajist who later became a Jana Sangh member of the Lok Sabha, Ram Gopal Shalwale, threatened to go on fast a day ahead of the Sant.

Before his death Shastri appointed a cabinet committee to go

[18] *Hindustan Times*, January 17, 1966.

into the question. By mid-January one of the members, Mrs. Gandhi, had become prime minister, and another, Mahavir Tyagi, had resigned in protest against the Tashkent Declaration. In addition the Congress Working Committee had set up a sub-committee and a committee of the Parliament was also at work. The first announcement came on March 9, 1966, when the Congress Party group said it had decided that, as a Congress policy, the Suba should be created out of the existing Punjab state and that a separate Hindi-speaking state called Haryana should also be created. The hilly areas would be merged into Himachal Pradesh.[19] The decision of the Parliamentary group was similar, although Vajpayee as a member dissented.[20] But these decisions were on the principle and not on the detailed division. That was to be decided by a special commission.

The Jana Sangh reaction was swift in opposition. Yagya Dutt Sharma went on fast. For more than a week Jana Sanghis and Arya Samajists demonstrated against the Suba in Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. Three Congressmen were killed in a fire in Panipat and reports spread rapidly that the Jana Sangh had a hand in this. Ambala, Jullundur, Amritsar, Ludhiana and other towns were the scenes of disorders while in Delhi there was a strike and some damage to Sikh owned properties. Tara Singh, who was not satisfied with the decisions, was arrested. So were two leading Arya Samajist newspaper editors, Virendra of *Pratap* and Yash of *Milap*.

However, while the Punjab Jana Sanghis and Arya Samajists were rioting, the national leadership took a much cooler stand. Madhok, already president-elect of the party, went immediately to Amritsar. He talked with Fateh Singh on March 13 after meeting Sharma first on the 11th in an attempt to dissuade him from the fast. Sharma eventually gave up his fast on the 21st after receiving "assurances" which were announced in Parliament by Home Minister Nanda. The "assurances" were that the division would be strictly linguistic "without any communal or religious factors being allowed to come into consideration," some common links would be retained between Punjab and Haryana and the rights of the minorities,

[19] *Ibid.*, March 10, 1966.
[20] *Ibid.*, March 19, 1966.

linguistic or otherwise" would be safeguarded.[21] The Jana Sangh while hardly pleased with the results could now settle down to accepting the *fait accompli*. They did not entirely give up and the Arya Samajists continued to splutter. On March 23 a delegation of Arya Samajists including Shalwale and Om Prakash Tyagi, also elected a Jana Sangh member of the Lok Sabha in 1967, and Prakash Vir Shastri and Virendra, now out of jail, met Nanda. They asked for more explicit safeguards and the release of prisoners.[22]

Madhok Presidency

As recounted above, Balraj Madhok was president-elect of the Jana Sangh when the Punjabi Suba decision was announced. He has been one of the leading characters throughout this biography of the Jana Sangh and nationally was one of the best known of his party. He had long favored cooperation between the Jana Sangh and other parties of the right, i.e., Swatantra, and on many issues held less rigid and more pragmatic views than his colleagues. This is not to say that he could not speechify with the most rabid Jana Sanghi, but his writings in general and many of his speeches during his presidency showed relative moderation. Succeeding two rather unknown presidents he was to lead the party in the 1967 elections. In Chapter XII we shall discuss his conflict with Vajpayee and Upadhyaya on the direction of the party after the elections.

Attention continued to center on Punjab. After some hesitation the Jana Sangh decided to stick with its earlier decision to hold its session in Jullundur. In his presidential address Madhok called for a division of the state on a "purely linguistic basis without allowing any political or communal consideration to come in. This is essential to prevent the extremist elements among the Akalis and the Arya Samajists to further aggravate the already difficult situation."[23] Madhok said the Jana Sangh opposed the division of Punjab "for the wider considerations of national development" as it had also opposed the division of Jammu and Kashmir into its

[21] *Ibid.*, March 22, 1966.
[22] *Ibid.*, March 24, 1966.
[23] "Presidential Address by Prof. Balraj Madhok," issued by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh Central Office (Delhi, 1966).

linguistic units. Now, however, he said it might be desirable to merge Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab hilly areas into Jammu and Kashmir "to bring the whole of the Western Himalayan region under one administrative control." It is important to note that he did not propose the division of Jammu and Kashmir with Jammu and Ladakh alone merging with Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab hills, a suggestion attributed to some Kashmiri Hindu leaders, and one which approximates a suggestion made by Mookerjee in 1953. Now that the decision has been taken "the non-Akali Hindus of Punjab" should "own Gurmukhi script unreservedly." In a resolution the session expressed its hope that the Nanda assurances would be carried out and said: "The Jana Sangh regards the Sikhs as part and parcel of the Hindu Society . . . We hope that they will keep themselves away from the pulls, and the leadership, which strive to sow among them seeds of separatism." [24] Madhok's request to "own Gurmukhi" was reinforced by Golwalkar who in a tour of the Punjab asked Hindus to learn Punjabi as it too is "a language of Bharat." [25]

Much of Madhok's address was directly related to the Indo-Pakistan conflict. He saw Pakistan engaged in creating directly or indirectly three alliances aimed against India. One of these was the "Pindi-Peking axis," another the Communist-Muslim League coming together in India, and the third the Pakistan-Turkey-Iran economic cooperation grouping which Madhok saw as including eventually Saudi Arabia and Jordan. On the last he said India should not believe this was aimed only at isolating the United Arab Republic. It was also aimed at Muslim hegemony in the sub-continent. To counterbalance this trend India needed, he said, to become more self-reliant in defense needs, to recognize Israel and to draw closer to the nations of Southeast Asia. The resolution on "Defence and Foreign Relations" echoed the speech. It called for a large expansion of Indian armed forces and for the development of atomic weapons. To oppose Communist China, it proposed opening of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the recognition of the Dalai Lama as the head of a Tibetan government in exile. It also said India should "give every encouragement

[24] Pamphlet published by Central Office.
[25] *Hindustan Times,* April 4, 1966.

to the movement for independence of Pakhtoonistan and East Bengal from the totalitarian control of Pakistan." The resolution did not mention the United States or the Soviet Union but the presidential address did. Madhok said India could no longer count on support from the Soviet Union on Kashmir—that the Soviets desired a balance in the sub-continent—but that the two countries could work together in the containment of China. Madhok saw a degree of condescension in the American view of India which grew out of India's economic dependence on the United States. He said the United States should be more sensitive to "Indian suspicion about undue foreign interference in the field of education while finalising the proposal about an Indo-American Foundation and Indian susceptibilities about Kashmir just as India must pay due regard to American susceptibilities about Vietnam."

On economic matters the session expressed concern about the rising prices, the fall in industrial production and the critical state of food production. All these were blamed on the "misdirected and doctrinaire economic policies" of the Congress. During the ensuing months the Jana Sangh would take part in a series of demonstrations against the government on the price question. All of this would be a tune up for the coming elections in which economic issues would play an important role.

The spring of 1966 also brought the biennial elections to the upper legislative houses. The Jana Sangh added three members to its Rajya Sabha delegation which now numbered six, after the death of Kapur. The Uttar Pradesh seat was given to a party veteran and former officer of the state unit, Kunj Behari Lal Rathi. From Madhya Pradesh former Mahasabhite Niranjan Lal Verma was elected. Verma had been a member of the Madhya Bharat assembly from Vidisha District but was defeated in the 1957 and 1962 elections. An agreement in Rajasthan with the Swatantra Party gave a seat in that state to the Jana Sangh. Sundar Singh Bhandari was elected and moved his headquarters from Jaipur to New Delhi where he became *de facto* deputy general secretary to Upadhyaya. After Upadhyaya's elevation to the presidency in 1967 he became general secretary. The expected number of seats were won in the Uttar Pradesh and Punjab legislative councils and former Lok Sabha member Uttam Rao Patil was elected to the Maharashtra

council. It was a suprise that the party won a seat in Mysore and added another in Andhra Pradesh. Those wins, together with Patil's, indicate again the appeal of the Jana Sangh to the professionals who comprise the teachers' and graduates' constituencies for the council. More out of character was a win for a Jana Sanghi in a by-election to the Calcutta municipality.

To return to the Punjab, the agreement to divide the state was accepted by the Sant Akalis even if it did not go far enough for the more extreme Akalis in the Master Tara Singh group and went too far for the urban Arya Samajists. The Sant, however, was not at all satisfied with the line of demarcation between the two new states. The main point of contention was the capital city of Chandigarh, although there were others as well, both administrative and territorial, as in Fazilka and Rupar. The bill introduced into Parliament provided that Chandigarh would become a union territory under direct rule from New Delhi but would serve as the common capital for both Punjab and Haryana. The bill alloted Simla to Himachal Pradesh, thus giving that union territory a capital on its own soil for the first time. The Sant strongly opposed the exclusion of Chandigarh from Punjab. He announced an agitation which would end with self-immolation on December 25. The announcement brought a rush of political activity as various formulae were tried to assuage the Sant and keep him from the pyre in Amritsar. The persuasions eventually were successful, the burning was avoided and the disputants agreed to postpone the question until later. During this period the Jana Sangh, which had reconstituted its unit into separate Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh units was relatively quiet. Neither the Haryana nor Punjab unit wanted to involve itself too deeply in an issue which would be important to each unit on the opposite side in the future. Having Chandigarh as a union territory, a Jana Sangh candidate was elected to the Lok Sabha from the city in 1967 on a *status quo* platform, albeit somewhat to the consternation of the Punjab and Haryana Jana Sanghs who were now committed largely to the views prevailing in their own states.

The Madhok presidency was the most active and widely reported in the party up to that time. The president travelled extensively and expressed his views publicly on every issue. These views were given a prominence in the press unprecedented for a Jana

Sangh leader. The president also spent some days in jail as the result of the November, 1966, anti-cow-slaughter agitation to which we now turn.

A demonstration was held in front of Parliament House on September 5, to demand complete abolition of cow slaughter in accordance with the directive principles of the constitution. At the demonstration three religious leaders announced that they would go and fast on November 20 to support the ban. One of these was Prabhudutt Brahmachari, an ascetic with headquarters in Allahabad and Vrindaban, who had contested against Nehru in the 1952 elections. Another was the Jain community leader Muni Shushil Kumar. The demand outside the house was supported by a noisy display inside the Lok Sabha by Jana Sanghi Swami Rameshwaranand, which could only be stopped by the Speaker's adjournment of the House. The leaders set up the Sarvadaliya Goraksha Maha-abhiyan Samiti (All Party Committee for the Cow Protection Movement) at a meeting in New Delhi a few days later.[26] The Supreme Council included Brahmachari, Golwalkar, Swami Karpatri of Ram Rajya Parishad, the Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Puri, Muni Shushil Kumar, Swami Guru Charan Das of the Bharat Sadhu Samaj, and Hanuman Prasad Poddar of the large Marwari business house.[27] An executive committee was also constituted which included some of the above and others who were nominees of the members of the Supreme Council. Among these were Hansraj Gupta of the Delhi RSS, V. P. Joshi of the Delhi RSS and Jana Sangh, Seth Govind Das of the Congress, Ramgopal Shalwale of the Arya Samaj, former Ram Rajya Parishad member of the Lok Sabha Nand Lal Shastri, and Professor Ram Singh of the Delhi Mahasabha. The organizing meeting was attended by still others including Upadhyaya who was one of the speakers.[28] At a working committee meeting in Nagpur on November 3 the Jana Sangh offered its "full support" to the Committee.[29]

[26] *Organiser.*, XX:7 (September, 25, 1966). Other reports state that the Committee was founded earlier, but it appears that the official organizing meeting was the one reported in *Organiser.*

[27] *Ibid.* Another report includes Mahant Digvijaynath, the Hindu Mahasabha leader.

[28] *Ibid.* It is doubtful if Govind Das actually associated himself.

[29] *Hindustan Times,* November 4, 1966.

November 7 was set for a large demonstration against cow slaughter in New Delhi. According to the press the number of marchers was 125,000, probably the largest in Delhi's history. The day ended tragically as the police were forced to open fire on the demonstrators and as fire was set to many vehicles. The climax of the demonstration was the trapping of Congress President Kamaraj Nadar in his residence and the injury of his personal servants. A number of speakers addressed the crowd outside Parliament House. Karpatri and another spoke first: "Though their speeches were angry and provocative, the crowd was peaceful. Trouble began when Swami Rameshwaranand took his place on the stage." He asked the people to stop anyone from entering or leaving Parliament House. "The excited crowd made a beeline for Parliament House" and the stone throwing, baton charging and fighting began. Vajpayee and Brahmachari tried vainly to stop the mob. By the time the day was over seven people had been killed.[30]

Arrests followed immediately. Rameshwaranand was arrested very soon. On November 8 the list of those arrested included Nand Lal Shastri, Haradyal Devgun, Joshi, Om Prakash Tyagi, Vasantrao Oke and Vijay Kumar Malhotra. The following day Madhok, Hans Raj Gupta, Lalchand Advani, and Kanwar Lal Gupta were arrested. The Jana Sangh strongly denied any organizational connection with the Committee and this view was endorsed by Muni Shushil Kumar.[31] Madhok and most of the others were released on November 18, although many of the lesser lights—especially among the naked sadhus—were retained in jail for some longer period. Madhok and the party demanded a judicial inquiry into the entire episode.

Brahmachari and the Jagadguru of Puri went on their fasts as scheduled. The fasts continued until January 30 and January 31 respectively. During the period there were countless attempts to find a formula which could end the deadlock between the government and the Committee and the fasters. The Jana Sangh urged both leaders to break the fasts and permit the matter to be settled electorally and constitutionally. It was clear that the movement

[30] Quotations from *ibid.*, November 8, 1966. Similar accounts appeared in other newspapers.

[31] *Times of India* (Delhi), November 14, 1966.

would be a factor in the forthcoming elections. Karpatri wanted to make it so and asked the Jana Sangh to join a united front. The Jana Sangh declined to become entangled with the tiny Ram Rajya Parishad and Hindu Mahasabha but the demand for the abolition of cow slaughter was a principal component of the Jana Sangh election manifesto.

Before moving to the 1967 elections a comment should be made on the discipline shown in the legislative groups of the party. In the Lok Sabha the fourteen member delegation just after the elections had dropped to twelve. We have already mentioned the loss of the Jaunpur by-election. Raja Ajit Pratap Singh of Pratapgarh decided to leave the Jana Sangh and apply for membership in the Congress on March 14, 1966. Chaudhury Lehri Singh resigned from the Jana Sangh just after the announcement of the division of the Punjab, also on March 14, 1966. Both men alleged the Jana Sangh "complicity" in the Punjab violence caused them to leave. The party gained a new member on May 27, 1966, when Maharaja Vijay Bhushan Singh Deo of Jashpur joined after leaving the Ram Rajya Parishad.

The total Jana Sangh membership of legislative assemblies rose from the 119 elected in 1962 to 122.[32] The changes were as follows:

Bihar: Increased from three to four when Jana Sangh won Monghyr by-election from Congress shortly after the general election.

Madhya Pradesh: Increased from 41 to 46. Six independents from Bastar District joined the Jana Sangh as did one Mahasabhite from Guna District. The party also lost one by-election to the Congress and had one member desert to the Praja Socialist Party.[33]

Punjab: Decreased from eight to seven as one member from perennial problem district Mahendragarh deserted to Congress.

Rajasthan: Decreased from 15 to 13. One Jana Sanghi was unseated for being too young to sit in the assembly. His place was taken by a Swatantrite supported by the Jana Sangh. Abdul Jabbar Khan deserted to the Congress.

[32] Assembly membership as of July 1, 1966, from *India, 1966* (New Delhi, Government of India, Publications Division, 1966).

[33] Included in the 46 Jana Sanghis in Madhya Pradesh are three who were expelled for the balance of the term for misbehavior. No by-elections were held.

Uttar Pradesh: Total remained unchanged at 49. One Mahasabhite from Etah District joined and remained in the Jana Sangh and the party gained a seat in Basti District from Congress.[34] A by-election was lost to the Congress and a member from another problem district, Gonda, deserted to the Congress.

Jammu and Kashmir had no change in its membership of three Jana Sanghis. The record of the Jana Sangh on desertions is probably as good as or better than any other party in India. Only four of 119 assembly members left the party. The two Lok Sabha members who left had no long term association with either the Jana Sangh or the RSS. The record is given in some detail to indicate the stronger discipline resulting from the careful selection of candidates begun in 1957 and improved in 1962.

From this narrative of the events of the 1962–67 election period we turn now to a consideration of the fourth, and most eventful, general elections in India.

[34] The winner in the by-election was K. K. Nayar, whose wife, Shakuntala, was a sitting Jana Sangh member.

CHAPTER XI

Facing the Electorate (IV)—1967

In 1967 for the fourth time in India's history the opposition went to the polls with the high, and previously dashed, hopes of displacing the Congress Party. This time, however, there was a different result for the opposition did reduce the Congress to a minority in several states and, almost without exception, in the other states sharply reduced the Congress majorities. In the Lok Sabha the results were headlined by one paper as "Congress struggles to a majority." This chapter will not attempt to analyse the causes of the Congress decline—its focus is the Jana Sangh performance—but some of the factors which contributed to that decline are of interest; the passing of Nehru; the economic recession; dissension within and desertion from the Congress; the poor performance of some Congress ministries; the majority of post-independence voters who perhaps did not recognize the role of the Congress in the independence struggle; and perhaps a general desire for a change. The Jana Sangh benefited greatly from the drop in Congress support but not enough to take charge alone anywhere except in Delhi. Swatantra and the SSP also gained nationally as did the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras and other parties marginally elsewhere. The post-election situation will be described in the next chapter but it was made clear that the Indian voter had not chosen a single alternative to the Congress. Assemblies were elected in every state. For the first time Lok Sabha members from Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, the Andamans, the Laccadives and Dadra and Nagar Haveli were directly elected. In Delhi a three tier election was held as the

electorate voted for members of the Lok Sabha, the Metropolitan Council and the Municipal Corporation.

Organization and Manifesto

The Jana Sangh was now an established political party with a good if unevenly spread organization. A well-formulated basic policy needed only updating and rearrangement to produce a manifesto for the 1967 elections. Hence, we need not spend much time on these two facets of the election.

The organization had continued to undergo the tuning up and expansion which had been a regular process since the Sharma episode. Local units in the areas of strength had been increased and to the extent possible a steady stream of new blood in workers and supporters had been developed. The states earmarked for expansion had been developed although, in terms of seats won in the elections only Bihar was to show any significant increase. It is safe to say, however, that everywhere there were more Jana Sangh units and more Jana Sanghis. There were no nationally known new adherents to the party. A few Hindu Mahasabhites such as Niranjanlal Verma and V. G. Deshpande had been added and a few Ram Rajya Parishad members such as the Maharaja of Jashpur. In Rajasthan the Maharaja of Jhalawar and the Maharajkumar of Kotah associated with the Jana Sangh for the elections; the former has since died but the latter has continued his association in the Lok Sabha.

The writer could not but notice the significant increase in publicity for the party as compared to 1962. In the pre-election stages the party candidate lists received coverage in the Delhi-based press to a greater extent than any party except the Congress. The day-to-day reporting of the campaign was heavy with Madhok and Vajpayee receiving personally the greatest amount of coverage. The "dope" stories in the daily press and the weekly journals seldom omitted the Jana Sangh in contrast to earlier elections when the party was often neglected.

The selection of candidates followed the Congress pattern. Local units recommended to state units which then forwarded the list for final consideration to the national parliamentary board which was dominated by Madhok, Vajpayee, Upadhyaya and the regional secretaries. The re-nomination rate was high and would

have been higher had not several sitting Jana Sanghis been squeezed out of their regular constituencies by the new delimitation which followed the 1961 census and was effective for the 1967 elections. Several constituencies which had been general seats became reserved seats and the sitting members could not safely be accommodated elsewhere. Other parties suffered as well and there was no gerrymandering aimed directly at the Jana Sangh. With a single exception, Suraj Lal Verma of Sitapur, all of the sitting members of the Lok Sabha ran in the elections. We have already noted the defections of Lehri Singh of Rohtak and Ajit Pratap Singh of Pratapgarh. U. M. Trivedi was first announced as sitting out the election but later was shunted to a Rajasthan constituency where he was defeated. When the votes were counted only two of the ten who contested were re-elected, Onkar Singh from Budaun and Kachwai from Ujjain. Only one Rajya Sabha member ran for the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee, and he was notably successful.

In the states a similar record of re-nomination was compiled. In Bihar all four sitting members ran again; all were defeated. In Haryana also all four stood again and three were re-elected. In Jammu and Kashmir all three ran again; two were returned. All three of those renominated in Punjab were re-elected while the fourth sitting member was nominated for the Lok Sabha and was defeated. In the larger states the effects of delimitation, and—in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan—the effects of electoral alliances, took a greater toll. In Uttar Pradesh of the 43 who were elected in 1962 and remained with the party, 36 contested in 1967. Of these 30 were renominated for assembly seats and ten were successful. Six more were named to contest Lok Sabha seats and two of them won. In Madhya Pradesh, 21 of 37 sitting members who had been elected on the party ticket in 1962 were renominated and 14 were reelected. In Rajasthan, of twelve, ten were renominated and six reelected.

To indicate in another way the electoral experience garnered by individual Jana Sanghis it is important to note how many of the successful 1967 candidates had had previous Jana Sangh electoral experience. In the central areas of party strength this number is, of course, higher than it is in areas of more recent expansion such as Bihar. Of the 35 Jana Sanghis elected to the Lok Sabha, 17 had

had electoral experience on the Jana Sangh or Hindu Mahasabha ticket in previous elections. The others included three members of the Rajmata of Gwalior group, a former Congressman with experience in that party and several Jana Sanghis who had been previously associated with the organizational work. Of the 255 Jana Sanghis elected to legislative assemblies 93 had previously been candidates for election.[1]

The Jana Sangh clearly had better financing in 1967 than in previous elections. It is difficult to determine precise sources of large financial support but various reports made to Parliament and carried in the press indicate that the Jana Sangh did receive substantial help from many of the large business organizations in India. Several candidates adopted by the party were persons of substance and presumably financed their own campaigns and those of others. The bulk of the underwriting, however, seems to have continued to come from the middle class shopkeepers and professionals who make up the backbone of the party. One well done booklet designed for national circulation contains advertisements from such large firms as Khatau Mills, Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Company, the Cement Allocation and Co-ordinating Organisation, Associated Cement, Tata and Scindia Steam Navigation.[2] Another booklet designed for distribution in Delhi in aid of Madhok calls attention to the smaller contributor who takes an advertisement in favor of his shop. It also includes some national firms such as Hindusthan Motors of the Birla group and the Modi industrial complex of Uttar Pradesh.[3]

The manifesto of the party was adopted at a Pratinidhi Sabha session in Nagpur in November. It contained little which was new. The eight pledges of the party were these:

1. Both Communist China and Pakistan are in illegal occupation of large areas of Indian territory. While the Congress government has

[1] Figures exclude 13 members of Rajmata group in Madhya Pradesh. By states: Andhra Pradesh, 1 of 3; Gujarat, 0 of 1; Haryana, 5 of 12; Himachal Pradesh, 1 of 7; Jammu and Kashmir, 2 of 3; Madhya Pradesh, 26 of 65 (excluding Rajmata group); Maharashtra, 3 of 4; Mysore, 1 of 4; Punjab, 4 of 9; Rajasthan, 12 of 22; Uttar Pradesh, 33 of 98; and West Bengal, 1 of 1.

[2] "Jana-deep Souvenir," printed at Rakesh Press, Delhi.

[3] "Smārikā, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Naī Dillī," printed at Guttenberg Printing Works, New Delhi.

acquiesced in their occupation, the Jana Sangh will take all necessary steps to regain them.

2. In the interest of national security, Jana Sangh will develop adequate defence potential, including atomic weapons.

3. Jana Sangh will decentralise political power in a real and effective manner.

4. Jana Sangh will end the emergency. In the interest of civil liberties, the Defence of India Rules will be repealed.

5. Jana Sangh will ensure equal treatment to all citizens, without favour or discrimination, irrespective of language, caste or creed.

6. The cow is our national point of honour. Cow slaughter will be legally banned.

7. Jana Sangh will change the Plan. With a view to balanced development and effective implementation, it will adopt micro-economic planning, region-wise and project-wise.

8. Non-alignment can neither be a creed nor a permanent basis of our foreign policy. Jana Sangh will follow an independent foreign policy.[4]

With these pledges fleshed out into a 118 paragraph manifesto the Jana Sangh fought the 1967 elections.

Tactics

With Madhok at the helm the Jana Sangh looked actively for alliances with other political parties. Swatantra was the most likely party for Madhok to work with and he negotiated principally with general secretary Minoo Masani. Talks were held with other parties but were, except for a few local adjustments, generally unsuccessful.

Swatantra and Jana Sangh negotiated an electoral alliance in Rajasthan. It provided that the two parties would form a government under Swatantra leadership were the alliance successful. In the division of the seats the Jana Sangh contested 63 assembly seats and the Swatantra Party 107. The remaining fourteen seats were left for contest by independents and members of the Janata Party which entered the alliance as a third member. An attempt to include the SSP in the alliance failed and there were a number of contests in which the SSP opposed the alliance. In no case (either for the assembly or the Lok Sabha) did candidates of the Jana Sangh oppose Swatantra candidates. The 23 Lok Sabha seats were

[4] "Jana-deep Souvenir," *op. cit.*, p. 59.

divided fourteen for Swantantra and seven for Jana Sangh. The alliance did not oppose the Maharajas of Bikaner and Bharatpur for the other two seats.

The two parties also came to an agreement in Gujarat in which the stronger Swatantra Party naturally dominated the much weaker Jana Sangh. In return for agreeing not to contest any Lok Sabha seats the Jana Sangh was allotted a quota of sixteen assembly seats of the total of 168. The Swatantra Party was allotted the remainder but some seats went uncontested by either party and in Surat District there were three seats in which candidates of the two parties opposed each other. The Swatantra Party contested 21 of the 24 Lok Sabha seats. The alliance did not oppose veteran Indulal Yagnik in Ahmedabad—he won a third term—, Republican leader K. U. Parmar in Gandhinagar—he was defeated—, or a PSP candidate in Amreli. The Gujarat agreement also provided for Jana Sangh acceptance of Swatantra leadership in a government should the alliance win a majority.

Swatantra and Jana Sangh talks were also held elsewhere. In Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh substantial agreement was reached. Where candidates did oppose each other it was frequently done so as to dilute the communal or caste strength of a Congress candidate in the same constituency. The newness of Jana Sangh in Orissa and the collapse of Swatantra in Bihar, after the defection of the Raja of Ramgarh, made talks in those two states appear less promising. In Orissa, also, Swatantra found a stronger ally in the Jana Congress under Harekrushna Mahtab and other ex-Congressmen. The remaining state in which the two parties could do each other the most damage was Uttar Pradesh. Some local agreement was reached; for example, the continuation of a Swatantra Muslim candidate against the Congress made a negative contribution to the Jana Sangh. In the analysis of the elections we shall look more closely at the effect of Jana Sangh-Swatantra competition.

In Madhya Pradesh the defection from Congress of a group called the Jana Congress led by Takhatmal Jain, Moolchand Deshlera and others changed the political alignment in that state; and so did the later defection of the Rajmata of Gwalior, Vijaye Raje Scindia. The Jana Sangh was already the second strongest party in the state. A series of talks were held in Bhopal among the leaders of

the Jana Sangh, the Jana Congress and the Rajmata group. For a time the SSP also associated with the talks but it was unable to reach complete agreement with the other parties and ran against them in a large number of constituencies. In the pact which was concluded, the Rajmata group agreed to accept the symbol of either the Jana Sangh or the Swatantra Party while the Jana Congress would rely on its own, newly allocated symbol. The avoidance of contests was not complete; the three parties had a total of 319 candidates for the 296 seats in the assembly. However, in the former Madhya Bharat areas which were once in Gwalior state the alliance was complete. For the 37 Lok Sabha seats the alliance was effective as the Jana Sangh contested 32, Swatantra 2 and the Jana Congress 3. Among the 32 Jana Sanghis were four nominees of the Rajmata, all of whom were successful, while the Rajmata herself won on the Swatantra ticket, and won an assembly seat on the Jana Sangh ticket. However, there were problems in the Lok Sabha contests. For example, the Jana Sangh had set up a candidate for the Raipur seat. Acharya Kripalani suddenly switched his attention from Baroda in Gujarat to Raipur and the Jana Sangh decided not to withdraw its candidate. Thus an essentially three cornered contest was set up among the Congress, the Jana Sangh and Kripalani supported by all other opposition parties. Had Kripalani received the Jana Sangh votes he probably would have won instead of waiting to win the seat vacated by the Rajmata when she decided to remain in the assembly.

In addition to the Rajmata group candidates who ran under the symbol of the Jana Sangh, the party also permitted its use by Ram Gopal Shalwale in Chandni Chowk, Delhi. Others supported by the Jana Sangh, but not using the symbol included two Hindu Mahasabhites. Bishen Chandra Seth, a sitting Mahasabhite, was supported by all opposition parties in his effort to defeat Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Rae Bareli. The Jana Sangh also buried the hatchet with Mahant Digvijaynath who had caused them so much difficulty in 1962 and supported him in a successful bid from his home base, Gorakhpur. Another Arya Samajist who received Jana Sangh support, for the third time, was Prakash Vir Shastri in Hapur. Former Punjab inspector-general of police Sant Prakash Singh, who ran on the Swatantra ticket, was supported against Defence Minister

Swaran Singh in Jullundur. Others supported, according to Upadhyaya, were H. V. Kamath of the PSP, S. M. Joshi of the SSP and B. K. Gaikwad of the Republican Party.[5]

Again the burden of the campaign fell primarily on the local worker. With improved resources in terms of personnel, funds, and vehicles the Jana Sangh appeared to this writer, who visited India briefly from his post in West Pakistan, to saturate the cites and the countryside of north west India. The comment was heard that if flags were votes the Jana Sangh would win handily. The writer followed the election campaign primarily through three Delhi English language papers which found their way to Lahore. From these it was clear that in national and local coverage the papers had vastly increased the space devoted to the Jana Sangh over that given in 1962. The national leadership was busy. Not only the big three of Madhok, Vajpayee, and Upadhyaya, the first two of whom had their own constituencies, were active but the second echelon with more campaign experience now proved effective. To cite one case, Yagya Dutt Sharma of Punjab was the principal campaigner in that state and the Jana Sangh did relatively very well.

Verdict


The result of the election was startling. A slump in the Congress poll and representation had been predicted as had a rise in the Jana Sangh, SSP and some of the regional parties. But the magnitude of the Congress decline was beyond what any unattached observer had expected. In two areas the Congress lost control of the legislatures to a single party, to the DMK in Madras, and to the Jana Sangh in Delhi. Two more pre-arranged coalitions won large victories, the Communist Marxist group in Kerala and the Swatantra-Jana Congress alliance in Orissa. In Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal the Congress emerged as the largest but not a majority party. On the other hand in Madhya Pradesh, which was high on the list of states in which the prognosticators thought the Congress was least likely to succeed, the Congress majority was statistically handsome; the next chapter will show that this judgment was superficial. Swatantra's high hopes in Gujarat were de-


[5] *Organiser*, XX:36 (April 23, 1967).

nied by a strong Congress win, while Haryana, like Madhya Pradesh, had a superficially large Congress majority. The magnitude of the upheaval at the polls could also be measured by the big Congress names who were defeated. Heading the list were the party president, Kamaraj, "syndicate" leaders Patil and Atulya Ghosh, several central ministers and the chief ministers of West Bengal, Punjab, Bihar and Madras. To apply a similar standard to the Jana Sangh, eleven of the 28 members of the working committee ran for election. Of these eight were elected, four each to the Lok Sabha and the assemblies. One lost in the Lok Sabha, U. M. Trivedi, whose constituency has been shifted, and two lost in assemblies, one each from Gujarat and Kerala where Jana Sangh wins would have been a fluke. The two contesting members of the triumvirate, Madhok and Vajpayee, won resounding victories.

In Delhi the Jana Sangh won a big victory capitalizing on its own strong organization and on the split within the Congress between the Brahm Prakash group and their opponents led by Mehr Chand Khanna. The Jana Sangh won six of seven Lok Sabha seats, 33 of 56 in the Metropolitan Council and 52 of 100 in the Municipal Corporation. The percentage of the Lok Sabha vote received by the Jana Sangh rose from 32.66 percent in 1952 to 46.72 percent in 1967. For the Council the Jana Sangh vote was noticably lower: 36.22 percent.

The most heralded of the victories was, of course, that of party president Madhok who rolled up a 36,000 vote margin in South Delhi against a wealthy Delhi businessman running on the Congress ticket. Possibly even more notable was the defeat of Union Minister Mehr Chand Khanna by political novice M. L. Sondhi in New Delhi. Sondhi had resigned from the Indian Foreign Service, turned to teaching and entered politics with the Jana Sangh. Delhi Jana Sangh president and former Hindu Mahasabha secretary Hardayal Devgun won the East Delhi seat. Kanwar Lal Gupta, who had apparently decided he was a Jana Sanghi after all, won the Delhi Saddar seat which he had denied to Bhai Mahavir in 1962 by contesting as an independent. The Arya Samajist Shalwale defeated central deputy minister Sham Nath in Chandni Chowk while Ram Swaroop Vidhyarthi benefited from a Congress split to win in Karol Bagh. The only seat lost by the Jana Sangh was the Outer Delhi seat


JANA SANGH - 1967
Parliamentary and Assembly Seats Won
Delhi
Bhind
Gwalior
Sitapur
Bahraich
Basti
Parliamentary Seats
Assembly Seats


JANA SANGH - 1967
Percentage of Popular Vote
Polled in Assembly Contests
By Districts
LEGEND
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE
0
1
5
10
20
30
50
100
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
MANIPUR

which Brahm Prakash won for the Congress against a newcomer to the Jana Sangh.

In the Council Vijay Kumar Malhotra headed the list of winners while the Congress losers included almost all of the leading candidates. Anwar Dehlavi, a Muslim, also rode in on the Jana Sangh ticket. In the Corporation election the Congress did better but could not stop a Jana Sangh majority headed by the present deputy-mayor Balraj Khanna. Several important Delhi Jana Sanghis did not contest but were added to the Council by nomination, as in the case of Lalchand Advani, or to the Corporation through the election of aldermen. Among the aldermen added were Mayor Hansraj Gupta and Kidar Nath Sahni.

In Madhya Pradesh the Jana Sangh polled 29.56 percent of the votes for the Lok Sabha and 28.28 percent for the assembly. These totals include the candidates of the Rajmata group which adopted the Jana Sangh symbol. If they are excluded the Jana Sangh recorded a gain of three seats for the Lok Sabha to a total of six and of 24 seats in the assembly for a total of 65. Among the regions of present Madhya Pradesh the assembly gain was distributed more evenly except for a substantial loss in Vindhya Pradesh, where the Maharaja of Rewa had aligned himself with Mishra and the Congress. The Jana Sangh dropped from five seats to one in Vindhya Pradesh but more than offset that by winning seven new seats in the former Bhopal state. Excluding the Rajmata group the party gained eight seats, for a total of 34, in Madhya Bharat, and 13 seats for a total of 23 in old Madhya Pradesh. Madhya Bharat continued to dominate the Jana Sangh. Of the 58 Madhya Bharat seats contested by non-Rajmata group of Jana Sanghis the party won 34.[6]

Mandsaur was again the strongest district for the party. It won six of the seven assembly seats—one involving the second re-election of Virendra Kumar Saklecha, the leader of the opposition in the outgoing assembly. The Jana Sangh retained the Lok Sabha seat with a businessman, Swatantra Singh Kothari. In the eighth assembly seat in the Mandsaur Lok Sabha constituency—Jaora in Ratlam District—Laxminarayan Pandey, who had defeated Katju in

[6] The entire list of Rajmata candidates is not available. Thirteen won on the Jana Sangh ticket and seven on the Swatantra ticket without Jana Sangh opposition, five in Guna District and two in Shivpuri District.

1962, was himself defeated in 1967. In Khargone where the Jana Sangh had won the Lok Sabha seat and seven of the eight assembly seats in 1962, the party had a moderate loss in percentage of votes and a substantial loss in seats won. It took but two of the nine assembly seats and incumbent Lok Sabha member Ramchandra V. Bade was defeated. However, the party won seats for the first time in neighboring Khandwa District, also a part of the Nimar area.

In other Lok Sabha contests sitting member Hukamchand Kachwai was re-elected from Ujjain and sitting member Vijay Bhushan Singh Deo, Maharaja of Jashpur, was defeated from Satna, his original seat having been reserved for scheduled tribes. The Maharaja's wife contested from Raipur against Acharya Kripalani and the seat was won by the Congress. Party secretary Jagannathan Rao Joshi was elected against the sitting Congress Muslim member from Bhopal, where the Jana Sangh made a sharply bitter showing. Jana Sangh support for the tribals in Bastar District led to a Lok Sabha win there and other seats were won in Dhar and Sagar. Sagar sent five Jana Sanghis to the seven assembly seats in the district. In an important contest the Jana Sangh set up sitting member Bal Krishna Paldhikar against Chief Minister Mishra in Katangi, Jabalpur District. The press gave Paldikhar a good chance to win but Mishra retained the seat by a margin of more than two to one. All of the three members who had been expelled from the assembly for misbehavior were renominated; one from Mandsaur was re-elected, two from Raipur were defeated.

In Uttar Pradesh the Jana Sangh retained its status as "largest party after the Congress" as it won 98 seats in the 425 member assembly for which it had contested 401. It took 12 of 85 Lok Sabha seats of which it contested 77. For the assembly the percentage of the vote received increased from 16.46 in 1962 to 21.67 in 1967, and for the Lok Sabha from 17.57 to 22.58. In terms of direct Congress-Jana Sangh rivalry, the Jana Sangh received 46 votes for every one hundred given to the Congress in 1962. In 1967, it received 68 votes to Congress' 100. For assembly contests no other party received ten percent of the vote although the third place SSP came just under that figure and won 44 seats; the Congress won 199, less than a majority.

The Lok Sabha contest which held the most interest for the

Jana Sangh was that in Balrampur where for the second time Atal Behari Vajpayee faced Subhadra Joshi. The situation was reversed as Mrs. Joshi was now the incumbent after her very narrow win in 1962 while Vajpayee was a member of the Rajya Sabha. In the campaign Mrs. Joshi, secretary of the Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee, charged Vajpayee and the Jana Sangh with communalism and Vajpayee charged her with pro-communist leanings. Vajpayee won with a large majority. In Gonda District of which Balrampur is a part the Jana Sangh won five assembly seats of nine contested. In the two neighboring seats, Kaisarganj and Bahraich, the Jana Sangh nominated, respectively, Shakuntala Nayar and her husband K. K. K. Nayar, a retired Indian Civil Service officer. Both were successful. Nearby in Domariaganj a contest occurred between Congress incumbent Keshava Dev Malaviya and Swatantra state leader Bhanu Pratap Singh. The press gave Singh the edge but when the result was declared Jana Sanghi Narain Swarup Sharma had won the seat by a wide margin over Malaviya with Singh far behind. In nearby Khalilabad Ranjeet Singh won the seat. In Gorakhpur the Jana Sangh supported Hindu Mahasabhite Mahant Digvijaynath who defeated a Congress candidate. The northern tier districts were once again a stronghold of the Jana Sangh. Having left Bahraich District to the Swatantra Party in 1962, the Jana Sangh reversed itself and took all of the district's nine assembly seats. Kheri returned four of seven Jana Sanghis to the assembly but defeated Lok Sabha incumbent Yuvraj Dutta Singh.

The areas in which the Jana Sangh attracted voters were much more widely dispersed than in the 1962 elections. In several districts where only a single seat was won in 1967 these seats were from urban areas. We shall say more about the urban-rural division of the Jana Sangh vote in the next section of this chapter, but here it may be remarked that the party increased its share of the vote in both sectors. The table in the appendix gives the results of the vote in each election by district, but to indicate the increased dispersion it may be well to take a larger section of Uttar Pradesh, the revenue division, and arrange the districts in geographical sequence rather than simply alphabetically:

Meerut (Dehru Dun, Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut, Bulandshahr) along the western border of the state had been histori-

cally a weak area for the Jana Sangh. Only the regular Himmat Singh of Bulandshahr was successful in 1957 and 1962 and he was returned again in 1967. His was the only win in 1962 as the Jana Sangh contested 36 of the 45 seats in the division. The Jana Sangh contested 37 in 1967 and won three seats adding another in Bulandshahr and winning the Meerut city seat.

Kumaon (Naini Tal, Almora, Garhwal, Tehri Garhwal) the mountainous and sparcely populated area against the Nepal border has also been a weak area for the Jana Sangh. The party won a stray seat in 1957 and in 1962 contested thirteen of the 17 seats winning none. It contested 14 in 1967 and regained the Almora seat held in 1957.

Rohilkhand (Bareilly, Bijnor, Budaun, Moradabad, Shahrahanpur, Pilibhit and Rampur) is an area to the northeast of the Ganges up to the Nepal border. The Jana Sangh had built a base in the area. It contested 47 of the 50 seats in 1962 and won six and also added the Bareilly and Budaun Lok Sabha seats. In 1967, with 49 seats in the division the Jana Sangh contested 46 and won 13, retained both Lok Sabha seats and also won the Moradabad Lok Sabha seat. In Aolna to which sitting member Brij Raj Singh had moved from a redelimited Bareilly, and in Rampur where the principal of Gurukul Kangra ran on the Jana Sangh ticket against a Swatantra member of the ruling family, the Jana Sangh lost by small margins. The Jana Sangh increased its representation in all districts except Bijnor where it lost both the seats it had had, and in Rampur where it again failed to win any seats.

Lucknow (Lucknow, Unnao, Rae Bareli, Sitapur, Hardoi, Kheri) contains two districts in which the Jana Sangh has been strong, Sitapur and Hardoi. The Jana Sangh contested 47 of the 48 seats in 1962 and won 14. In 1967 it also contested 47 seats and won 18. The Sitapur and Shahabad Lok Sabha seats were won in both elections but the Misrikh seat, won in 1962, was lost in 1967. The sitting member from Shahabad switched to Kheri and was defeated. The two assembly seats won in 1962 in Rae Bareli were lost since the Congress parliamentary candidate was Prime Minister Gandhi. But the loss was more than made up with the addition of three seats from Lucknow city, two new seats from Unnao District, and two additional from Kheri District. The Jana Sangh gained a

seat in Sitapur and lost one in Hardoi. Important successes for the party were those of Tambreshwari Prasad and Gaya Prasad Mehrotra from Sitapur; whereas the defeat of assembly leader Sharda Bakht Singh from Hardoi was an important loss.

Faizabad (Faizabad, Gonda, Bahraich, Sultanpur, Pratapgarh, Bara Banki), like Lucknow, is in the heart of the old Oudh area with a zamindari land system and a number of traditional leaders who had entered politics. One of these, Ajit Pratap Singh of Pratapgarh (who had come into the Jana Sangh but defected in 1966 to the Congress) joined hands with Union Minister Raja Dinesh Singh and inflicted a defeat on the Jana Sangh in Pratapgarh District. In 1962 the Jana Sangh contested 48 of the 57 seats and won eleven; in 1967 it contested 51 of 55 seats and won 18, though it lost both seats held in Bara Banki and all three in Pratapgarh. The major offsetting gain was the nine seats won in Bahraich, which we have mentioned above in discussing the northern tier parliamentary elections. As mentioned above the Jana Sangh won the Kaisarganj, Balrampur and Bahraich parliamentary seats in 1967.

Gorakhpur (Gorakhpur, Deoria, Basti, Azamgarh) just below the Nepalese border and extending toward the south and Azamgarh is perhaps economically the poorest division in the state. With the exception of Basti, the Jana Sangh had shown little strength in the area although new seats were gained in Gorakhpur, where the Mahasabha also has some following, and Azamgarh. A blank was again drawn in Deoria. In 1962 the Jana Sangh contested 48 of the 59 seats and won but four, all in Basti. In 1967, it contested 54 of 56 seats and won eleven, adding three more in Basti and two new seats each in Gorakhpur and Azamgarh. A major defeat was that of Madho Prasad Tripathi in Basti, but as noted earlier the party scored a surprise win in the Domariaganj Lok Sabha seat and also won the Basti seat.

Varanasi (Mirzapur, Varanasi, Jaunpur, Ghazipur, Ballia) which straddles the Ganges River and extends into Bihar on the east and Madhya Pradesh in the south contains two districts which have been strongholds for the Jana Sangh, Jaunpur and Mirzapur. In 1962 the Jana Sangh contested 39 of the 46 seats and won five, three in Jaunpur and one each in Varanasi and Mirzapur, and also won the Jaunpur Lok Sabha seat. In 1967, the Jana Sangh con-

tested all of the 46 seats and won eight and also won the Mirzapur Lok Sabha seat. The disappointment for the party was Jaunpur where it won only one assembly seat and lost both the Jaunpur and Machhlishahr Lok Sabha seats. In the latter the candidate was Yadhuvendra Dutt Dubey, who had twice won an assembly seat for the Jana Sangh. Gains were recorded in Mirzapur and Ballia where two seats were won and in Varanasi where three seats were taken by Jana Sanghis. In Ghazipur, as in 1962, seven of the eight Jana Sangh contestants lost their deposits.

Allahabad (Farrukhabad, Etawah, Kanpur, Fatehpur, Allahabad) contains two of the largest cities of the state and had generally been a weak area for the Jana Sangh. In 1962 the Jana Sangh contested 42 of 47 seats and won but three, one each in Farrukhabad, Fatehpur and Allahabad. In 1967, the party contested all 48 seats and took six, three in Farrukhabad, and one each in Etawah, Kanpur and Allahabad. No Lok Sabha seats were won and several candidates lost their deposits. The Jana Sangh opposed SSP leader Ram Manohar Lohia in Kannauj, and Congress candidates Vijayalakshmi Pandit, sister of Nehru, and Hare Krishna Shastri, son of the late prime minister, in Allahabad District.

Jhansi (Jhansi, Jalaun, Hamirpur, Banda) along the southern border of the state provided the biggest gain for the Jana Sangh. In 1962 it contested 19 of the 20 seats and won only one. But in 1967 it contested 19 and won ten. Swami Brahmanandji, a former Congressman, won the Hamirpur Lok Sabha seat. In Banda where the only seat had been won in 1962, three of five went to the Jana Sangh in 1967. Four of five were won in Hamirpur, two in Jhansi, and one in Jalaun.

Agra (Aligarh, Mathura, Agra, Mainpuri, Etah) also reported a sizable gain for the Jana Sangh. The party contested 38 of 41 seats in 1962 and won four. In 1967, it contested 39 seats and won ten. No Lok Sabha seats were won and sitting member Rao Krishnapal Singh, who had been elected on the Swatantra ticket in 1962 from Jalesar, was defeated in 1967 on the Jana Sangh ticket from Etah. All of the four seats won in 1962 were from Etah District but the district provided only one winner in 1967. The other seats came from Aligarh (four), Agra (three), and Mathura and Mainpuri (one each).

This divisional study of the Jana Sangh indicates the dispersal of Jana Sangh seats compared with 1962. In no division did the Jana Sangh win fewer seats than it did in 1962. The 49 seats in 1962 were won in 24 districts, while the 98 seats in 1967 were from 38 of the 53 districts in the state.[7] The percentage of votes received by the party declined in only 12 districts. In many of those the decline was marginal and was related more to an increase of candidates from other parties than to a decline of the Jana Sangh vote *viz-a-viz* the Congress. Even so, to win power in Uttar Pradesh the Jana Sangh would require more than double its present assembly membership and would need greater representation from the divisions in which it had continued to be weak, Gorakhpur, Allahabad and Meerut.

Despite having been founded in Punjab the Jana Sangh had regularly done very poorly in that state. The division of the Punjab into "new" Punjab and Haryana, however, brought the Jana Sangh into a role as defender of the urban Hindus and the 1967 election gave the party new strength in the Punjabi Suba. The Jana Sangh contested only 49 of the 104 assembly seats, several of them in areas which were overwhelmingly Sikh, and won nine. In 1962 the party had won but four. All of the seats won were in urban Hindu constituencies, three in Amritsar, two each in Ludhiana and Jullundur, and one each in Pathankot and in Abohar—a town on the Haryana-Punjab border in Ferozepur District. Dr. Baldev Prakash and Balramdas Tandon each won third terms in Amritsar City, where the Jana Sangh did lose one urban seat when a Communist defeated Chief Minister Giani Gurumukh Singh Musafir. The party supported General Rajinder Singh "Sparrow" who won in Jullundur. The Jana Sangh candidate for a Kapurthala District seat was Amar Kaur, sister of the revolutionary Bhagat Singh; a brother of Bhagat Singh, Kulbir Singh, who had won the Ferozepur assembly seat in 1962 was defeated for the Fazilka Lok Sabha seat in 1967. The Jana Sangh attempted to capitalize on the connection of the party with the old revolutionaries in the Punjab but failed. A stalwart who returned to the assembly was Lal Chand Sabharwal from Jullundur.

The Jana Sangh surprised many by winning one Lok Sabha seat

[7] Throughout this study we have not included the "semi-districts" of Uttarkhand, Pithoragarh and Chamoli as separate.

and running strongly in several others. Party secretary Yagya Dutt Sharma, who had gained fame by his fast during the Punjabi Suba agitation, was elected in Amritsar defeating Surjit Singh Majithia. Working committee member Kishen Lal, who had lost the Amritsar Lok Sabha seat in 1957 and 1962, switched to Gurdaspur and finished second, as did General Jai Singh in Hoshiarpur, where he lost by only 1511 votes to former Punjab chief minister Chaudhury Ram Kishan.

The division of Punjab had left Chandigarh as a Union Territory with one Lok Sabha seat—and both Punjab and Haryana squabbling over its future. The Jana Sangh units in the two successor states joined in the clamor but the Jana Sangh candidate for the Lok Sabha seat, Sri Chand Goel, took a position in favor of the *status quo*. He was elected by a substantial margin.

In Haryana the Jana Sangh tripled its membership in the assembly from four to twelve, but showed a net loss of two Lok Sabha seats. In 1962 the Jana Sangh had won three Lok Sabha seats, but the defection of Lehri Singh left but two sitting members. Swami Rameshwaranand ran again from the Karnal seat and lost by 203 votes. Redistricting caused Yudhvir Singh Chaudhury to switch from Mahendragarh to Hissar where he was badly beaten. The Jana Sangh candidate in Ambala was successful. The party also supported a Swatantra candidate against Gulzarilal Nanda. In Rohtak the Jana Sangh candidate was a former political lieutenant of pre-partition Unionist leader Sir Chhotu Ram because the party tried to gain the allegiance of former Jat Unionists in the state. The Jana Sangh share of the Lok Sabha vote, however, declined slightly probably as a result of not entering contests for two of the seats.

In the assembly the Jana Sangh became the largest and official opposition with its twelve seats. Mangal Sein was re-elected for the second time from Rohtak and Fateh Chand Vij was re-elected from Panipat in Karnal District. An unexpected loss was that of Mukhtiar Singh from Sonepat (also in Karnal District); the state Jana Sangh president was later elected to the Rajya Sabha. The collapse of the Haryana government in November, 1967, led to mid-term elections being scheduled for May, 1968. These will show more clearly the strength of the Jana Sangh in the state.

The alliance with Swatantra in Rajasthan resulted in a sizable

increase in the number of Lok Sabha and assembly seats won but as there were fewer candidates entered, there was only a small increase in the percentage of votes received by the Jana Sangh. In parliamentary contests the Jana Sangh's Onkar Lal Berwa retained the Kotah seat he had won in 1962. Maharajkumar Brij Raj Singh of Kotah who had been elected in 1962 on the Congress ticket, was re-elected in 1967 to the Jhalawar seat on the Jana Sangh ticket. Another Lok Sabha seat was added from Sikar. In Bhilwara, sitting member Umashankar M. Trivedi, who had switched from Mandsaur in Madhya Pradesh, was badly beaten. The Jana Sangh candidate in Ajmer ran a strong second.

The Jana Sangh won more than one third of the assembly seats assigned to it, 22 of 63. Heading the list was Bhairon Singh Shekawat, who won a fourth term from Jaipur city. State Jana Sangh president Satish Chandra Agarwal was elected to a third term, also from Jaipur city. In Kotah District the Jana Sangh had been strong in the past and with the addition to the party of the Maharajkumar of Kotah and Maharaja Harish Chandra Singh of Jhalawar its strength had been increased. The Jana Sangh won all eight seats in Kotah and both seats for which it contested in Jhalawar. The Maharaja won one of them. A former Jana Sangh state president, Madan Singh Danta, who had left the party in 1961, rejoined and was elected from Sikar District. The party lost all of the three seats it had won in 1962 from Udaipur District, the home of Chief Minister Sukhadia, although there was only a marginal drop in terms of percentage of the vote. In an interesting contest Jana Sanghi Guman Mal Lodha came within a few votes of defeating Muslim minister Barkatullah Khan in Jodhpur. Together the Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance won 33.79 percent of the votes and 70 seats, while the Congress took 41.42 percent and won 89 seats, four short of a majority. Sixteen independents—some of them Jana Sangh-Swatantra supported—eight SSP members, and one Communist held the remaining seats.

In no state did the Jana Sangh record a sharper increase than in Bihar. It won 26 assembly seats compared with three in 1962 and took 10.42 percent of the vote, a rise from 2.77 percent. The party also won the Banka Lok Sabha seat. The results, however, indicated an initial burst of support in selected areas. Although the party won

approximately one seat in every ten contested, it also lost deposits in more than 70 percent. None of the four sitting members was re-elected although each of them ran again. Most of the winning candidates were new to election contests; only four of the 26 had entered before, and the Lok Sabha winner was also a newcomer. The Jana Sangh had worked hard in the tribal areas in the interelection period and this effort paid off. About one half of the seats were won from the tribal areas of Ranchi, Santhal Parganas, Singhbhum and adjacent areas. Bhagalpur was the only district in which more than twenty percent of the vote was won and the district gave the Jana Sangh four seats. Bihar had thus achieved the target set by the party, that it come up to the level of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in 1957. As in those two states in 1962 and 1967 the Jana Sangh will now anticipate continued growth.

In Jammu and Kashmir the Jana Sangh entered contests in the Vale itself for the first time. Previously all seats contested by the Praja Parishad—now formally merged into the Jana Sangh—had been in Jammu. The results gave the Jana Sangh three seats in the assembly, all from the Jammu area. State president Pandit Prem Nath Dogra was re-elected from Jammu city for the second time. Shiv Charan Gupta retained his seat but Rishi Kumar Kaushal was defeated in a bid for re-election. Muslim candidate Abdur Rehman ran a strong race against Congressman Inderjit Malhotra in the Jammu Lok Sabha constituency.

The remaining states can be treated briefly. In the east the Jana Sangh won a seat in the West Bengal assembly for the first time since the Mookerjee days of 1952, but the winner soon defected to the Congress. As in the previous two elections, Haripada Bharati retained his deposit in a Lok Sabha contest but his battle was again a lone one. The Jana Sangh contested the Lok Sabha in Assam for the first time since 1952, and won 5.48 percent of the vote principally on the strength of its candidate who opposed Union Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed in a straight contest. In assembly contests the poll was more in line with the 1962 results, 1.84 percent, although seven of the twenty candidates retained their deposits. The party also contested in Orissa for the first time. Nineteen candidates ran for the assembly and all lost their deposits. Two candidates ran for the Lok Sabha and met the same fate.

In the west, the Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance in Gujarat was disappointing to the party. It contested sixteen seats for the assembly but none for the Lok Sabha. Only one assembly candidate was elected. For the second consecutive election the Jana Sangh contested widely in Maharashtra. Four of the 165 assembly candidates won while 115 lost deposits; the percentage of the poll rose to 8.18. Among the winners was Ramchandra Mhalgi of Poona who had been the leader of the party in the assembly, 1957–1962, when Jana Sanghis last sat in Bombay. A seat was won in the Bombay suburbs and two from the partly tribal district of Bhandara. No Lok Sabha seats were won but seven of the 26 candidates did retain their deposits. The map accompanying this chapter shows the scattered areas of the state in which the Jana Sangh appears to be building a base for possible future growth.

In the south, seats were won in the assembly for the first time in Andhra Pradesh and Mysore—three in the former and four in the latter. The successes were widely scattered; each of the seats was won in a different district. The party put up 24 assembly candidates in both Madras and Kerala and all lost their deposits.

Appraisal of elections

In appraising the 1962 elections certain factors were studied to determine the position of the Jana Sangh. In appraising the 1967 elections the conflict between the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad will not be studied; the strength of the other two "Hindu" parties has diminished so greatly as to be insignificant. The Jana Sangh itself made no effort to ally with either party as it had in the first three elections. Instead it looked to the Swatantra Party as an election partner and where that cooperation occurred its impact will be be studied. Two other patterns of particular interest are the importance of the Hindi-speaking areas to the Jana Sangh and the division between urban and rural voting. We will not re-examine the place of the Jana Sangh in districts which have large Muslim voting blocks; it was found that in 1962 there was no relationship between Muslim population and Jana Sangh vote and it is sufficient to note that there was no correlation in 1967 either.

The party's own appraisal of the election came in the report

presented by Upadhyaya in April.[8] The general secretary expressed broad satisfaction with the results, noting that the record in Uttar Pradesh was not up to party hopes while that in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Maharashtra was better than expected. He said he was pleased that a start had been made in two of the southern states and in Gujarat. He commented that after the division of Punjab "Sikhs and non-Sikh Hindus" were working together and said the Jana Sangh had increased its support from Christians, Muslims and Jews. He also noted the progress made in the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Bihar. He ended his report: "Our past achievement is remarkable, but what remains to be done is considerable . . . Let us all march and march until the goal is achieved."

The independent *Eastern Economist* said that "if the electorate has shown any general bias, it is perhaps toward the right." [9] The journal coupled the gains of the Jana Sangh with those of Swatantra and commented on the discussions then current about a joint group in Parliament; which would possibly include the DMK:

> Such an alliance could have an element of mutual advantage because whereas the Jana Sangh and the DMK have a broad-based appeal to the mass mind, both stand to gain by the injection of some political maturity into the thinking of their leaderships. The Jana Sangh particularly needs to be rescued from the inexperience and naivete of some of its leaders." [10]

The question of alliance between the Jana Sangh and Swatantra was settled during the elections in some states, but in others the two parties did each other considerable damage, if the assumption of complete transferance of votes is accepted. The two parties faced each other in 403 assembly contests, of which the Jana Sangh won 73 and "might" have won another 27, and Swatantra won 33 and "might" have won another ten. They opposed each other in 74 Lok Sabha contests with the Jana Sangh winning nine and Swatantra three. The Jana Sangh "might" have added another fifteen and the Swatantra one other seat. In Rajasthan the alliance was complete and there were no contests between the two parties but in Gujarat

[8] Text in *Organiser*, XX:36 (April 23, 1967).
[9] *Eastern Economist*, 48:12 (March 24, 1967).
[10] *Ibid.*

contests took place for three assembly seats in Surat District and the Swatantra Party "might" have won one of those seats. There were no contests in Jammu and Kashmir and but one in Madras for an assembly seat which Swatantra won. In Madhya Pradesh there were ten assembly conflicts of which Jana Sangh won two and each party "might" have won another; the single Lok Sabha conflict made no difference. In Orissa there were fifteen assembly contests of which Swatantra won eleven, and two Lok Sabha contests of which Swatantra won one; in the others the outcome was not affected. Both the assembly seats won by Swatantra in Assam were among the six in which the two parties contested; the other four were not affected. In Haryana the Jana Sangh won one of the two seats in which it was opposed by Swatantra and in Mysore Swatantra won two of the five assembly seats and one of the two Lok Sabha seats. West Bengal saw five assembly contests—four in Purulia District—but a pooling of the votes would not have changed the result, as was true in the single seat in Himachal Pradesh. The Jana Sangh won one of the six seats in the Punjab assembly and "might" have won one in the Lok Sabha—this out of the three seats contested by the two parties. In Andhra Pradesh the two parties contested 17 assembly seats and two Lok Sabha seats but the outcome was not affected; Jana Sangh won one and Swatantra four of the assembly seats. In Maharashtra the Jana Sangh won one and Swatantra "might" have won one of the 31 assembly seats while the result was unaffected in the three Lok Sabha seats. Swatantra opposed the Jana Sangh winner of the Chandigarh Lok Sabha seat. Thus in the states mentioned in this paragraph the conflict between the parties was mild either because of the alliances drawn up or because only one of the two parties had any appreciable strength. Even where they did oppose each other it was sometimes a case of one party retaining a candidate in order to split the potential Congress vote to the other party's advantage.

It was in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar that the results might have been greatly changed if the two parties had been able to contract the alliance they discussed before the elections. Jana Sangh opposed Swatantra in 193 of the 207 assembly seats contested by Swatantra in Uttar Pradesh. Ten of the twelve assembly seats won by Swatantra were against Jana Sangh opposition and the party might have taken six more. Jana Sangh won 54 against Swatantra and "might"

have won twenty more. Swatantra contested 38 Lok Sabha seats, opposed the Jana Sangh in 35 of them and won only one, that against the Jana Sangh. Jana Sangh won seven and "might" have added another ten if the Swatantra votes had been transferred to its candidate. In Bihar the two parties opposed each other in 108 assembly constituencies and 24 Lok Sabha seats. The Swatantra Party won its only three seats in the assembly against Jana Sangh opposition and it "might" have won another in the assembly and one in the Lok Sabha. The Jana Sangh won thirteen of its 26 seats against Swatantra and "might" have won six more. It won one Lok Sabha seat and "might" have won four more.

The Hindi-Speaking Areas

The decline of the Congress Party in the Hindi-speaking areas—Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Haryana and Delhi—which was evident in the 1962 election was continued in 1967. Two different trends appeared however. First, the Congress decline was more widespread outside the Hindi-speaking area than in 1962, particularly in West Bengal, Orissa, Madras and Kerala. Second, the Swatantra Party which in 1962 seemed to be a major beneficiary—along with the Jana Sangh—in absorbing the Congress losses, itself lost seats in the area—especially in Bihar—in 1967. In the Lok Sabha, for which there were 210 seats in 1962 and 214 for 1967, the Congress dropped from 147 seats to 123. The Jana Sangh rose from 14 to 33 and Swatantra dropped from 13 to 10. The SSP won 15 seats in 1967 compared to four seats won by the former Socialist Party in 1962. The CPI won three in 1962 while the "right" CPI took ten in 1967 and another seat went to the Marxist Communists. While neither all the parties nor the numbers of seats are precisely comparable the principal gainer in the area was the Jana Sangh, while the communist parties and the SSP also gained at the expense of the Congress, Swatantra and the PSP, which dropped from seven to four seats.

In terms of votes received for assembly seats in the states in the area (and the Lok Sabha vote in Delhi) the Congress also dropped considerably from 38.80 in 1962 to 35.53 in 1967. The Jana Sangh share of the vote rose from 12.62 in 1962 to 18.85 in 1967. Trailing behind the Jana Sangh were the SSP (9.87), Swa-

tantra (5.72), PSP (4.19), CPI (3.31), Republican (2.09), and Communist Marxist (1.02). The balance went to candidates of other smaller parties and to independents. Thus the gain of the Jana Sangh was about twice the loss of the Congress, indicating that the Jana Sangh probably absorbed some of the substantial losses of Swatantra and the PSP.

The increasing importance of the Jana Sangh in the Hindi-speaking areas was reflected in corresponding importance of the area to the Jana Sangh. Of 35 Lok Sabha seats won by candidates using the Jana Sangh symbol all but two were from this area, and the winner from Chandigarh was surely on the border line while the winner in Amritsar was elected principally on Hindi votes. While in 1962 all of the Jana Sangh assembly seats were won in the northern states, including those seats won in Jammu and in what was to become Punjabi Suba, in 1967 the party did branch out into other areas. Of the 268 seats won, 32 came from outside the Hindi-speaking area in Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Mysore and West Bengal. The special factors operating in 1952 in West Bengal with Mookerjee and in 1957 in Maharashtra with the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti did not operate in 1967 and the party can be said to have won seats on its own strength. The Hindi area shell was cracking but only another election can tell if the cracks are permanent and are expandable.

The votes received by the Jana Sangh continued to come at the rate of 80 percent from the Hindi areas. In Lok Sabha contests in the Hindi area about 36 percent of the Jana Sangh candidates lost their deposits while outside the percentage was 68; these compare with 47 and 86 in 1962. The comparable 1967 figures for assembly contests were 43 percent in the Hindi areas and 72 outside reflecting the more widely broadcast setting up of candidates for assembly seats in both areas. In the Hindi area the high record of loss of deposits in Bihar has inflated the figures.

Urban and Rural Vote

In discussing both Punjab and Uttar Pradesh results the importance of the urban vote has been noted. In Punjab it was most marked. Using the criteria established in Chapter IX in discussing

this topic in the 1962 elections, it is found that each of the nine seats won by the Jana Sangh in 1967 were urban. Of the sixteen seats so classified the Jana Sangh contested fourteen and lost only one deposit. The deposit lost and one of the seats not contested were in small towns with predominately Sikh populations. The remaining uncontested seat saw the Jana Sangh support a winning independent. In the sixteen urban seats taken together, voters gave the Jana Sangh 34.32 percent of the vote compared with 24.33 in 1962. More voters supported the Jana Sangh in these seats than supported any other party. Congress won but three seats; CPI, one; Akali Dal (Sant), one; and independents, two. The Jana Sangh also showed a small increase in votes in the rural areas: 5.62 as against 3.69 per cent.

In Uttar Pradesh the difference between the Jana Sangh poll in the urban and the rural areas continued to narrow as in 1962. In 1967, in the 47 urban constituencies the party contested 45 seats and won 17—more than any other party—and polled 27.51 percent of the vote. In the 378 rural seats the party contested 356 seats and won 81 while polling 20.88 percent of the vote. The party's share of the rural vote increased by 34 percent while that in the urban constituencies increased only 21 percent. While the Jana Sangh sharply increased its support in three of the five largest cities —Lucknow, Varanasi and Agra—it continued to be rather weak in Kanpur and Allahabad. The party's entrance into Meerut District came through a win in the city constituency. The Jana Sangh appeared to be following its earlier pattern of strength in urban areas with subsequent reaching out into other areas.

To say that the 1967 elections had been a shock to the Congress would be to state the obvious. But the elections had also made a great change in the thinking of the Jana Sangh which was now the second party in India in terms of votes received and assembly seats won, and third behind Swatantra in the Lok Sabha. The deployment of this new found strength will be the subject of the first part of the final chapter of this biography.

CHAPTER XII

After 1967

In this last chapter of the biography of the Jana Sangh we shall look at the performance of the party in the tumultuous Indian political scene in the first year after the 1967 elections and conclude with some general comments on the party and its future.

The year 1967 which opened with the election campaign later found the Jana Sangh—under a new president—governing in Delhi and sharing in the governance of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. It also witnessed Jana Sangh ministers in Punjab and saw the Jana Sangh support a non-Congress ministry in Haryana. Rajasthan was a disappointment to the Swatantra-Jana Sangh alliance as the Congress was eventually able to form a ministry there. The reinforced Jana Sangh delegation in the Lok Sabha became a major force in the opposition. The party, perhaps as a result of its expansion, suffered the factionalism which is endemic in Indian political groupings. Communal rioting, the language issue, relations with Pakistan and China and the Middle East war were other issues which brought the Jana Sangh into prominence.

Ministries

Although chronologically the Jana Sangh joined the coalition cabinet in Bihar before it took over the government in Delhi, in the capital it was clear as soon as the election results were known that the Jana Sangh had gained an absolute majority in the Metropolitan Council. After a period of indecisiveness on the part of the Central Government the Jana Sangh assumed office on March 18.

The indecisiveness resulted from the peculiar nature of the Delhi government under which the executive councillors (not ministers) are appointed by the President and are not responsible, as in other states and territories, to the legislature. The Congress gave the appearance of attempting to perpetuate its rule. As chief executive councillor the Jana Sangh chose Vijay Kumar Malhotra, long a party member and previously leader of the Jana Sangh group in the Delhi Municipal Corporation. The other three councillors were Ram Lal Verma, like Malhotra a college teacher by profession; Amar Chand Shubh, a lawyer; and Shiv Narain Sarsunia, a Jana Sangh scheduled caste member. As chairman (i.e., speaker) of the Metropolitan Council the Jana Sangh selected Lalchand K. Advani, then assistant editor of *Organiser* and a long time Jana Sangh and RSS worker in Rajasthan and Delhi. Within the severely limited framework of the Delhi government the Jana Sangh seems to have done rather well in its first experience of governing alone. One incident which is worthy of mention was the exclusion of Malhotra from a central meeting of state chief ministers. Malhotra supported by the top leadership of the party complained to Prime Minister Gandhi and Home Minister Chavan and received an assurance that the Chief Executive Councillor of Delhi would be invited to attend future meetings.

The Jana Sangh also won control of the Delhi Municipal Corporation in the elections held concurrently with the Lok Sabha and Council elections. After the indirect election of six aldermen the Jana Sangh had 55 of the 106 seats with 43 held by the Congress and six by independents. Among the aldermen elected were Hans Raj Gupta and Kidar Nāth Sahni, both of whom had been associated with the party since its founding. Gupta was elected mayor and Sahni was designated leader of the Jana Sangh group in the Corporation. In August, the Jana Sangh retained by a very small margin a seat in a Corporation by-election.[1]

The first Jana Sangh ministerial experience, however, was Bihar where the party had vastly increased its representation from four to 26. The 128 (of 318) member Congress group had no possibility of forming a ministry. The opposition turned to "rebel Congressman" Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, leader of the Jana Kranti Dal, a

[1] *Hindustan Times,* August 29, 1967.

group which also held 26 seats in the assembly. The principal constituent of the opposition group was the Samyukta Socialist Party with 68 seats; others were the PSP (18), "right" Communist Party (24), Marxist Communist Party (4), Swatantra (3) and independents (21). There was some hesitation on the part of the Jana Sangh which was not pleased with the idea of joining a coalition with the Communists.[2] We shall say more about the Jana Sangh and coalitions below. Rather than find itself with the Congress in opposition the Jana Sangh accepted the SSP condition that the Communists be included and its designees were sworn in with others in the Sinha ministry on March 5. The SSP leader, Karpoori Thakur, was appointed deputy chief minister. Two Jana Sanghis became ministers: Vijay Kumar Mitra of Bhagalpur, an RSS worker, who became Minister of Agriculture; and Ram Deo Mahto of Patna, also from the RSS, who became Minister of Co-operation. A Jana Sanghi, Rudri Pratap Sarangi, was included as minister of state.

The Bihar coalition ministry has not had an easy path. It was faced with substantial defections, including three elected on the Jana Sangh ticket, when the Soshit Dal was formed by a former SSP minister.[3] The Jana Sangh disagreed with the provision in the agreed policy of the coalition which would accord Urdu the status of second official language of Bihar.[4] There were acrimonious exchanges between the Communists and the Jana Sanghis, especially after a series of communal disturbances in Ranchi District. In a Cabinet expansion in September an additional Jana Sanghi, Rupna Oraon, was made a minister of state.[5] At this writing the future of the Bihar ministry remains in doubt and it is not at all certain to serve out its five year term. If the defections reported are final the strength of the Jana Sangh in Bihar has dropped to 23 at the end of 1967.

In Punjab, too, the Congress failed to win a majority of the seats. The Congress' 48 seats were opposed by slightly over 50 belonging to a patched up group of oppositionists. A small balance

[2] *Statesman* (Delhi), March 4, 1967.

[3] *Hindustan Times*, August 29, 1967. One other Jana Sanghi was reported to have defected in October. *Ibid.*, October 21, 1967.

[4] *Ibid.*, March 25, 1967.

[5] *Ibid.*, September 8, 1967.

owed temporary allegiance to the Maharaja of Patiala who had been elected to the assembly as an independent. Congress maneuvers to persuade the Maharaja and some other independents to join in forming a Congress ministry, perhaps with the Maharaja as chief minister, failed. The Congress then selected former Agriculture Minister Gian Singh Rarewala, a relative of the Maharaja, as leader and prepared to play an opposition role for the time being. The largest party other than the Congress was the Sant Fateh Singh group of the Akali Dal led by former Punjab justice Gurnam Singh. Gurnam Singh had held the view, which was shared to some extent by the Sant, that the new Punjabi Suba would require cooperation between the Sikh Akalis and the Hindu Jana Sanghis, who had won so heavily in the urban portions of the state. The initial coalition group headed by Gurnam Singh included both the Sant Akalis (24) and the Master Tara Singh group of the Akalis (2), the Jana Sangh (9), the Republicans (3), right Communists (5), left Communists (3), SSP (1), and a number of independents.

A week after the Bihar ministry was sworn in the new Punjab ministry took office with Gurnam Singh as chief minister and home minister, Jana Sanghi Baldev Prakash as deputy chief minister and finance minister and Akali Lachhman Singh Gill, Republican Piara Ram Dharowal and independent Rajinder Singh "Sparrow"—a retired major general—as the other ministers.[6] Shortly afterward Communist Satya Pal Dang, who had defeated former chief minister Musafir, was added, and to answer a complaint from the Legislative Council that no minister had been appointed from that House, Jana Sanghi Kishen Lal was also added.[7] No Jana Sanghis were included among the ministers of state and deputy ministers who were added to the ministry in May.

The United Front drew up a minimum agreed program which had something in it for each of the cooperating parties, but which was not so tightly drawn as to cause undue friction between the groups. The ministry appeared well on its way to functioning as an effective government. The Congress attempted on occasion to win over former Congressmen and the United Front received a number

[6] *Ibid.*, March 15, 1967.

[7] *Statesman* (Delhi) March 12, 1967, and *Times of India* (Delhi), May 21, 1967.

of defectors from the Congress. But the key to success was the close alliance between the Jana Sangh and the moderate Akalis led by Sant Fateh Singh, who had decidedly climbed down from the time he threatened self-immolation in December, 1966, and Gurnam Singh. The alliance found the Jana Sangh supporting an Akali candidate in the Tarn Taran assembly by-election and the Akali winning by a large margin. The two parties worked together in the October municipal elections. This arrangement naturally benefited the Jana Sangh more than the predominately rural Akalis. The Jana Sangh won the key city of Amritsar and overall won 82 seats to the Congress' 28.[8]

The Akali-Jana Sangh alliance would be welcomed by the bulk of both groups but would also be condemned by the more extreme elements who gave the parties electoral support in 1962. The Jana Sangh assembly group showed no sign of cracking and leaders such as Kishen Lal, Baldev Prakash and Lal Chand Sabharwal preached Hindu-Sikh unity and acceptance of Punjabi as the official state language. Yagya Dutt Sharma and Sant Fateh Singh were in frequent consultation on party matters. Opposition came from outside the legislature where some staunch Arya Samajists became disenchanted.[9] This, however, did not appear to effect the Jana Sangh performance in the municipal elections. It would seem that the Punjab Jana Sangh had gone a long way toward adjusting to the new Punjab situation in accordance with the proposals of Madhok at the Jullundur session.

The Akali response, however, was not so solid. Early on, two of the Sant's close associates left his group to form the new (and third) "Hudiara" Akali Dal.[10] The blow which caused the fall of the Gurnam Singh ministry came when Lachhman Singh Gill defected from the United Front and from the Akali Dal on November 22. Gurnam Singh resigned. Gill formed a new ministry with some co-defectors including the Republicans and received the support—but not the participation—of the Congress.[11] Gill was unhappy on several grounds: the Sant's support of his rival Gurnam Singh, the

[8] *Organiser,* XXL:10 (October 15, 1967).
[9] *Statesman* (Delhi), October 4, 1967.
[10] *Times of India* (Delhi), June 30, 1967.
[11] *Hindustan Times,* November 23, 1967, *et seq.,* Coincidentally Master Tara Singh died the same day—November 22—as Gill defected.

Akali alliance with the Jana Sangh and the Congress reluctance at the center to look sympathetically at Punjab. On the last he thought a Gill-Congress alliance would have a better hearing in New Delhi. As 1967 ended the Gill ministry was shakily in office and the Jana Sangh-Sant Akali alliance endured.

While the Punjab and Bihar coalitions were the first governments formed in those states after the election, Jana Sangh participation in Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh followed the fall of a Congress post-election ministry.

The Congress won a clear majority in Haryana with 48 seats of a total of 81. The Jana Sangh with 12 seats was next and its leader Dr. Mangal Sein prepared for the role of leader of the opposition. The Congress selected Bhagwat Dayal Sharma, a Brahmin who had been chief minister before the elections, to continue. Sharma seemed comfortably in the saddle even though the Jat and Ahir Congressmen might not be overly pleased with a Brahmin as leader. The assembly met and proceeded to the election of a speaker. In a surprise move, the Ahir leader, Rao Birendra Singh, a Congressman, opposed the Congress candidate for the speakership. He won with the support of dissident Congressmen and of the opposition led by the Jana Sangh. Sharma resigned and a new ministry headed by the Rao was sworn in on March 24.[12] Initially the Jana Sangh agreed to join the ministry. Mangal Sein was prepared to be sworn in but in a last minute decision the party only agreed to support the Birendra Singh ministry.

The record of Haryana with its sharp caste differences and personal rivalries was a dismal one. The Jana Sangh continued to support the ministry but it too suffered from the almost constant stream of defectors who crossed and re-crossed the aisle. Four Jana Sanghis left the party and joined the Congress. Finally, on November 20, the center declared President's Rule in Haryana and announced new elections would be held, probably in May, 1968. The Jana Sangh in this state suffers as do all parties from the caste rivalry. The stalwart Jana Sanghis were unaffected by the floor crossing, but the newer and weaker ones were, and they challenged the "RSS leaders" in a manner reminiscent of the post-Mookerjee period of the national party. The elections will be important for the

[12] *Statesman* (Delhi), March 25, 1967.

Jana Sangh which will now face a stronger Swatantra challenge from ex-Congressmen led by Jat Chaudhuri Hardwarilal.

In Uttar Pradesh the Congress failed to win a majority in the assembly in the elections by a margin of five seats, 207 of 423 seats then declared. Immediately the Congress selected former chief minister Chandra Bhan Gupta as leader and he won over the required number of independents to secure a majority for the Congress. His task was made easier by the fact that the chief minister just prior to the elections, Sucheta Kripalani, had been elected to the Lok Sabha and his chief rival, Kamlapati Tripathi, had been upset in the elections. He did, however, have a challenger in the Jat leader from Meerut District, Chaudhuri Charan Singh. Charan Singh refused a proffered seat in the cabinet. Meanwhile, the national Jana Sangh authorized the Uttar Pradesh party to negotiate an alliance with other opposition groups. The initial negotiations raised the possibility of an opposition ministry which the Jana Sangh, as the largest party after the Congress, would dominate. The Congress success in winning over the required number of independents relegated the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal to the status of opposition. Pitamber Das was named to lead the Jana Sangh legislature party with Ganga Ram Talwar as leader in the assembly.

Charan Singh struck on April 1 when he announced to a surprised Congress bench and a cheering opposition bench that he was ending a 45-year career with the Congress and crossing the aisle. He accused the Gupta ministry of being dominated by the Bania caste and of betraying Congress ideals.[13] Crossing with Charan Singh were a sufficient number of his associates to bring down the Gupta ministry. Charan Singh's defection could not have been a great surprise to Gupta. The Jat had long been a "loner" in the Uttar Pradesh cabinets. As agriculture minister in an earlier cabinet he had written a pamphlet opposing the Congress plan for cooperative farming. Because of this and certain other stands many observers had thought Charan Singh might go over to the Swatantra Party. Now in the role of Congress defector Charan Singh found himself among a mixed group of which the Jana Sangh was largest but the SSP and the CPI the noisiest.

The Samyukta Vidhayak Dal lost no time in choosing Charan

[13] *Link*, April 9, 1967.

Singh as leader. On April 6 his cabinet was sworn in. Among the 16 full ministers four came from the Jana Sangh. Ram Prakash Gupta of Lucknow, a member of the Legislative Council and former deputy mayor of Lucknow, was named Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of Education. Ganga Bakht Singh, from Hardoi, became Minister of Cooperation. Tambreshwar Prasad, from Sitapur, took office as Minister of Power and Irrigation. Varmeshwar Pandey, of Banaras, became Minister of Local Self-Government. The fifth minister, Man Singh Verma, was not a member of either house; he was Minister of Transport and Tourism. The Jana Sangh also contributed three of the 12 deputy ministers of whom Himmat Singh of Bulandshahr was most prominent. It, of course, did not go unnoticed that the two party leaders, Pitamber Das and Talwar, were passed over and that the Jana Sangh, foolishly as it turned out, reached outside the legislature for one minister.

While the new ministry was settling in the results of two more assembly seats were declared, one each to the Congress and the Jana Sangh. The Congress victory was notable as it brought Kamlapati Tripathi into the assembly from Jaunpur, once considered a Jana Sangh stronghold. The shaky new ministry also had to face two by-elections to the Rajya Sabha to replace Indira Gandhi and Vajpayee who had been elected to the Lok Sabha. The Jana Sangh put forward the candidacy of Shafiq Ahmad Khan Tatari, a Muslim who had left the SSP for the Jana Sangh just before the general elections. The PSP requested a seat for party chairman Triloki Singh. Reportedly in an effort to divide the SVD, the Congress instigated a nomination on behalf of Republican B. P. Mauriya.[14] Neither the Congress nor the SVD was willing to have a contest of strength. A compromise was worked out under which the seats, which had but eleven months to run, would go to Triloki Singh and to S. K. D. Paliwal, a Congress nominee. In May the Congress retained an assembly seat in a by-election. In the same month a harbinger of difficulty for the Jana Sangh appeared when its deputy leader in the Legislative Council, Shiv Prasad Singh, formed a pressure group of 37 agriculturalist members of the legislature called the Krishak Vidhayak Parishad.[15] In June the KVP put up

[14] *Statesman* (Delhi), April 26, 1967.
[15] *Times of India* (Delhi) May 10, 1967.

one of its Jana Sangh members against the SVD nominee for deputy speaker. He was assured the support of the Congress in an attempt to embarrass both the Charan Singh ministry and the Jana Sangh. The maneuver failed as the nominator withdrew the nomination, but the Jana Sangh was faced with a problem which could only be solved by expelling Shiv Prasad Singh and several others.

In July by-elections were held for a seat in the Rajya Sabha vacated by former Law Minister G. S. Pathak and for three vacancies in the Legislative Council. All were to be filled through elections held in the assembly. The result was disaster. The Congress won all the seats. The Jana Sangh contested two of the council seats. Of a potential 214 votes, Transport Minister Verma received only 180. In the other seat Madho Prasad Tripathi polled somewhat better but lost with 202 votes. In the secret ballotting it was never certain where the defections were. The press assumed a measure of desertions from the Jana Sanghis but also saw it as possible that other constituents might have sabotaged the minister and Tripathi.[16]

At the end of 1967 a wobbly SVD ministry continued in office in Uttar Pradesh. Charan Singh was faced with pulls from the Jana Sangh—against Urdu—and from the left—for the lowering of land revenue. The agreed program gave the appearance of more reservations to the program than program items. The Swatantra Party split over the national party's stand on the Arab-Israel war. The Communists and the SSP threatened, retreated and threatened again to leave the ministry, but continued to support it on crucial divisions. Taunts of RSS infiltration into the education, local government and cooperative departments were openly leveled at the Jana Sangh by its coalition partners. Within the Jana Sangh the old question of RSS *vs.* non-RSS came up again and again. The future of the Charan Singh ministry is very much in doubt—and many in the Jana Sangh seem to wish they had never become involved.

Involvement in Uttar Pradesh led eventually to involvement in Madhya Pradesh, but, as we shall see, with a difference. In the face of opposition from the Jana Sangh, the Jana Congress, and the group of the Rajmata of Gwalior, the Congress had won a surprising victory in the elections. Chief Minister D. P. Mishra held a

[16] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1967.

167–129 lead over the combined opposition. He formed a new ministry but in spite of the apparently large majority it was not a united Congress even after the departure of the Rajmata and the Jana Congress. Mishra, who had come into the office after the Kamaraj Plan, faced much internal opposition. Virendra Kumar Saklecha of Mandsaur retained the leadership of the Jana Sangh group, which dropped from 78 to 65 when the Rajmata formed a separate group of her followers with about 25 members.[17] The Rajmata then moved to form a single opposition block. Jana Sangh secretary Kusha Bhau Thakre initially opposed the move but the party did join under the leadership of the Rajmata.[18] She claimed a membership of 129, that is, the entire opposition including the smaller groups, the PSP, SSP, CPI, Jana Congress and Ram Rajya Parishad. In May, Mishra's group in the Congress won an important by-election in Rewa which brought back to the assembly former minister Arjun Singh and humiliated the losing Jana Sanghi, who forfeited his deposit. In a by-election for the Rajmata's Lok Sabha she and the Jana Sangh supported Acharya Kripalani who won easily.

Mishra's fall was a direct result of factionalism in the Congress of which the United Front took advantage. On July 22, a number of Congressmen announced they had left the party and joined the United Front. New Delhi did not accede to Mishra's request for new elections following his resignation. The Rajmatā declined to lead the new ministry which was then headed by Govind Narain Singh, a defecting Congressman who had been a deputy minister in the Mandloi cabinet and a minister in the pre-1967 Mishra cabinet. Saklecha was named deputy chief minister. The initial list included only Congress defectors, Jana Sanghis and members of the new Kranti Dal of the Rajmata. The SSP and PSP were to name ministers at a later date. Joining Saklecha were Bhanu Pratap Singh of Raigarh and Ramhit Gupta of Satna as ministers, Naresh Johari of Gwalior and Goverdhan Das Khandelwal of Betul as ministers of state, and Lakshmi Narayan Sharma of Sehore and Phul Chand Verma of Khandwa as deputy ministers. In November the Rajmata formed the Krantikari Vidhayak Dal within the United Front with

[17] *Hindustan Times*, March 18, 1967.
[18] *Ibid.*, March 28, 1967.

90 members. The Jana Sangh remained at 65. The United Front government has performed rather well and seemed safe as 1967 ended. The difference between the hurried action in Uttar Pradesh and the more deliberate action led by the Rajmata from outside the Congress in Madhya Pradesh repaid the wait. The absence of large leftist blocks in the Madhya Pradesh United Front also made for smoother working of the ministry.

The Other States

It is necessary to speak at length about only one other state, Rajasthan. The Congress failed to obtain a majority in the general elections. Congress won 89 of 184 seats; the Swatantra-Jana Sangh alliance won 71. The balance was held by 15 independents, most of whom were assumed to be in favor of an opposition government, eight SSP members and a single right Communist. Chief Minister Mohan Lal Sukhadia and his colleagues moved quickly to try to persuade independents and members of other parties to join the Congress. At the same time a united group was formed under the leadership of Maharawal Laxman Singh of Dungarpur of Swatantra. He, Satish Chandra Agrawal of the Jana Sangh, Maharaja Harish Chandra Singh of Jhalawar—a former minister turned Jana Sanghi—and others lined up the non-Congress forces. The non-Congress group went to Delhi and presented themselves to the President, a demonstrable majority. Governor Sampurnanand, however, hesitated and in the interim Jhalawar suddenly died of a heart attack. Congress offers seemed to be paying off. Demonstrations against Sukhadia and the Congress were held in Jaipur and became violent. On March 14, the center proclaimed President's rule in the state but kept the assembly in being. Sampurnanand was replaced by former Lok Sabha Speaker Hukum Singh. The trading of members continued and in the process the Jana Sangh lost several to the Congress. On April 26, President's rule ended and Sukhadia was sworn in as chief minister of a Congress government which had the support of a safe majority. The Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance continues in the assembly, but seems too weak to upset the Sukhadia ministry.

Jammu and Kashmir provided some Jana Sangh activity when Pandit Prem Nath Dogra retired from the presidency of the state

unit after twenty years in office. Now 84 he continues as the leader of the assembly group. The new president is Thakur Baldev Singh.[19] A minor breach of discipline case occurred when a Jana Sangh member defied the party directive and opposed Yuvraj Karan Singh in the by-election to the Udhampur Lok Sabha seat. Baldev Singh had run second in the seat in the general election.

The small Jana Sangh groups in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Mysore and the single member in Gujarat continue to sit as Jana Sanghis with the opposition. But in West Bengal Girindranath Mandal resigned from the Jana Sangh and joined the Congress.[20] Nonetheless, Lok Sabha member M. L. Sondhi reported to the party that the confusion in West Bengal after the elections gave the Jana Sangh an opportunity to prove that it was "better equipped than other parties to tackle the problems facing the nation." [21]

The Center

With 35 members elected to the Lok Sabha on its ticket the Jana Sangh became the third largest party after Congress and Swatantra. The size of the group fell to 31 when the four members elected on the Jana Sangh symbol as nominees of the Rajmata of Gwalior decided to sit separately.[22] The four sit with the Nirdaliya Sangthan, a group led by Prakash Vir Shastri. The group has a number of Jana Sangh-supported members including Shastri and Mahant Digvijaynath of the Hindu Mahasabha.

The press speculated briefly that there might be contest for the parliamentary leadership between Vajpayee, who had led the party from the Rajya Sabha, and Madhok, who was president of the party. Vajpayee was elected unanimously. Kanwar Lal Gupta of Delhi was appointed chief whip; Sri Chand Goel of Chandigarh, secretary; Beni Shankar Sharma of Bihar, treasurer; and Om Prakash Tyagi of Uttar Pradesh, whip.

The improved quality of the Jana Sangh in Parliament was quickly shown. Both Vajpayee and Madhok are experienced parliamentarians. Maharajkumar Brijraj Singh of Kotah had been on the

[19] *Statesman* (Delhi), April 7, 1967.
[20] *Times of India* (Delhi) June 21, 1967.
[21] *Statesman* (Delhi), September 9, 1967.
[22] Jana Sangh sources indicate Baburao Patel has joined as an associate member.

Congress bench in the third Lok Sabha. Gupta and Goel both had experience in state legislatures, as had both Mr. & Mrs. K. K. Nayar of Uttar Pradesh, one of the three husband and wife combinations in the Lok Sabha.[23] Sondhi, the former foreign service officer, added notably to the foreign debates. The departure of flamboyant Swami Rameshwaranand still left Hukamchand Kachwai in the group. He took the occasion of the language bill debate to burn a copy of the bill in the House. The Speaker was not amused nor was the party leadership which publicly reprimanded him.

In the Rajya Sabha the absence of Vajpayee left the party without a strong speaker. The membership increased to six when Mukhtiar Singh was elected to fill a vacancy in Haryana. He was president of the Haryana Jana Sangh and had been a member of the Punjab-Haryana assembly, 1962–1967, but was defeated for re-election. The Jana Sangh was involved negatively in the North East Bombay Lok Sabha by-election. The conqueror of Krishna Menon, S. G. Barve, died shortly after the election. The Jana Sangh withdrew its strong candidate, M. S. Agaskar, in the by-election in favor of the Congress candidate and Menon was defeated again in the by-election by Barve's sister. Some other opposition parties cried "foul," but the Jana Sangh was not prepared to carry opposition unity to the extreme of supporting Menon. Opposition unity and coalitions is our next topic of discussion.

The Party

We have purposely described the coalition activities in several states before looking at the debate within the party over the question of entering non-Congress coalitions. The possibilities were several. The party could stay out of coalitions but risk being branded as an ally of the Congress and fail to reap credit for any improvement made by other opposition parties. The advantage to this would be that the Jana Sangh would not be saddled with responsibility if the coalition failed to improve the situation and would also be able to exert its independent position. A second possibility was to enter coaltions only where the communists were not also partners, but the mathematics of the question made this

[23] The others are the Kripalanis, he opposition, she Congress, and the Gopalans, both Communist Marxists from Kerala.

impossible in some states where politics required association with the SSP which in its turn was unwilling to enter alliances with the Jana Sangh from which the communists were excluded. A third possibility was to enter coalitions regardless of the partners so long as the Congress was out of office. Variants could include opposition support to a Jana Sangh minority ministry or Jana Sangh support to an opposition ministry as in Haryana.

There were clearly differences of opinion within the party. The press assigned differing views to each member of the triumvirate which had led the party into the elections.[24] According to reports which appear to be close to the truth the leaders lined up like this. Madhok favored coalitions against the Congress, but only with "similarly minded" parties, and this meant primarily Swatantra. To *Link* he was a rightist and pro-Western, a political leader who accepted the "Masani approach." Vajpayee favored any alliance so long as the Congress was displaced. He did not campaign for alliances with the communists, but did work for cooperation with the SSP and, as the SSP favored working with the communist parties, he was seen to have indirectly favored the communist tie. Upadhyaya was disposed to the go-it-alone policy of the staunch RSS wing of the party, but was also a political realist, at least in the view of *Link*, in that he favored temporary alliances with other parties to keep the "rejected Congress" out of office. Upadhyaya saw the alliances as transient lasting only while the Jana Sangh prepared to consolidate the base won in the elections and moved toward eventual power.

In April the Pratinidhi Sabhas of both the RSS and the Jana Sangh held meetings. Both endorsed coalition governments, the RSS in general and the Jana Sangh after some debate. The RSS noted the "changed political picture of the country" and said it "hopes the present coming together of several parties will help understanding one another" and "wipe out animosity."[25] At the Delhi session of the Jana Sangh Vajpayee introduced a resolution endorsing Jana Sangh participation in coalitions. Bihar leader Thakur Prasad seconded the resolution. The resolution did not go unchallenged. A member from Madhya Pradesh, Naresh Johari,

[24] *See*, for example, *Link*, March 26, April 16, and July 23, 1967.
[25] *Organiser*, XX:34 (April 9, 1967).

who was later to be a member of the Jana Sangh coalition there, said the party had yielded to expediency and compromised its anti-communist principles. Another said the Haryana pattern of supporting but not joining the ministry should be followed in all states. Still another made the comment that "if the Congress is malaria, the communists are plague." The resolution was passed but the party leadership was put on notice that many in the rank and file were not pleased with what they saw as compromise.[26]

The subject continued to be a topic for consideration at each successive meeting of the governing bodies of the party up to and including the annual session in Calicut. Some of the stresses within the coalitions and Jana Sangh opposition to some of the agreed principles were mentioned earlier in the discussion of the states. Urdu as a second language in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh was a particularly acrimonious issue as was the land revenue to be extracted in the two states. Endorsement of state trading and state procurement of food grains, two policies opposed by the Jana Sangh in the past, were also subjects of debate. The Jana Sangh favored small cabinets but several of them—particularly in Haryana and Punjab—seemed to grow each week as the chief ministers sought to protect their positions by adding new ministers. Interstate conflicts now assumed new proportions and Jana Sanghis found themselves on both sides. One concerned the supply of electricity by the coalition in Punjab to the Jana Sangh government in Delhi. Another, more sharply debated, was the Punjab-Haryana dispute over Chandigarh. The Jana Sangh's coalition partners—the Akalis —in Punjab are dedicated to the placing of Chandigarh in Punjab. Equally adamant on the side of placing it in Haryana was the Rao Birendra Singh government in Haryana, supported by the Jana Sangh. And the lone Lok Sabha member from Chandigarh, Jana Sanghi Sri Chand Goel, was quite prepared to accept the *status quo* and keep Chandigarh a Union Territory. The experience of governing was new for the Jana Sangh as it was for most of the "opposition ministers," a wonderful Indian term which though a contradiction well describes the non-Congress governments.

The language question aborbed much of the energy of the party. Jana Sangh opposition to Urdu was called "ill-conceived" by

[26] *Ibid.*, XX:37 (April 30, 1967).

one newspaper which it saw rising from Jana Sangh antipathy to Pakistan.[27] Another newspaper feared the potential communal nature of the debate and noted that every state in India had some linguistic minority including the Bengalis in Assam and, hitting a bit closer to the Jana Sangh, the Hindi speakers in Punjab. It appealed for the preservation of the Urdu literary heritage of India and for some compromise between designation as official second language and possible obliteration.[28] As 1967 closed there seemed to some observers to be a mild softening of the Jana Sangh attitude coupled with a slightly less ardent insistance by the SSP and the communists, but the issue was far from settled. Intertwined with the Urdu issue were the communal riots during the summer in Ranchi District in Bihar and the "pandit agitation" in Kashmir. The Congress, and the Jana Sangh's coalition partners in Bihar placed the blame on the Jana Sangh.[29] The Jana Sangh in turn blamed the Congress opposition in Bihar and the Sadiq ministry in Kashmir.[30]

The introduction of the Official Language Bill into Parliament in November, 1967, brought into focus another aspect of standing Jana Sangh policy. The bill was an attempt to reconcile views. There were the ardent protagonists of Hindi; those who demanded the immediate and complete withdrawal of English; and those who feared northern Indian dominance if Hindi was made the sole official national language and who wished to continue the present usage of English for national and interstate needs. The Jana Sangh had been considered in the first category along with the even more devoted SSP group and many in the Congress of whom Seth Govind Das was chief. Jana Sangh state units and Jana Sangh associated youth groups such as the Vidyarthi Parishad in the Hindi area still seemed to hold these opinions, but the national leadership sensing the possibility of a party breakthrough outside the Hindi areas had moderated its views. In the special case of the Jana Sangh in Punjab the party had gone a long way to accommodate the Akalis, far enough to draw criticism from such Arya Samajists as Prakash Vir

[27] *Hindustan Times*, August 1, 1967.
[28] *Times of India*, August 4, 1967.
[29] For example, Chavan's report in the Congress Working Committee, *Times of India* (Delhi) September 2, 1967.
[30] Madhok, reported in *Hindustan Times*, August 30, 1967, and Vajpayee, reported in *Times of India* (Delhi) September 4, 1967.

Shastri and Lala Jagat Narain.[31] The Jana Sangh decided to oppose the bill on the basis that it would "perpetuate the stranglehold of English on India's public affairs." [32] Riots and demonstrations took place in Delhi and in Uttar Pradesh against the bill and were answered by similar occurrences in Madras. The Jana Sangh leadership condemned the activities, as it did the incendiary activity of Kachwai mentioned above, and it seems clear that on a national level the Jana Sangh was not a party to the demonstrations. As much cannot be said for individual Jana Sanghis and local units. The language issue became a principal topic at Calicut, to which we shall turn shortly.

Foreign policy issues concerned principally the continuing Jana Sangh antagonism toward Pakistan and China, and the Middle Eastern war. The Jana Sangh saw the hand of China in the Naxalbari disturbances in West Bengal. It continued to believe that China and Pakistan had made an alliance against India. When Mrs. Gandhi, overflying Pakistan, sent a message to Ayub congratulating Pakistan on the completion of Mangla Dam, the Jana Sangh was in the forefront of those who forced the Prime Minister to back down in Parliament and not send a minister to represent India at the dedication ceremony of the dam and related Indus basin works. On the Middle East question the Jana Sangh opposed the openly pro-Arab position of the Government of India. It called on the Arabs to recognize and negotiate with Israel but said that Israel should recognize its place in Afro-Asia, work with the Afro-Asians in scientific and technical cooperation, and not be "an instrument to western diplomacy." Israel should withdraw its forces from occupied Arab territories and should work to resettle the refugees. The waterways including Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba should be open to all traffic.[33]

The Jana Sangh had decided to hold its annual session in the south in recognition of the increased support received from that area during the elections. The venue chosen was Calicut in the Malabar area of Kerala, where the Jana Sangh had received a smattering of support. The area also was the center of Muslim

[31] *Statesman* (Delhi), October 31, 1967, reporting a meeting at Amritsar.
[32] *Times of India* (Delhi), November 13, 1967.
[33] *Organiser*, XX:47 (July 9, 1967).

League activity and the Jana Sangh hoped for support from the Hindus. With the poor showing of the Congress some wishful thinkers among the Jana Sanghis saw themselves as an alternative to the Muslim League and the communists.

To succeed Madhok as president the Jana Sangh chose its long time general secretary, Dindayal Upadhyaya. Madhok was quite willing to continue in office and Vajpayee was also willing to undertake the assignment. The press saw the selection of Upadhyaya as a reassertion of RSS leadership in the party.[31] All of the candidates—the others were Bhai Mahavir and Jagannathan Rao Joshi—had RSS backgrounds, but both Madhok and Vajpayee might be said to have moved away somewhat from the RSS. Madhok with his sympathies for closer working with Swatantra and Vajpayee with his ideas of a broader coalition could be seen by the RSS leadership as being less than fully devoted to the go-it-alone line of the more dedicated Jana Sanghis. To succeed himself as general secretary Upadhyaya turned to the man who had been groomed for the job as unofficial deputy general secretary, Sundar Singh Bhandari of Rajasthan. Upadhyaya also appointed five secretaries. Vajpayee would continue to look after the parliamentary wing. The other four would take over the geographical regions of the party: Deshmukh for the east and the north central, Yagya Dutt Sharma for the north, Joshi for the west and south central and, a new nominee, P. Parmeshwaran, for the deep south, Kerala and Madras.

The presidential address of Upadhyaya contained little which was new but there was some change of emphasis.[35] Perhaps reverting to his own views that the Jana Sangh should persevere along its own path, he said that the "electoral revolution" was not complete in that no party had replaced the Congress. For the Jana Sangh the results "left much to be desired" but it had been "proved to the people" that the Jana Sangh "has the potential to grow into an alternative to the Congress." He saw three post-election problems. First were the "problems of transition" which included floor crossing and the "instability of coalition governments." Second were constitutional problems including the need for a clearer definition

[31] *Link*, December 10, 1967.
[35] Text in *Organiser*, XXI:21 (December 31, 1967).

of the role of the governor. Third were the problems of the nation in the economic, defense, home, and foreign fields. On the first he counseled patience and tolerance among differing points of view. On the second he considered election of governors but suggested the post be reserved for retired Supreme Court judges who would serve in rotation. On the language issue he suggested that all the recognized languages should be made official languages. English must go, regional languages should be used but Hindi should develop as the link language. Patience and not coercion were needed. He cautioned against any compromise with Pakistan or Sheikh Abdullah on Kashmir, called for the recognition of a Tibetan government in exile and for diplomatic relations with Israel and said India's policies should "be guided neither by the United States nor the Soviet Union." He reiterated the Jana Sangh policy on agricultural development but took a less conservative view than his predecessor on the role of the state in the economic system.

The session was very well attended for one held in a corner of the country far from the centers of Jana Sangh strength. The press agreed on the figure of about ten thousand delegates of which the host state provided perhaps a third. The session was lively.[36] One notable and frequent participant was the former Mahasabha president, V. G. Deshpande, who successfully moved an amendment to a resolution on the political situation which eliminated criticism of Ajoy Mukherjee, the deposed West Bengal chief minister. Less successful was another amendment to the same resolution by Om Prakash Tyagi who wanted to make an explicit condemnation of the communists. Also unsuccessful was an amendment to the foreign policy resolution by a Madhya Pradesh member who wanted to place the Jana Sangh on record as supporting the American position in Vietnam. Again the resolutions did not deviate from established Jana Sangh policy but there did appear to be a move away from extreme positions. This was most marked in the language resolution. An attempt was made to reconcile the differing views of the north and the south in the all important question of language requirements for recruitment to all-India services. The Jana Sangh said: (1) Neither English nor Hindi should be required for en-

[36] It is reported in *Organiser*, XXI:22 (January 7, 1968) and was the most widely reported of all Jana Sangh sessions in the national press.

trance; the examinations may be taken in a regional language. (2) Probationers should be required to learn either English or Hindi during the probation period. (3) Probationers whose mother tongue is Hindi should learn another Indian language during the probation period.[37] Even the acceptance of English as a qualification was a climb down and a gesture of importance to the south.

The session closed on December 31, 1967, and that is equally a good point to close the narrative portion of this biography of the second largest party in India. We shall turn now to some basic considerations for the longer haul. The questions which must be considered are five. First, is the Jana Sangh a communal organization in the Indian context? It has been said with justification that the Indian sub-continent has witnessed two struggles for dominance. One of these, the more recent, is the conflict between monotheistic Islam, an intruder, and polytheistic, uncodified Hinduism which Islam found in the sub-continent. Our second question concerns the older of the two conflicts, that between the older Dravidian culture and the newer Aryan civilization, a conflict which is more than 3000 years old. The third question involves a much more recent conflict: that between the traditional Hindu society and modern, Western technology and culture. Fourthly, we must look at the tenacity of the Jana Sangh party as it is the self-proclaimed final bastion against atheistic Marxism. And lastly, we must consider the prospects for a further softening of Jana Sangh positions on each of these issues as it attempts to expand. possibly through cooperation with the secular and conservative Swatantra Party. In considering these five aspects no immutable conclusions can be reached. Biography cannot be completed while the organism being described still lives; perhaps it cannot be completed even long after it has departed from the scene.

Communalism

What is communalism? Webster and his colleagues provide no answer which fits the peculiar circumstances of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Here community in the political sense is equated to religion and to the sub-divisions of religion. However, as religion is much more than a matter of which church one attends and implies a

[37] *Times of India* (Delhi), December 31, 1967.

whole set of standards of conduct for all spheres of human endeavor, the communal designation of an individual subsumes a wide range of assumptions about the individual and his associations. It has often been said that Hinduism is pervasive and the same might as well be said about the sub-continental variants of the other major religions. While divisions among communities may break down to some degree among the sophisticated, Westernized elite—and this, too, is an arguable point—and while each community has within itself divisions which seem at first glance to be irreconcilable, each of the principal communities can and often does take a nearly unified stand when faced with a challenge from another community.

In Indian terms, of course, the majority community is the Hindus with their multitude of castes and sects. More specifically one might look upon the "twice-born" castes—Brahmins, Rajputs and Banias to use the politically more common designations—as being *the* community for there are times when the backward and scheduled castes, the latter a euphemism for the Untouchables, can and do work against the high caste Hindus. The largest minority community is the Muslims and the census enumerates other communities: Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and Christians. To the RSS and the Jana Sangh Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are Hindus, an appellation not necessarily accepted by the adherents of these religious systems. To Jana Sanghis, Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists follow a sectarian division of the main Hindu stream, but Christians and Muslims are followers of "foreign" religions brought into India from outside the sub-continent and usually propagated by conquerors.[11] Noncensus minority communities present in India include the small group of Indian Jews and the highly affluent Parsis.

The RSS specifically excludes from membership Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews but will admit Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. The Jana Sangh follows the "open membership" which Mookerjee proposed to the Hindu Mahasabha. The RSS makes no bones about its exclusive nature: it is devoted to the development of *Hindu* ideals. The Jana Sangh makes much of its open membership and will accept anyone who will subscribe to its program. It does say that it does not go out of its way to attract non-Hindus, using that term in the Jana Sangh sense. The party can point to several

Muslim members. In 1962 it elected one Muslim assemblyman in Rajasthan, although Abdul Jabbar Khan eventually deserted the party. In Delhi, a Muslim Jana Sanghi is a member of the Metropolitan Council. Other Muslims in Madhya Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir ran as candidates on the Jana Sangh ticket. The party can also recall that its first president in Madras was a Christian and it has had Christian candidates. There are other Muslims and Christians on the rolls and perhaps some members of the non-census groups. There are many Jains in both the RSS and the Jana Sangh, but Jains are the least distinguishable from Hindus of the three Hindu "sectarian" groups. There are some Sikhs, but most of these are representative of a group of Sikhs, largely from Sind, who do not recognize the last *guru* and who do not wear beards, carry a sword or wear comb, bangle or breeches. In short they are not Sikhs in the usual religio-political sense. Perhaps there are also Buddhists of the older order or even of the Neo-Buddhist, former untouchable variety who were brought into the *sangha* by Dr. Ambedkar.

To its opponents the Jana Sangh is communal even though some of these opponents are now coalition partners. The "left-wing" of the Congress, the secular Praja Socialist Party and the Communist Party have made much of the communal basis of the Jana Sangh in their opposition to it. It is no reply to the charges to point out that each of the three parties has, when expedient, made alliances with avowedly communal parties such as the Akali Dal, Muslim League and even the Hindu Mahasabha. The Congress Party in Parliament has piously condemned communalism in a report of the committee headed by Ajit Prasad Jain. Yet the party worked in alliance with the Akalis in 1957 and the Muslim League in Kerala in 1960. The Communist Party has worked in elections with the Jana Sangh and the Mahasabha in Maharashtra and with the League in Kerala and Madras and with the Akalis. The PSP also participated with the Mahasabha and the Jana Sangh in Maharashtra, with the League in Kerala and with the Jana Sangh again in the Kripalani campaign in 1962. This is not to say that any of the three parties have not had qualms about so allying and have not publicly repented of their lapses. Not only these three parties but virtually every Indian political party has carefully played on the communal and caste sympathies of the electorate. However, this

only proves again that people in glass houses should not throw stones. It does not answer the question: is the Jana Sangh communal?

The Jana Sangh calls itself "national." It does not deny that in its definition of Bharatiya *sanskriti* it clearly means the ancient Hindu culture of India and by extension this must exclude much of the "foreign" culture brought into India by Muslims and Christians. It asks of Christians and Muslims that they throw off their alleged extra-territorial allegiances, even though these allegiances if they exist at all are religious and not political. It asks them to accept the heroes and mythology of the Hindu past, a demand which may be repulsive to their own monotheistic beliefs.

To attempt to answer the question, it has to be acknowledged that the Jana Sangh is considered a communal party in the usual meaning of the term in the subcontinent. This conclusion is reached on two bases. First, the party is almost exclusively Hindu (including Jain) in membership, control and support. Secondly, many of the tenets of the Jana Sangh are anathema to Muslims and Christians, who with considerable justification, fear the emergence of the party in the northern India areas. To be fair it should also be said that there are degrees of communalism. The Jana Sangh is not so rigidly Hindu as the Mahasabha or the Ram Rajya Parishad nor does it stand solely for the interests of its community as does the Muslim League or the Akali Dal. There is a fine line between a communal party and a nationalist party. The Jana Sangh appears to straddle that line.

Aryans and Dravidians

The conflict between Hindu and Muslim has effectively been waged for some 950 years in the subcontinent.[38] However, another conflict has been taking place since about 1500 B.C. when the Aryans moved into the subcontinent and encountered the indigenous peoples. The conflict between Aryan and Dravidian has continued throughout the centuries as the Dravidians have gradually been squeezed toward the southern end of the peninsula. Recently this conflict has been manifested in the rioting in Madras against

[38] Dating from the entry of Mahmud of Ghazni rather than from the earlier Arab invasion of the Sind.

Hindi. It has had political impact in the sharp rise in strength of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam.

In this conflict the Jana Sangh had placed itself squarely on the side of the Hindi protagonists but has recently shown signs of moderating this view. Its basic policy calls for the elimination of English as the inter-state language and the substitution of Hindi. It also calls for the use within the states of the state languages to the exclusion of English. For his policy the party has the sanction of the Constituent Assembly, even though the constitutional provision regarding Hindi was carried by the bare margin of one vote. In the south and in the east the party has been viewed by many as a group of Hindi zealots who are bent on destroying the position of, say, Madrasis and Bengalis. Hindi to the former is an unrelated language and to the latter a language of dubious literary status. The Jana Sangh has tried recently to soften its demands on behalf of Hindi but it is doubtful whether the party can be loyal to its own concepts and at the same time take a long range stand which would satisfy Dravidians and others who oppose Hindi.

Related to the language question is one of caste. Madras has since independence been a center of anti-Brahmin feelings. Brahmins have been pictured by both the pre-independence Justice Party and by such post-independence groups as the DMK, as Aryan and non-Dravidian wielders of "alien" power. The Congress itself has taken up the cudgels against Brahmins and it toppled its own chief minister, the Brahmin Rajagopalachari, in favor of a lower caste leader, Kumaraswamy Kamaraj Nadar. Much of the all-India leadership of the Jana Sangh is drawn from among Brahmins and other high caste Hindus. In the units in the southern states, also, the leadership is frequently Brahmin or other high caste Hindu.[39] Anti-Brahminism is a major factor in the lack of success of the Jana Sangh in Maharashtra, a state in which the leadership of the Congress has devolved on the dominant Maratha caste.

The policy of the Jana Sangh as to cow slaughter should also be considered in relation to the Aryan versus non-Aryan conflict in India. While seldom Dravidian, the tribal population of India is likewise non-Aryan. Many of the tribals do not share the Hindu reverence for the bovine species and to some the cow is a primary

[39] This, of course, is also true to some degree in other parties.

(and relished) part of the diet. It hardly seems likely that the Christian and animist tribals of Assam and elsewhere—to say nothing of the country's Muslims—would support a party which has as one of its basic tenets the prohibition of cow slaughter. Nor can the party expect support on this issue, or on many others, from the all but de-Hinduized rationalists among the more Westernized elite.

Modern vs. Traditional

Throughout we have touched on the basic conflict which can be seen within the Jana Sangh itself, a conflict between the traditional and the modern. The party has put it thus:

> . . . the rebuilding of Bharat on the basis of Bharatiya *Sanskriti* and *Maryada* as a political, social and economic democracy granting equality of opportunity and liberty to individuals so as to make her a prosperous, powerful and united nation, progressive, modern and enlightened.[40]

The Jana Sangh tries to keep its roots deep in the soil of traditional Hinduism while idealistically looking forward to a modern and open society in India.

Yet it seems inevitable that the very modernization demanded by the Jana Sangh will go far to destroy, or at least undermine, the fabric of the traditional society. The Jana Sangh does not endorse the obscurantist program put forward by Swami Karpatri and the Ram Rajya Parishad, nor has it gone off on the tangent of Hindu Socialism espoused by the Hindu Mahasabha. It does, however, set up a block against Westernization, the very process which appears to this observer to be the necessary catalyst for India's development. The Jana Sangh would like to import Western technology and use Western capital while barring the entry of Western secularism and liberalism. It is doubtful that such a policy can succeed.[41]

Tenacity of Jana Sangh

In pursuing its aims the Jana Sangh has shown a remarkable singleness of purpose. The substance of its policies since the founding of the party has changed little and since the reassertion of RSS

[40] From the first election manifesto, *Organiser* V:11 (October 29, 1951).

[41] *See*, for example, Arnold J. Toynbee's article "The Psychology of Encounters," *The World and the West* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 66–82.

direction after the Sharma episode almost no changes of consequence have occurred. There has been little apparent opposition to the party's line from within the higher ranks. None of the post-Sharma leaders has deserted from the party. Such disciplinary problems as have arisen have come from members who have joined the party primarily for election purposes and who do not have an RSS background.

The Jana Sangh frequently claims that it will be the final barrier between India and Communism. It maintains that it alone has the tenacity to resist the inroads of communists and that it alone has the organization which can and will challenge the communists, if necessary, on the barricades.

The party also believes that eventually most Hindus will give their support to it. Upadhyaya has said: "The votes are there if we can go out and get them, but for that we need organisation and more organisation." [42] The Jana Sangh does not depend solely on nationally known leaders for its political work, but relies primarily on the dedicated cadre of workers drawn mainly from the RSS. It also, as we have seen, sets up large numbers of candidates in widely spread areas of India both for training and for publicity.

Expansion and Alliance

The Jana Sangh in the 1967 elections entered into alliances on a much wider scale than in the earlier elections. It has contracted alliances with the Swatantra Party in Gujarat and Rajasthan and with other parties in Madhya Pradesh. In the previous elections there was no reasonable prospect of the Jana Sangh providing or participating in an alternate government to the Congress in any state. As 1967 approached the party sensed the possibility of victory, in alliance with Swatantra and others, in several states. As the prospect of forming or participating in a government came closer, the earlier rigidity of the party on alliances showed signs of melting. Now that coalitions have been made there is debate within the party on alliances and potential partners.

This points up the basic problem for the Jana Sangh, or for any political party. In a democratic society a party must win power

[42] J. Anthony Lukas, " 'India for the Hindus,' Says the Jan Sangh," *New York Times Magazine*, August 14, 1966, pp. 20 ff.

through the electoral system. In order to do so it must either convince a sufficient number of voters of the rightness of its views, or it must tailor its views to the views of the voter—or combine the two methods. Despite Jana Sangh claims to the contrary it is unlikely that the voters nationally would elect a Jana Sangh government based on the present stated policies of the party as contained in the "Policies and Principles" document. The party therefore can turn only to alteration of policy or to alliance with some party with similar views.

In the 1967 elections, in the coalitions and at Calicut the Jana Sangh appeared to be taking steps both toward moderation and toward alliances. The close of 1967 is a critical juncture for the Jana Sangh. Its future will depend not only on the mood of the voter but on the party's position on alliances and policy changes. It would not appear likely that any major concessions will be made on either issue but that the "go-it-alone" policy will predominate.

Appendices

APPENDIX I

JANA SANGH WORKING COMMITTEES, 1954–1967

	Year	1954	1955	1956	1958	1959	1960	1961	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
	Session	Bombay	Jodhpur	Jaipur	Ambala	Bangalore	Nagpur	Lucknow	Bhopal	Ahmedabad	Vijayawada	Jullundur	Calicut
Name	*State*												
Bhai Mahavir	Delhi	x	x	x	x	.	x	x	x	x	.	.	x
Mauli Chandra Sharma	Punjab	P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Dindayal Upadhyaya	Uttar Pradesh	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	P
Umashankar M. Trivedi	Madhya Pradesh	T	T	T	T	T	x	x	x	x	x	x	.
Shivkumar Dwivedi	Bihar	x	x	x	.	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Acharya Ram Dev	Punjab	x	x	V	V	V	x	.	.	.	.	.	.
Raj Kumar Shrivastava	Uttar Pradesh	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.
Deva Prasad Ghosh	West Bengal	x	V	P	P	P	V	V	VP	P	V	x	x
Guru Dutt Vaid	Delhi	x	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x	.	.	.
Kishori Lal Goel	Madhya Pradesh	x	x	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Raj Kishore Shukla	Madhya Pradesh	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Narayanlal B. Pitti	Maharashtra	x	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Chettan Singh	Punjab	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Bapu Saheb Sohni	Maharashtra	xP	V	V	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Ram Narain Shastri	Madhya Pradesh	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Vasant Krishna Oke	Delhi	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Nana Deshmukh	Uttar Pradesh	x	x	x	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Atal Behari Vajpayee	Uttar Pradesh	x	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Man Singh Verma	Uttar Pradesh	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x
Balraj Madhok	Delhi	x	x	x	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	P	x
Tarakant Jha	Bihar	x	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Bhairon Singh Shekawat	Rajasthan	x	x	.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	V	x
Sunder Singh Bhandari	Rajasthan	x	x	x	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	S	S	G
Hari Prasad Pandya	Gujarat	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	.	.	.
Hari Singh Gohil	Gujarat	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	x

Name	*State*	1954 Bombay	1955 Jodhpur	1956 Jaipur	1958 Ambala	1959 Bangalore	1960 Nagpur	1961 Lucknow	1963 Bhopal	1964 Ahmedabad	1965 Vijayawada	1966 Jullundur	1967 Calicut
Ramchandra K. Mhalgi	Maharashtra	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Jagannathanrao Joshi	Mysore	x	S	x	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
J. S. Ramchandramurthi	Andhra Pradesh	x	x	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Amarnath Bajaj	Delhi	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Prem Nath Dogra	Jammu	.	P	x	V	x	x	x	x	V	x	x	x
Yashodar Bhai Mehta	Gujarat	.	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Hotchand Advani	Maharashtra	.	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Om Prakash Mengi	Jammu	.	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Jagdish Prasad Mathur	Delhi	.	.	x	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Pitambar Das	Uttar Pradesh	.	.	x	x	V	P	V	V	V	V	x	V
Satyendra Nath Bose	West Bengal	.	.	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Uttamrao Patil	Maharashtra	.	.	x	x	x	V	.	x	x	x	x	x
Keshab Chander	Punjab	.	.	.	x	x	T	T	x	x	x	x	.
M. A. Venkata Rao	Mysore	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.
Smt. Hirabai Iyer	Uttar Pradesh	.	.	.	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Bachhraj Vyas	Maharashtra	.	.	.	x	.	x	x	x	.	P	x	T
Kishen Lal (Mangi)	Punjab	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x	.	.	.	x
Yagya Dutt Sharma	Punjab	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Z
Thakur Prasad	Bihar	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Giriraj Kishore Kapur	Madhya Pradesh	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	.	.
Haripada Bharati	West Bengal	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x	x	.	.
Smt. Malati Paranjpe	Maharashtra	.	.	.	.	x	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
V. Rajagopalacharya	Madras	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x	.	.	.
N. Narayana Menon	Kerala	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	.	.	.	.	.
A. Rama Rao	Andhra Pradesh	.	.	.	.	.	x	P	x	x	.	.	.
Harendra Singh	Haryana	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.	.	.	.	.
Smt. Kamla Madhok	Delhi	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.	.	.	.	.
Raghu Vira	Delhi	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	P	.	.	.	.
Jhamatmal Wadhwani	Maharashtra	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	T	T	T	.	.
Yaduvendra Dutta Dubey	Uttar Pradesh	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	.	.	:
S. B. Swetadri	Mysore	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	x	x
J. Yagya Narayana	Andhra Pradesh	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	V	V
P. Madhava Menon	Kerala	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.	.	.
Kusha Bhau Thakre	Madhya Pradesh	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	x
N. P. Vasudevan	Madras	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	x	x

Year		1954	1955	1956	1958	1959	1960	1961	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Session		Bombay	Jodhpur	Jaipur	Ambala	Bangalore	Nagpur	Lucknow	Bhopal	Ahmedabad	Vijayawada	Jullundur	Calicut
O. Rajagopalan	Kerala	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	x
Ranga Reddi	Andhra Pradesh	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.	.
Virendra Kumar Saklecha	Madhya Pradesh	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.	.
Ramprasad Das	West Bengal	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.	.
Ramesh Kumar Mishra	Assam	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x	x
Kidar Nath Sahni	Delhi	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.	.
Satish Chandra Agarwal	Rajasthan	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.
Ganga Ram Talwar	Uttar Pradesh	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.
Lalchand K. Advani	Delhi	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x
Vasant Kumar Pandit	Maharashtra	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	.
Smt. Sumati Bai Suklekar	Maharashtra	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x
Lal Raghunandan Singh Deo	Orissa	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x	x
J. Banarji	West Bengal	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x
P. Parmeswaran	Kerala	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	Z
Mukhtiar Singh	Haryana	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	x

Source: *Organiser*, various issues, supplemented by Jana Sangh records.

Abbreviations: P—President
V—Vice President
G—General Secretary
Z—Zonal Secretary
O—Office Secretary
S—Secretary
T—Treasurer
x—Member
xP—Sohni succeeded Sharma
VP—Vice President Ghosh succeeded Raghu Vira
Smt—Shrimati indicating women members

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
ASSAM																				
Cachar	15	2	0	2	1.51											14	4	0	3	2.81
Kamrup											17	1	0	1	0.31	22	2	0	2	0.69
Lakhimpur											13	2	0	2	1.79	16	10	0	6	7.79
Nowgong											10	1	0	1	1.86	13	3	0	1	3.55
Sibsagar																16	1	0	1	0.15
United Khasi and Jaintia Hills	5	1	0	1	2.12															
Total	105	3	0	3	0.29						105	4	0	4	0.45	126	20	0	13	1.84
BIHAR																				
Bhagalpur	11	3	0	3	2.44	12	4	0	3	3.83	12	7	0	4	7.99	12	12	4	7	21.64
Champaran	20	6	0	6	2.38	21	3	0	2	2.59	21	2	0	1	1.37	21	15	2	11	9.70
Darbhanga						31	4	0	4	1.21	31	7	0	6	2.65	30	24	0	22	5.81
Dhanbad	8	1	0	0	1.54						7	2	0	2	1.79	8	8	0	6	9.46
Gaya	24	3	0	3	1.22	25	1	0	1	0.54	25	9	1	8	3.85	25	23	1	18	10.10
Hazaribagh											16	4	0	4	0.94	16	16	1	11	13.30
Monghyr	24	4	0	3	2.21	23	3	0	1	1.52	23	6	0	4	3.99	22	16	0	12	7.35
Muzaffarpur	31	2	0	2	0.42	29	2	0	2	1.14	29	8	0	6	1.94	28	24	1	19	7.55
Palamau																8	8	1	5	15.43
Patna	20	5	0	5	1.64	21	4	0	3	1.93	21	9	1	7	7.49	20	14	3	7	13.16
Purnea	18	3	0	3	2.03	18	2	0	1	2.41	18	7	0	6	3.63	21	17	1	12	10.25
Ranchi											15	1	0	1	0.51	15	15	2	6	17.82
Saharsa	11	1	0	1	0.36											13	11	0	10	7.91
Santhal Parganas	19	1	0	1	0.08	19	3	0	3	1.87	19	2	0	2	0.46	18	16	5	8	18.52
Saran	28	6	0	6	1.53	26	3	0	2	1.35	26	5	1	4	4.08	25	20	2	13	10.42

District	1952 Total Seats	1952 Jana Sangh Cont	1952 Jana Sangh Won	1952 Jana Sangh LD	1952 Jana Sangh %	1957 Total Seats	1957 Jana Sangh Cont	1957 Jana Sangh Won	1957 Jana Sangh LD	1957 Jana Sangh %	1962 Total Seats	1962 Jana Sangh Cont	1962 Jana Sangh Won	1962 Jana Sangh LD	1962 Jana Sangh %	1967 Total Seats	1967 Jana Sangh Cont	1967 Jana Sangh Won	1967 Jana Sangh LD	1967 Jana Sangh %
BIHAR (*continued*)																				
Shahabad	22	6	0	6	1.67						22	6	0	6	1.11	22	18	0	16	6.70
Singhbhum	12	3	0	3	3.46											14	13	3	9	16.25
Total	318	44	0	42	1.15	318	29	0	22	1.19	318	75	3	61	2.77	318	270	26	192	10.42
GUJARAT																				
Ahmedabad											16	6	0	6	1.59	18	3	0	3	1.15
Baroda						10	1	0	1	0.75	12	3	0	3	1.62					
Bhavnagar	12	2	0	1	1.64						8	1	0	0	2.37	9	4	0	1	11.02
Bulsar-Dangs																10	1	0	1	1.19
Jamnagar											6	1	0	1	1.46					
Junagadh						9	1	0	0	2.59	9	4	0	3	6.73	10	3	0	1	7.68
Kaira											15	2	0	2	0.38					
Kutch											5	1	0	1	2.42					
Mehsana																13	1	0	0	2.66
Rajkot	14	1	0	1	0.69	8	3	0	0	7.30	9	3	0	2	6.38	10	2	1	0	9.31
Surat	9	1	0	1	0.09						10	3	0	3	2.05	11	2	0	2	0.59
Surendranagar											5	2	0	2	1.66					
Total	188	4	0	3	0.10	132	5	0	1	0.55	154	26	0	23	1.33	168	16	1	8	1.88
HARYANA (*b*)																				
Ambala	6	3	0	2	4.57	7	3	0	0	13.98	6	5	0	1	22.79	9	7	2	2	23.76
Gurgaon						9	5	0	1	16.98	9	5	0	4	11.82	13	9	1	3	14.70
Hissar	10	5	0	3	7.16	10	4	0	4	4.83	10	6	0	5	6.03	17	8	2	6	9.02
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]						[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	5.78	5	2	0	1	7.14

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
HARYANA (b) (continued)																				
Karnal	11	8	0	2	14.63	11	6	0	1	17.38	11	7	1	1	18.37	16	9	4	1	18.51
Mahendragarh	8	3	2	1	8.79	4	3	3	0	36.53	4	3	1	1	17.73	6	3	1	2	8.20
Rohtak	11	2	0	0	2.60	11	3	1	1	4.96	11	6	2	2	13.36	15	10	2	6	15.38
Total	60	23	2	9	6.21	55	24	4	7	12.02	54	34	4	16	13.46	81	48	12	21	14.39
JAMMU AND KASHMIR (c)																				
Jammu Province						30	22	5	4	28.44	30	25	3	6	24.45	31	26	3	6	25.85
Kashmir Province																44	3	0	2	0.90
Total						75	22	5	4	24.63	75	25	3	6	17.47	75	29	3	8	16.45
KERALA (d)	*1954*					*1960*					*1965*					*1967*				
Alleppey																14	2	0	2	0.16
Cannanore											14	4	0	4	1.49	14	3	0	3	0.94
Ernakulam											15	1	0	1	0.28	15	3	0	3	0.54
Kozhikode						20	1	0	1	0.10	20	8	0	8	1.23	20	11	0	11	2.95
Palghat						15	1	0	1	0.26	14	3	0	3	1.50	14	5	0	5	3.01
Trichur						12	1	0	1	0.23										
Trivandrum	26	1	0	1	0.06															
Total	117	1	0	1	0.01	126	3	0	3	0.06	133	16	0	16	0.52	133	24	0	24	0.88

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
MADHYA PRADESH	1952					1957					1962					1967				
Balaghat	8	1	0	1	0.45											8	6	0	4	10.90
Bastar																11	10	2	4	29.00
Betul											5	5	2	2	21.19	5	4	3	0	38.49
Bhind	7	3	0	3	4.71	6	4	0	2	11.97	6	4	0	4	5.78	6	4	4	0	25.40
Bilaspur	20	6	0	5	2.43	19	14	0	6	15.92	19	19	1	6	24.46	19	18	1	1	28.40
Chhatarpur	7	7	0	2	19.93	5	4	0	0	29.46	5	3	2	1	22.04	5	5	0	3	18.51
Chhindwara	7	2	0	1	5.87						7	4	0	2	10.31	7	7	1	2	22.46
Damoh	4	2	0	0	13.17	4	1	0	1	1.23	4	2	0	1	8.58	4	4	0	2	18.10
Datia	3	2	0	1	9.54	2	1	0	1	2.08						2	1	0	1	1.13
Dewas	5	1	0	0	7.71	4	3	1	0	35.97	4	3	2	0	38.27	4	4	3	0	46.43
Dhar	6	3	0	0	11.32	6	4	0	0	18.70	6	4	4	0	32.01	6	6	3	0	44.09
Durg	16	2	0	2	1.10	16	2	0	1	1.53	16	10	0	9	6.91	17	13	0	7	13.47
Guna	6	1	0	1	1.44	5	1	0	1	2.78	5	4	0	3	10.55					
Gwalior	5	1	0	1	2.78	6	2	0	2	4.19	6	4	0	3	8.96	6	6	6	0	51.33
Hoshangabad	5	4	0	4	4.63	6	1	0	1	0.88	6	5	0	4	8.30	6	5	0	3	12.61
Indore	7	3	0	0	10.22	7	4	0	1	11.85	7	4	0	1	11.37	7	7	1	2	24.18
Jabalpur	11	8	0	7	5.42	12	6	0	4	8.60	12	11	1	2	22.10	12	12	1	3	27.61
Jhabua											4	3	0	3	7.13	5	2	0	1	6.47
Mandla	6	2	0	1	4.96											6	4	0	3	8.88
Mandsaur	8	7	1	2	19.39	7	7	3	2	38.13	7	7	6	0	55.76	7	7	6	0	52.03
Morena	9	1	0	1	0.46						7	5	0	4	5.91	7	2	2	0	10.71
Narsimhapur	4	1	0	0	8.03	4	1	0	1	1.47	4	2	0	2	3.09	4	4	0	3	13.20
Nimar (Khandwa)	6	1	0	1	7.00	6	2	0	0	11.98	6	6	0	1	25.01	6	6	4	0	42.27
Nimar (Khar-gone)	9	7	3	0	29.48	8	8	1	1	37.74	8	7	7	0	48.92	9	9	2	0	42.50

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
MADHYA PRADESH (continued)																				
Panna	5	4	0	2	17.77	3	3	0	0	25.21	3	3	1	0	30.29	3	3	0	0	29.55
Raigarh						9	4	0	3	4.67	9	4	0	4	3.65	9	9	2	2	26.14
Raipur	19	6	0	4	3.82	18	7	0	5	9.01	18	12	3	7	19.97	18	18	1	9	24.03
Raisen	12	4	0	3	3.52						3	3	0	2	19.16	4	4	2	0	42.45
Rajgarh	6	1	0	0	2.54	5	2	0	1	10.62	5	2	1	1	11.00	5	5	2	2	26.52
Ratlam	5	2	0	2	8.46	4	2	0	1	7.70	4	1	1	0	14.06	4	4	1	1	36.20
Rewa	15	6	1	4	6.80	7	3	1	2	4.48	7	6	0	5	6.45	7	7	0	6	10.54
Sagar	6	6	0	4	12.28	7	6	0	5	9.58	7	7	2	0	34.18	7	7	5	0	41.39
Satna	8	6	0	5	6.71	6	4	1	2	12.25	6	6	2	1	24.04	6	6	1	0	37.22
Sehore	18	5	0	3	5.84	6	3	0	1	17.70	6	4	0	2	15.10	7	7	5	0	47.84
Seoni	5	1	0	1	0.78						5	1	0	0	2.93	5	5	0	1	19.62
Shahdol	9	1	0	1	1.08	7	5	0	5	8.71	7	6	0	5	11.19	8	8	0	6	15.92
Shajapur	5	5	0	2	20.92	5	5	3	1	38.38	5	5	4	0	45.55	5	5	5	0	51.19
Shivpuri						5	3	0	3	5.25	5	3	0	2	8.60	5	3	3	0	44.81
Sidhi	6	5	1	0	20.27	5	3	0	2	8.48	5	4	0	4	6.38	5	5	0	4	8.07
Surguja						9	6	0	6	7.61	9	9	1	5	18.67	10	10	3	1	26.53
Tikamgarh	7	2	0	2	3.63	4	2	0	2	4.19						4	4	0	4	5.98
Ujjain	7	6	0	2	15.31	6	4	0	1	14.55	6	4	1	1	22.70	6	5	5	0	45.93
Vidisha	5	1	0	0	0.68						4	3	0	3	1.55	4	4	4	0	64.84
Total	339	126	6	68	5.66	288	127	10	64	9.88	288	195	41	90	16.66	296	265	78	75	28.28

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total Seats	Jana Sangh Cont	Won	LD	%	Total Seats	Jana Sangh Cont	Won	LD	%	Total Seats	Jana Sangh Cont	Won	LD	%	Total Seats	Jana Sangh Cont	Won	LD	%
MADRAS																				
Chinglepüt																15	2	0	2	0.13
Madras											10	2	0	2	0.47	12	6	0	6	0.50
Madurai											20	1	0	1	0.39	22	3	0	3	0.59
North Arcot																22	2	0	2	0.14
Ramanathapuram																17	1	0	1	0.06
Salem Dha-rampuri											23	1	0	1	0.22	26	6	0	6	0.22
Thanjavur																23	1	0	1	0.02
Tiruchirappali																22	2	0	2	0.09
Tiruneveli																19	1	0	1	0.05
Total											206	4	0	4	0.08	234	24	0	24	0.15
MAHARASHTRA																				
Ahmednagar											12	2	0	2	1.75	12	6	0	5	4.25
Akola	10	4	0	3	8.27	8	3	0	2	4.87	8	4	0	3	5.57	8	3	0	1	10.10
Amravati	12	3	0	3	2.80						8	3	0	3	2.64	8	6	0	6	5.72
Aurangabad	11	2	0	2	0.75	10	2	0	2	2.79						11	6	0	2	11.08
Bhandara	12	3	0	2	1.67	9	1	0	0	5.56	9	5	0	2	8.25	9	8	2	4	14.69
Bhir																7	5	0	4	5.62
Bombay						23	1	0	0	2.26	23	18	0	18	6.34	28	24	1	18	11.74
Buldana	9	5	0	5	6.19	7	3	0	1	7.41	7	6	0	2	15.37	7	7	0	2	21.74
Chanda	11	5	0	4	5.25	9	1	0	0	4.61	9	3	0	2	3.17	9	3	0	1	6.17
Dhulia											9	7	0	3	12.66	9	5	0	0	20.58
Jalgaon						12	1	1	0	3.74	12	9	0	7	8.83	12	9	0	5	12.53
Kolaba											8	8	0	8	5.71	7	7	0	7	6.20

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
MAHARASHTRA (continued)																				
Kolhapur											11	2	0	2	1.03	11	1	0	1	0.74
Nagpur	13	10	0	9	6.34	10	1	0	1	0.78	10	8	0	8	6.98	10	6	0	4	8.87
Nanded						7	1	0	1	0.75	7	1	0	1	0.69	7	5	0	5	3.21
Nasik											12	4	0	4	3.57	13	3	0	1	6.47
Osmanabad																10	7	0	7	1.87
Parbhani																8	4	0	4	3.17
Poona						16	1	1	0	2.81	16	12	0	9	8.96	17	11	1	9	10.56
Ratnagiri						14	2	2	0	9.33	14	13	0	7	13.76	13	9	0	4	14.38
Sangli						8	1	0	0	4.24	8	6	0	6	2.42	8	6	0	6	1.07
Satara											10	1	0	1	0.56	10	3	0	3	2.13
Sholapur											12	2	0	2	1.89	13	3	0	3	0.80
Thana											12	6	0	3	6.50	11	10	0	5	13.52
Wardha	6	2	0	2	2.09						4	3	0	3	4.80	4	1	0	1	1.57
Yeotmal	10	2	0	2	1.85						8	4	0	4	1.03	8	7	0	7	2.42
Total	301	36	0	32	1.28	264	18	4	7	2.01	264	127	0	100	5.00	270	165	4	115	8.18
MYSORE																				
Bangalore	21	8	0	7	3.38	23	3	0	2	1.42	23	8	0	8	1.23	23	3	0	3	1.04
Belgaum						18	1	0	0	1.08						18	2	0	1	0.89
Bellary						8	1	0	1	0.55										
Bijapur						15	2	0	2	0.89	15	10	0	8	6.58	15	3	0	2	3.59
Chikmagalur	10	3	0	2	7.73						5	1	0	1	0.83	6	1	0	0	6.45
Chitradurga											9	3	0	3	2.51					

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total Seats	Jana Sangh				Total Seats	Jana Sangh				Total Seats	Jana Sangh				Total Seats	Jana Sangh			
		Cont	Won	LD	%		Cont	Won	LD	%		Cont	Won	LD	%		Cont	Won	LD	%
MYSORE (continued)																				
Coorg											2	2	0	2	3.84	3	1	1	0	15.09
Bidar																6	1	1	0	10.07
Dharwar	14	1	0	1	0.90	17	3	0	2	2.06	17	9	0	7	5.25	18	5	1	2	6.18
Gulbarga																13	1	0	1	0.52
Hassan											8	5	0	4	5.93	8	3	0	3	1.26
Kolar						12	1	0	1	0.24										
Mysore	15	4	0	4	1.02	16	1	0	1	1.25	16	4	0	4	1.99	16	7	0	7	3.38
North Kanara											5	2	0	2	1.45	6	1	0	0	3.58
Raichur																10	1	0	1	0.70
Shimoga	6	2	0	1	5.11	7	2	0	1	2.85	7	6	0	5	6.52	9	3	0	2	3.30
South Kanara	9	2	0	2	1.80	14	3	0	1	5.92	14	9	0	8	5.15	14	4	1	1	8.82
Tumkur	13	5	0	4	3.44	12	3	0	3	3.97	12	4	0	4	1.81	13	1	0	1	0.96
Total	211	25	0	21	1.21	208	20	0	14	1.34	208	63	0	56	2.29	216	37	4	24	2.82
ORISSA																				
Bolangir																9	3	0	3	1.42
Cuttack																24	3	0	3	0.29
Kalahandi																8	3	0	3	1.40
Phulbani																4	4	0	4	4.09
Puri																15	1	0	1	0.39
Sambalpur																12	2	0	2	0.82
Sundargarh																6	3	0	3	3.35
Total																140	19	0	19	0.54

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
PUNJAB (e)																				
Amritsar	14	3	0	1	2.17	13	8	2	5	13.52	13	4	2	1	8.56	14	6	3	3	11.31
Bhatinda	15	6	0	6	1.35						8	5	0	5	5.29	10	5	0	5	3.43
Ferozepur	13	8	0	5	7.97	12	6	1	2	8.38	12	7	2	4	12.27	15	10	1	6	12.07
Gurdaspur	9	6	0	4	8.07	8	7	0	2	18.10	8	7	0	3	15.64	9	7	1	2	21.20
Hoshiarpur	8	5	0	4	5.89	8	2	0	1	5.21	7	2	0	2	3.44	8	4	0	3	8.62
Jullundur	11	7	0	5	4.27	10	7	1	5	11.71	10	3	0	1	6.83	12	3	2	1	9.49
Kapurthala	4	1	0	1	1.32											3	1	0	1	5.80
Ludhiana	8	4	0	4	2.96	8	3	1	1	6.37	8	4	0	3	7.23	10	3	2	1	8.98
Patiala	13	5	0	5	1.26	7	2	0	2	2.37	7	5	0	4	7.47	9	4	0	1	8.26
Rupar	4	2	0	2	4.05						3	1	0	1	2.99	5	3	0	1	9.95
Sangrur	12	5	0	5	1.80	7	1	0	1	0.72	7	3	0	3	2.63	9	3	0	2	4.73
Total	111	52	0	42	4.01	86	36	5	19	7.47	86	41	4	27	7.59	104	49	9	26	9.84
RAJASTHAN																				
Ajmer	31	16	3	5	11.35	9	1	0	1	1.64	9	6	0	3	11.93	9	4	2	0	17.86
Alwar											10	1	0	0	3.09	10	3	1	0	8.75
Banswara																4	2	0	2	1.99
Barmer	4	1	0	1	3.87	5	1	0	1	3.58	5	1	0	1	0.85	6	1	0	0	4.74
Bharatpur						10	1	0	1	0.60	10	2	0	2	0.55	10	2	0	2	1.04
Bhilwara	8	2	1	0	10.76	8	3	0	2	4.46	8	3	0	2	6.34	8	4	0	2	9.13
Bikaner	3	1	0	1	3.07	4	1	0	1	1.28	4	3	0	3	3.70	4	1	0	0	5.34
Bundi						3	2	0	2	5.80	3	2	1	0	32.21	3	3	1	0	36.58
Chittorgarh	6	4	2	1	34.83	7	3	0	1	12.23	7	5	1	2	18.45	7	4	0	0	17.94
Churu	5	2	0	2	4.85	6	2	0	0	7.60	6	2	0	2	2.64	6	3	1	1	13.66
Ganganagar	6	2	0	2	1.08	7	1	0	1	1.28	7	5	0	5	2.59	9	2	0	1	3.13

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
RAJASTHAN (continued)																				
Jaipur	16	2	0	1	1.85	17	2	2	0	5.42	17	12	2	8	13.17	17	2	2	0	7.28
Jalore	5	1	0	1	1.58	5	1	0	1	2.42	5	3	0	3	3.78	5	1	0	0	10.31
Jhalawar	4	2	0	2	7.42						5	5	1	2	23.04	5	2	2	0	26.70
Jhunjhunu	4	1	0	0	3.55	7	5	0	5	6.53	7	4	0	4	2.81	7	1	0	1	1.68
Jodhpur	7	1	0	1	0.08	7	1	0	1	1.96	7	2	0	0	6.31	8	3	1	0	18.17
Kotah	8	5	0	4	9.33	7	5	2	0	31.61	7	7	4	1	34.91	8	8	8	0	53.41
Nagaur	8	3	0	3	2.94	8	2	0	0	8.78	8	3	0	2	3.88	9	2	0	0	8.05
Pali	7	4	0	4	3.77	7	3	0	2	5.27	7	4	0	4	5.03					
Sawai Madhopur	8	6	0	3	19.09	8	4	0	3	8.23	8	6	3	3	21.96	9	5	2	2	16.17
Sikar	10	2	1	1	5.67	8	2	2	0	8.23	8	6	0	2	13.46	7	3	2	0	20.60
Sirohi	3	2	0	2	4.64						3	3	0	3	8.24	3	1	0	0	8.47
Tonk	4	1	0	0	9.95						4	3	0	3	4.23					
Udaipur	13	7	4	1	22.48	13	7	0	4	11.70	13	6	3	0	18.54	13	6	0	0	18.14
Total	189	65	11	35	6.34	176	47	6	26	5.42	176	94	15	55	9.15	184	63	22	11	11.69
UTTAR PRADESH																				
Agra	10	7	0	5	8.27	10	4	0	2	6.09	10	10	0	6	10.90	10	10	3	5	19.48
Aligarh	10	6	0	6	3.62	10	4	0	1	7.39	10	9	0	4	14.17	10	8	4	2	17.46
Allahabad	14	3	0	3	0.47	14	9	0	8	6.84	14	12	1	10	8.40	14	14	1	9	12.12
Almora						6	2	1	1	10.96	6	5	0	3	16.52	6	5	1	0	25.78
Azamgarh	14	8	0	8	5.61	14	7	0	5	7.69	14	14	0	9	13.06	14	14	2	6	19.01
Bahraich	10	5	0	5	5.68						9	4	0	1	6.43	9	9	9	0	44.50
Ballia	8	4	0	4	4.40	8	4	0	3	6.18	8	5	0	5	2.89	8	8	2	5	13.84

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
UTTAR PRADESH (continued)																				
Banda	5	1	0	0	3.98	5	1	0	0	3.23	5	4	1	3	14.01	5	5	3	0	29.14
Bara Banki	7	3	0	2	4.66	8	3	1	1	5.54	8	8	2	5	20.02	8	8	0	5	12.04
Bareilly	9	4	0	1	10.90	9	6	0	4	10.44	9	9	2	5	16.93	9	9	5	1	34.74
Basti	18	4	0	3	2.18	16	6	0	3	4.92	16	13	4	4	25.95	15	15	7	1	38.52
Bijnor	7	3	0	2	5.13	7	5	0	1	20.90	7	7	2	3	25.97	7	7	0	2	21.35
Budaun	9	7	1	2	19.26	9	3	0	1	7.49	9	8	2	1	20.88	8	7	4	0	32.24
Bulandshahr	10	6	0	4	8.89	10	7	1	5	9.31	10	9	1	5	12.28	10	10	2	6	15.83
Dehra Dun	2	1	0	1	6.65	3	2	0	1	16.22	3	2	0	1	13.81	2	2	0	1	23.48
Deoria	15	10	0	10	6.60	14	7	0	6	7.27	14	10	0	4	13.31	13	13	0	5	18.45
Etah	8	8	0	3	16.83	8	7	0	3	15.08	8	7	4	2	19.99	8	8	1	0	26.74
Etawah						7	6	1	5	10.11	7	7	0	5	12.45	7	7	1	3	19.47
Faizabad	11	5	0	4	4.64	10	7	0	4	12.35	10	8	2	3	18.28	10	10	1	5	18.84
Farrukhabad	7	4	0	3	6.44	7	6	0	4	14.94	7	6	1	2	17.43	7	7	3	0	29.84
Fatehpur	5	2	0	1	3.83	6	5	0	5	8.16	6	5	1	4	13.23	6	6	0	4	14.40
Garhwal						5	1	0	0	4.37	5	2	0	2	3.67	5	4	0	3	11.02
Ghazipur	8	1	0	1	0.75	8	4	0	4	3.95	8	8	0	7	6.67	8	8	0	7	11.20
Gonda	11	7	1	2	18.15	13	8	3	1	22.03	13	12	4	2	28.92	12	8	5	1	28.57
Gorakhpur	16	8	0	5	7.29	15	9	0	9	4.01	15	11	0	10	7.84	15	13	2	7	14.74
Hamirpur						5	1	0	0	2.76	5	5	0	5	5.43	5	4	4	0	41.50
Hardoi	9	7	0	4	12.62	9	7	1	0	22.65	9	9	4	0	34.49	9	9	3	1	26.73
Jalaun						4	2	0	1	6.15	4	4	0	4	5.95	4	4	1	0	33.15
Jaunpur	11	10	0	7	11.74	10	8	1	5	15.53	10	8	3	0	30.02	10	10	1	1	32.42

	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
UTTAR PRADESH (continued)																				
Jhansi	6	2	0	2	2.07	6	1	0	0	4.07	6	6	0	5	12.07	6	6	2	2	26.43
Kanpur	13	4	0	4	3.18	13	4	0	4	2.14	13	12	0	11	8.58	14	14	1	9	15.71
Kheri	6	5	0	3	10.94	7	7	2	3	29.97	7	7	2	3	26.57	7	7	4	1	34.55
Lucknow	8	4	0	1	8.16	8	4	0	0	11.77	8	8	1	2	28.71	8	7	3	0	26.39
Mainpuri	7	5	0	4	7.92	7	3	1	1	6.40	7	7	0	6	8.07	7	7	1	4	13.58
Mathura	6	5	0	4	9.34	6	5	0	2	13.89	6	5	0	2	19.06	6	6	1	3	15.74
Meerut	15	9	0	8	4.68	15	9	0	5	8.69	15	10	0	7	8.58	15	12	1	8	11.90
Mirzapur	7	3	0	2	5.70	7	5	2	1	27.75	7	7	1	1	31.84	7	7	2	0	39.64
Moradabad	11	5	0	4	4.83	11	6	0	2	10.59	11	11	0	4	20.59	11	10	1	6	19.07
Muzaffarnagar	8	4	0	4	5.61	8	6	0	5	9.81	8	6	0	4	8.24	8	6	0	5	6.64
Naini Tal	2	2	0	2	7.12	3	2	0	2	6.03	3	3	0	3	7.07	3	2	0	1	9.45
Pilibhit	4	3	0	2	9.25	3	3	0	2	13.56	3	3	0	1	22.02	4	4	2	1	22.87
Pratapgarh	8	2	0	2	2.15	8	1	0	0	2.99	8	7	3	2	31.14	7	7	0	6	11.63
Rae Bareli	8	4	0	3	6.75	8	6	1	2	15.29	8	7	2	3	19.48	8	8	0	5	19.03
Rampur	4	2	0	0	16.59	4	2	0	2	3.53	4	3	0	0	20.25	4	3	0	0	18.04
Saharanpur	9	4	0	4	3.02	9	7	0	5	8.03	9	9	0	5	12.79	10	7	0	4	10.17
Shahjahanpur	7	1	0	1	1.30	7	3	0	3	4.07	7	6	0	5	9.70	6	6	1	4	17.41
Sitapur	9	8	0	6	13.04	9	7	1	4	13.88	9	9	5	0	38.05	9	9	6	0	33.42
Sultanpur	9	5	0	4	8.52	9	4	1	2	8.14	9	9	0	2	22.51	8	8	3	1	37.16
Tehri Garhwal											3	3	0	3	9.09	3	3	0	3	10.90
Unnao	7	2	0	1	4.60	7	2	0	1	4.98	7	7	0	3	14.80	7	7	2	2	22.50
Varanasi	13	7	0	6	7.09	13	7	0	4	7.66	13	11	1	5	13.64	13	13	3	5	20.36
Total	430	210	2	153	6.44	430	235	17	133	9.77	430	377	49	192	16.46	425	401	98	150	21.67

District	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total Seats	Jana Sangh				Total Seats	Jana Sangh				Total Seats	Jana Sangh				Total Seats	Jana Sangh			
		Cont	Won	LD	%		Cont	Won	LD	%		Cont	Won	LD	%		Cont	Won	LD	%
WEST BENGAL																				
Bankura	14	2	0	0	2.48											13	5	0	5	2.63
Birbhum						10	1	0	1	0.36										
Burdwan	20	8	0	6	4.87	21	5	0	5	0.64						25	3	0	3	0.38
Calcutta	26	11	0	11	3.47	26	3	0	3	0.68	26	6	0	6	0.71	23	9	0	6	5.84
Darjeeling						5	1	0	1	1.97						5	2	0	2	2.08
Hooghly	14	4	0	1	5.30											18	2	0	2	0.26
Howrah	16	10	0	10	2.63	15	1	0	1	0.65	15	5	0	5	1.87	16	2	0	1	1.19
Jalpaiguri																11	1	0	1	0.12
Malda						9	1	0	1	1.38	9	2	0	2	0.70	10	1	0	1	1.38
Midnapur	35	18	8	5	12.68	32	13	0	10	4.19	32	3	0	3	0.23	35	4	0	4	0.29
Murshidabad	16	1	0	1	0.21											18	1	0	1	0.64
Nadia	10	4	0	3	7.76	11	1	0	1	0.39	11	4	0	4	0.93	14	3	0	3	0.63
Purulia																11	11	0	10	5.96
24 Parganas	40	26	1	23	9.17	42	7	0	7	0.66	42	5	0	4	0.72	50	14	1	13	1.03
West Dinajpur	8	1	0	0	1.36															
Total	250	85	9	60	5.31	252	33	0	30	0.98	252	25	0	24	0.45	280	58	1	52	1.33
UNION TERRITORIES																				
Chandigarh (f)	1	1	0	1	2.81						1	1	0	1	12.18					
Delhi (g)	48	31	5	4	21.88															
Himachal Pradesh (h)	50	18	0	14	6.82	12	5	0	5	2.93	13	9	0	9	6.50	60	33	7	13	13.87
Tripura																30	5	0	5	0.35

Notes:

General: Constituencies have been adjusted to conform to district and state alignment in 1967. As a rule of thumb, constituency has been assigned to district in which locality giving name to constituency is located. Totals do not always conform to totals in Election Commission reports as several errors have been identified. Only districts in which Jana Sangh has contested have been listed; hence, figure in total seats column may not add. LD = deposits lost.

(a) Districts marked * in Andhra Pradesh voted in 1955 rather than 1957.

(b) Haryana: In PEPSU Mid-Term election, 1954, Jana Sangh in Mahendragarh: 9–4–0–3–5.19.

(c) Jammu and Kashmir: Figures for 1957 and 1962 are for Praja Parishad.

(d) Kerala: Figures for 1954 are for Travincore-Cochin 1954 Mid-Term election. Jana Sangh did not contest 1952 or 1957.

(e) Punjab: In 1954 PEPSU Mid-Term election following for Jana Sangh: Bhatinda: 12–1–0–1–0.14; Kapurthala: 4–2–0–2–3.69; Patiala· 13–2–0–2–0.34; Sangrur: 13–2–0–2–0.46.

(f) Chandigarh: Indicates Punjab MLAs in 1952 and 1962.

(g) Delhi: No assembly in 1957 and 1962.

(h) Himachal Pradesh: Includes seats transferred from Punjab in 1952 and only such seats in 1957 and 1962 as there was no assembly.

APPENDIX III

JANA SANGH ELECTION RESULTS FOR LOK SABHA SEATS BY STATES

State	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh				Total	Jana Sangh			
	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%	Seats	Cont	Won	LD	%
Andhra Pradesh						43	1	0	1	0.04	43	8	0	8	1.17	41	6	0	5	1.44
Assam	12	2	0	1	3.64											14	3	0	2	5.48
Bihar	53	2	0	2	0.42	53	2	0	1	0.08	53	13	0	11	2.34	53	48	1	35	11.05
Gujarat											22	5	0	5	1.44					
Haryana	9	5	0	4	7.41	8	6	0	1	22.75	8	8	3	4	23.42	9	7	1	2	19.85
Jammu and Kashmir																6	2	0	0	18.83
Kerala											18	4	0	4	0.68	19	4	0	4	1.39
Madhya Pradesh	38	11	0	4	5.92	36	21	0	6	13.96	36	28	3	13	17.87	37	32	10	4	29.56
Madras																39	4	0	4	0.22
Maharashtra	42	4	0	2	2.01	44	7	2	1	4.73	44	17	0	13	4.40	45	26	0	19	7.36
Mysore	25	4	0	4	2.22	26	5	0	4	2.48	26	7	0	6	2.68	27	5	0	3	2.25
Orissa																20	2	0	2	0.55
Punjab	13	5	0	5	3.05	12	10	0	5	13.32	12	9	0	6	11.39	13	8	1	3	12.49
Rajasthan	22	4	1	2	3.67	22	7	0	0	11.10	22	11	1	4	9.28	23	7	3	1	10.27
Uttar Pradesh	86	41	0	23	7.29	86	61	2	30	14.79	86	74	7	33	17.57	85	77	12	22	22.58
West Bengal	36	6	2	0	5.59	36	5	0	3	1.43	36	4	0	4	1.05	40	7	0	6	1.39
UNION TERRITORIES																				
Chandigarh																1	1	1	0	48.70
Dadra and Nagar Haveli																1	1	0	1	4.09
Delhi	4	3	0	0	25.92	5	5	0	2	19.72	5	5	0	0	32.66	7	7	6	0	46.72
Himachal Pradesh	5	3	0	1	13.66						6	2	0	2	0.94	6	3	0	0	19.06
Tripura	2	2	0	2	6.14															
Total	489	92	3	51	3.06	494	130	4	54	5.93	494	195	14	113	6.44	520	250	35	113	9.41

APPENDIX IV

A NOTE ON CASTE

It is frequently alleged that the Jana Sangh is a "high caste" party. The allegation probably fits all parties, except, of course, the Republican Party (formerly Scheduled Caste Federation). The development of India is such that the more senior political leadership continues to be drawn from the educated Brahmin, Rajput, Bania and Kayastha castes in North India and their equivalents elsewhere. A detailed study down to the state level has not been made of the caste composition of the Jana Sangh leadership. The following, however, gives the caste of the members of the working committee. The names are given in the order listed in Appendix I. "D" indicates the information is doubtful while "A" indicates the individual is an Arya Sanajist. The information has been supplied by several Jana Sangh leaders.

Brahmins: M. C. Sharma, Upadhyaya, Trivedi, Dwivedi, R. K. Shukla, Sohni, Shastri, Oke, Deshmukh, Vajpayee, Jha, Pandya, Mhalgi, Joshi, Dogra, Iyer, Vyas, Y. D. Sharma (A), Paranjpe, Rajagopalach-arya, Dubey, Rajagopalan, Mishra, Pandit, Suklekar, Banarji, Parmes-waran (D).

Rajputs: Shekawat, Gohil (D), Mengi (possibly Khattri), Singh Deo

Khattri (Punjab Kshatriya (?) caste): Mahavir (A), Ram Dev (A), Vaid (A), Madhok (A), Bajaj (D), Chander (A), Kishen Lal (A), Kapur (A), Mrs. Madhok (A), Sahni (A), Talwar.

Nair (Kerala Kshatriya (?) caste): N. N. Menon, P. M. Menon.

Maratha (Maharashtra Kshatriya (?) caste): Patil.

Bania (or Vaishya): Goel (A), Pitti, Bhandari (Jain), Mehta, Pitamber Das, Raghu Vira (A), Saklecha, Agarwal (Jain).

Kayastha: Shrivastava, Ghosh, Mathur, Bose, Thakur Prasad, Bharati, Thakre (D), Ramprasad Das.

Jat: Chettan Singh (Sikh), Harendra Singh, Mukhtiar Singh (A).

Sindhi Non-Brahmin: H. Advani, Wadhwani, L. K. Advani.

Scheduled Caste: Verma.

My North Indian informants were unable to identify the caste of the other members, principally from the South Indian group. The above is not definitive. Probably others are also from the Arya Samaj, including Trivedi and Vajpayee.

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
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
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Index



JANA SANGH - 1957
Parliamentary and Assembly Seats Won
MMU AND KASHMIR
HIMACHAL PRADESH
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
Parliamentary Seats ■
Assembly Seats ●


JANA SANGH - 1957
Percentage of Popular Vote
Polled in Assembly Contests
By Districts
(Andhra Region, 1955)
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
MANIPUR
LEGEND
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE
0
1
5
10
20
30
50
100

In Madhya Pradesh, the Jana Sangh contested 21 of the 36 Lok Sabha seats and polled 13.96 per cent of the vote. It won no seats but reduced its forfeiture of deposits to six. Trivedi ran in the Mandsaur seat, having yielded the Chittorgarh, Rajasthan, seat from which he won in 1952 to another Jana Sangh candidate. Although he lost, three of the seven Jana Sangh candidates in the assembly constituencies comprising the Mandsaur Lok Sabha seat won their assembly seats. Both he and Ramchandra V. Bade from Khargone ran second to their Congress opponents and both won the seats in 1962. The Jana Sangh did not oppose Praja Socialist leader Hari Vishnu Kamath in Hoshangabad, Mahasabha organizing secretary Hardayal Devgun in Bhopal or Mahasabha general secretary V. G. Deshpande in Guna. Devgun and Deshpande later joined the Jana Sangh. Sita Ram Goel, a frequent contributor to *Organiser*, contested unsuccessfully from Khujaraho. The Congress won 35 of the 36 Lok Sabha seats. The other went to Brij Narayan Brajesh of the Mahasabha who was also unopposed by the Jana Sangh.

The Jana Sangh contested 127 of the 288 assembly seats, won ten and had 64 candidates lose deposits. The party won 9.88 per cent of the vote. The seats were all won in the former Madhya Bharat area (eight) and the former Vindhya Pradesh area (two). Four districts of the state gave the Jana Sangh more than one-third of the votes: Shajapur, Mandsaur, Nimar (Khargone) and Dewas. The party won three seats in Shajapur and Mandsaur and one each in Nimar (Khargone) and Dewas. All these districts were in Madhya Bharat before the states reorganization. Vimal Kumar Chordia, who became leader of the party in the assembly, and Virendra Kumar Saklecha, who became leader after 1962 and a minister in 1967, were returned from Mandsaur District. Bade was upset in his bid for re-election to the assembly from Nimar (Khargone) District.

In Rajasthan, the party contested only seven of the 22 Lok Sabha seats, winning none, but losing no deposits, while polling 11.10 per cent of the vote. For the assembly the Jana Sangh contested only 47 of the 176 seats, winning six, losing 26 deposits and polling 5.42 per cent of the vote, a decline in both seats won and percentage of vote from 1952. However, three key Jana

Sanghis were elected to the assembly and contributed greatly to the quality of the opposition in the state. Bhairon Singh Shekawat was re-elected from Sikar District and was joined by party secretary, Jagdish Prasad Mathur, from the same district.[14] Satish Chandra Agarwal, currently Jana Sangh president in Rajasthan, was elected from Jaipur city. Kotah was the strongest district for the party. There it polled more than 30 per cent of the vote and won two seats. In Udaipur and Chittorgarh the party also polled more than 10 per cent but won no seats. In all three districts, located adjacent to each other in the southeastern corner of the state, the Jana Sangh built a base from which to grow in 1962 and 1967.

Punjab was both a failure and an improvement for the party. Again the party failed to do well in Lok Sabha contests, but, drawing on the urban Hindu vote it won nine seats in the assembly. The party contested 16 of the 22 Lok Sabha seats and gained 16.04 per cent of the vote. With the exception of Delhi this was the highest percentage polled in any state by the Jana Sangh. In Amritsar, party stalwart Kishen Lal ran a strong race against the president of the Pradesh Congress Committee, Giani Gurumukh Singh Musafir, finishing second in the contest ahead of the Communist candidate Sohan Singh Josh. In Mahendragarh District the Jana Sangh won all three seats it contested and polled more than one-third of the vote. Three candidates who won in 1957, were prominent in the assembly and won also in 1962 and 1967 were Balram Das Tandon, Baldev Prakash of Amritsar, and Mangal Sein of Rohtak. Former Mahasabhite Keshab Chander was defeated in an Amritsar city constituency. The party also won single seats in Jullundur, Ludhiana and Ferozepur urban constituencies.

Pursuant to the abolition of the Delhi Legislative Assembly elections were held only for the five Lok Sabha seats. The Jana Sangh contested all five, won none and lost two deposits while polling 19.72 per cent of the vote. Madhok finished a distant second to Mrs. Kripalani, who was now the Congress candidate. In Chandni Chowk, Vasantrao Oke also finished second as did Shyam

[14] There are two persons with the name Jagdish Prasad Mathur in the leadership of the Jana Sangh. The Rajasthan member is not to be confused with the office secretary of the party who is also a member of the working committee and is from Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.

New Age also reacted to the increase of the vote for the "Right," though with shock and concern:

> What should really shock all Congressmen is the grim fact that in eight [sic] states of the Union, their leadership has adopted such a course that the reactionary Right has acquired the status of the main opposition and in the nation's Parliament their representation has increased more than ever before.[21]

Finally, from one of India's leading independent weekly journals, "There is no vote for socialism in the results of this election." Commenting specifically on the Jana Sangh rise, the journal wrote:

> It is the Jana Sangh again that promises, because of its militant and disciplined character, a far greater opposition to the Congress in the years to come. One might or might not like this particular expression of opinion of the Hindi electorate but it is undoubtedly a force of great importance which needs quickly to be evaluated.[22]

It must be said that each of the editorial comments quoted here were reproduced in *Organiser* and thus illustrate what the Jana Sangh liked to have said about its performance. It must also be said, however, that similar views were expressed to the writer by politicians of a wide range of parties and personal convictions. They were accompanied by reactions ranging from genuine pleasure to unabashed horror at the prospect of the "communal" Jana Sangh.

The Hindi-speaking Areas

One commentator on the 1962 elections suggests the possibility of a long-range decline in the strength of the Congress Party in the Hindi-speaking "Prussia" of India.[23] This "Prussia" included the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Haryana, and the Union Territory of Delhi. On Lok Sabha constituencies the Congress vote in this area dropped from 48.03 percent in 1957 to 39.89 percent in 1962 and the party lost 30 Lok Sabha seats compared with a gain of 20 outside the area. The emergence

[21] *New Age*, March 11, 1962, quoted *ibid.*
[22] *Eastern Economist*, March 2, 1962, quoted *ibid.*
[23] Surinder Suri, *1962 Elections, a Political Analysis* (New Delhi, Sudha Publications, 1962), p. 58.

of the Swatantra Party accounted for some of the decline as Swatantra polled 8.98 percent of the vote. It is difficult to compare 1962 with 1957 so far as Swatantra is concerned as the party did not exist in 1957 although some of its constituents contested. In Bihar it took over and expanded the Janata Party but in the other states it molded together a mixture of former Congressmen, previously non-political groups and zamindars and rulers. The Jana Sangh expanded its share of the vote from 11.76 percent to 13.77 percent. Thus together Jana Sangh and Swatantra perhaps accounted largely for the Congress decline. The Jana Sangh gained 12 seats. The Communist Party registered a small gain and the Praja Socialist Party received a considerable setback which may have been offset by an apparent increase in the polling for the Socialist Party led by Ram Manohar Lohia. Lohia's party was not recognized in 1957, and, although the number of seats won by the party can be ascertained, the complete list of candidates cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy. Throughout the area the Jana Sangh captured 35 votes for each 100 Congress votes in 1962 compared with but 25 per hundred in 1957. The very poor Jana Sangh showing in Bihar and a relatively weak performance in Rajasthan kept the Jana Sangh index at 35 rather than near 50 if these two states were not included. On the other hand it is in these two states that Swatantra made its best showing. In each state one or the other of the two parties emerged as the strongest contender with Congress and each became the official opposition in two states. The collapse of the Swatantra Party in Bihar altered this position.

The importance of the Jana Sangh in the Hindi-speaking areas *vis-a-vis* Congress was clear but there was another side which must be mentioned. This was the overwhelming dominance of the northern areas in the Jana Sangh itself. The efforts to expand the party in Maharashtra and in the south and to revive it in West Bengal, while they paid some dividends in making the party better known, did not materially effect the great preponderance of the north. In 1957 half of the four Lok Sabha seats won came from outside the Hindi-speaking areas and in 1952 two of three were from West Bengal. In each election special factors were operating: Mookerjee's personal attraction in 1952 and the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti in